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Thesis Summary 
 
This thesis provides an explanation of one RMA issue: the effectiveness of contemporary 
military technology against tough geography, based upon case studies in the Korean 
peninsula. The originality of the thesis is that it will provide a sound insight for potential foes’ 
approach to the dominant US military power (superior technology and sustenance of war). 
The North Korean defence strategy – using their edge in geography and skill – tried to protect 
themselves from the dominant US power, but it may be impossible to deter or defeat them 
with technological superiority alone. This research also provides a valuable example, through 
Stephen Biddle’s technology and skill theory, which claims that, in the future of war, the 
skills of the unit (tactical readiness) are as important as the technology involved. 
 
By examining three case studies, the thesis aims to reveal that technological 
superiority alone cannot guarantee military success against the foe that possesses the 
geographic advantage and the capability to use its benefits. The first case study of the Imjin 
Wars will examine the significance of geography and capability to using the geographic edge 
in the Korean peninsula. The second case study of the Korean War will examine how 
technology alone failed to overcome the skilled and geographically advantageous defenders 
in modern warfare. Finally, by examining possible conflict scenarios of US-ROK alliance and 
North Korea, this research will seek to prove that contemporary military technology alone 
would not guarantee military success and deterrence against North Korea, which is both 
geographically advantaged and highly skilled.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
The initial idea for this project came from the transformed military strategy that both the 
Koreans and the US implemented in response to the rapid change of the Korean peninsula’s 
security circumstance at the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War, North Korea had to 
acclimate itself to the less warm relationship with Russia
1
 and China. As a consequence, they 
suffered an economic crisis and major setbacks in their warfare capability, since they were 
not able to introduce new weaponry and train their forces properly for offensive purposes. On 
the other hand, even though ROK (Republic of Korea) suffered an economic crisis in 1997, it 
recovered quickly and enjoyed steady economic growth, which enabled it to produce more 
modernized and technologically advanced armed forces. Along with the economic growth 
that gave them a financial basis to improve their military forces, the ROK was prompted 
towards modernized and technology-centred armed forces due to their contemporary security 
circumstances.  
 
Firstly, ROK will recuperate war time operation command in 2015.
2
 Secondly, they have 
started to protect their national interest not only within the Korean peninsula but also along 
its outside. Under these circumstances, military authorities were urged to update independent 
and long-range operations capabilities. The ROK proposed two grand threats in the Defence 
White Paper of 2004. It suggested “the direct military threat” which was conventional 
weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and front-line troop disposition of North 
Korea. In addition to the direct military threat, unspecified threats were added. Terrorism, 
                                                          
1 The Soviet Union and North Korea formed an alliance in July, 1961, which included The Mutual 
Military Aid clause but this treaty ceased in September, 1985 after the Cold War ended, allowing 
Russia and ROK to establish formal diplomatic relationship in 1990. 
2 The ROK forces’ operation command was handed to the UNC (United Nation Command) during the 
Korean War (14
th 
of July, 1950). Even though the peace time operation command recuperated in 
December, 1994, wartime command still belongs to the UNC. The significance of wartime command 
recuperation was not just restricted to the recovery of operation command independence. The ROK 
government will be required to improve their forces’ quality especially in the weaker areas to achieve 
independent operation. Even though they possessed massive military power, there was a lack of 
information on warfare capability due to heavy US reliance. The modernization of forces to operate 
independently will be carried out for next few years.  
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WMD expansion and regional instability were mentioned as unspecified threats; however, 
due to their concern at friction with neighbouring countries, the ROK did not mention their 
neighbouring countries as a future threat. However, in The Navy and Air Force Vision of 
2025 which mentions the ROK’s future objectives, strategy, tactic and force improvement 
plan, it was stated that protecting the national interest involved securing the Sea Lane Of 
Communication (SLOC), the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Fishing Protection Zone, 
the Continental Shelf, and the disputed Dok-Do island, which are vital to national security. 
This means their operations range will need to expand by at least 300-500km away from 
coastlines and borders. Although they are hesitant to speak of such matters directly, the ROK 
recognizes neighbouring countries as future threats to the pursuit of their national interests. 
Therefore, the ROK military authorities are also preparing and building up military strategy 
and capabilities against regional powers. Accordingly, their transformation to technology 
centred forces has progressed significantly in recent years.  
 
The USFK (United States Forces Korea) has also transformed their strategy according to the 
GPR (Global Posture Review) and Flexibility agreement, which obviously aimed to 
transform their strategy in this area to a more technologically-centred one.
3
 Consequently, the 
Korean peninsula is experiencing the biggest disparity in military technology since the 
Korean War. Much research is on-going regarding how the technological disparity itself may 
affect possible Korean peninsula conflicts, but most of the research is focused on the area of a 
possible North Korean invasion of the South and its defence. However, there is no guarantee 
that this will be the only possible conflict; the strategist has to research the entire gamut of 
possible situations and prepare solutions to meet the needs of whatever situation may arise. 
During the First North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the US prepared a surgical operation to 
the suspicious North Korean nuclear site (Yongbyon) similar to an operation performed in 
Libya (1986).
4
 
 
                                                          
3  See) Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture, September 2004 
4
 The former ROK president Kim Yongsam gave testimony to the SBS radio (Seoul, ROK) on 13
th
 of 
April, 2009 that there were 33 US battleships and 2 air craft carriers in the East Sea to bombard 
Yongbyon during the first crisis, and he phoned the US president (Bill Clinton) to avoid all-out war 
with North Korea which he believed led to the US decision not to bombard Yongbyon.    
11 
 
Firstly, one needs to look at the deterrence side of Korean peninsula security. North Korea 
started to adopt an asymmetric warfare strategy using WMDs, most notably surface-to-
surface missiles (SSM) and long-range artillery, from the beginning of the 1980’s. The 
missiles and long-range artillery were not easy to intercept and left devastating effects on the 
South once launched. In addition, the proliferation of those technologies and the increased 
range of missiles would become a direct threat to US security. This became a huge security 
burden to the US-ROK alliance. Under these circumstances, the US-ROK alliance requires 
the capability to neutralize such weapons before being launched. In turn, this capability will 
become a necessary element of North Korean deterrence, since it will debilitate the efficiency 
of North Korean military strategy. Considering the beneficial effects of deterrence, the US-
ROK alliance should not rule out an offensive (pre-emptive strike) against North Korea  
 
Secondly, it may be the case that the US-ROK alliance has to launch an offensive due to 
sudden changes in North Korea. At present, the US-ROK alliance has reportedly been 
engaged in discussion to flesh out OPLAN 5029; the ROK-US Combined Forces Command 
(CFC) operation plan to prepare for sudden changes in North Korea (Contingency plan). 
Based on the various statements given by Walter Sharp (The Chief of USFK), the operation 
plan currently under discussion by the ROK and the US includes plans for a military 
operation in response to five or six scenarios of upheaval in North Korea.  These include: the 
outflow of nuclear weapons or other WMDs, a civil war resulting from a regime change or 
coup d’état, a South Korean hostage incident within North Korea, a large scale defection of 
North Korean residents, or a large scale natural disaster.
5
 Consequently, this operation plan 
also considers the possibility of an offensive against the North Korean state.   
 
Thirdly, in the case that the US-ROK alliance launches an all-out offensive, the all-out war 
plan (OPLAN 5027) has been developed by the ROK-US CFC. After the OPLAN 5026, an 
all-out war scenario reform (5027-94) was created since the North could retaliate, escalating 
the conflict to an all-out war. The all-out war operation plan (OPLAN 5027) experienced 
significant transformation in 1994 and has been updated every two years since that time (96, 
98, 00, 02, 04, 06, and 08). Unlike previous issues which concentrated on how to defend the 
territory once the North launched the offensive, OPLAN 5027-98 is a much more offensive-
minded plan, outlining a pre-emptive attack if North Korea showed unmistakable signs of 
                                                          
5
 The Hankyore (Seoul), 2
nd
 of November, 2009 
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preparing to strike. It also includes a detailed operation plan to achieve the ultimate goal of 
abolishing North Korea as a functioning state – ending the rule of its leader (Kim Jongil), and 
reorganizing the country under the ROK control – as well as strategies for manoeuvring 
warfare north of the Demilitarized Zone and countering a sudden chemical and biological 
attack against Seoul. Based on the Iraq Freedom Operation success and further developments 
in Missile Defence (MD) especially sensor technology, OPLAN 5027-04 added new plans 
using the latest development of airpower and sensor technology to respond to North Korean 
missile launching or possible invasion without waiting for many ground forces to arrive. The 
latest OPLAN 5027-08 contained a minor correction of the plan due to the wartime command 
takeover.
6
 Based on the development of OPLAN 5027, it is quite apparent that the ROK-US 
CFC’s all-out war plan has developed in a way which is elaborate, aggressive, and which 
uses their technological dominance.  
 
Michael O’Hanlon insisted in his book, “Defence Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era” that pre-
emptive use of force by the US-ROK alliances against North Korea seems very unlikely. 
Consequently, the United States should reduce its conventional commitment in the Korean 
peninsula. O’Hanlon argues that the North Korean front line and military headquarters are 
well protected, and any pre-emptive action would trigger “a massive retaliation from the 
North”; there is no easy access of approach to Pyongyang; and the number of active duty 
NKPA is large and loyal, and will not “melt away like the Saddam’s Iraqi forces.”7 As 
O’Hanlon observes, due to the immense cost and casualties they would suffer, the US-ROK 
alliance would not pre-empt North Korea. 
 
However, the US-ROK alliance feared the potentially devastating effect of North Korea’s 
asymmetric strategy and possible proliferation of their arsenal and technology. Therefore, the 
US-ROK alliance has been preparing the offensive strategy and the North Korean was 
warned  by the ROK government  that North Korea be facing military action if there were  
further provocation. Therefore, even though the US-ROK alliance wants to avoid the pre-
                                                          
6
 Excerpted and analysed from- Global Security; OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War–West, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm (Accessed on the 2
nd
 of November, 2009) 
7
 M.E. O’Hanlon, Defence Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era, Washington, D.C, Brookings Institution 
Press, 2005, p.100-101 
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emptive action and following offensive, this is the conflict scenario that still exists in the 
Korean peninsula.   
 
Whereas the NKPA was pursuing Soviet Union style military strategy, which involved    
breaking through to the front and eventually advancing to Seoul via a massive artillery 
support and mechanized power, the US-ROK alliance’s main military strategy was to defend 
them in the North of Seoul which was clearly reflected in OPLA 5027-74.  
 
However, the problem arose when North Korea proposed the idea of asymmetric warfare 
following their realization that they could no longer compete with the South in an arms race. 
The first point to consider is that the Seoul metropolitan area is located near the cease-fire 
line and the depth of Korean peninsula is relatively short. Secondly, North Korea possessed 
an elaborate military industry due to their self-reliance ideology. Therefore, the North started 
to develop and deploy WMDs, which became their main means of asymmetric warfare 
beginning in the middle of 1980s. Most notably, their missiles and nuclear weapon 
development plan became an international issue, brining about the first nuclear crisis in 1994.  
At this point, the US-ROK CFC drafted OPLAN 5026 and OPLAN 5027-94. Both OPLANs 
included offensive elements unlike the previous ones. However, due to two previous ROK 
administrations’ peaceful and diplomatic approaches to North Korea (Sunshine policy), the 
ROK military authorities were reluctant to confirm that a pre-emptive strike or planned 
offensive was part of their official military strategy.  
 
The incumbent administration adopted the "non-nuclear, openness, 3000"
8
 as their inter- 
Korea policy. This was pragmatic and reciprocal. Kim Jongun, who was appointed as the 
designated successor to Kim Jongil, wanted to bolster his military credentials.
9
 Thus the 
tension between the North and South started to rise again. There was the sinking of the 
battleship Chonan on 26
th
 of March, 2010, the bombardment of Yeonpyong Island on 23
rd
 of 
November, 2010, and the change of the ROM minister of National defence on 4
th
 of 
                                                          
8
 If North Korea declared the denuclearization and opened the gate, the South would help them to 
reach 3000 US dollar per capita income in ten years. Excerpted from-  Hanguk Gyongjae (Seoul, 
ROK), 20
th 
of January, 2009 
9
 ABC News (New York, United States), 26
th
 of November, 2010  
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December, 2010.
10
 As a result, the level of official comment from the ROK government had 
been seriously raised. The ROK minister of National Defence, Kim Taeyong, mentioned on 
the 20
th
 of January, 2010 at an open forum (Subject: National Defence Reform and the 
Prospect of South and North Korea Relations) that, “even though there has been a debate on 
the lawfulness of pre-emptive strike, due to the severe damage caused once the North Korean 
nuclear weapons are launched, if there is an obvious sign of North Korean nuclear attack, we 
will pre-empt suspicious targets”.11 This comment officially confirmed that ROK would pre-
empt the North Korean WMDs targets if there is an obvious signs of attack, which was also 
the spine of OPLAN 5026. In addition, after the Yonpyong Bombardment, Kim Taeyong was 
replaced by the hardliner Kim Kwanjin.
12
 In his inaugural speech on 4
th
 of December, 2010, 
he declared that 1) ROK was experiencing the worst crisis after the Korean War, 2) They 
needed to react strongly and immediately against the North Korean provocation and must 
continue until North Korea yielded completely, 3) They did not like war but would not be 
afraid of wage it against the North. The second comment in his inaugural speech, confirms 
that once the North attacked them, they would retaliate immediately and break down the 
North Korean regime in the end, the core of OPLAN 5027-94. However, the most significant 
comment is the third. In this comment, he officially declared that ROK would consider the 
offensive to North Korea as a possible conflict scenario unlike two previous administrations 
who had not been eager to comment on this matter.  
 
The offensive scenario, including pre-emptive strike and all-out war was emerged after the 
North Korean asymmetric threat (WMDs) became a reality. It did not become an official 
policy due to two previous administration’s peaceful approach to inter-Korea relationship. 
However, after the Yonpyong Bombardment and Sinking of the Chonan battleship, those 
                                                          
10
 The Chonnan sinking cost the lives of 46 soldiers and the Yonpyong bombardment was the first 
direct attack on the South territory. It caused the first civilian casualties after the armistice in 1953.  
11
 Jungang Ilbo (Seoul), 10
th
 of January, 2010 
12
 After the incident on Yonpyong Island, the ROK government was asked why there was no air-strike 
on North Korea's coastal artillery positions. Kim Taeyong replied that such an airstrike risked 
prompting a "full-blown war". Excerpted from- ABC News (New York, United States), 26
th
 of 
November, 2010 His comment was heavily criticized and he was quickly replaced by the hardline 
minister. It also shows that the ROK government would no longer tolerate the North Korean 
provocation and considered the offensive as the possible option.   
15 
 
offensive scenarios no longer existed in the document alone and became an official policy by 
incumbent government. 
 
However, the question remains as to whether the technologically advanced US-ROK joint 
force could achieve a successful and decisive strike against the North Korean defence, once 
they have launched the offensive. In the history of the Korean peninsula, the potent Chinese 
and Japanese expedition forces in many cases suffered because of the Korean defenders who 
used their geographic edge.
13
 During the Korean War stalemate, the technologically advanced 
US forces also struggled to achieve their limited target (Dominant Hill) against the 
communist forces that were able to use the Korean peninsula’s geographic advantage.14 
Moreover, in contemporary warfare, especially in Afghanistan where the mountainous 
topography is as dominant a feature of the landscape as the Korean Peninsula, the 
technologically advanced NATO forces are struggling against Al-Qaeda, which has the 
capability to use their knowledge of the local geography to their advantage. Consequently, it 
would be rash to assume that technological dominance alone would lead to military success 
against the North Korean defenders who have a similar advantage.  
 
Methodology and literature review 
 
This thesis will adopt Stephen Biddle’s works as the conceptual base to examine the core 
claim of the research: military technology alone may not result in successful outcome in war 
once the defender is skilled enough to maximize their geographic defensive edge. In addition, 
it will also rely on Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” which indicated the importance of geographic 
dimensions of war in the orient. Biddle insisted in his writings after the First Gulf War (1991) 
that the skill imbalance between the Coalition and Iraqi forces enhanced the efficiency of 
military technology and broke down the Iraqi regime easily.
15
 After a careful review of the 
                                                          
13
 Detailed research on traditional Korean peninsula defensive warfare strategy will be given in 
Chapter 3.  
14
 The concrete analysis of positional warfare to capture the dominant hill during the stalemate of 
Korean War will be given in Chapter 5. 
15 See) S. Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict, 
International Security, 21(2): Fall, 1996, p.139-179 
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Afghan campaign, Biddle published additional writings and insisted that in the early phase of 
war, when the NATO forces met the inexperienced and less skilled Taliban, due to the skill 
imbalance, they enjoyed a technological advantage. In the later phase of war when the skilled 
and resolute Al-Qaeda fighters were introduced, the NATO forces were struggling to 
maximize the technological advantage and the significance of skill stood out.
16
 In other words, 
Biddle analyses contemporary Afghan and other campaigns and insists that the offender’s 
superiority of technology and its efficiency will depend upon the defender’s capability of 
using their geographic edge. 
 
In the contemporary Korean peninsula, a few military agreements and operation plans 
between the US and ROK such as OPLAN 5026, 5027, 5029, GPR, Flexibility Agreement, 
Wartime command takeover clearly show that they have transformed their strategy to a 
technology-centred one. According to their military doctrine, North Korea has improved their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
S. Biddle, M. Fischerkeller, and W. Hinkle, Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare, Joint Force 
Quarterly, 22: Summer, 1999, p.18-27 
S. Biddle, The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare,” Security Studies, 8(1): Fall, 
1998, p.1-74 
S. Biddle, Chapter 7 in Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2004 
S. Biddle, The Gulf Debate Redux: Why Skill and Technology are the Right Answer, International 
Security, 22(2): Fall, 1997, p.163-174 
16 Referred Biddle’s works are  
 S. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle 
S. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2): March/April 2003, p.31-46. 
S. Biddle, M. Fischerkeller, and W. Hinkle, The Interaction of Skill and Technology in Combat, 
Military Operations Research, 7(1): 2002, p.39-56. 
S. Biddle, Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory, Journal of Politics, 63(3): August, 
2001, p.741-774 
S. Biddle, M. Fischerkeller, and W. Hinkle, Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare  
S. Biddle, The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare 
S. Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict 
S. Biddle, Explaining Military Outcomes, in R.A. Brooks and E. A. Stanley, eds., Creating Military 
Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 207-227 
S. Biddle, Toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan,” in J. Engstrom, ed., Understanding Victory and 
Defeat in Contemporary War, London, Routledge, 2007, p.187-205 
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defensive strategy using the geographic merit and skill.
17
 Therefore, according to Biddle’s 
insistence, the efficiency of military technological dominance of the US-ROK alliance in case 
of an offensive against the NKPA (North Korean People’s Army) would not be as great as 
the US-ROK alliance would expect, since the NKPA has accumulated vast experience of 
defensive warfare using their geographic edge, has fortified their territory, and has trained 
their entire force to use this advantage. 
 
Significant questions to be raised are whether Biddle’s argument on skill and technology is 
correct and whether it can be applied to possible Korean peninsula conflict. The questions to 
be answered in this thesis are as follows: First, can Biddle’s insights about modern military 
technology, skill and geography apply in regards to possible Korean Peninsula conflict? 
Second, if Biddle’s argument can be applied to a possible Korean conflict, does the 
technological dominance of the offender (US-ROK alliance) guarantee their success against 
the defender (North Korea) who have a home-terrain advantage? The main question of this 
thesis – whether the technologically dominant US-ROK alliance can have ultimate success 
against the North who is ready to use their defensive edge – is also closely linked with one of 
the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) debates concerning the efficiency of newly- 
developed military technology to the geography and the limits of contemporary technology. 
 
Accordingly, before examining Biddle’s argument and its application to a possible Korean 
conflict, it needs to first be demonstrated that the Korean peninsula conflict meets all of his 
applicable criteria. Therefore, the second chapter of this research will start by examining the 
contemporary debate on the technological effectiveness and skill which is associated with the 
capability to use the geographic edge, through Biddle’s claims and Sun Tzu’s Art of War. The 
second and third section will provide the historical overview on the RMA and show that the 
US-ROK joint forces have been transformed into high-tech forces and developed strategies 
and tactics to use their strength in military technology dominance.  
                                                          
17
 North Korea accumulated the vast experience of defensive warfare using the mountainous terrain of 
Korean Peninsula during the Korean War and developed it through the fortification of territory and 
training the entire army as a “cadre army” under the four military guideline which was espoused by 
Kim Ilsung at the Fifth Plenum of the fourth KWP (Korean Workers Party) Central Committee in 
December, 1962. Therefore, North Korea has a capability to maximize their geographic defensive 
edge. 
18 
 
The historic overview of RMA will be divided into two sections: before and after 9/11. The 
research for this chapter will consult the MTR (Military Technical Revolution), SOS 
(System-of-Systems), Joint Vision 2010, and a few writings on the issue of what the RMA is 
and how the RMA had developed before 9/11. This will reveal that the US military strategy 
had transformed and concentrated on technology after the Cold War ended. For that purpose, 
the following works will be consulted,   
 T.W. Galdi, Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational 
Responses, Outstanding Issues, CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for 
Congress, 11
th
 of December 1995. Posted on Federation of American Scientists (FAS) 
Website; http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-1170.htm,  
 M.C. FitzGerald, The New Revolution in Russian Military Affairs, RUSI Whitehall 
paper series, 1994  
 M. Patrick, The Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 23 (1), March 2000  
 J.R. Blaker, Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America’s 
21
st
 Century defence, progressive policy institute Defence Working Paper No.3, 
January, 1997 
 E. Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare, Foreign Affairs, 75(2): March/April, 1996 
 Admiral W.A. Owens, The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems, Strategic Forum, 
National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 63: February, 
1996 
 Admiral W.A. Owens and E. Offley, Lifting the fog of war, New York, FSG, 2000 
 C.S. Gray and G. Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, London, Frank Cass 
Publishers, 1999 
 C.S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Other Evidence of 
History, London, Frank Cass, 2002 
 D.J. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age: Clausewitzian Future, 
London, Routledge, 2004 
 
After that, the chapter will explain that the US-ROK joint forces have been further developed 
to face newly emerged threats
18
 during the War on Terror era. To review the general US 
                                                          
18
 The US threat recognition in the War on Terror will be reviewed in the next chapter in detail.  
The newly emerged threats are  
19 
 
military strategy, in which it can be seen that the US military has been transforming towards 
technology-centred forces, the US defence review and military strategy review are 
consulted.
19
 In addition, to review WMDs, HDBTs, GPR, and the US new nuclear strategy 
which have influenced the Korean peninsula security immensely in the last few years, the 
importance of the following works will be considered.
20
   
 The US DOD, Report to Congress on the Defeat of HDBTs (Hard and Deeply Buried 
Targets),  July, 2001 
 The US DOD, Nuclear Posture Review Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, 
January 2002. Excerpts are available from the Global Security Website:  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm 
 The US DOD, Nuclear Posture Review, April, 2010 
 Douglas J. Feith, op.cit.,  
 Chairman of the JCS, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 13 February 2006 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1) Adversaries – Rogue States and Terrorist Organizations  
2) The major threat – WMD and its proliferation  
3) The style of conflict – Small wars and Counter-Insurgency which emphasized the flexibility and 
mobility  
19
 The following are dominantly reviewed  
The US Department of Defence (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, 30
th
 of 
September, 2001 
The US DOD, Quadrennial Defence Review Report, Washington, 6
th 
of February, 2006 
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 
2004 
The President of United States, National Security Strategy 2002, Washington, The White House, 
September, 2002 
The President of United States, National Security Strategy 2010, Washington, The White House, May, 
2010 
20
 WMDs became the major asset for the NKPA and those WMDs are usually HDBTs; therefore, the 
US stance on the WMDs and HDBTs is significant security concern in the Korean Peninsula. To face 
the small wars and counter-insurgency flexibly, the US military authorities had a full defence posture 
review and materialized as GPR. Due to the fact that GPR would allow the USFK flexibly, it will also 
influence the Korean peninsula security severely.   
20 
 
In the third chapter, the research will detail why the geographic element of war is so 
important to Korean peninsula strategy by examining traditional defence strategies using the 
geographic edge. To review the traditional Korean military strategy, the choice is restricted to 
Korean sources. Among various resources, “HanGukGoDaeSaHwaeEuiGunSaWaJungChi 
(the Military and Politics of ancient Korean kingdoms)” will be used as a primary source to 
research ancient Korean kingdoms’ military strategies. 21 In addition, the history books 
commissioned by the Institute for Military History Compilation (IMHC) of ROK to research 
the traditional military strategies of the Korean kingdoms will also be consulted.
22
 
 
The later part of the third chapter will also examine the NKPA strategy, particularly defence 
strategy, to show that North Korea has already fortified their territory using the geographic 
edge and has the capability to use this geography to their advantage. The NKPA military 
strategy transformed dramatically to asymmetric warfare strategy using WMDs after the Cold 
War ended. Therefore, selecting sources reflecting the contemporary development is very 
important. The US and western military societies have done much research on WMDs and 
their proliferation. However, regarding the North Korean asymmetric strategy and warfare 
capability, the detailed and contemporary knowledge is better researched in the ROK military 
society which has to face the North Korean WMDs directly if there is a conflict. Therefore, 
the Korean resources will mainly be consulted. For that purpose, the following books are 
consulted predominantly for the NKPA military strategy research.  
 M.S. Jang, BukHanGunSaYeonGu, Seoul, Palbokwon, 1999 
 Bukhanyeonguhakhwae, BukHanEuiGunSa, Seoul, Gyonginmunhwasa, 2006 
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 Y. H.  Kim. HanGukGoDaeSaHwaeEuiGunSaWaJungChi, Seoul, Korea University Press, 2002 
22  I.H. Seo, HanKukGoDaeGunSaJeonRyak (The military strategy of Ancient Kingdoms), IMHC, 
ROK Ministry of National Defence (MND), 2005 
B.O. Choi, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa1-GoDae (The military history of Ancient Kingdoms), IMHC, 
ROKMND, 1994 
J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa2-GoRyeoSiDae (The military history Goryeo Kingdom), 
IMHC, ROKMND, 1993 
H.K. Jang, JoSeonSiDaeGuSaJeonRyak (The military strategy of Joseon Dynasty), IMHC, ROKMND, 
2006 
J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3-JoSeonSiDaeJeonPyeon (The military history of early stage 
of Joseon Dynasty), IMHC, ROKMND, 1996 
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 Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University, 
BukHanGunSaMunJeEuiJaeJoMyong, Paju, Hanwool, 2006 
 M.R. Lee, KimJeongIlCheJeEuiBukHanGunDaeHaeBu, Seoul, Hwanggeumal, 2008 
 
Following the third chapter research which aims to show that Biddle’s arguments on modern 
technology, skill and geography can be applied to the possible Korean conflict, the second 
part of the research aims to examine the validity of his argument, which leads to the 
conclusion that a modern military itself cannot guarantee military success against the 
defender who has a capability to use their local knowledge of the landscape to their 
advantage.  
 
The methodology of the thesis planned interviews and three case studies. Interviews were 
planned to examine the NKPA military strategy and contemporary development of US-ROK 
military strategy. In addition, since most case studies materials were not easy to access in the 
UK, a field study in Korea was also planned, which inevitably led to the time-consuming 
translation procedure.
23
 Initially, it was believed that interviewing intelligence officers in the 
ROK Armed Forces would be ideal to examine the NKPA military strategy because they are 
the ones dealing with the most up-to-date information about the movements of the North 
Korean military. However, from the start, this met several problems. Most of the e-mail 
contacts were not successful. To solve this problem, human contact was used. After the initial 
contact with possible interview targets, it was found that they were either reluctant or not 
passionate due to the sensitive nature of the questionnaire. At the end, the researcher failed to 
get any relevant information.  
 
Following the failure of the interview plan, the remaining options were considered. The only 
possible solution was to rely on the published literature. There was an initial hesitation to 
depend upon published literature such as news article and research report as it is usually 
slightly outdated. In addition, it was initially thought that the published literature tended to 
slightly favour the government position and did not research deeply in the certain areas since 
                                                          
23 1) The focus of the Korean War case study is technology and geography. However, especially the 
significance of geographic dimension in this war has not been researched enough in the western 
military studies, and the geography of the Korean peninsula has also not been well-informed.  
2) The Imjin Wars are not well-known in western military research.  
22 
 
the information was distributed by the government. However, that was the only option left 
and the adoption of literature analysis was ultimately successful. For the fledgling researcher, 
it was difficult to get up-to-date information through interviews, but there was an abundance 
of published literature. This, at least, was a starting point. It was initially thought that since 
the reports were mostly government official documents, there would be restraint. However, in 
fact, even though I failed to get up-to-date information, because military experts reinterpreted 
the given source; there were various in-depth research papers. Therefore, the case study was 
adopted based on published literature reviews and field studies as a major research method of 
the second part of the research.  
 
The first case study is the seven year war between Korea and Japan (1592-1599, Imjin Wars). 
The reasons for choosing this case were: it is an ideal case to show that the geographic factors 
are an important part of Korean peninsula warfare; the Korean peninsula is an adequate place 
to wage a defensive warfare using topography; and the Koreans have developed defensive 
strategy and tactics using their geography.
24
 
 
Therefore, the focus on the Imjin Wars research is not related to broad and international 
issues such as how the war had been transformed into international warfare following the 
Chinese engagement, or how the Chinese and Japanese regimes were changed due to the 
fatigue of prolonged war effort. Instead, the focus of this case study will be given to the 
detailed military operation and action by Joseon and Japan as well as the Joseon defence 
strategy and tactics whose contents are mostly published in Korea. For that reason, the Imjin 
Wars military history book published in Korea will be the main source used. The following 
books and articles are predominantly consulted for the research in this chapter:  
 I.H. Seo, ImJinWaeRanSa, Seoul, IMHC,  ROKMND, 1987 
 J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3 
                                                          
24
 The traditional Korean defensive strategy however, can be examined in many cases; the Imjin Wars 
are the case that can prove many decisive points. Most of all, analysing the initial military fiasco of 
the Joseon dynasty (the Korean dynasty at that time) can explain the outcome of direct combat with 
the well-trained and outnumbered enemy due to strategic mistakes of commanders without applying 
the traditional defensive warfare strategy using terrain. Secondly, analysing the strategic and tactical 
change of Joseon using defensive terrain and guerrilla warfare can explain the advantage of traditional 
defensive warfare strategy.  
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 W.R. Cho, SaeRoUnGwanJeomEuiImJinWaeRanSaYeonGu, Seoul, Aseamunhwasa, 
2005 
 The second edition of ImJinJeonRanSa series (Sang–Jung-Ha) published by ROK 
Imjinwaeransayeonguhwae (Imjin Wars Research Committee) in 1994: H.S. Lee, 
ImJinWaeRanSaSang, Seoul, Imjinwaeransayeonguhwae, 1994, H.S. Lee, 
ImJinWaeRanSaJung, Seoul, Imjinwaeransayeonguhwae, 1994, and H.S. Lee, 
ImJinWaeRanSaHa, Seoul, Imjinwaeransayeonguhwae, 1994  
 
By examining the initial military fiasco of the Koreans which did not approach the war by 
using their traditional defensive warfare strategy based around the Korean peninsula’s steep 
mountains and deep and wide rivers, it is revealed that the defensive strategy using 
geographic edge is an integral part of Korean peninsula warfare strategy. Meanwhile, 
examining their gradual transformation of military strategy to use their geographic potential, 
and the ultimate withdrawal of the Japanese which was contributed by the Koreans’ masterful 
application of defensive strategy using the Korean peninsula topography, demonstrates the 
main argument of thesis.  
 
The second case is the Korean War. The reasons for choosing this case were that the Korean 
War lends a unique opportunity to evaluate the efficiency of modern military technology 
against the Korean peninsula’s mountainous topography. We can also examine the course of 
action for the possible Korean peninsula conflict as well as the origin of both Koreas’ 
military strategies. Like the first case study, its focus does not lie in international politics and 
diplomatic matter such as why the war broke out, how the war accelerated into the 
international war, how the regimes in both Koreas’ were supported by communists and 
capitalists and eventually why the cease-fire status in the Korean peninsula was solidified.  
For the purpose of research, it is required to consult the detailed military action and 
operations. The mainstay of Korean War military operation research such as the NKPA 
western front operation, Naktong River line defence campaign, Inchon landing operation and 
Marching North, the PVA offensives will refer to both Korean and American resources. 
However, the newly spotlighted cases such as the NKPA invasion plan and strategy, the 
battle of Chunchon in the initial phase of the war, and the communist defence strategy and 
operation during the stalemate will be predominantly researched by consulting the Korean 
sources. The following books and articles will be the spine of this part of research: 
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 Department of Military History, Korea Military Academy (KMA), 
HanGukJeonJaengSaBuDo, Seoul, Hwanggeumal, 2005 
 R.E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Centre of Military History, 
Washington D.C, the US Government Printing Office,1992 
 B.C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow November 1950–July 1951, Washington D.C, Centre 
of Military History, United States Army, 1990 
 Official military history of Korean War series- IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, Seoul, 
Guningongjehwae (Military Mutual Aid Association), 1995, IMHC, 
HanGukJeonJaengJung, Seoul,IMHC,1996, and IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengHa, Seoul, 
IMHC, 1997 
 
In this case study, examining the battle of Chunchon in the initial stage of war and the 
position warfare during the stalemate reveals that technological dominance alone cannot 
guarantee military success against the defender who can use their geographic edge through 
adequate training, fortification and command. In addition, examining the western front 
campaign during the initial phase of war and the UN forces’ marching north campaign will 
demonstrate that once the defender loses the capability to use their geographic defensive edge, 
the offender’s dominance in technology will increase and become a decisive factor in the war.  
 
The final case will be the application of contemporary military technology to the strategically 
important North Korean targets. Chapter Three already examined the North Korean defence 
strategy using their mountainous geography, based on the instruction of the Korean War and 
their tactical preparedness regarding this edge. Now we will directly evaluate the 
contemporary military technology’s eventual effectiveness against the North Korean HDBTs. 
Accordingly, this chapter confirms Stephen Biddle’s argument that, even though an offender 
may possess the upper hand in military technology, this will not guarantee ultimate military 
success against a defender who has a capability to use the local geographic defensive edge.   
 
Purpose and originality of research  
 
The security circumstance in the Korean peninsula has been drastically transformed during 
the post-Cold War era. The major North Korean threat has been shifted from the NKPA 
mechanized troops to the asymmetric assets which challenge the US-ROK alliances 
25 
 
weaknesses such as WMDs and guerrilla warfare capability. The US-ROK alliance’s 
approach to the possible conflict has also been transformed from a forward defence strategy 
denying the NKPA mechanized troops breakthrough to Seoul to a technology and capability 
centred strategy which aims to equip the capability to neutralize the North Korean 
asymmetric warfare assets and the centre of gravity targets for the ultimate deterrence and 
nullification of the North Korean strengths in possible conflict. However, the contemporary 
research is still focusing on the issues of thwarting North Korean Two-Front and High-Speed 
warfare strategy drafted during the Cold War to ensure the North Korean armoured troop’s 
breakthrough to Seoul.
25
 In addition, even though there have been a few articles regarding the 
possible collision between the US-ROK alliance’s technological approach and the North 
Korean asymmetrical warfare strategy, the focus of ROK academia has been how to 
neutralize the North Korean long-range artillery – which is the most devastating of North 
Korean WMD assets – while the US and western articles have mainly been focused on how 
to curb the proliferation of North Korean WMDs as well as the North Korean missile which 
could threaten their homeland security. In other words, the US and ROK respectively have 
been researching a solution aimed at their individual strategic dilemmas.   
 
However, this thesis will focus on the fundamental question of whether or not the US-ROK 
alliance’s technological approach to the North Korean asymmetrical strategy using WMDs 
could effectively deter or defeat the North Koreans. The North Korean WMDs would bring 
an exorbitant cost to the US-ROK alliance and would be hard to neutralize once launched.
26
 
In this circumstance, from the US-ROK alliance perspective, the capability to pre-empt or 
                                                          
25 For example, Michael O’Hanlon in his article, “Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why defending 
South Korea is easier than the Pentagon thinks” International Security, 22(4), concluded that the 
contribution of NKPA mechanized troops would not be decisive as the North Korean expects for the 
following reasons.   
1) They should advance through the central highland to reach Seoul which means massive 
mechanize troops manoeuvre is almost impossible.  (Geographic restraints) 
2) The US-ROK alliance has prepared the anti-mechanized troops warfare based on the painful 
experience during the Korean War 
3) Due to the geographic restraints, the NKPA mechanized troops has to use the narrow and 
winding pass which would become a easy prey for the US-ROK defending troops.  
26
 North Korean long-range artillery shells could rain down in the Seoul metropolitan area while the 
North Korean missiles could reach Japan and the US’s Pacific coast.  
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prevent the reload of the North Korean WMDs is the key for deterrence and ultimate success 
in the battlefield. On the contrary, North Korea would naturally try to increase the 
survivability of their WMDs. For the better survivability of their WMDs and centre of gravity 
targets, North Korea has vehemently pursued the fortification of territory using their 
mountainous topography while enhancing the capability to use the geographic advantage 
which has been a sound success in Korean peninsula military history. Ultimately, the issue 
(US-ROK alliance’s technology centred strategy vs North Korean asymmetric warfare 
strategy) boils down to technological prowess against geographic advantage. Therefore, this 
thesis will focus on the question of whether the technology centred US-ROK alliance strategy 
can achieve deterrence and ultimate success in possible conflict against the North Koreans 
who possess geographic advantage and capability to maximize the advantage. 
 
Biddle claims that technology and skill will be equally important in future wars by examining 
various cases from the Great War to the Afghan Campaign. He commented after analysing 
the Afghan Campaign that due to the Al-Qaeda fighters’ capability to use their geographic 
edge, the efficiency of military technology was seriously damaged and eventually, offender 
skills such as special manoeuvring was required to break the Al-Qaeda defence line. In the 
contemporary Korean peninsula, based on the enhanced the ROK economy and the demands 
of the War on Terror, the US-ROK alliance transformed their force to a technology centred 
one. However, after they realized that they could not compete with the South in the arms race, 
North Korea has been focusing on improving the asymmetric warfare capability through 
WMDs. To enhance the survivability of WMDs and centre of gravity targets against the 
advanced US military technology, they have been engrossed in fortification of their territory 
using their geographic edge. In this circumstance, Biddle’s insight on skill and technology 
appear beneficial to the research into contemporary Korean peninsula security since it 
suggests that to achieve ultimate military success and deterrence against North Korea, the 
US-ROK alliance would need more than a technological dominance as was the case in the 
Afghan campaign. Therefore, this thesis will investigate using of Biddle’s skill and 
technology theory to analyse the circumstances of contemporary Korean peninsula security.  
 
There are several possible benefits of this research. Firstly, it could bolster Biddle’s empirical 
research into military technology and skill by analysing past wars and contemporary security 
circumstances in the Korean peninsula. Secondly, it could prove Sun Tzu’s claim that 
“geography and capability to use this geographic edge is a strategically significant 
27 
 
consideration in the oriental warfare” is still important in contemporary warfare. Thirdly, this 
text may serve as a means to examine the gamut of possible courses of action in the event that 
a Korean peninsula conflict breaks out. Fourthly, through the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 case study it is 
shown that the topography of the Korean peninsula, which boasts a portfolio of steep 
mountains inlayed with a wide, deep river, makes it an ideal place to host a defensive war. 
Fifthly, through the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 case study, it is argued that even though the offender holds 
technological dominance, there is no guarantee that this would lead to ultimate victory 
against a defender who has skill and commitment to use their geographic edge. Also 
demonstrated through the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 case study is that, even though military technology is 
one of the most important elements of war, the ultimate success of war is not decided by the 
technology alone but by a mixture of many important elements, such as the preponderance, 
command, tactics, training and strategy used by the military. 
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Part 1 The US-ROK Technology-centred 
Military Strategy and Posture, and the North 
Korean Tactical Readiness, Focusing on 
Terrain and its use 
 
Introduction 
 
War is an art composed of a myriad of elements that interact together to ultimately decide the 
fate of the engaged parties. However, in the Korean peninsula, the geographical features, 
along with tactical preparedness to maximize the geographic edge, have been major factors 
that have decided the outcomes of war. The defensive strategy using the Korean peninsula 
geography with reasonable tactical preparedness gives an incentive to the technologically 
inferior defender even in modern conflicts like the Korean War.  
 
In this thesis, the significance of geographical factors and tactical preparedness in the Korean 
peninsula will be evaluated against the technologically-advanced counterpart. It will also 
emphasize that technology alone cannot guarantee an eventual military success against the 
defender who possesses a geographic edge as well as the capability to maximize its worth. 
The implication of this thesis is that if the technologically-advanced US-ROK joint forces 
decide to launch an offensive campaign against the NKPA, there is no guarantee that they 
will be able to easily break down the NKPA, who have heavily fortified their territory by 
maximizing their steep mountainous topography, and who possess quality training on how to 
get the best out of this natural fortress.   
 
Part 1 will first evaluate Biddle’s argument that in future warfare, combat skill (tactical 
readiness) and military technology will be just as important as they were in the past. Biddle 
also claims that once the defender is motivated and highly trained, the offender’s 
technological superiority alone cannot guarantee a military success – as can be witnessed 
through the case study of contemporary Iraq and Afghan campaigns. To apply the Biddle 
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argument to the subject of Korean peninsula security, it must first be established that the US-
ROK force is transforming itself into a technology-centred force. 
 
Therefore, Chapter 2 will demonstrate that the US-ROK alliance has gradually become 
technology-centred military forces and it will examine how the contemporary RMA has been 
influencing the US-ROK joint forces to develop technologically. After that, the main 
strategies and tactics that have been built around the technological prowess of the 
contemporary US-ROK forces will be examined. 
 
Chapter 3 will explore the geographic dimensions of war and explain the traditional Korean 
defence strategy to show how the Korean forces developed this strategy using their 
geographic edge; this will demonstrate the significance of the geography and tactical 
preparedness factor in the Korean peninsula security. Finally, it will evaluate the North 
Korean military strategy. By doing so, it can be revealed that like previous Korean kingdoms, 
and, based on the bitter experience of the Korean War and careful research on several modern 
conflicts, North Korea has tried to develop their defence strategy while using their geographic 
advantage and improving their tactical preparedness to get the best out of their defence 
strategy.  
 
In the end, it can be shown that, once the US-ROK joint force is involved in an offensive 
whose scenario will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, it will be a conflict between the 
technologically-advanced offender and the defender who is equipped with the defensive 
strategy using their geographic edge and having the capability to maximize it. In addition, at 
the end of this part, it could examine Biddle’s claim that, once the geographically 
advantageous and highly skilled defender is in defence, the technological superiority of the 
offender alone cannot guarantee any military success.  
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Chapter 2 The Military Transformation of US-
ROK Alliance  
 
2-1 Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare, and its 
Implications on Korean Peninsula Security 
 
The extensive and historic research on RMA will be carried out in the next part of this 
research. Here, it will examine why RMA advocates believe that technology could overcome 
geographic constraints and bring ultimate success in the battlefield. After that, by examining 
Stephen Biddle’s skill and technology theory and Sun Tzu’ view on geography in the oriental 
warfare, it will support the argument of the thesis that, even though there has been a 
significant improvement in the military technology, the geographic element of war is still the 
important element in the contemporary battlefield.  
 
William Owens, the former Vice Chairman of US JCS, analysed the Soviet RSC and 
suggested a New System-of-Systems theory. According to the New System-of-Systems, once 
the (1) ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), (2) Precision force and (3) 
advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence) systems 
interact with each other there will be an inevitable synergy at work to create the new mega 
system. This will function to help boost the efficiency of modern military technology on the 
battle field. Once the ISR and advanced C4I joined together, there will be a (4) dominant 
battlespace awareness. The perfect Mission Assignment (5) will be acquired through the 
combination of advanced C4I and precision force. The clear Battle Assessment (6) will be 
created through a combination of Precision Force and ISR. It also insists that due to the New 
Systems of System, carrying out the combat action cycle of (4) (5) (6) will be quicker 
and eventually lead to a better performance on the battlefield.
27
 
 
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski went further than the Owen’s System of Systems theory and 
proposed the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept. He believed that once the Armed 
                                                          
27 Admiral W.A. Owens and E. Offley, op.cit., p.98-103 
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forces were successfully adopting innovation from the business sector by using information 
technology, they would achieve a military transformation.
28
 The NCW concept permeated 
into the entire military after Rumsfeld appointed Cebrowski as the director of Office of Force 
Transformation on October, 2001. Network-centric warfare is the concept that by 1) 
connecting and networking all the components dispersed in the battlespace 2) sharing the 
information, and boosting situational awareness (Sensor) 3) enabling self-synchronization by 
the commander and speedy command (Command and Control)
29
 4) this will eventually 
increase the combat power and effectiveness of the mission dramatically.
30
 In this NCW 
concept, perfect situational awareness will be reached due to the development of high-tech 
sensor technology and the commander’s self-synchronization and speedy command will be 
accomplished by the development of information technology. In addition, the orders of the 
commander will be carried out accurately thorough the development of stand-off precision 
guided bombs.  
 
The Effect-Based Operation (EBO) is another spine of RMA advocates along with the NCW. 
Major General David Deptula has argued that, during the second Gulf War, development of 
airpower, especially stealth aircraft and PGMs, enabled the first application of EBO. He 
insisted on changing targeting paradigm and focusing on desired effects instead of target 
destruction.
31
 Deptula defined EBO as a tool to support parallel attacks on critical targets to 
cause paralysis in an enemy’s system of systems. In addition, the desired effect of EBO is to 
control an enemy by eliminating his capability to employ forces, and EBO improves on 
current war fighting methods because it reduces force requirement, casualties, forward basing 
                                                          
28
 Vice Admiral A.K. Cebrowski and J.J. Garstka, Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future, 
Naval Institute Proceeding,  124(1), January, 1998 
29 NCW concept emphasize the role of C2 (Command and Control) as it process the information 
collected by sensors and assign the duty to various precision force. In addition, it also emphasize the 
prompt combat action by swift processing of gathered information as it will guarantee the better 
performance in the battlespace.    
30 D.S. Alberts, J.J. Garstka, and F.P. Stetin, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging 
Information Superiority, CCRP (Command and Control Research Program), 1999, p.88-103 
Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare Washington, D.C, 
Department of Defense, 2005, p.3-26 
31 Lieutenant Colonel B.T. Williams (United States Air Force),  Effect-Based Operations: Theory, 
Application and the Role of Airpower, U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2002, p.2  
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needs, and conflict duration.
32
 According to the JFCOM (Joint Force Command), “EBO is 
knowledge-based process that predicts enemy reactions.  By predicting enemy behaviour and 
understanding his system, effect-based planning can direct attacks against critical nodes and 
links that should cause a breakdown in cohesion and destroy the adversary’s ability to 
resist.”33 
 
In conclusion, EBO advocates insists that, in an total war era, the armed forces concentrated 
on direct and physical effects such as total destruction of enemy military power and 
occupation of enemy territory. In the EBO concepts, though, they are targeting and 
neutralizing the key military system which had become possible due to the development of 
stand-off PGMs to paralyze the enemy forces, debilitate enemy warfare capability and 
eventually get the desired outcome. The key to the success of EBO depends upon selecting 
the most adequate targets and offensive means. 
 
RMA advocates insists that, along with the NCW and EBO, the consolidation of Jointness to 
avoid the battlespace overlapping, rapid power projection capability to meet the newly 
emerged threats by adjusting the overseas residential army, and strengthening the logistic 
capability, lighter troops (Stryker Brigade Combat Team; SBCT) has been targeted. They 
have proceeded smoothly and transformed the military.
34
   
 
According to RMA advocates, the Second Gulf War was the first full scale implementation of 
NCW and EBO. They insisted that, instead of total destruction and decimation of Iraqi forces, 
they were selecting and attacking targets which brought the desired effects.
35
 In addition, the 
troops in the battleground enjoyed the almost real-time information sharing and absolute 
superiority in information. They also insists that the effectiveness of NCW and EBO, based 
on their superiority in technology, was proved in the Second Gulf War. They substituted EBO 
                                                          
32 D. A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of War, cited in Ibid., p.3   
33 USJFCOM J9 Concepts Department, A Concept Framework for Effects-based Operations, White 
Paper Version 1.0, Suffolk, VA: JFCOM, 18 October 2001 cited in Ibid., p.4 
34
 Rapid power projection, SBCT, and battlespace overlapping problem will be discussed in the RMA 
section.   
35
 They selected political and military headquarters, C4I installations, and republican guard.  Their 
desired effect was to break down their systems and willingness to fight. 
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for the Airland Battle concept, which emphasized the massive mechanize forces duel and 
which was successfully implemented in the First Gulf War.   
 
This contemporary warfare interpretation of RMA advocates is also reflected in the relevance 
of technology and geography, which are the core subject of this project. Martin Libicki, 
during his debate on geography and military technology in Orbis, in Spring, 1996, insisted on 
the following: He argued that “1) the application of information to military power has three 
fundamental elements; perceiving reality and representing it in bits (Intelligence), processing 
and distribution bits, and using bits to act on reality which are almost close to the suggestion 
of Owen’s system of systems, and 2) As cyberspace expands, the impact of geography on 
each segment declines apace”.36  
 
In his writing, as a supporting argument for the declining impact of the geography in the 
information age, he argued that, if the information dominance is extended to the allies, 
processing and distributing information would not be constrained by the geography. However, 
geographic considerations will nevertheless matter for the collection of information, since the 
contemporary sensor technology would still need to be closer to the battlespace, except for 
the satellite technology. He also insisted that, as the technology develops, these matters will 
be eventually overcome.
37
   
 
In terms of acting on reality, he argued that PGMs are guided by three types: which are active 
manned guidance, chasing given signatures and travelling with specific coordinates. PGMs 
are being developed that can hit moving targets by adjusting their own flight path to 
continually updated coordinates.
38
 Therefore, the need for on-the-spot guidance (geography) 
has been decreased. He also mentioned that the burden of logistics would have been severely 
reduced.  The massive size cross-border attack would be suicidal against the US because the 
invader would be exposed and the US possessed an edge in technology to punish them. Also, 
due to the development of PGMs, the needs of ordnance has been significantly decreased. 
Finally because of the development of sensor and information technology, the need for on-
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the-spot guidance has been decreased and remote control is possible. Therefore, for precision 
targeting, fewer humans would be required and the burden of logistics would be reduced.
39
 
 
In conclusion, according to the RMA advocates, the strategic and tactical value of geography 
has been diminished due to the development of technology. Because of the development of 
C4I, quality information would be delivered and shared without the geographic restraints. 
Owing to the development of sensor technology, surveillance and reconnaissance capability 
has been increased drastically and, although there is a limited geographic constraint, it will 
soon be overcome. Finally, due to the development of guidance technology, the hidden target 
would be easily neutralized with relatively less ammunition. This would mean that the 
defensive worth of geography and logistic burdens would be severely reduced.   
 
Based on the results of the First Gulf War, the RMA advocate’s argument, that the smashing 
Coalition victory was due to modern military technology and that new technology will 
revolutionize the battlefield, was gathering momentum in the security society. At that point, 
the counter-argument was raised that the technological advantage was not the only reason for 
the Coalition success, and that future warfare may be decided not only by military technology 
but also by the skill of units – as it was in the past.    
 
Following the sweeping victory of the First Gulf War, there was euphoria in regards to 
modern military technology and especially information technology. Biddle questioned that 
euphoria and published the article “Victory Misunderstood” which argued that in the First 
Gulf War, Iraqi errors created opportunities for new Coalition technology to perform at 
proving ground effectiveness levels.
40
 Biddle also argued that “(1) the advanced technology 
raised the cost of error dramatically
41
, (2) the skilful defender would be able to erode the 
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technological advantage markedly
42
, and (3) even advanced technology and defensive errors, 
however numerous, cannot provide victory at very low losses unless the attacker is highly 
skilled.”43  
 
He examined “the battle of 73 Easting” conducted by the US 7th Corps and Iraqi Republican 
Guard during the First Gulf War and explained that the Iraqi errors stemmed from (1) the fact 
that the Iraqi defensive lines were very poorly prepared
44
, (2) the Republican Guard failure to 
coordinate the efforts of different arms at its disposal, especially artillery
45
, and (3) that the 
Iraqi covering forces systemically failed to alert their main defences to an impending US 
approach, allowing even the Republican Guard units to be taken completely by surprise.
46
 By 
contrast, Biddle also admitted that, along with technological superiority, the Coalition forces 
also fought extremely well. In this battle, consecutive Iraqi force employment errors caused 
by lack of skill and the Coalition force’s tight, efficient combat battle formation brought 
about a major skill imbalance in battle, which was intensified by the efficiency of technology, 
producing the stunning Coalition victory in the end. Biddle’s main argument in this article 
and other Gulf War-related articles was that technology alone could not explain all the losses 
that resulted from the First Gulf War; a considerable skill imbalance also caused the Iraqi 
military debacle.
47
  
 
The implication of these initial period writings on the Korean peninsula security is that, if 
technologically inferior NKPA chose the open field as a battlefield
 48
 or defended unprepared 
positions against the US-ROK alliance force, the efficiency of the advanced US-ROK 
alliance’s military technology would be maximized. Therefore, the North Korean invasion of 
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the South would be an almost suicidal mission with only a mechanized force-centred invasion, 
since their mechanized troops would be exposed on the way to the main target (Seoul).     
 
After the war in Afghanistan broke out, Biddle researched the Afghan campaign and 
expanded his research scope regarding the relation between modern military technology and 
skill. In other words, he was able to research the capabilities of technologically-advanced 
forces once they met a highly skilled foe and ask what modern technology efficiency looks 
like and whether it is required to overcome those foes.  
 
In the initial period of the campaign, the indigenous Afghan Taliban targets were ill-prepared 
and exposed even though the terrain and conditions present were extraordinary. Therefore, as 
was the case in the First Gulf War, the Coalition forces were able to detect and destroy the 
Taliban targets with stand-off precision air strikes. The instruction was also the same as the 
First Gulf War: that modern military technology would heavily punish the foe that did not 
possess a decent level of battle skills.
49
 For example, during the strategically important fight 
for Mazar-e-Sharif
50
, the indigenous Afghan Taliban showed immaturity and the western 
forces enjoyed great success until the foreign Al-Qaeda soldiers were introduced in Bai 
Beche. The Taliban were poor in morale and motivation since they were fighting only to 
prevent the extradition of a foreigner, Osama bin Laden.
51
 They were often very poorly 
trained since many of them had little or no formal military instruction and the size of the 
forces had been steadily fluctuating depending on the crop cycle and apparent military need.
52
 
Their regime’s unpopularity also did not encourage support. Therefore, the Afghan Taliban 
was not a good standard force and suffered a severe imbalance of combat skills along with 
their lack in standards of technology.
53
 As a consequence, by the time the massive numbers 
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of foreign Al-Qaeda fighters were introduced in Bai Beche, the outcome of the battle was 
almost the same as the First Gulf War.  
 
However, later in the campaign (most notably from the battle of Bai Bache), when the better 
trained foreign Al-Qaeda fighters
54
 were introduced into the battle, exposed targets were less 
common because of better concealment, overhead cover and camouflage. The stand-off 
precision became less effective because the target became difficult to find and neutralize, and 
close combat became more frequent.
55
 In this later period of the campaign, while precision 
bombing was necessary, it was not sufficient. Hence Biddle argued that “1) the earth’s 
surface remains an extremely complex environment with an abundance of natural and 
manmade cover and concealment available for those militaries capable of exploiting it
56
, and 
2) overcoming a skilled and resolute defender who has adopted standard countermeasures to 
high-firepower airstrikes will still require close combat by friendly ground forces whose own 
skills are sufficient; enabling them to use local cover and their own suppressive fire to 
advance against hostile survivors with modern weapons”.57 For example, during the battle of 
Bai Bache, Al-Qaeda’s local cover and concealment were good enough to prevent the US 
special operation forces on the ground from locating the entirety of the enemy’s individual 
fighting positions, many of which could not be singled out for a precision attack.
58
  
 
At operation Anaconda in March 2002,
59
 Al-Qaeda possessed the geographic edge and 
fortified the rough terrain. Therefore, once the infantry waged close combat without 
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neutralizing those targets, it was expected that there would be a massive casualties. A stand-
off precision attack was planned and achieved on this sector. However, due to the efficient 
enemy fortification, fewer than 50 percent of all the Al-Qaeda positions were ultimately 
identified prior to ground contact. This was made possible since the Al-Qaeda troops were 
capable of using their geographic edge.
60
 
 
In conclusion, during the Afghan Campaign, precision firepower did not manage to annihilate 
well-prepared opponents at stand-off range. Overcoming skilled, resolute opposition required 
both precision firepower and ground manoeuvre; neither alone was sufficient.
61
 As will be 
analysed in the Korean War case study, during the stalemate (position warfare), even though 
the US possessed absolute dominance in fire and airpower, the tenacious and highly 
motivated communist forces handed severe blows to the US in several cases. However, as 
one can see from the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, once the technological dominance is 
harmonized with the manoeuvre (the Tank Battalion cut off the enemy retreat route) the 
technologically advanced forces could win the battle without much cost. The First Gulf War 
articles stressed that although technology gave the Coalition forces an edge, the skill 
imbalance between the Coalition and Iraqi forces enhanced the efficiency of modern military 
technology and contributed to a smashing victory. Biddle’s research after the Afghan 
Campaign expanded upon this scope and argued that in future war, skills of the unit (tactical 
readiness) such as manoeuvres are as important as the technology involved, since technology 
has its limits and harmony of skill and technology is the crucial element of military success. 
This has been shown in previous wars.
62
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What is the implication of Biddle’s argument in regards to Korean peninsula security? The 
US-ROK alliance is transforming to a technology-centred force and the North Korean 
asymmetric strategy using WMDs has become a serious security burden for the alliance. For 
the ROK forces, this served as a direct threat to their security since Seoul is only 40 km away 
from the cease-fire line. For the US, who aimed to build capability based deterrence that 
demanded equipping the forces with the capability to neutralize potential foes’ targets that 
might threaten their homeland and allies’ security, the potential adversary, North Korea’s 
WMDs and their proliferation, is a direct threat to their security. Consequently, they have 
actively pursued and developed the capability to neutralize the North Korean WMDs targets. 
 
However, North Korea has fortified their territory using steep and rigid mountainous 
topography while enhancing tactical readiness to maximize its worth through four military 
guidelines; especially to train the entire army as a “cadre army” and “to fortify the entire 
country” as a part of an asymmetric strategy which strengthens their edge in WMDs by 
enhancing survivability and weakening the US-ROK edge in stand-off precision 
technology.
63
 This circumstance represents a duel between a technologically-advanced 
offender and a geographically-advantageous, motivated and well-trained defender. In this 
case, according to the Biddle argument, technological dominance alone would not necessarily 
guarantee ultimate military success against the skilled defender and may result in heavy cost. 
Biddle points out the consecutive battles after the battle of Bai Beche, where the motivated 
and highly trained Al-Qaeda fighters were engaged in combat.  
 
Biddle’s notion of skill was quite broad: it included command, morale, training, deception, 
decoy, manoeuvre, and fortification using the geographic advantage. In Biddle’s writings, the 
geographic dimension has also been considered; however, in oriental military society, due to 
the severe weather conditions (hot and humid summers and cold winters) and rough terrain 
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(deep and wide rivers, and steep mountainous topography) there has been a significant 
consideration of geography and climate in waging war.  
 
Harold Winters also mentioned in “Battling the Elements” that “despite the evolving 
technology in warfare, physical geography has a continuous, powerful, and profound effect 
on the nature and course of combat.”64 By examining several cases in which geography and 
climate affected the outcome or course of combat, this book claims that the geographic 
consideration is still an important dimension in modern warfare. Especially, case studies on 
the American Civil War’s Eastern Theatre and World War I’s Battle of Verdun where the 
combat was conducted amid severely deformed rocks is closely related to the Korean 
peninsula combat research. Even though the terrain of the Korean peninsula is rumpled and 
mountainous, most of rocks are of Precambrian origin and they are not located between major 
plates, which mean that the rocks have eroded for a significant period of time and the 
mountains are usually low. Once an offender meets a defender who is capable enough to use 
their geographic edge and chooses direct approaches due to their advantages or urgent 
strategic concerns, there is no guarantee that the offensive will be successful. Ultimately, to 
break down enemy defence lines with little cost, the offender would need to have a proper 
plan, skill, and command, as proved in the confederate General Lee’s offensive manoeuvre 
using the terrain during the American Civil War’s Eastern Theatre campaign.65 Even though 
the technology factor was not eminent in those cases, they proved that mountainous 
topography could give the advantage to the defender and prove a formidable challenge to the 
offender.   
 
In addition, Sun Tzu in his “The Art of War” mentioned that the one who understands the 
geographic characteristic of the battlefield would have a significant advantage and careful 
preparation and shrewd command are required to break down the enemy who possesses the 
geographic edge. He claimed that “Advantageous terrain can be a natural ally in battle, and 
superior military leadership lies in the ability to assess the enemy’s situation and create 
conditions for victory, to analyse natural hazards and calculate distances.”66 He also said that, 
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“If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition 
to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we 
have still gone only halfway towards victory.” Another piece of related advice is, “If you 
know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know 
Heaven and Earth (Geography), you may make your victory complete”.67 In addition to the 
terrain chapter, Sun Tzu also mentioned in the nine situations chapter the importance of the 
psychological status of troops, how to lead troops, and what kind of tactics have to be 
adopted in the nine different topographies.   
 
For Biddle, geography and its adequate application is one of the military skills, but it is not 
considered as important as the oriental military society. In the oriental military thought, as 
mentioned in the “Art of War”, the geographic dimension and the capability to use the 
geographic edge are major elements in military skills. Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” can provide the 
missing link to applying Biddle’s skill and technology theory into the Korean peninsula. 
Under the specific security circumstances of the Korean peninsula
68
, Biddle’s theory on skill 
and technology contains the problem that the geographic consideration is not the major 
consideration of skill. However, once Biddle’s research is combined with the insights of Sun 
Tzu’s “Art of War” which mentions the significance of geography and skill to use the 
geographic edge following the research of specific oriental topography and climate, one can 
create a skill and technology theory proper to the Korean peninsula. In other words, because 
geography and skill to use the geographic advantage are as important as other major skills 
such as training, manoeuvre and military technology in the Korean peninsula security, skill 
and technology theory’s general understanding that the offender’s military technological 
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superiority alone cannot guarantee the military success against the skilled defender could be 
reinterpreted to reflect the specifics of the Korean peninsula security situation. (The 
offender’s military technology superiority alone cannot guarantee military success against the 
geographically advantaged and skilled defender). Therefore, once the specific model of skill 
and technology theory reflecting the specialty of the Korean peninsula is applied, there is no 
guarantee that the technologically advanced US-ROK alliance would have military success 
against the North Korean defenders, who have the capability and willingness to use their 
geographic edge – as was the case in the later Afghan Campaign (Al-Qaeda). 
 
In the chapters below, through the case study of the Imjin Wars and the Korean War as well 
as the examination of modern technology application in the strategically important North 
Korean target, Biddle’s claim “for the skilful and resolute foe, they would need more than 
advanced technology to win their conflict and reduce the cost” will be examined. Before that, 
this section will examine how the US–ROK alliance has been transformed into a technology-
centred force (Chapter 2), how the geographic dimension has been an important element of 
war in the Korean peninsula and how North Korea developed military strategy using their 
geographic edge and enhanced the capability to use this edge (Chapter 3). These are 
prerequisites to apply and analyse the claim of this thesis which is based on Biddle’s 
arguments on skill and technology.    
 
2-2 RMA  
 
The most circulated concept of the RMA, as defined by Andy Marshall of US Net 
Assessment, is that the RMA would occur once the characteristics of warfare and the way 
that the war was being carried out was fundamentally transformed. This would happen 
through developing appropriate concepts (evolving military system) of operations 
(operational innovation), appropriate organizations (organizational adaptation), and doctrine 
and practices to take advantage of emerging technologies.
69
 Therefore, the contemporary 
RMA placed significant weight upon operational innovation and organizational adaptation. 
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In the contemporary Korean peninsula security, RMA has also significantly influenced the 
strategic thinking of the US-ROK alliance. What exact influence has been made on the 
contemporary US-ROK joint forces by the contemporary RMA? Is it simply to develop the 
military technology to neutralize the most dominant North Korean threat (WMDs hidden in 
fortified trenches as part of their asymmetric warfare strategy)? The influence of the RMA 
has been much more than that; the US-ROK alliance has also developed a military system to 
get the best out of emergent technology, which included the operational innovation (OPLAN 
5026-5030) and organizational adaptation (GPR and Flexibility agreement).
70
 This chapter 
will examine the contemporary RMA first, and then evaluate how the contemporary RMA 
has influenced the security of the Korean peninsula.  
 
Historical Overview of RMA  
 
The origin of the current RMA is hard to fix precisely and its original architects are obscure.  
Some people believe that the current RMA can be traced back to the 1970’s, when the notion 
of an electronic battlefield emerged alongside early versions of relevant technologies in the 
Vietnam War – people sniffers, air-dropped battlefield sensors, and early smart bombs.71 
 
However, the origin of the contemporary RMA is more commonly regarded as the Ogarkov’s 
RSC (Reconnaissance-Strike Complex) that was developed in 1984.
72
 From the late 1970’s, 
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Soviet military writers wrote about a possible military technical revolution. Relatively lower 
ranking officers had begun to argue that computers, space surveillance, and long-range 
missiles were merging into a new level of military technology – significant enough to shift 
the correlation of forces between East and West.
73
 With the development of the Airland 
battle/FOFA (Follow-on-Forces Attack) concepts that incorporated the combat deployment of 
advanced conventional munitions (ACMs), Moscow started to perceive that the west was 
gaining an edge in the qualitative arms race.
74
 In late 1990, Military Thought (Voennaya 
myzl), a journal in Russia, explained that the Airland Battle concept was based on 1) highly 
effective ground, air, and space-based reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
systems 2) powerful fire with great precision, range, and destructiveness, and 3) automated 
C3 (Command, Control, and Communications) systems that were to ensure the delivery of 
strikes in real time.
75
 
 
From the early 1980s, the interest in military technology had been diffused into Soviet Forces’ 
headquarters. They believed that advanced conventional weapons would be as effective as 
small tactical nuclear weapons on the field.
76
 Indeed, the central message from a decade of 
Soviet military thought was that these technologies would be able to revolutionise military 
doctrine, operational concepts, training, force structure, defence industries and R&D 
priorities.
77
  
 
The development of Soviet RSC was stimulated by the development of precision deep strike 
systems associated with NATO’s Airland Battle doctrine and FOFA concept.78 Ironically, the 
US Airland battle doctrine reflected their military failures during the Vietnam War and the 
fear of Soviet Armoured troops. During and after the Vietnam War, the US began research on 
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the Soviet strength for the possible conflict with them. The US realized that if the Soviet 
OMG (Operational Manoeuvring Group) were able to succeed in making a breakthrough, 
waging a deep battle into their rear line followed by the operation breakthrough manoeuvre of 
FOFs (Follow-on-Forces), the NATO force would be paralyzed within a short time. 
Accordingly, the US understood that deep battle would be unavoidable in order to neutralize 
the Soviet’s strength in fire and mobile power. In addition, they also realized that for ultimate 
victory against the Soviet armoured troops, they should get rid of the Soviet FOFs through 
deep battle (Follow-on-Forces Attack). According to this recognition, they drafted the 
Airland Battle Doctrine. The key element of the Airland Battle Doctrine is to spot the enemy 
in their rear, command a wide operation area, and neutralize the target in a deep area (stand-
off accurate strike capability). To be able to carry out this doctrine, the US needed a 
capability of Deep See, Deep Control, and Deep Attack/Strike; they believed that their 
technological edge, especially in C3, would make it happen.
79
 
 
The Soviet military authorities realized that their formidable armoured troops would be 
vulnerable to the US Airland Battle Doctrine and the developed US military technologies 
would allow a deep attack on the Soviet Armoured troops as well as the spearhead troops.  
They feared that NATO’s stand-off self-guided anti-tank weapons, which they thought would 
be as powerful as tactical nuclear weaponry, would bring disaster to their armoured troops. 
Under this circumstance, the Soviet military authorities believed that once they had 
succeeded in producing a new strategic level Reconnaissance-Strike Complex combining a 
new control system with long-range precision weapons, this system would have a 
revolutionary power which could only be compared to the nuclear weapon.
80
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However, their pursuit of military transformation through adopting newly developed military 
technology failed to bear fruit. Since the Soviet Union suffered financial constraints and 
clung to the materialism of Marxist-Leninist ideology, they focused only on one type of 
warfare, armoured conflict in Central Europe, and invested solely in technology and weapons. 
Their narrow understanding of revolution and financial limitation failed to revolutionize the 
Soviet forces and the fundamental technology gap was not overcome.
81
 
 
The Soviet RSC crossed the Atlantic Ocean and influenced the US. The US was familiar with 
the technological revolution; they initially adopted the Soviet RSC as the MTR concentrated 
on the technological transformation. The initial stage of the US MTR was developed to 
maximize the military technology efficiency on the battle field. As founding fathers of the 
current RMA, one can name former Defence Secretary Bill Perry, Director of Net 
Assessments Andy Marshall, former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William 
Owens, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs General Shalikashvili.
82
   
 
Among these members of the RMA, William Owens (the former Vice Chairman of US JCS) 
who analysed the Soviet RSC suggested the New System-of-Systems theory. According to 
the New System-of-Systems, once the (1) ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance), (2) Precision force and (3) advanced C4I (Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer, and Intelligence) systems interact with each other there would be 
an inevitable synergy at work to create the new mega-system which would function to help 
boost the efficiency of modern military technology on the battle field. In other words, once 
the ISR and advanced C4I joined together, there will be a (4) dominant battlespace awareness. 
The perfect Mission Assignment (5) will be acquired through the combination of advanced 
C4I and precision force. The clear Battle Assessment (6) will be created through a 
combination of Precision Force and ISR. It also insists that due to the New Systems of 
System, carrying out the combat action cycle of (4) (5) (6) will be quicker and eventually 
lead to a better performance on the battle field.
83
 The New System-of-Systems developed 
with much consideration on the maximization of their information technology dominance in 
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the battlefield. This information technology centred future war concept is described as 
Information warfare, Information-based warfare, and Network-centric warfare.   
 
By the middle of the 1990s MTR, which emphasized the military technology and support 
system, had been developed and settled into an RMA which also included the operational 
innovation and organizational adaptation as a significant element of military transformation. 
 
 
 
Diagram 2-1 A New System-of-Systems 
 
However, Owens’s New System-of-Systems theory also influenced each armed force’s new 
visions of future warfare during the 90’s. This included the Former Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan’s FORCE XXI84, the Former Chief of Naval Operations, 
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Jeremy M. Boorda’s CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability) 85 , and the Air Force’s 
SPACECAST 2020.
86
 Like the New System-of-Systems thinking, the core concept of these 
future war plans was creating a new combined system interconnecting ISR (sensor), a 
precision strike (shooter) and a C4I (network) which could help revitalize their dominance in 
information technology, while increasing their effectiveness and efficiency in the battlefield 
dramatically.  
 
Furthermore, each of these armed forces endeavours during the 1990s were similar to the 
early MTR and RMA advocates who interpreted military transformation as producing the 
best possible outcome in the battlefield using their edge in military technology, especially  
information technology. However, their efforts had a very serious pitfall in the battlespace 
overlapping problem which inevitably led to the lack of joint warfare concepts and 
organization to maximize the advantage in technology.
87
   
 
After each armed force’s future warfare plan showed the weakness in the battlespace 
overlapping and joint war-fighting, the US JCS published “The Joint Vision 2010” to 
enhance their notions of jointness and to help avoid overlapping battlespace, as well as to 
achieve a full spectrum dominance using their advanced technologies and new operations 
concepts.
88
 To that end, the vision was based on the information technology, which 
guaranteed superiority.  They aimed to develop new operation concepts such as dominant 
manoeuvres, precise engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.
89
  
 
This vision progressed from the early military transformation advocates’ view, which utilized 
the advantages in military technology and helped create the supporting system to guarantee 
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the ultimate efficiency of military technology on the battlefield. It became the modern 
concept of the RMA which also emphasized organizational adaptation and operational 
innovation to maximize the advantages in technology. This vision set the agenda of the full 
spectrum dominance which would require a considerable amount of operational innovation 
along with technological superiority and supporting system. In addition, the vision also 
envisaged that in order to fulfil the full potential of their advantages in technology with 
operational innovation, they would also require agile, innovative and flexible organization, 
innovative leadership, and new joint doctrine and training.
90
  Because this vision also aimed 
to reach full spectrum dominance through developing information technology and supporting 
systems, one cannot deny that it was also highly influenced by the New System-of-Systems 
thinking.  Nonetheless, it was still considerable progress in terms of military transformation. 
 
The US military transformation was based on their dominance in information technology, and 
it experienced another turn-around due to newly emerged threats such as terrorists, WMDs 
and their proliferation in the post-Cold War era, especially after 9/11.  In other words, the US 
military transformation focused on improvement in the areas of new technology, deterrence 
strategy (capability based approach) and the defence posture from the Cold War-type forward 
deployment and static defence posture to much more mobile and agile forces dealing with the 
newly emerging threats. Since North Korea has been classified as a rogue state which can be 
attributed in part to their WMDs and their proliferation, the major part of the defence posture 
review was looking at the US residential force overseas and the relationship with coalition 
partners. The US military transformation during the War on Terror era would severely 
influence the US-ROK alliance compared to the RMA before the 9/11 attacks.
91
 The 
following chapter will analyse how the US military transformation has come to terms with 
the newly emerged threats and their impact on the Korean peninsula.  
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2-3 The US Military Transformation after 9/11 and its 
Impact upon the US-ROK Alliance  
 
The US Military Transformation after 9/11 
 
In QDR 2006, the US military authorities cautioned “Although U.S. military forces maintain 
their predominance in traditional warfare; they must also be improved to address the non-
traditional, asymmetric challenges of this new century. These challenges include: irregular 
warfare (conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states); 
catastrophic terrorism employing WMDs; and disruptive threats to the United States’ ability 
to maintain its qualitative edge and to project power.” 92 In the contemporary US National 
Security Strategy of 2010, it was also confirmed that WMDs and their proliferation would be 
the greatest challenge ahead of them.
93
 The US military authorities had already warned before 
9/11 that potential foes’ WMDs and their proliferation would be the new security threat to the 
US.
94
 However, the US security threat recognition that “WMDs and their proliferation by 
potential adversaries as well as non-traditional small wars and counter-insurgency would be 
prime but newly emerged threats to their security” rose to the surface after 9/11.95 
 
In short, the US military authorities recognized that the security threats they would face 
would stem from small-sized local war, terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs or regional 
instability rather than the traditional massive full-scale war, and that Cold War type 
deterrence would not work against the newly emerged threats. After the US recognized these 
newly emerged threats, they readjusted their ongoing military transformation to deal with 
these contemporary problems. Along with better accuracy of target acquisition (sensor) and 
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stand-off precision technology, they targeted the actual capability to neutralize the potential 
foes’ threats (usually WMDs and HDBTs) as a part of a capability oriented deterrence 
approach; such as both conventional and unconventional earth penetrating weaponry, as 
mentioned in the NPR (Nuclear Posture Review) of 2001 and the “Report to Congress on the 
Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets” in July, 2001. 96  However, the US move 
especially after 9/11 to effectively face the newly emerged threats was not restricted to the 
development of required technology and capability-centred operation and deterrence strategy. 
They have also transformed their grand strategy, global defence posture, and their military 
organization. This chapter will briefly explain the thoughts regarding these transformations.  
 
The US grand strategy has been challenged and transformed. Until the 1990’s, the US 
maintained a Win-Win strategy that aimed to wage two major regional conflicts (MRCs) 
simultaneously and win both of them.
97
 However, this strategy was discarded by the Bush 
Administration after 9/11. Instead, in the “National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America (2004)”, the 1-4-2-1 strategy emerged. Its military objective was to defend the 
homeland (1), deter forward in and from the four regions (4), and conduct two (2), 
overlapping “swift defeat” campaigns.98 In addition, two years later, in the QDR2006, instead 
of the Four Regional Defence which was mentioned in the QDR2001 and National Military 
Strategy 2004, focus shifted towards global operation capability to 1) defend the homeland, 2) 
prevail in the War on Terror (terrorism) and conduct irregular operation, and 3) conduct and 
win conventional campaigns reflecting the challenge they had. 
99
   
 
Comparing this strategy to the Win-Win strategy in two major theatres of warfare from the 
1990’s and the 1-4-2-1 strategy of early 21st century where US military commitment was 
restricted to a two major theatre warfare, the QDR 2006 strategy extended their geographical 
coverage to a global scale since the possible conflict was not going to be the MRC but small 
wars and counter-insurgency due to changed security circumstances after 9/11. Therefore, 
they put a greater emphasis on military readiness, swift deployment and power projection 
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capability as well as the effects and capability based approach to the operation. In other 
words, along with the technical challenge, the US was pushed to develop new operation 
strategies, complete a major revamp on foreign residential forces, and restructure their 
organizational adaptations to face these newly emerged threats.   
 
In addition, as mentioned above, the RMA (military transformation) would not be effectively 
secured only by technological revolution. It also required operational innovation and 
organizational adaptation. Moreover, due to these newly emerged threats, the US military 
authorities would require developing a new deterrence approach and strategy which would 
become a crucial element of military transformation and help to culminate it. To deal with the 
newly emerged threat of the post-Cold War era especially after 9/11 and be prepared for the 
Fourth Generation War (4GW),
100
 their operational innovation, global defence posture and 
organizational transformation which emphasizes the flexibility (military readiness, swift 
deployment and power projection), capability, and effect has been facilitated.  
 
The US military doctrine was developed with careful consideration to the capability and 
effects against the newly emerged threats. The US already asserted in the Joint Vision 2010 
that they would reshuffle their armed forces towards becoming a capability-centred one.
101
  
Rapid Decisive Operation (RDO) is the product of this approach. The RDO was first 
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introduced in the April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance.
102
 The RDO is a joint operational 
concept for future operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, command 
and control, and effects-based operations to achieve the desired political/military effect as 
quickly as possible without wasting many resources or suffering heavy casualties and 
physical destruction.
103
 As can be witnessed from the RDO, they have also developed their 
operation strategy towards a capability centred one in order to cope with newly emerged 
threats.  
 
In addition, a series of US nuclear posture reviews clearly show that the US deterrence 
strategy has also been transformed to a strategy based on effect and capability. In other words, 
they have transformed from the Cold War type threat based nuclear deterrence (MAD, 
Mutual Assured Destruction) using strategic nuclear weapons towards a capability-based 
deterrence. During the Cold War, the functioning of nuclear deterrence based on the MAD 
threat was guaranteed due to both sides’ well-established communication, physical capacity 
to inflict unacceptable costs, and credibility to automatically retaliate. It was a reasonable and 
rational choice for both sides.
104
 
 
After the former Soviet Union collapsed, the US faced many different kinds of military 
threats and there was a growing recognition of the fact that the Cold War threat based 
deterrence approaches against the newly emerged threats is inappropriate.
105
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As President Bush emphasized on 20
th
 of May, 2003: 
 “The contemporary and emerging missile threat from these hostile states is fundamentally 
different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new 
tools for defence. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we 
cannot be wholly dependent on our capability to deter them. Compared to the Soviet Union, 
their leaderships are often more risk prone …. Deterring these threats will be difficult. There 
are no mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication with these states …” 106  
 
The typical newly-emerged threat for the US would be the regional rogue states such as Iran 
and North Korea as well as terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda; however, they may not 
be as prudent, attentive, and well-informed as was the case of the former Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the US had to develop new deterrence policies tailored to the newly emerged 
threats. These started from the better understanding of opponents and increasing the 
efficiency of deterrence by deploying a spectrum of activities aimed at improving their 
capability to deter diverse opponents and decimate the potential adversaries’ salience.107 
 
Therefore, the Cold War nuclear triad of SLBMs, ICBMs, and long-range bombers were 
transformed to the capability-based new triad of Offenses, Defences, and Infrastructure to 
cope with newly emerged threats.
108
 The three elements of the New Triad are tied together 
through command and control, intelligence, and planning capabilities. The New Triad has 
three elements: non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities (Offenses), active and passive 
defences (Defences), and defence-industrial infrastructure (Infrastructure), all supported by 
command and control, intelligence, and planning.
109
 In addition, since the WMD is usually 
hard to intercept once launched and produces devastating havoc once exploded, the US 
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adopted the pre-emptive strategy against WMD-related targets to increase their efficiency in 
dealing with offensive means and to help reduce the possible cost on their forces.
110
   
 
In other words, to help cope with the newly emerged threats, the US adopted capability and 
effect based operational and deterrence approaches. The US plans to develop an innovative 
operation strategy and new triad of deterrence with their advanced military technology to 
boost the capability and effectiveness against the newly emerged threat. Thus, the 
significance of technology has been enhanced while military technology has become an 
invaluable part of contemporary operation and deterrence strategy.  
 
There also have been many concerns with the US in waging the “War on Terror”; but the 
chief concern of the US military authorities was the recognition of overstretched and 
inflexible forces. New types of threats in the post-Cold War era called for changes in several 
different areas: from forward deployment to rapid deployment; and, accordingly, relations 
with allies should be redefined, and policies related to American forces overseas should be 
reviewed. Therefore, their global defence posture has also been transformed.  
 
The US government believed that force posture changes would strengthen their ability to 
meet their security commitments and contend with new challenges more effectively. As they 
transformed their posture, they were guided by the following goals: 
· Expanding allied roles and building new security partnerships.  
·Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not 
overly concentrating military forces in a few locations. 
·Focusing within and across regions by complementing tailored regional military presence 
and activities with capabilities for prompt global military action. 
·Developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and operating from the premise that 
forces will not likely fight in place. 
·Focusing on capabilities, not numbers, by reinforcing the premise that the US does not need 
specific numbers of platforms or personnel in administrative regions to be able to execute its 
security commitments effectively.
111
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This global defence posture transformation and doctrinal innovation (RDO) also confirms 
that the US is currently transforming their military by sharing its burdens with allies, 
developing flexibility, and focusing on effect and capability to deal with the newly emerged 
threats.  
 
The organizational adaptation has also been pursued. The Forces’ organization needed to be 
transformed from the forward deployment unit to carrying out the massive all-out war to the 
expeditionary unit equipped with quick despatching capabilities on a global scale to defend 
their national interest from these newly emerged threats. First of all, the units that possessed 
minimum independent joint operations capability were transformed from a division to a 
brigade to enhance their flexibility against newly emerged threats. The new concept behind 
these military units such as the BCT (Brigade Combat Team) and the UA (Unit of Action) 
emerged. In the US army, the reform of force organization to a SBCT (Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team) became one of the most important subjects. The US JCS General Eric K. 
Shinseki explained that the US army was organized into either light or heavy forces. He 
further mentioned that the light forces could respond rapidly as well as support operations but 
lacked any considerable staying power against heavy mechanized forces, while heavy ones 
were well equipped for war but difficult to deploy strategically.
112
  
 
Therefore the Army has been developing the Stryker brigades, which are equipped with 
medium-weight armoured vehicles, and which, according to General Shinseki, “will meet an 
operational shortfall that currently exists between the capabilities of our early arriving light 
forces and our later arriving heavy forces.” 113 These medium weight forces (SBCT) seek to 
combine the mobility and firepower of heavy forces with the deployability of light forces.
114
 
The SBCT was designed for rapid deployment; its goal was “to place a credible combat force 
on the ground anywhere in the world in 96 hours from liftoff.”115 Therefore the SBCT would 
                                                          
112 General E. K. Shinseki, The Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity, Army, October 2000, p. 
23 
113 General E. K. Shinseki, The Army Vision: A Status Report, Army, October 2001, p.33 
114 V. Alan, D. Orletsky, B. Pirnie, and S. Jones, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking 
Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Option, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2002, p.4  
115
 Ibid., p.6 
57 
 
be transferred by transport airplane and due to the heavy weight of Tanks and Bradley 
Armoured Vehicle, the light weight Stryker armoured vehicle would be adopted.  
 
In conclusion, the US military aimed to boost their flexibility (military readiness, quick 
deployment, and power projection) and capability to neutralize suspicious WMDs related 
targets. This was done to maximize their technological edge and effectively deal with the 
newly-emerged threats on a global scale and eventually deter the potential foe and prevent 
them from threatening their home land defence, Therefore, an operational innovation, the 
RDO, was introduced, and global defence posture was also transformed from the Cold War 
style static forward deployment forces to mobile and flexible forces. These were ready to be 
deployed during any global conflict swiftly as well as the new organizational adaptation of 
the SBCT. In addition, as one can see from the NPR, they vowed to develop both 
conventional and unconventional means to neutralize potential foes’ WMDs. This means that 
they had long planned to develop the earth penetrator, as well as raise the efficiency of target 
acquisition and stand-off precision technology.  
 
RMA after the Second Gulf War 
 
During the Second Gulf War, the US waged the EBO and NCW with their cutting edge 
information gathering assets (senor), C4I system and PGMs against the Iraqi forces who were 
armed with the typical conventional weapons for the mechanized battles. It was a massive 
success to the Coalition forces. However, the casualties have been soaring dramatically since 
Bush declared the end of the major combat action on 1
st
 of May, 2003. In other words, 
information-centred, small-size high-tech forces revealed the fatal weakness in the newly 
emerging 4
th
 generation war. Therefore, there was a big question mark on whether or not the 
contemporary military transformation is suitable for the complex irregular battlefield or 
not.
116
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The Military Balance 2007 also commented the contemporary military transformation and 
their point of criticism was below.  
 
 Firstly, the contemporary military transformation concept was made reflecting the strategic 
circumstance before 9/11. Therefore, it is not adequate in the War on Terror era. It also 
mentioned that QDR 2006 already acknowledged “the need for US forces to engage in 
irregular warfare activities including long duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, 
counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilisation and reconstruction efforts”. In 
addition, the demands of counter insurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have inspired 
adaptations in the areas of equipment, operations, training and doctrine.
117
 
 
Secondly, it mentioned the problem of light army and marines. Prior to the Iraqi and 
Afghanistan operation, it was widely accepted that information and surveillance technologies 
combined with stand-off PGMs would enable the smaller and lighter ground forces to have a 
similar power that larger and heavier forces had in the past. Light forces would be more 
efficient and cost effective, deploying more easily and requiring little logistical support. 
However, these light forces revealed the weakness in insurgent’s guerrilla tactics adopting 
Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) and suicide bomb.
118
  
 
Thirdly, it also mentioned that the US would need to adopt a new counter insurgency doctrine 
and operation as well as integrate civil and military effort. The counter-insurgency doctrine 
was based mainly on the idea of a communist-inspired, rural-based ‘people’s war’ when they 
went into the War and was not suitable to urban and high-altitude combat. In addition, the 
previous counter-insurgency doctrine did not give much attention to defend and build nascent 
regimes that lacked institutional capacity and were striving to achieve legitimacy which was 
the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, along with the training of urban and high-altitude 
combat skills, Army and Marine Corps have initiated cultural and language training, while 
leaders are trained on the development of human intelligence capabilities, civil affairs tasks 
and psychological operations. The new doctrine emphasises the need to secure the population, 
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develop precise intelligence and win the battle of popular perception, sometimes known as 
the campaign for ‘hearts and minds’.119 
 
The US DOD has been readjusting the path of military transformation reflecting these 
criticisms. Firstly, QDR 2006 emphasized the importance of ground forces and marine.
120
 
The strategic significance of C4I asset, Air power, and stand-off PGMs has been relatively 
reduced and the new emphasis was given to the special forces, civil military relations, and 
understanding of local culture and language.  
 
Secondly, even though, there was strong public opinion on withdrawal from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the number of troops, especially ground forces and the marines has been 
increasing until the eventual withdrawal.
121
 A major development of the Rumsfeld era was 
small-size high-tech forces; however the increase of number of troops is proof that they 
regard stability operation to be important as a military operation. According to DoD directive 
number 3000.05, they pledged that they would give significant attention to the stability 
operation. That directive mentioned that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission 
that DoD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable 
to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities 
including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, facilities, and planning”.122 Recognition of stability operation significance also can 
be found in the Field Manual 3-0. Along with the typical traditional ground operation of 
offence and defence, the Army added the stability and support operation to the manual and 
upgraded their significance to a similar level to that of offence and defence. The stability 
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operation was transformed from the supportive military action to achieving the specific 
objectives of the strategically significant military operation.
123
     
 
Thirdly, since the US army was focusing on the swift power projection capability, they 
became much more mobile and lighter forces. The original purpose of the army’s military 
transformation was to solve the problem of the infantry’s survivability and the mechanized 
force’s mobility by transforming a lighter task force based on their edge in information 
technology.
124
 However, to become lighter and mobile, they sacrificed the armour in the 
vehicles, most notably in a Humvee (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) which 
debilitated its survivability. Since the Humvee was not designed to offer protection against 
intense small arms fire, they exposed a critical weakness in urban combat and enemy IEDs. 
Therefore, they started to adopt the up-armour to have better survivability. But, the problem 
was not solved yet. Even though survivability has been increased,
125
 mobility has been 
severely restricted and the heavily armoured doors tend to jam shut, trapping the troops inside. 
Therefore, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) was developed and deployed. US 
TODAY reported in 2008 that fatalities caused by IEDs were decreased by 88% in May, 
2008 compared to May, 2007. In addition, in that article, it was reported that Defence 
Secretary Robert Gates had made obtaining at least 15,000 MRAPs his top priority last 
year.
126
 The dramatic replacement of Humvee to MRAP shows that, instead of lightness and 
mobility to be despatched promptly which was the core concept of the Rumsfeld era’s SBCT, 
the US army was going back to the traditional notion of armoured vehicle which gives 
enough protection and survivability to the infantry.  
 
Fourthly, the US Army has also revised the counter-insurgency doctrine. Reflecting their 
lessons during the Iraqi and Afghanistan War, they published FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. 
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The manual clearly described counter-insurgency as a political-cultural-sociological struggle, 
a civic effort far bigger than a straightforward military problem. This shifted the core of 
counter-insurgency from the soldier to people. In addition, since the safety of civilians 
became the central issue of operations, the political, social, and cultural elements are reflected 
heavily in this doctrine.
127
 
 
Fifthly, the US started to transform from Rumsfeld’s defence strategy stressing unilateralism 
and pre-emptive use of forces with the dominant hard power, into a defence strategy using 
soft power such as international collaboration and economic aid. The US DoD published the 
National Defense Strategy in June 2008. In this document, they vowed to invest in the 
counter-insurgency warfare capability and instead of killing and capturing insurgents or 
terrorists, they would try to win the heart and mind of local people by economic aid which 
would uproot terrorism.
128
    
 
Finally there has been a re-evaluation of EBO which was regarded as the core concept of 
future warfare along with NCW. James Mattis (Commander of JFCOM) mentioned in his 
article “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance For Effect Based Operation” that The US Army, 
US Marine Corps, and other observers have concluded that EBO: 
“  Assumes a level of unachievable predictability 
 Cannot correctly anticipate reactions of complex systems (for example, leadership, societies, 
political systems, and so forth) 
 Calls for an unattainable level of knowledge of the enemy 
 Is too prescriptive and overengineered 
 Discounts the human dimensions of war (for example, passion, imagination, willpower, and     
unpredictability) 
 Promotes centralization and leads to micromanagement from headquarters 
 Is staff, not command, led 
Fails to deliver clear and timely direction to subordinates 
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 Uses confusing terminology and is difficult to understand.”129 
 
However, the US Air Force insisted that the EBO is battle-proven in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and to weigh down a meaningful operation concept (the EBO) to an unworkable software 
engineering approach to war was not correct.
130
 Therefore, they still remained confident of 
the EBO and even though the EBO is no longer applied in ground operations especially close 
combat, the EBO would still be applied the US Air Forces’ strategic stand-off precision 
operation. In conclusion, the US army recognized that since small-size close combat is the 
mainstay of counter-insurgency, the utility of the EBO has been significantly reduced 
because it concentrated on parallel attacks on strategically important enemy targets to break 
down their systems and willingness to fight. The EBO debates showed that in the 
contemporary security situation, the entire conflict cannot be fixed by the dominant 
information and stand-off precision technology and traditional conventional approaches to the 
conflict are still the dominant form of warfare.    
 
Briefly, after Bush’s declaration of ending major combat in Iraq, May, 2003, the US has been 
seriously self-scrutinizing its military transformation and has been trying to find a new 
readjusted path of military transformation. They realized that a light, mobile, and high-tech 
war, using their advantage in information and stand-off precision technology, was not a 
suitable answer to the 4
th
 generation war. Instead, they found the utility of stability operations 
which requires more troops on the ground and an understanding of local culture and language, 
heavier armour, and small-sized close combat. The focus of readjustment of military 
transformation does not give away their edge in technology. Based on the edge, they are 
trying to integrate the useful lessons of traditional conventional warfare strategy, such as 
better survivability of infantry by beefing up the armour, civil military relationship, and 
small-sized troops’ command and training. The chapter below will discuss how the US 
military transformation has influenced the US-ROK alliances, especially after 9/11 and will 
show that the US-ROK alliance has been transformed to technology-centred forces.  
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How has US military transformation after the 9/11 attacks affected the US-ROK alliance?  
Discussed briefly in the chapter below, firstly, will be the traditional military partnership 
between the US and the ROK. Then, by researching US military transformation and its 
impact upon Korean peninsula security, it will be shown that the US-ROK alliance had been 
transformed to a technology-dominant force.  
 
US Military Transformation and Its Impact on the US-ROK 
Alliance  
 
The US Security Umbrella and Coordination during the Cold War Era 
 
The USFK has kept its influential role in the defence of the Korean peninsula. This section 
will first examine the US role in the security of the Korean peninsula after the Korean War. 
This demonstrated that US commitment to the ROK defence has been a vital factor behind 
North Korean deterrence. After that, how the US military transformation especially after 9/11 
has affected the US-ROK alliance will be analyzed to show that the joint forces have been 
transformed into technology-centred forces.  
 
Eisenhower took power in 1953 and tried to reach the armistice as early as possible during 
the Korean War. He wanted to withdraw most of the residential army under the principle of a 
money-saving and long-haul policy. During the long and exhausting Korean War, the US 
analysed that it had not been effective in using conventional weapons against the Chinese 
human sea tactics, and needed to adopt a productive strategy from a new perspective.
131
 
Eisenhower largely endorsed NSC-68. He accepted its monolithic view of international 
communism and the dangers it identified as communist subversion. However, the prolonged 
and attrite Korean war asked for huge US commitment and Eisenhower warned that care had 
to be taken that waging containment did not impose so many demands upon the American 
economy that it might destroy the very system that it was trying to defend. Then he rejected 
the profligacy of NSC-68 with its assumption that 20% of GNP could be devoted to defence. 
The crux of the New Look was thus to accept the principles of NSC-68 but to prosecute them 
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in ways that did not overburden American society. The result was that Eisenhower’s 
containment strategy had key themes: renewed focus on nuclear weapons, burden sharing 
with allies, and covert tactics and finally economic and psychological warfare. Eisenhower 
took the US back to a reliance on its supremacy in airpower and nuclear weapons.
132
  
 
After the Korean War, there were 325,000 US troops in the ROK; however their force was 
curtailed to 70,000 by 1957 according to the New Look policy. Even though the number of 
troops were reduced, the US role in ROK defence has been pivotal. First, they strengthened 
the ROK forces
133
 and had given the nuclear umbrella to ROK. On 28
th
 of January, 1958, the 
UNC confirmed that the 280mm Howitzers and the Honest John SSM which could adopt a 
nuclear warhead were deployed in the Korean peninsula. In addition, one MGM-1 Matador 
surface-to-surface cruise missile (Range: 1,100 km) squadron was also dispatched in 1959. In 
1961, the MGM-13 Mace missile (Range: 1,800km) was also introduced to the Korean 
Peninsula.
134
 Secondly, the USFK also became a trip-wire to ignite the automatic US 
engagement in the potential North Korean invasion, since the US 8
th
 Corps (US 2
nd
 and 7
th
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Infantry division: they were forward deployed and directly faced the NKPA in the cease-fire 
line) was in charge of the western front in front of Seoul.
135
 
 
The burden-sharing
136
and its nuclear and airpower dependence was one aspect of the New 
Look Policy that influenced ROK security in general. The New Look policy contributed to 
the massive army-centric structure of the ROK armed forces and the lack of airpower whose 
objective was limited to the purpose of air base protection and CAS (Close Air Support), as 
well as information warfare capability, which became the stumbling block for the ROK 
forces to achieve an independent operation capability.
137
 However, under the post-war 
reconstruction situation, the ROK forces were unable to develop the costly air, nuclear, and 
information power. Instead, the US gave the assurance of full scale engagement in the event 
of the North Korean invasion. They offered a nuclear umbrella and the strong air and 
information power support which contributed to deterrence success against North Korea. The 
US-ROK security cooperation (The US security guarantee) based on the New Look Policy 
was sustained during the Cold War era even though there was slight tension at times.   
 
During the 1960s, though, there was immense improvement of the NKPA, the US aided the 
ROK’s defence through the prolonged residence of US troops. Apart from that, through the 
Brown Memorandum (4
th
 of March, 1966) as the compensation of ROK commitment to the 
Vietnam War, the US authorized and supported the economic aid and modernization of the 
ROK Armed Forces. 
  
However, the shared burden policy in the Asia-Pacific region was intensified after the Nixon 
Doctrine instigated the ROK self-defence policy. Unlike the initial phase of the Youl-Gok 
plan in the early 1970s, which aimed at replacing the withdrawn US army’s 7th Division, the 
second phase of the Youl-Gok plan quickly raised the ROK’s own deterrence capability 
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through SSM and nuclear weapons, due to the scheduled further withdrawal of US residential 
troops by the Carter administration.
138
 However, the US commitment and security guarantee 
in the Korean Peninsula and their support to the ROK force modernization was not severely 
impaired. Because of the Nixon doctrine, the 7
th
 Infantry division returned to the US in 1971 
and the 2
nd
 Infantry Division which guarded the DMZ in Gaeseong-Munsan Axis (one of the 
most important North Korean Invasion Route to Seoul) was repositioned to the North of 
Seoul. However, the 2
nd
 Division was still within shooting-range of NKPA artilleries, which 
could act as the trip-wire for US automatic engagement. The US nuclear weapons were not 
removed at that time.
139
      
 
Moreover, the pursuit of their own deterrence capability, in the end, was swiftly abandoned 
due to Reagan’s reassurance of the Korean peninsula’s security by cancelling the withdrawal 
plan. Along with the recuperation of the US and ROK military cooperation, this led to the 
abandonment of the ROK’s nuclear and long-range SSM plan. As analysed, the US security 
guarantee and its back-up of the ROK modernization plan was the most influential factor of 
ROK armed forces build-up, strategy, and North Korean deterrence during the Cold War.
140
 
 
The US Military Transformation and its Impact on the Korean 
Peninsula during the Post-Cold War Era 
 
After the Cold War ended, there was a discussion on the matter of the US residential forces 
reduction and repositioning in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the US DOD submitted “A 
Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim; Looking Toward the 21
st
 Century” to 
Congress in April, 1990.
141
 This report targeted the readjustment and curtailment of US 
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residential forces in the area. They set up three developing stages without any clear targets on 
the second and third stage to manage the readjustment of the troops and increase the stability 
in the region. However, due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, a new approach to this matter was inevitable. Therefore, the US DOD submitted the 
rearranged report to Congress in July, 1992 with the much clearer target of repositioning and 
the curtailment of US troops in the area.
142
 Accordingly, by 1992, as a first stage measure, 
2,000 soldiers of the air forces and 7,000 army non-combatants in USFK were curtailed.
143
 
However, further scheduled reductions could not materialize due to the tension between the 
North and South in the early 90’s, most notably in the first North Korean Nuclear Crisis of 
1994.      
 
Moreover, at the Bottom-Up review in 1993, the US government declared their intention to 
possess the capability to win two MRCs, with North Korea named as a major flash point 
along with Croatia and Iraq. The US government promised to keep 100 thousand strong US 
forces in the region (Asia-Pacific). That commitment was not changed and revealed in the so-
called Nye Report in February, 1995, which also reaffirmed that they would keep 100,000 US 
forces in the region.
144
 Therefore, the US commitment to the Korean Peninsula had not yet 
been seriously transformed by the time 9/11 occurred.  
 
However, the US military strategy has been dramatically transformed since the 9/11 attacks, 
as mentioned above. Their military build-up and deterrence strategy has been transformed 
from a threat-based approach using strategic nuclear weapons towards effect and capability-
based approaches to face the newly emerging threats. Their military organization has also 
been transformed towards a mobile and flexible model (for instance the Stryker division) to 
be despatched in the possible conflict zone as early as possible with reasonable strength. In 
addition, the static and front deployed overseas forces were transformed into mobile and 
flexible models.  
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In this circumstance, the US-ROK alliance started to move away from the Cold War type 
force structure and strategy. They were not only targeting the Cold War type of territorial 
defence capability and threat-based deterrence against North Korea using their nuclear 
weapons and automatic US engagement but also they were raising the capability to neutralize 
the North Korean Asymmetric assets (WMDs) such as missiles, nuclear weapons, 
biochemical weapons and long-range artillery. Since those assets had become the major 
military assets of the contemporary NKPA and a concern for the US homeland security by 
their direct threat and proliferation, possessing a capability to neutralize those assets would 
eventually contribute to the deterrence against North Korea (capability and effect base 
deterrence approach).
145
 
 
In fact, even though there were no major transformations in development to the Korean 
Peninsula before 9/11, there were a handful of transformations that were well underway after 
the Soviet Union collapsed. First, the US-ROK alliance published a report called “A New 
Alliance for the Next Century: the Future of the US-Korean Security Cooperation” in 
1995.
146
 According to this report, the US had already prepared for a massive US ground force 
curtailment and stated that US commitment to the Korean peninsula would dominantly be 
high-tech Naval and Airpower, which meant the USFK would be built around flexibility and 
capability. However, it was only targeted during in the second stage (North-South peace 
settlement and reunification: Accommodation and Integration) out of the three stages of US-
ROK alliance development
147
 and their force was still mainly committed for the territorial 
                                                          
145
Until the Cold War ended, the US had utilized the nuclear umbrella and security guarantee to the 
ROK government to deter North Korea (Threat based deterrence approach). However, after the Cold 
War ended, the US-ROK alliance has transformed their deterrence approach to a capability centred 
one. They believed that once they were equipped with the capability to control the enemy’s (North 
Korea) strength, North Korea’s hostile action would be severely reduced and eventually deterred. 
According to this approach, the US-ROK alliance has mainly aimed for the capability to neutralize the 
NKPA long-range artillery and missiles, which are the core asset of North Korean asymmetric warfare 
capability, and have made significant progress in recent years. 
146
 J.D. Pollack and Y.G. Cha, et. al., A New Alliance for the Next Century: the Future of the US-
Korean Security Cooperation, Santa Monica, RAND, 1995  
147
 I.Y. Kim, HaeWaeJuDunMiGunJaeBaeChiGyeHwaikGwaJuHanMiGunEuiMiRae, Gunsanondan 
of ROK, 39: Fall.2004: p.43-44  
69 
 
defence against North Korea. As the concern for the North Korean WMDs was mounting in 
the middle of 90’s, the US-ROK alliance waived the threat-based deterrence (nuclear 
weapons) against North Korea
148
 and started to mull over a capabilities and effect-based 
approach to deter North Korea. It was reflected in the newly drafted OPLAN 5026 and the 
modified OPLAN 5027-94 during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. Therefore, 
the US-ROK military transformation was well underway before 9/11 and the War on Terror 
only worked to ignite major transformation in the Korean peninsula, even though there was 
not a major shift at this time from the Cold war type military strategy of territorial defence 
and deterrence using the automatic US engagement, 
 
The OPLAN 5026, drafted in 1993 during the first nuclear crisis, details an operation for 
carrying out surgical air-strikes on suspicious North Korean nuclear targets. OPLAN 5027 is 
an all-out war scenario and has been updated every two years since the first nuclear crisis in 
1994. OPLAN 5029 is the operation plan to prepare for a sudden change in North Korea 
(Contingency plan). The most noticeable thing about the OPLAN is that it developed after the 
first nuclear crisis in 1994.  According to the OPLAN 5026, during the first nuclear crisis, the 
US planned to deploy additional squadrons of aircraft and aircraft carrier battle group to ROK, 
including F-117s. However, during the second nuclear crisis in 2003, due to the more 
sophisticated nature of neutralizing North Korean WMDs (the list of strategically important 
targets had been significantly increased and their fortification also became a real issue), the 
Korean peninsula and Guam saw the deployment of additional assets in early March 2003. 
This brought a great deal of capability to the region that would be useful if the United States 
were to conduct surgical strikes.
149
 OPLAN has been reformed to properly deal with the 
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newly-emerged North Korean threat (asymmetric in character) and was also drafted to boost 
their edge in military technology concerning pre-emptive strike strategy. Therefore, OPLAN 
development after the first nuclear crisis clearly demonstrated that the US-ROK alliance 
approached the North Korean deterrence matter with the capability and effect-based 
approaches, using their edge in military technology rather than threat-based approaches.
150
 In 
addition, the GPR and Flexibility Agreement also confirmed the US-ROK alliance was 
targeting to build their military strategies around their edges in technology, flexible power 
projection capability, and effect and capability. 
 
As mentioned above, the US contemplated a major transformation of their force reallocation 
and projection which was finalized as the GPR. President Bush stated on 25 November 2003 
that the US would redeploy US troops all over the world: 
“Since the end of the Cold War, the once-familiar threats facing our Nation, our friends, and 
our allies have given way to the less predictable dangers associated with rogue nations, global 
terrorism, and WMDs. We have been actively transforming our defences to address these 
changes. While we continue to make progress in the transformation of our uniformed military, 
it remains for us to realign the global posture of our forces to better address these new 
challenges.”151 
 
The most significant objective of the GPR is to retain strategic flexibility, which would allow 
for intervention in unstable regions with limited military power. The GPR is the concept that, 
by acquiring and networking the stronghold and lily pad
152
 with each other, access to unstable 
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areas will be gained during emergencies, allowing for conflicts to be resolved quickly with 
timely power concentrations. Therefore, most of their military power was concentrated upon 
the power projection capability of the expedition force (strength deriving from quality and 
capability rather than quantity and number) and converting the residential troops’ operation 
concept from a fixed residence in a certain place to a flexible residence, which can move to 
another place if necessary. 
 
According to the GPR, the area which most needed the new residency of US troops were the 
places which possessed a high possibility of generating crisis. The US linked the following 
areas: North-Korea, South and Central Asia, the Middle-East, the Caucasus, East-Africa, and 
the Caribbean Sea as arcs of instability, and wished to relocate US troops in these areas to 
tackle possible conflicts and threats of terror.
153
  
 
The relocation concept of the US troops in Asia can be categorised as follows: First, to 
control the future rival China and tackle the Taiwan Strait problem, alliances and war 
supplies would be disposed around the Asia-Pacific region. Second, the set-up of a quick-
reaction troops system to search for and destroy international terrorist organisations such as 
the Jemaah Islamiah. Third, Guam will be used as a strategic stronghold in Asia.
154
 Fourth, 
the triangle defence system of US-Australia-Japan will be maintained and strengthened. Fifth, 
the curtailment and relocation of residential troops in the Korean peninsula (1/3 = 12,500), as 
well as the merger and abolition of small and dispersed garrisons.
155
 
 
If the troop relocation in Asia is finalised, the US will free themselves from their sole 
objective in the Asia-Pacific – tackling the North Korean threat – and move the residential 
troops in ROK to Pyongtaek, which has a harbour and airport nearby, to meet the quick 
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reaction system requirements of the GPR.
156
 Moreover, military garrisons and residential 
troops in ROK can be used flexibly in case of emergency according to the Strategic 
Flexibility Agreement that was reached in January, 2006.  
 
Since the US decided to redeploy their residential troops in the Korean Peninsula, under the 
terms of the War on Terror, they have become able to project their force flexibly and quickly 
in a low-key regional conflict which is desirable in this era. This also shows that the USFK is 
transforming according to the contemporary US military transformation trends, where 
technology and effect has become a real issue. As a result, the efficiency of the US military 
technology has steadily become a strategically significant issue in the Korean peninsula as 
well.  
 
In conclusion, the US-ROK alliance is transforming from the Cold War type, which was a 
static and threat-based military, to a high-tech, effect and capability-based force. At this point, 
one can question whether this technology-centred transformation would work effectively 
against the newly-emerged North Korean asymmetric threat. While the contemporary 
military technology granted severe advantages to the offender in the First and Second Gulf 
War, as well as the Israel and Palestine conflict in recent years for instance, there have also 
been cases where military technology failed to make any significant impact on the outcome 
of the conflict such as the recent insurgence of Afghanistan and Iraq. In consequence, one 
may ask why there was a difference of impact while the technologically-advanced forces 
adopted almost the same technology and similar operation strategies to maximize their edges 
in technology. This thesis aims to find an answer to this problem through case studies of the 
Korean peninsula. This thesis will reveal that technology alone cannot guarantee ultimate 
military success against a foe that holds the geographic edge and the capability to utilize it. 
Therefore, it has to be shown that 1) the geographic dimension of war is a significant one in 
the Korean peninsula, and 2) the NKPA possessed the capability to use the geographic edge 
in the Korean peninsula. For that purpose, the chapter below will firstly review the 
geographical dimension of war and examine the traditional Korean defence strategy, which 
further demonstrates the importance of using the geographical edge. The last chapter will 
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research the contemporary North Korean military strategy and tactics to show that North 
Korea has drafted a defensive plan using their geography and has raised the capability to use 
the geographic edge after they researched the Korean War, in addition to other contemporary 
conflicts.  
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Chapter 3 North Korean Geographic Edge and 
Tactical Preparedness  
 
3-1 Geographic Dimension of War and the Traditional 
Korean Military Strategy – The Significance of Tactical 
Preparedness using the Characteristics of Korean 
Peninsula Topography 
 
The geographical consideration has always been an integral part of war. Clausewitz 
mentioned that the geographical element is one of five elements of strategy along with moral, 
physical, mathematical, and statistical elements.
157
 He further mentioned that the grammar of 
strategy literally and inalienably is dictated by the distinctive requirements of physical 
geography.
158
 Sun Tzu listed geography among five constant factors which governed warfare 
in his book “The Art of War”.159 He also mentioned that there are six kinds of terrain – (1) 
accessible ground; (2) entangling ground; (3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) 
precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy – and also how to be 
successful in combat for each specific terrain.
160
 Colin Gray further confirmed that geography 
is an integral element or dimension of strategy and positioned it as one of 17 dimensions of 
strategy. He claimed that, “Although geography is a distinguishable dimension, it manifests 
itself in, and helps shape, strategy in every dimension.”161 Gray considered geography as (1) 
physical environment or ‘terrain’ (of all kinds), (2) the driver of technology for tactics, 
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logistics, and organization, and (3) the spatial and temporal relations that inspire rival grand 
theories of geopolitics.
162
  
 
Geography acts as the physical reality in a tactical, operational, and strategic level. In a 
tactical level, it is related to how to attack or defend the terrain, avenues of approach and 
fields of fire.
163
 For example, during the American Civil War Battle of Antietam (17
th
 of 
September, 1862), the Union Commander’s (Major General George McClellan) flawed 
chasing tactics and point of crossing (avenue of approach) against the natural barrier of the 
Antietam Creek, along with the Confederate’s adequate stalling tactics and defence line using 
the geography ultimately decided the fate of battle.
164
  
 
At an operation level, it is about how the unit will fight in the face of geographic restraints; 
however, the important contribution of logistics and intelligence cannot be ignored.
165
 For 
example, during the Imjin Wars, due to the natural barrier of the Korean peninsula and its 
distance from the Japanese mainland, the logistics and intelligence side of the war became a 
real issue and a major stumbling block for the Japanese forces. 
 
In addition, according to Colin Gray, geography drives the technological choices that 
dominate tactics, logistics, and military cultures.
166
 For example, the US aims to possess the 
capability to neutralize potential foes’ WMD facilities and centre of gravity targets, usually 
HDBTs, as an integral part of capability-based deterrence approach. Meanwhile, The ROK is 
also passionately pursuing the technology and capability to deal with the NKPA long-range 
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artillery, an integral part of North Korean asymmetric warfare strategy and usually hidden in 
underground tunnels.  
 
In regards to the Korean peninsula’s security, how would the geographic factor influence 
security? The topography of North Korea is dominated by a series of rugged mountainous 
ranges, comprising approximately 80 percent of the country’s landscape. This mountainous 
terrain is composed of resistant metamorphic rocks that form sharp ridgelines and less-
resistant granites that form valleys and depressions. These mountains are formidable barriers 
against movement in both the north-south and east-west direction.
167
 Therefore, due to the 
tough terrain, the North Koreans could fortify the strategically significant targets with ease. 
For the US-ROK alliance side, the North Korean advantage in the topography increased the 
difficulty in neutralizing the strategically important North Korean targets. The rivers in North 
Korea are usually deep and wide, especially in the summer season from heavy rain. The 
depth and flow of these rivers has proved to be too much for offenders to cross. The 
mountainous topography of North Korea was a major stumbling block to the technologically 
advanced US forces during the Korean War. In addition, it serves as a potential shelter for the 
North Korean WMDs. In conclusion, the topography of North Korea is highly favourable to 
the defender once it is properly fortified to maximize its value. Therefore, the geographic 
dimension in the contemporary Korean peninsula security should be a significant 
consideration.  
 
How could the geography of the Korean Peninsula affect both parties in possible conflicts? 
On a tactical level, the defender could strengthen their defence line with the steep mountains 
and deep and wide rivers; while for the offender it is about how to approach the defence line 
and break the defence. At the operations level, under the severe geographic restraints, how 
the offender and defender maximize the Korean peninsula topography in their operations, and 
gets sufficient supply and information, has often been the critical factor in the Korean 
peninsula conflict. In addition, since the US-ROK alliance develops and deploys advanced 
technology to neutralize the North Korean HDBT, one can say that the geographic factor 
drives the technological development in the Korean peninsula security. The geographic 
dimension of war in the Korean peninsula is still one of the major dimensions to be 
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considered, and the efforts of the technologically advanced US-ROK alliance to overcome 
this geographic restraint has become increasingly limited due to the North Korean capability 
to maximize its worth. Under this circumstance, one critical question emerges. As Colin Gray 
said, the US-ROK alliance has developed and deployed the technology to overcome 
geographic restraints. However, do those efforts effectively work against the geographically- 
advantaged NKPA who understand how to use their edge and continually frustrate the 
security abilities of the US-ROK alliance? 
 
The chapter above analysed how the US-ROK alliance has transformed their forces to a 
technology-centred one, reflecting the contemporary trend of military transformation and the 
War on Terror. The section below will review the traditional Korean Peninsula defence 
strategy using the geographic edge. In doing so, it will reveal the strategic significance of the 
defence strategy through using the geographic edge and military readiness to use the 
geographic edge in Korean peninsula security.  
 
Traditional Defence Strategy of Korea  
 
Korea has not always found herself in a defensive position. Especially when the Korean 
peninsula was divided into three kingdoms in ancient times
168
, to be more prosperous, each 
country invaded the other for their territorial gains. In that time, JyunRyub, which was a 
national hunting event to train individual horse-riding skills and raise battle competence with 
the bow (the final winner became a national hero), was supervised by the king to show off 
their military power and train soldiers.
169
 So, JyunRyub became an important national event 
to train for manoeuvre warfare.  
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offensive warfare was concentrated on those seasons, one could say that both events were closely 
related to each other. In other words, there was the close strategic connection between their offensive 
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training. (Ibid., p.75)  
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The ancient kingdom Goguryeo effectively applied manoeuvre warfare to extend their 
territory both in the Korea peninsula and the North East of China, through their cavalry battle 
strategy acquired through JyunRyub and their nomadic lifestyle. When they conquered the 
ancient kingdoms of Okjeo and Dongye, which were geographically adjacent to them and 
agricultural societies based on their fertile prairies, they took a chance on the enemy’s 
military weakness.
170
 They used the heavy cavalry’s offensive manoeuvre to cause havoc in 
the enemy’s infantry-centred defence line. On the other hand, when they fought against the 
militarily stronger Xian Bei tribe to extend their territory to the Liao River in the North East 
of China, they gave false information to pay less attention to the defence. Then they applied 
deception and guerrilla warfare onto the enemy battle array, as well as making an effort to 
finally seduce the enemy’s main attack to their supporting attack. They then annihilated the 
enemy by turning around its main force in an appropriate time and place.
171
 This outcome 
would not be possible without their manoeuvre warfare capability using the mobility of their 
cavalry. Ancient Korean kingdoms like Goguryo considered offensive manoeuvre warfare 
through heavy armed cavalry as the one of the main axes of their strategies.  
 
In addition to this, many of the ancient and medieval Korean kingdoms also waged pre-
emptive warfare against tribes or tribal countries around the Korean peninsula since they 
were worried about those tribes becoming a security threat through rapid tribal unification.
172 
For example, even though there was a significant intention to expand their territory, the 
Goryeo dynasty (918-1392) and Joseon dynasty (1392–1910) attacked the Jurchens173 around 
their northern border to prohibit the unification of the tribe and to further disturb Korean 
peninsula security. As a result, Goryeo constructed nine castles (1107) in the North Eastern 
section of the Korean peninsula.
174
 Four counties and six fortresses (1433–1449) in the 
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southern part of Yalu and Tumen River were constructed during the Joseon dynasty era.
175
 To 
prevent any further pirate pillage, Goryeo (1389) and Joseon (1419) also organized an 
expedition force and attacked the pirate main base on the Tsushima island of Japan.
176
 As 
explained, the type of warfare Korea has waged is not always a defensive warfare. However, 
it remains to be explored why defensive warfare has been the main strategy of the Korean 
peninsula. 
 
Korean dynasties mostly possessed numerically inferior military capability compared to the 
Chinese, which affected their basic strategy. Tactically speaking, it was not an inspired idea 
for Koreans to wage an open field combat against the northern nomad tribes such as the Kitan, 
Jurchens and Mongol, who were good at cavalry warfare, the Chinese who had the numerical 
superiority, and the Japanese, who had excellent hand-to-hand combat skill.
177
 
 
Therefore, rather than an offensive strategy and open field combat, their military strategy 
started from how to defend with the edge they had. The most significant traditional Korean 
peninsula defensive strategies are defence in depth, which utilizes the castles on the hill and 
the rivers on the way to the invader's main strategic target, the capital of Korea. They also 
used, Scorched Earth tactics, which worsen the invader’s weakness of extended supply 
line.
178
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Invaders had a long journey to reach the Korean peninsula. Therefore they always had 
problems with the long supply line. These invasions would also be delayed by the hot and 
wet Korean summer and sometimes with floods and epidemics. In addition, the invader had 
to overcome the Korean traditional defence in depth, which would delay the enemy advance 
further and cause them a considerable headache when they tried to avoid attacking castles. 
These natural barriers, the long journey, the climate of Korea as well as the Korean 
traditional defensive strategies and tactics which utilize these strategic advantages, all caused 
a delay in their advance. Therefore, for the invader, logistical problems were usually the 
biggest concern. Ultimately, the consistent lack of supplies made it almost impossible to 
accept the chilly and windy Korean winter.   
 
Traditionally, Koreans combined the Scorched Earth tactics with the defence in depth to 
strengthen their advantage in defensive warfare. The concept of the Korean castle-centred 
defence in depth strategy was coupled with Scorched Earth tactics. First, the entire public 
would gather at the castle on the hill, which was normally located on the way to the capital, 
burn everything, and poison the water. With their long supply line, the invaders would seek to 
make use of the local supply and start to pillage. However, these tactics left nothing to help 
the invaders wage a protracted war. Because these were located on the way to the capital, 
they had to make a decision whether they would occupy the castle or leave it. If they attacked 
it, they would suffer serious casualties and waste time. Also, since the castles were all linked, 
once one was in danger, others would support it. If they left it to save time and casualties, 
then combatants from these castles would attack the enemy rear line in order to cut off their 
supply. If the invaders finally decided to withdraw, mostly because of the cold Korean winter 
and protracted warfare, the combatants might also decide to attack the invader’s withdrawal 
force.
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This strategy shows that traditional Korean military thought was immensely influenced by a 
mixture of topography and climate. The core characteristic of this defence strategy is the 
protracted defence and guerrilla warfare strategy using the Korean peninsula’s mountainous 
topography and climate. These defensive strategies have proven to be very effective. For 
example, based on this strategy, Goguryeo repelled four massive invasions (598, 612, 613, 
and 614) of the Chinese dynasty Sui (581-618). The Sui dynasty eventually collapsed and one 
of the main reasons behind this was the immense cost of the failed expedition to Goguryeo.
180
  
 
In conclusion, even though there is an element of offensive strategy to Korean strategic 
thinking, its main structure can be defined as a defensive strategy using a geographic edge, 
adjusted to the specific security situations of the Korean peninsula. However, due to the 
lengthy peace of the early Joseon dynasty, the Joseon government was negligent in repairing 
or building the castles which were the core of this defence strategy, except for the king of the 
Taejong era (1400–1418). Therefore, this traditional defence strategy actually could not be 
adopted by Joseon before the Japanese invasion in the 16
th
 century.
181
 It contributed 
immensely to the Joseon’s initial military fiasco during the Imjin Wars. The strategic 
significance of a defensive strategy using mountainous geography in the Korean peninsula 
will be researched in detail using the Imjin Wars as a case study. 
 
3-2 The North Korean Military Strategy Development   
 
The section above analysed how the US-ROK alliance has been transformed to a technology-
centred force and the significance of geographic factors in Korean strategic thinking. It also 
reviewed the few contemporary writings regarding the issues of modern military technology, 
skill, and geography. These argue that the strategic effect of modern military technology is 
significantly reduced against the foe that possesses the geographic edge and the military 
readiness to use this edge. This section will reflect how the research and experience of the 
Korean War and several contemporary conflicts caused the NKPA to develop strategies and 
tactics that use their geographic edge while upgrading their capability to take advantage of 
their strategies and tactics.  
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Foundation of the NKPA Military Strategy  
 
The US and ROK military analysts argue that, based on the Soviet military strategy, the 
current NKPA military strategy added the experience of the Korean War, Kim Ilsung’s anti-
Japanese guerrilla warfare, and several local wars.
182
 Kim Ilsung acquired the PLA (People’s 
Liberation Army) irregular warfare strategy through the anti-Japanese guerrilla experience 
from 1931 to 1940.
183
 He then learned the Soviet regular warfare strategy by serving for the 
Soviet army from 1941 to 1945.
184
 Through the Korean War experiences, North Korea also 
recognized that the NKPA needed to adopt strategies and tactics which reflected the specific 
Korean peninsula’s geographic characteristics such as steep mountains, deep and wide rivers, 
and the long coast line. Furthermore, they also learned many lessons from local wars and 
conflicts.
185
   
                                                          
182
 M.R. Lee, BukHanGunSaJeonRyakEuiYeokDongJeokSilCheWaKimJeongIlCheJeEuiGunSaDongHyang in 
Bukhanyeonguhwae, BukHanEuiGunSa, Seoul, Gyonginmunhwasa, 2006, p.247-250 
M.S, Jang, op.cit., p.28-37 
G.S. Kim, JoSeonInMinGunChangSeolGwaBalJeon in Graduate School of  North Korean Studies,  
Kyungnam University, BukHanGunSaMunJeEuiJaeJoMyong, Paju, Hanwool, 2006, p.116-117 
M.R. Lee, KimJeongIlCheJeEuiBukHanGunDaeHaeBu, p.58-61 
KIDA, BukHanGunSaCheJePyongGaWaJeonMang, Seoul, KIDA press, 2006, p.48-50 
W.S. Seo, BukhanJeonRyakSaSangShinRon, Seoul, Hanwon, 1990, p.67-83 
183
 Since he served for PLA from 1933 to 1940, he had received an education of Mao Zedong’s 
Peoples’ war theory 
184
When he returned to North Korea, he was a Soviet Army Colonel and had studied the 
Tukhachevsky’s deep operation theory and saw the possibility for its application and success during 
the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)  
185
  (1) Cuban Missile Crisis ( October, 1962) – Independent operation capability  
      (2) Vietnam War (1962-1975) – Irregular warfare 
      (3) Arab-Israeli conflict (June, 1967 and October, 1970)-  Surprise lightning attack 
      (4) Soviet  War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)– Independent defensive warfare capability  
Excerpted from– W.S. Seo, op.cit., p.83 
Meanwhile, from the First Gulf War experience, they realized the might of modern warfare. 
Consequently, they positively pushed ahead the local development plan of strategic weaponry most 
notably in the form of missile and nuclear weapons, which is also in the category of WMD, and 
83 
 
The NKPA military strategy that was used during the Korean War was based on Soviet 
Military Strategy, which will be reviewed in the Korean War case study in Chapter 5. 
However, after they avoided a military catastrophe due to the massive Chinese engagement, 
the NKPA started to modify their strategy to adjust the specific Korean peninsula 
requirements. The NKPA discussed the strategic and tactical mistakes of the Korean War 
during the initial phases of war during the Third Plenum of the Second KWP Central 
Committee. This Plenum has a significant meaning for the further development of NKPA 
military strategy, since it tried to complement the detected defect of Soviet Warfare strategy 
application to the Korean peninsula and became the trigger of the indigenous North Korean 
military strategy. This was adopted to meet the specialty of the Korean Peninsula rather than 
a reckless imitation of Soviet military strategy.
186
   
 
In this plenum, the North Korean military authorities first picked the reserve problem which 
was a significant element of Soviet military strategy. They confessed that, due to the lack of 
reserves, they were not successful during the August and September offensive to the UN 
defence position in the Naktong River and they failed to prohibit the sudden collapse of their 
troops following the UN success of the Inchon landing operation. They also recognized that, 
since they did not have the proper local defence position, facility, and shelter, their reserve 
problem became greater and eventually they could not prevent the UN forces from marching 
north until the Chinese engagement.
187
 Their recognition of reserve problems was reflected in 
the decision to bolster their defence facilities and build up a strong reserve in their rear during 
the Korean War. After the Korean War, the North Korean recognition of problems with 
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reserve and defence facilities in the rear was also reflected in their Four Military Guide Line 
as “Arming the entire population and fortifying the entire country”.188  
 
Secondly, they evaluated that the sudden NKPA collapse was due to the lack of officer 
classes’ commanding capability, troops’ discipline and ideology education. Once they earned 
the crucial time, they started officer re-education in every branch of military service. The 
head of the Soviet military advisory group and new ambassador to North Korea, Razuvayev, 
enforced a strict and systemic five month long re-education, even though the frontal unit kept 
asking for reinforcement.
189
 They also intensified the ideological brainwashing of the troops 
and gave an opportunity for the non-communist member soldiers to join the communist party 
according to their military merit. The effect of these measures started to come out on the 
NKPA’s stubborn defence campaign during the fall of 1951, most notably during the Battle 
of Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge Line.
190
  
 
Thirdly, they mentioned their failure to exterminate the enemy’s combat capability which 
was highly appreciated in the Soviet military strategy. At the initial stage of the Korean War, 
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the North Korean headquarters ordered taking out a symbolic target such as a radio station, 
government facility, or prison rather than follow the suggestions from the Soviet military 
advisory group, which was to take the Han River Bridge to exterminate the ROK main forces 
in the North of the Han River.
191
 Along with their failure in the Battle of Chunchon, this 
decision gave crucial time for the ROK forces to regroup and lay the defence line in the Han 
River, which consequently gave the US the opportunity to engage in the Korean War. The 
North Korean military authorities and Soviet military advisory group believed that the NKPA 
failure of exterminating the ROK’s strength in the initial stage of war was one of the main 
reasons behind their heavy losses in the Naktong River Line campaign. They therefore 
developed the chase and annihilation operation concept further.   
 
Fourthly, they pointed out that their forces failed to overcome the technological disparity 
(especially the UN airpower superiority) which brought about various supply and supporting 
firepower problems to the frontal unit. To overcome this defect, they vowed to improve their 
highland and night combat skills under the US air supremacy, to master land mine warfare to 
help weaken the enemy’s mobility, and to enhance their logistical capability and indigenous 
war industry productivity.
192
 This move was reflected in, “modernizing weaponry, doctrine 
and tactics under the principles of self-reliance (Juche) in national defence” and “fortifying 
the entire country” in their Four Military Guidelines. 
 
Finally, they pointed out the failure of guerrilla warfare. They expected a vast communist 
uprising in the ROK rear and a melt-down of the ROK forces. However, this did not happen 
and they failed to lay down the second front in the ROK rear line until the defeated NKPA 
waged its guerrilla warfare.
193
 This led to a vast build-up of their irregular warfare force and 
capability after the Korean War.     
 
Reconstruction of the Economy and Armed Forces; (1954-
1961) 
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IMHC, SoRyeonGunSaDanJangRaJuBaYeFEui6.25JeonJaengBoGoSeo1, Seoul, Guningongjehwae, 
2001, p.182-183   
192
 M.S. Jang, op.cit., p.33-34 and p.152-153 
193
 Ibid., p.34 
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Through the Korean War experience, the NKPA realized that as long as the US forces were 
stationed on the Korean peninsula, immediate communization using military means was 
almost impossible. Therefore, throughout the 1950’s the NKPA kept a relatively cautious 
approach to the Korean peninsula communization resorting to arms. Even though they paid 
attention to the military capability enhancement, they paid more attention to the economy 
reconstruction. Militarily, taking a lesson from the harsh experience under the UN air 
supremacy during the Korean War, they tried to strengthen their airpower
194
 capability and 
pursued their ordnance modernisation rather than focusing on increasing the size of their 
troops.
195
 The North Korean Air Force was expanded to five air divisions, with 33,000 troops 
as of 1959, which included the MIG-15 and newly developed MIG-17.
196
 Accordingly, North 
Korea focused on the economy’s reconstruction, and the improvement of quality of forces, 
rather than increasing the quantity which could also cause the labour deficiency. At that point, 
even though their airpower was inferior to US FEAF (Far East Air Force) strength, it was far 
superior to the ROK Air Force whose main fighter was still an old fashioned F-86F.   
 
The Preparation of Independent War and Emphasis on 
Guerrilla Warfare; (1962-1975) 
 
Entering into the 1960’s, the North Korean security circumstance changed dramatically. Most 
of all, there was the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA)197 withdrawal in 1958 and the 
purge of an officer class that served the Chinese Army before, since they were a potential 
                                                          
194
 G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.110 
195
 From 1951 to 1956, the NKPA introduced around 2,000 tanks and self-propelled guns including 
the newly developed T-54 tanks and SU-100 self-propelled guns. Excerpted from- Ibid., p.114 
In fact, the NKPA did not need to expand the size of troops at that moment since both sides possessed 
almost the same size troops. In 1955, the NKPA and PVA possessed slightly more than 650,000 
troops including 250,000 PVA soldiers, and the US-ROK joint forces possessed around 700,000 
troops including 85,500 US residential forces. Excerpted from- IMHC, HanMiGunSaGwanGyeSa, 
Seoul, IMHC, 2002, p.677 
196
 ROK Air Force, GongGunSa2 (the history of Air Force Volume 2), ROK Air Force Headquarter, 
1964, p.89 
197 The Chinese sent their troops with volunteer status since they did not wage the official war against 
the US and UN which could lead to the all-out war against the US.    
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threat to the Kim Ilsung regime. Therefore, the quality and quantity of their force retrograded. 
Furthermore, the US deployed nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula from 1958.
198
 The 
military balance in the Korean peninsula sharply turned against North Korea. The 
democratization movement of the ROK, which could be an opportunity for the North Korean 
to at least raise the communist sympathiser, was quickly overturned by the anti-communist 
military coup d'état.
199
   
 
In terms of the international security circumstance, North Korea was involved in an ideology 
debate between China and the Former Soviet Union. Since both countries wanted to court 
North Korea to their side, North Korea managed to sign “The DPRK (Democratic People`s 
Republic of Korea; North Korea) Soviet Union Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance” on the 6th of July, 1961 and the same treaty with communist China on the 
11
th
 of July, 1961. However, the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union 
became tense after the “Cuban Missile Crisis” since North Korea criticised Khrushchev’s 
revisionism, which included peaceful coexistence with the US in their official newspaper 
Rodong Sinmun on the 17
th
 of
 
November, 1962.
200
 After this, the relationship between North 
Korea and the Soviet Union worsened and North Korea could not expect any more military 
aid from the Soviet Union.
201
 After the military delegate sent to the Soviet Union returned to 
North Korea empty-handed, the Fifth Plenum of the Third KWP Central Committee was held 
urgently on the 10th of December. In this plenum, they resolved to strengthen military power 
even though there would be slight constraints on the economic development and put out 
                                                          
198 J.B. Lee, NamHanEuiHaekMuGiBaeChiWaBukHanEuiHaekMuGiGaeBal1, Pyonghwahakyeongu, 
9(3), p.27-28 
199
 The Rhee Syngman regime was collapsed by the April Revolution in ROK since they committed 
the electoral corruption during the presidential election on the 15
th
 of March, 1960. But the social 
unrest was quickly quelled after the anti-communist military coup d’état on 16th of May, 1961. 
200
 G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.131, and  S.H. Kang, op.cit., p.23 
During the early part of the Sino-Soviet ideology split, North Korea actually supported China since 
Khrushchev’s condemnation of personal cult targeting Stalin could influence the North Korean despot 
Kim Ilsung’s position in North Korea.  
201 After North Korea criticised the Soviet’s stance on the Cuban Missile crisis, they sent a military 
delegation to Moscow and asked for military aid (29
th
 of November–5th of December, 1962) but the 
Soviets refused it. The relationship between them understandably worsened. Excerpted from- T.Y. 
Ham, GukGaAnBoEuiJeongChiGyeongJaeHak, Seoul, Bubmoonsa, 1998, p.164  
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Three Military Guidelines: To arm the entire population; to fortify the entire country; to train 
the entire army as a “cadre army”.202 From then on, they started to use one-third of their 
national budget towards the national defence sector. This was the beginning of “developing 
the military capability along with the economy at the same phase” policy.203  
 
The Four Military Guidelines which added “Modernizing weaponry, doctrine, and tactics 
under the principle of self-reliance in national defence” to the pre-existing Three Military 
Guidelines became, in 1966, the spine of North Korean military doctrine. However, in 
regards to the characteristics behind these guidelines, there was a divided opinion. Most of 
the ROK military analysts, especially from the Armed Forces, argued that, since this military 
doctrine was adopted to strengthen their military capability in efforts to become the 
groundwork of a matrix of further offensive warfare capability build-up, it was quite an 
offensive military doctrine. However some civilian military analysts such as Ham Taekyoung 
and Kim Gwangsoo, argued that since the “Three Military Guidelines” were drafted under 
various North Korean security dilemmas such as the PVA withdrawal, the US nuclear 
weapons deployment in the Korean peninsula, as well as an era of discord with the Soviet 
Union, it was originally drafted as a defensive military doctrine. However, both opinions 
agreed that the adopted point of the Three Military Guidelines was the tipping point in NKPA 
military strategy transformation to a model of self-reliance. To overcome these security 
dilemmas, North Korea opted to chase after the military idea of self-reliance, as outlined in 
the “Three Military Guidelines” as their military policy principle, and develop their military 
capability along with their economy simultaneously.  
 
However, entering into 1965, the security situation in North Korea began to turn in their 
favour. Most of all, the US forces started heavily concentrating their efforts on the Vietnam 
War while the relationship between the Soviet and North Korea improved following the 
                                                          
202
 After the PVA withdrawal, North Korea suffered the numerical disparity therefore securing enough 
reserve was vital. It was reflected in the, “arming the entire population and training the entire army as 
a cadre army,” to lead the newly recruited military reserve in the case of war. Since the US deployed 
nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula, they started to build an underground shelter in 1959. This 
movement was developed using the logic that the entire country had to be fortified under the 
possibility of US threat. Excerpted from- G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.131-132 
203
 Ibid., p.131-132 
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Khrushchev regime collapse. In this circumstance, North Korea quickly turned onto the 
offensive. In 1966, North Korea added the “modernizing weaponry, doctrine, and tactics 
under the principle of self-reliance in national defence” to the Three Military Guidelines. This 
became possible since they could expect economic, technological and military aid and 
cooperation from the Soviet Union.
204
 Because the US was involved in the Vietnam quagmire 
and North Korea’s relationship with the Soviets had greatly improved, North Korea believed 
that if they succeeded in instigating social unrest in the South and overthrowing the anti-
communist regime, they could reach a culminating point of waging the second Korean 
War.
205
 However, their attempt to instigate social unrest failed and only worked to increase 
anti-communism opinion in the South due to the atrocity of guerrilla warfare. Even though 
their attempt was foiled, the NKPA continuously pursued the offensive warfare capability 
build-up.  
 
At that time, however, the focus was in strengthening their irregular warfare capability. Choi 
Hyon (The Minister of National Defence) and Oh Jinwoo (The Chairman of the General Staff 
Department) who took over the position in 1969 were adept at irregular warfare due to their 
personal careers. The North Korean irregular force dramatically expanded from the end of 
the1960s, unlike the regular force whose expansion was stagnated.
206
 At that point, three 
Armies in the front possessed a light infantry brigade in which each retained the outstanding 
irregular warfare capability. Their Navy, Air Force, and General Staff Department also 
possessed the special warfare brigade by 1978.
207
 In addition, from the early 70’s they 
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 M.S. Jang, op.cit., p.129 
205 In 1968, the security crisis crept into the Korean peninsula again and reached its peak.   
22/01/1968 – ROK President had an assassination attempt by the North Korean special forces 
23/01/1968 – Pueblo incident (This was the first surrender of an American naval vessel since the War 
of 1812) 
206
 Choi Hyon took charge of NKPA 2
nd 
Corps which was famous for the irregular warfare in the 
enemy rear line during the PVA 3
rd
 offensive and Oh Jinwoo was the captain of NKPA 766
th
 
Independent unit which was assigned to the irregular warfare in the enemy rear during the initial 
phase of the Korean War.   
207
 The Navy and General Staff department put one brigade under direct command while the Air Force 
possessed three brigades at the time. The NKPA Irregular warfare unit has two kinds. First of all, the 
role of the light infantry brigade is to infiltrate the enemy rear before the main force launches the all-
out offensive, and attack the enemy forward command centre or strategically important military target 
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secretly started to build underground tunnels to infiltrate the enemy rear in massive numbers. 
By strengthening their irregular warfare capability, they acquired the capability to wage the 
so-called Two-Front War which combined modern and guerrilla warfare, regular and 
irregular warfare, and large and small troops to perplex the enemy in the rear and make an 
easier breakthrough on the front.
208
    
 
 The Development of Regular Force, Improvement of Mobile 
Warfare Capability and Completion of Two-Front War 
Strategy; (1976- ) 
 
After the mid 1970s, even though the NKPA still pursued the Two-Front War strategy, they 
prioritised the regular warfare capability build-up, unlike the early 70s. They concentrated 
especially on elevating the mobile warfare capability. This was because from the middle of 
the 70s, the new officer class that had received a spell of re-education in the Soviet military 
school, most notably in the Frunze Academy. There they had learned the orthodox Soviet 
OMG strategy, which started to be introduced in the NKPA headquarters.
209
 Kim Cholman 
the vice chairman of the General Staff Department at that time also had a re-education spell, 
and published an article called “HyunDaeJeonEuiGwaHakJeokTeukSeongGwaSeungRiEuiYoIn” 
(the scientific nature of modern warfare and key factor of military victory) in the North 
Korean Journal “Keunroza” (Worker) in 1976.210  This article contains several important 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the front to cause the havoc in the enemy front and secure the main forces’ advance passages such 
as the bridge and defile. The role of General Staff Department, Navy, and Air Force special warfare 
units are more strategic. Their main role is to attack the strategic target in the rear such as the enemy 
command centre, airport, harbour, energy facility.  
Analysed from- G.S. Kim, op. it., p.141-142, M.R. Lee, KimJeongIlCheJeEuiBukHanGunDaeHaeBu, 
p.147-154, KIDA, op.cit., p.52-53  and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, North Korean Special Forces, 
Annapolis, Maryland, 1998, p.104-114 
208
 KIDA, op.cit., p.53, and G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.139 
209
 G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.155 
210
 He characterised Modern Warfare as followings in that article.  
1) Three dimensional warfare with no distinction between the front and rear  
2) Highly modernized mechanized warfare  
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concepts that influenced the North Korean operation strategy until the early 1990’s – the 
significance of (1) operational and tactical manoeuvre through the application of mechanized 
troops, (2) firepower to support the deep operation,
211
 (3) deep strike, and (4) command and 
control. 
 
He also mentioned that, for a swift decisive victory, the entire operational plan should target 
speedy and mobile warfare.
212
 This article presaged the NKPA effort to enhance their 
mobility and their mobile warfare capability. First, they transformed their regular force 
structure to one more suitable for mobile operation. By allowing the General Staff 
Department to command the Corps directly, the command structure was simplified which 
also guaranteed a more prompt command and control.
213
 They also divided their mechanized 
division to brigade size to meet the specific requirements of the Korean peninsula 
topography.
214
 Secondly, in terms of force modernisation for mobile warfare, they spurred on 
the artillery automation and self-propelling as well as the domestic imitation of the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
       3)   Prompt phase in operation and combat 
       4)   Protracted warfare 
Excerpted from– Ibid., p.154 
211
 Due to the short depth of the Korean peninsula, the entire depth simultaneous operation could be 
achieved with long-range artillery and SSMs. The NKPA emphasis on the firepower reflected their 
weakness in airpower. 
212
 KIDA, op.cit., p.50-51 
Even though he mentioned that the general nature of modern warfare is a protracted one, he also said 
the speedy phase of the operation and combat level. It looks very contradictory. But under the specific 
Korean peninsula security situation where US reinforcement would be a vital factor, waging prompt 
and mobile warfare makes it a very important element for the NKPA. The general understanding of 
this statement is that the North Korean military targets the speedy mobile warfare against ROK before 
the US is fully engaged in the Korean conflict, but once the US is fully engaged, they would 
transform their strategy to a protracted one to generate the most devastating cost possible to the US.    
213
 G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.151 
214
 W.S. Seo, op.cit., p.103 
Because the Korean peninsula boasts steep mountains where only a narrow road is available to the 
mechanized troops, and deep and wide rivers where a large scale river crossing would be a very tough 
job for the offender; reducing the size of mechanized troops would guarantee better mobility.   
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tank.
215
 In addition, reflecting upon the mechanized troops’ painful experiences under the US 
air supremacy, they also tried to improve the mobility and accuracy of their anti-air 
weaponry.
216
Thirdly, they also improved their river crossing and landing operations 
capability. The river crossing capability is an important element of mobile warfare in the 
Korean peninsula where many deep and wide rivers exist.
217
  
 
Completion of the Two-Front War Strategy 
 
The Soviet military doctrine was developed to satisfy the requirements of possible plain 
battlefield conditions of Poland, Ukraine, and Western Europe. The Soviet military 
doctrine
218
required, first of all, acquiring the relative dominance of numbers and firepower in 
a certain front and then making a breakthrough on that front. Once the breakthrough had been 
achieved, the OMG and its ATG (Advanced Tactical Group) whose main strength was with 
the armoured troops would advance to make way for the main forces and harass the enemy’s 
rear. The main forces, along with the massive fire, air, and airborne support which would 
enable the main force to strike the entire enemy depth, quickly followed the breakthrough 
made by OMG. The main force would then fully exploit the breakthrough by chasing the 
enemy’s retreating troops persistently with consecutive strikes. The prime objective was the 
annihilation of the enemy. The Soviet Armoured troops’ organization and formation during 
the battle were established to guarantee superiority in numbers and firepower. That would 
have been suitable in the prairies of Europe since it is the ideal place to wage a duel between 
massive size armoured troops.  
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 To review the Soviet deep battle doctrine, 
See) D. M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operation Art: In the Pursuit of Deep Battle, London, Frank Cass, 
1991  
D. M. Glantz, The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Manoeuvre: Spearhead of the Offensive, London, Frank 
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However, the Soviet Military Doctrine could not be fully adopted in the mountainous Korean 
peninsula topography where manoeuvring the massive armoured troops would be almost 
impossible. Therefore, the NKPA adopted the Two-Front War strategy combining the 
mechanized regular troops as a main force and irregular warfare troops, whose purpose was 
to cause a shamble in the enemy rear and secure the main force advance passage in the frontal 
area.  
 
In addition to the Two-Front War strategy, they also pursued the High-Speed war.
219
 In their 
scenario of war, before the NKPA main force launched the all-out offensive, the light infantry 
and the special force unit would infiltrate the ROK rear. They would use either the 
mountainous area infiltration route, pre-built underground tunnels or AN-2 transport airplane 
modified for the special force operation. Their roles were to agitate the enemy rear and then 
secure the main force’s advance route, a similar role to the Former Soviet OMG and its 
ATG.
220
 Then, the regular armoured troops that were acting as a main force would launch the 
offensive with massive fire and airpower support to make a breakthrough. Once the 
                                                          
219 The NKPA intended to catch the US-ROK alliance by surprise for a full scale invasion, take the 
initiative and eventually win the war quickly and with ease. Reasons for the NKPA to pursue the 
High-Speed war were not only because of their logistic problems but also more importantly because 
of the full scale US engagement fear. 
To review the NKPA military strategy in the possible Korean Conflict,  
G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.156-162 
M.S. Jang, op.cit., p.319-328 
W.S. Seo, op.cit., p.105-130 
KIDA, op.cit., p.5 
220 The debate on the role of North Korean light infantry is still on-going. Jang Myongsoon in his 
book “BukHanGunSaYeonGu (p.323)” wrote that the main role of the light infantry and special 
warfare troops was to agitate the enemy rear and North Korea would use the armoured troops as the 
special assignment troops as the Soviet OMG. However, according to the newly published ROK 
defence White Paper (2008), and 2009 Bukhangaeyo (Published by the Korea Institute for National 
Unification), North Korea expanded the number of light infantry units and special warfare troops to 
180,000, while the NKPA Corps in the front would have one more light infantry division, and the 
NKPA divisions in the front would also expand their light infantry battalion to this regiment. This 
expansion of light infantry shows that the role of light infantry had been clearly solidified and they 
would be used as the special assignment troops as analysed above.    
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breakthrough has been made, their next target (in the exploitation stage) was to isolate Seoul 
and its suburbs, paralyze their war command system and take most of the Korean population 
hostage. At the same time they would go on to annihilate the South Korean main force in the 
North of Han River through continuously chasing and striking. Eventually, they aimed at 
finishing the war before the US was fully engaged.  
 
Comparing the Soviet Military Doctrine with the NKPA Military Strategy, one can see that 
the NKPA kept the spine of the Soviet Military Doctrine. Both would use special assignment 
troops (OMG for the Soviets and light infantry for the NKPA) to cause havoc and make way 
for main forces to penetrate deep into the enemy’s rear. Meanwhile, following main forces 
would attack the enemy’s entire depth while pursuing the enemy’s remaining forces, 
annihilating them with consecutive strikes.
221
   
 
After the Korean War, Kim Ilsung frequently mentioned specific characteristics of the Korean 
Peninsula. He mentioned the significance of mountains and night-time combat skills as well 
as the Two-Front War strategy to meet the special requirements of the Korean peninsula’s 
geographic characteristics
222
(most notably in the 2
nd 
Congress of KWP Representatives (5
th
 of 
October, 1966) and 5
th 
KWP Party Congress, 2
nd
 of November, 1970). Among adjusting 
measures, he paid particular attention to the light infantry which could be used effectively in 
the mountainous Korean peninsula topography. He mentioned in the Forth Plenum of the 
Fourth KWP Central Committee (January, 1970) that light infantry had to enhance their 
capability to operate in the mountainous area and in the enemy rear. That same year, he 
further mentioned that the light infantry should have the capability to form a second front in 
the enemy rear. Once the light infantry was successfully expanded in the 1960s, North Korea 
firmly advocated the Two-Front War strategy. Kim Ilsung mentioned in the 5
th
 KWP Party 
Congress that the Two-Front War strategy combining regular warfare and irregular warfare 
(Light Infantry and Special warfare troops) would become the key factor for their eventual 
military victory against the South. He bragged that even though the US possessed nuclear 
weaponry, North Korea held the highly trained light infantry which he said was well-matched 
to US nuclear power. In addition, North Korea learned during the Korean War that the 
massive armoured troops manoeuvre would be constrained by steep mountains, and the deep 
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 G.S. Kim, op.cit., p.158 
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and wide rivers of the Korean peninsula. The NKPA also understood that to reach their 
foremost strategic target (Seoul), they would have to go through the mountainous topography 
which also inevitably led to unfavourable road conditions (narrow and anfractuous) for the 
massive armoured troops manoeuvre. Therefore, instead of using the mechanized troops as 
the special assignment troops, they adopted a plan to use light infantry as special assignment 
troops to adjust to the mountainous topography of the Korean Peninsula.
223
  
 
In conclusion, the NKPA military strategy (Two-Front War and High-Speed War strategy) 
preserved the spine of the Soviet military doctrine but combined it with the Korean War 
experience and geographic characteristics of the Korean peninsula adjusting the Soviet 
military doctrine to apply to specific Korean peninsula security circumstances.  
 
Consolidation of Asymmetric Power  
 
What is the Asymmetric Warfare Strategy?  
 
The concept of asymmetric warfare in modern warfare was first officially announced during 
the 1995 US doctrinal statement, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States. 
However, a more generous rounding to the definition was published in the Joint Strategy 
Review, Asymmetric Approaches to Warfare: “Asymmetric Approaches are attempts to 
circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weakness using methods of 
operation… Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, non-traditional tactics, 
weapons or technologies and can be applied at all levels of warfare – strategic, operational 
and tactical- and across the spectrum of military operations”.224  
 
The ROK definition of asymmetric warfare contains the spine of the US JCS definition. In 
their army drill book, they state, “the Asymmetric warfare is the operation which is carrying 
out with the different ways and means against the counterpart which lead them to react to the 
situation inefficiently”. It also stated that asymmetric warfare is based on a mix of 
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 Highly trained light infantry could offer better mobility and survivability than the mechanized 
troops in the steep mountainous area.  
224
 R. Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare – Threat and Response in the 21st Century, Polity, 2007, p.19   
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heterogeneity and superiority. On one hand, the heterogeneity might be defined as “Using the 
weaponry which is not retained or developed to the counterpart to attack the counterpart’s 
vulnerability or to exterminate the counterpart’s capability”. On the other hand, superiority is 
described as “reacting to the counterpart provocation with the overwhelming dominance in 
numbers or quality.”225  
 
The concept of asymmetric warfare is nothing new. Sun Tzu in his “Art of War” already 
proposed the idea of asymmetric approaches to war. He said that “All warfare is based on 
deception (Laying Plans Part), In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining 
battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory (Energy Part), and avoid 
what is strong and to strike at what is weak (Weak Points and Strong Part).” 226 Liddell Hart 
who saw the “Great War” trench warfare tragedy also insisted upon using indirect approaches 
of war which avoid the counterpart strength and utilize their vulnerability.  
 
In other words, the asymmetric approaches of war have been adopted for the weak (the have-
nots) to win the conflict by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the strong (the haves), or by the 
strong and equal power to reduce their costs and ultimately win the conflict by exploiting the 
vulnerability of their counterpart. Asymmetric warfare is a strategic way of warfare using the 
differences between friend and foe (employing their own specific relative advantages to 
aggravate the counterpart’s vulnerability) to gain an advantage over the counterpart, while 
still being able to inflict a heavy cost on the counterpart, and ultimately win a war.  
 
 The NKPA Asymmetric Warfare Strategy 
 
The NKPA asymmetric warfare strategy has become a great security issue recently since the 
North Korean threat of WMDs
227
 has increased in severity. Even so, their pursuit of 
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 T.Y. Kwon, and H. Noh, op.cit., p.259-260  
226
 English translation is based on L. Giles, "Sun Tzu on The Art of War" 
227
The main NKPA WMDs are long-range artillery, SSMs, Nuclear weapons and Bio-chemical 
weapons. In fact, North Korea’s original motive for developing ballistic missiles likely followed the 
Soviet Doctrine by viewing missiles as a form of extended range artillery that can strike an enemy’s 
rear during a conflict. Excerpted from– CNS (Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute 
of International Studies) Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities, 22
nd
 of March, 
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asymmetric warfare is nothing new. They have consistently tried to utilize their military 
advantage to aggravate the ROK vulnerability.   
 
Geographically, the Korean peninsula has a short depth, covered with many steep mountains, 
encapsulated by a long coastline. The NKPA has developed their irregular and mobile 
warfare capability as well as airpower to exploit the geographic ROK vulnerability.
228
 After 
the Cold War ended, North Korea had been suffering economic crisis and lost two of its 
biggest patrons. Nevertheless, the ROK was still able to experience economic growth. 
Therefore, a conventional arms race became an invalid option for the North. In fact, the most 
common measures of power in international relations –economic size and defence spending – 
show clearly that North Korea has been smaller on an absolute and per-capita basis for at 
least thirty years, and continues to fall farther and farther behind.
229
 Instead of strengthening 
the mechanized troops and airpower which requires an economic foundation, they started to 
put forward WMDs, and especially long-range artillery (which is lethal but economic) as a 
main means of asymmetric warfare, along with their irregular warfare troops. Long-range 
artillery is not usually classified under the WMD category. However, under specific Korean 
security circumstances, it is qualified as WMD. Firstly, the Seoul metropolitan area is just 40 
km away from the cease-fire line; therefore, it is within the shooting-range of the long-range 
artilleries of NKPA. Secondly, the NKPA possessed the huge cache of long-range artilleries 
as they followed the former Soviet military doctrine, which considers artillery as the “God of 
War. Finally, these long-range artilleries could equip the bio-chemical warhead. Therefore, 
the NKPA long-range artillery can inflict severe damage on the Seoul metropolitan area and 
is categorised as WMD in ROK.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2006, p.6. However, the striking power of the conventional warhead and possible Nuclear and Bio-
chemical warhead became a huge security burden for the US-ROK alliance due to the severe 
casualties and costs these weapons could inflict.   
228 The Special Forces could easily penetrate the ROK rear through the mountain pass and operate 
actively in the mountainous area. Because of the long coastline, they could also easily infiltrate the 
ROK rear mainly through the use of a semi-submersible submarine. Due to the short depth of the 
Korean peninsula, with the mobile warfare capability and airpower which would become possible to 
bombard the strategic target in the rear let alone the CAS mission in the front, their aim of High-
Speed warfare could be possible.  
229 T.Y. Ham, BukHanEuiJunJaengSuHaengNeungRyuk, Seoul, Sejong Institute, 2005, p.7 
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Troop Strength 
(Ten Thousand) 
Tanks 
Field Artillery/ 
Multiple Rocket 
Launch System 
Surface to 
Surface Missile 
1970’s 50 1,500 3,000 None 
1980’s 75 2,200 5,000 
Started to 
Produce 
1990’s 100 3,500 11,000 400 
1999-2000 110 4,000 13,000 600 
2008 119 3,900 
13,600 
(MRLS;5,100) 
 
Index 3-1 The Progress of the North Korean Military Capability Development
230
 
 
North Korean asymmetric warfare strategy was designed to maximize their relative 
advantage in a self-sustainable industry while exploiting the ROK’s fatal weakness: that 
Seoul was only 48 Km away from DMZ and the industrial, economic, and political centre of 
ROK. The adoption of WMDs, especially long-range artillery, as a main means of 
asymmetric warfare strategy would give the NKPA several strategic advantages.  
 
First, it would allow the NKPA to take the initiative during the initial phase of war since it 
could grant much needed firepower in the front. It could also help spread war-phobia not only 
to the battle front but also to the civilian population. Secondly, it would strengthen their long-
range offensive capability which would aid in covering up their weakness in deep strike 
capability due to their relative enfeeblement of airpower.  This would affect their ability to 
attack the strategic targets at the rear.
231
 In addition, the mere possession of WMDs would 
give the NKPA a minimum deterrence against the US nuclear threat and become a valuable 
bargaining chip during diplomatic talks. The introduction of WMDs for military and 
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they could destroy the airport and harbour in the ROK rear.    
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diplomatic purposes and their devastating effects when deployed, provoked the US-ROK 
alliance’s introduction of a pre-emptive strike strategy and its capability (OPLAN 5026). The 
threat of North Korean WMDs and asymmetric warfare led the US-ROK alliance to 
transform their traditional threat-based deterrence strategy
232
 into capability-based 
approaches of deterrence against North Korea.
233
 
 
After the Cold War ended, even though the NKPA had not significantly increased their 
mobile warfare capability, which is at the core of their regular warfare strategy (an integral 
part of their Two-Front warfare strategy and the heart of High-Speed warfare) it is still in the 
centre of the North Korean military potential and invasion plan. In addition, the irregular 
warfare capability, another integral part of Two-Front Warfare strategy, has been 
strengthened recently.  
 
The solidification of asymmetric approaches of war was conceived in an aim to boost their 
Two-Front and High-Speed warfare strategy. The asymmetric warfare strategy with a main 
means of WMD is designed to increase the efficiency of their conventional and irregular 
warfare capability. This is no longer possible because of the economic and diplomatic 
problems associated with the arms race.
234
 The asymmetric approaches of war using WMD 
                                                          
232
 The US–ROK alliance give enough assurance of massive retaliation using strategic nuclear powers 
and massive engagement of US troops once the North breaches the cease-fire agreement and launches 
the all-out war, and eventually make the North Korean to give up on the reunification banking on the 
military means.  
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 Let alone having a capability to demolish any North Korean breach of cease-fire agreement, they 
aim to equip with the nuclear (tactical) or conventional capability as well as the operation plan to deal 
with the threat (most notably in the form of WMD in the recent Korean Peninsula) immediately so as 
not to give any military or diplomatic edges to North Korea. 
234 The enhancement of their conventional warfare capability through the arms race is no longer a 
viable option to the North. However, the superiority of conventional warfare capability is required to 
achieve their military strategy of Two-Front and High-Speed war. Without the conventional warfare 
superiority, they cannot reach the foremost strategic target (Seoul) and demolish the ROK’s main 
strength around Seoul. In addition, it is almost impossible to achieve a High-Speed war without the 
mobility and firepower. Once the NKPA is able to attack the entire depth simultaneously, first of all, 
the moral and defence capability in the enemy front will be severely damaged which will increase the 
NKPA conventional power potential. In addition, in the enemy rear, the war phobia and public 
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would allow them to maximize their strength (their war industry is well-developed under the 
self-reliance ideology and it is possible to produce the WMDs in mass numbers without much 
cost), harass the weaknesses of the US-ROK alliance (the Seoul metropolitan area is not far 
away from the DMZ), and allow for eventually increasing the efficiency of their conventional 
warfare capability. 
 
Moreover, North Korea has fortified their territory using their knowledge of the geography 
and raised their capability to use this edge. Proper use of geography is also considered part of 
asymmetric warfare strategy, as the survivability of their WMD (the North Korean strength) 
would be raised but the efficiency of US military technology (target acquisition, stand-off 
technology, and earth-penetrating weapons: the US strength) would be decreased.  
 
In conclusion, North Korea still kept the Two-Front and High-Speed warfare strategy as their 
main military strategy, but they solidified the asymmetric warfare strategy using WMDs, 
especially long-range artillery, to overcome considerable economic frailty and lack of 
external support. Moreover, to increase the efficiency of their asymmetric strategy, they also 
tried fortification using the mountainous geography. Since the fortification of the territory 
boosted the strategic worth of North Korean WMDs, it also became a realistic burden for the 
US-ROK alliance. Therefore, in researching the North Koreans, fortification and tactical 
preparedness to use their edge becomes an important security issue as well. How much has 
their fortification progressed and are their armed forces ready to use this edge? The small 
section below will explain the North Korean fortification using their geographic edge. By 
doing so, it is able to be ascertained whether the possible conflict between the US-ROK 
alliance and NKPA could be a duel between the technologically advanced forces and the 
geographically advantaged and tactically capable forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
disorder will be diffused which will increase the NKPA irregular warfare potential. Therefore, the 
WMD application will be beneficial to the NKPA regular and irregular forces. 
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Military Purpose 
 
1. Threatening or attacking military establishments in the Korean 
peninsula, US, and Japan 
2. Deterrence against the  foe (the US Nuclear) 
3. Delay of US reinforcements deployment 
4. Attacking the strategic target and population in the rear 
including the Seoul Metropolitan area – paralyzing war 
command and spreading war-phobia 
5. Complement the imbalance of the conventional arms race 
 
Index 3-2 The military purpose of the North Korean missile development
235
 
 
The North Korean territorial fortification  
 
During the Korean War, the NKPA learned the vital lesson that, providing there has been 
suitable fortification and training, the Korean peninsula’s mountainous topography would 
give them a great defensive edge as well as natural camouflage and coverage to add to their 
offensive strength. Following the UN forces’ success on the Inchon landing operation, the 
NKPA lost the Pyongyang and Wonsan quickly and was forced out to the inner highland near 
the Chinese border. This was because the NKPA failed to capitalize the natural barrier of 
Korean peninsula central highland, due to the lack of reserves and an unprepared defensive 
line.  
 
As analysed above, the NKPA headquarter also pointed out the failure of fortification in the 
rear using the mountainous Korean peninsula topography. However, following the Chinese 
engagement, the communist forces waged staunch trench warfare using the mountainous 
topography and closely linked underground tunnels against the dominant US fire and 
airpower. They drove the US forces into trouble in many cases. During the Korean War, the 
communist forces built the so called “Underground Great Wall” spanning from the Imjin 
River mouth in the west to Gosong in the east (about 4,000km).
236
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Along with frontal fortification, North Korea started to fortify the rear, maximizing the 
geographic edge. Following the PVA withdrawal and the armed force purge in 1958, the 
fortification of territory was driven by the US nuclear fear. The logic that North Korea had to 
fortify their territory for enduring the US nuclear bombing was inherited into the Three 
Military Guidelines as a “fortification of territory”.237 The fear of US nuclear bombing and 
the urgent need for territorial fortification were clearly revealed in Kim Ilsung’s speech at the 
4
th
 graduate ceremony of Kim Ilsung University in 1963; “We need to fortify our territory. 
We do not have nuclear weapons. We have to stand against the enemy who possess the 
nuclear weapon. We have to dig in the tunnel wherever the enemy would be tempted to attack. 
Once we stayed in the underground tunnel, we can protect ourselves from any nuclear 
weapon strikes. We have to fortify the entire territory not to mention the frontal line.”238       
 
Needless to say, the logic of fortifying territory also reflected the Korean War experience, 
especially their massive damage under the enemy air supremacy.
239
 Kim mentioned that “the 
Korean War experience tells us that many steep mountains in the Korean peninsula would be 
helpful for us to fortify our territory.”240 He also claimed that, under the military doctrine of 
“Fortification of territory”, we need to build the formidable defence system which is capable 
of repelling any enemy invasion.”241 He further demanded the fortification of war industry 
facilities. Throughout the 1960s, their territorial fortification progressed significantly and Kim 
bragged in his speech at the 5
th 
KWP Party Congress (November, 1970) that, “the entire 
territory is now fully fortified and the important production unit is also perfectly fortified.”242  
 
The territorial fortification was beefed up even more after the First Gulf War; North Korea 
organized the tentative Gulf War research institute under the Ministry of People’s Armed 
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Forces and researched the First Gulf War. After the First Gulf War, through direct instruction, 
this note was given to each commander. Kim Ilsung stressed the following:  
(1) If the conflict would occur in the Korean peninsula, the US would approach the 
conflict just as they did during the First Gulf War.  
(2) Through the experience of the Gulf War, we recognize that, through the fortification of 
the entire territory, we can stand any enemy massive air bombardment.  
(3) The NKPA should research the US strategy in war and strengthen the construction of 
an underground tunnel.   
(4) Once we fulfil the fortification of the entire territory, even the technologically 
advanced forces would not penetrate our defence line.  
 
The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces also published a military drill book called 
“ManJeonJaengGyeongHeomAeDaeHaYeo (Regarding the First Gulf War experience)” in 
November, 1992 which also contained the importance of complete underground tunnel 
construction in strategically important places for the defensive warfare. In addition, it insisted 
upon the significance of fake targets and trenches as well as the tactics of concealment and 
diversion for effective deception.
243
  
 
After the First Gulf War, North Korea sent military delegates to Yugoslavia in 1999 
following NATO’s engagement in Kosovo. They also monitored the whole course of the 
Second Gulf War and researched it. According to the testimony of exiled former NKPA 
general An Yongchol,
244
 after the Second Gulf War Kim Jongil was relieved, unlike the US 
had predicted. Kim Jongil pointed out that during the Second Gulf War, even if the main 
battlefield was in the desert, the US forces were struggling to find underground military 
facilities and neutralize those. He confidently stated that “since the North Korean territory is 
mountainous, the underground military facility would not be detected and they would not 
become another Iraq.” Therefore, under a modern warfare setting, the NKPA perceived the 
potential threat of modern US military technology and had been engrossed in preparing the 
adequate remedy with their outstanding fortification and deception skills using their 
geographic edge. These North Korean preparations against the US precision stand-off 
technology would become a serious security burden to the US-ROK alliance. Because of the 
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developed North Korean defensive strategy and preparation using their geographic edge and 
underground tunnels, the neutralization of the suspicious North Korean WMDs launching 
facilities, production units, and arsenal which became the most critical security threat for the 
US-ROK alliance, as well as the North Korean centre of gravity would become a much more 
difficult issue than previously thought.    
 
This part of the research examined how the US-ROK alliance was transformed to technology-
centred forces and the strategic significance of North Korean WMDs, which were 
substantially increased after they adopted the capability approach of deterrence. It also 
examined that in accordance with the Korean peninsula security, the geographic 
consideration has always been a significant element of war in that region and the NKPA has 
fortified their territory using their geography while raising their capability to use the edge. As 
a result of this section, it is demonstrated that conflict between the North and US-ROK 
alliance could be a duel between a technologically advanced and centred force, and a 
geographically advantageous force that possesses the capability to use their edge. Therefore 
this part of the research presents the platform of examination for Biddle’s argument on skill 
and technology and the thesis argument that technological superiority alone cannot 
completely guarantee military success against North Korea.   
 
The North Korean long-range artillery threat  
 
The North Korean long-range artillery is one of the obvious security concerns for ROK. Thus, 
the debate concerning the extent of strategic effect has been keenly carried out in both 
contemporary ROK and US military society. The core of the debate on the NKPA long-range 
artillery effectiveness is how many shells would drop on the Seoul metropolitan area in an 
hour. The Stars and Stripes (9
th
 of February, 2003) interviewed Stephen Oertwig (USFK 
spokesman at that time) and he mentioned that, in the first hours of an attack, around 300,000 
to 500,000 artillery rounds could rain down on Seoul. However, the numbers of artillery 
rounds that would fall on the Seoul metropolitan area is quite unrealistic since it could be 
possible only if all the artillery pieces in the front are fired toward the Seoul metropolitan area. 
In reality, only the 170mm self-propelled guns and 240mm MLRS which hold a shooting-
range of around 40km have the capability to bombard the Seoul metropolitan area. Among 
648 of those ordinances, only 342 pieces deployed in the north of the Seoul metropolitan area 
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pose any direct threat.
245
 It is very pessimistic but unrealistic early prediction of North 
Korean long-range artillery effect.  
  
On the one hand, there is an optimistic opinion (Im Jongin) that the NKPA long-range 
artillery would not be a great threat to ROK security since the 170mm self-propelled guns 
would not be able to reach Seoul unless they use the Rocket Assisted Projectile. These are 
considerably more expensive and were not developed by the NKPA, and they would not be 
particularly effective due to the long loading time. They also insisted that the destructive 
power of 240mm MLRS would not be devastating enough to bring Seoul to a shambles.  
 
On the other hand, there is also the pessimistic opinion (Park Jin) that, since the North 
Korean long-range artillery is hidden amongst various underground bunkers and tunnels, the 
ROK armed forces are not equipped with the weaponry to neutralize them. If the USFK 
withdraws, about 25,000 rounds an hour would drop onto the Seoul metropolitan Area and 
Seoul would be seized by the NKPA in 16 days.
246
 During the heated debate on the strategic 
effectiveness of North Korean long-range artillery, JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul) reported on the 6
th
 
of October, 2004, after several interviews with military analysts considering the deployment 
numbers of long-range artillery and loading time. They commented that, once the war had 
begun, a minimum of 1,000 and maximum of 2,000 rounds would fall down on the Seoul 
metropolitan area in an hour. However, the mere fact that the NKPA is able to attack the 
Seoul metropolitan area with cheap weaponry would give a significant strategy edge to the 
NKPA.   
  
Stalin once mentioned that “artillery was the god of war”. This comment clearly 
demonstrated that concerning communist warfare, the use of artillery is clinical. Since the 
NKPA followed the former Soviet Union’s military strategy and later adopted the Two-Front 
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warfare strategy,
247
 the NKPA also considered the artillery’s fire support in the front for the 
breakthrough and long-range assault capability for the enemy rear agitation as the most 
important elements in war. As mentioned above, unlike the Soviet Military Doctrine, the 
NKPA were not able to bombard the enemy rear with any substantial amount of airpower. 
Therefore, they deployed massive amounts of SSM and long-range artillery to support the 
entire depth offence capability. Even though their initial strategic objective of massive long-
range artillery introduction was to elevate the entire depth offence capability, Because Seoul 
is near to the DMZ, the strategic impetus of long-range artillery has been expanded to 
paralyze the enemy’s centre of geography and can contribute to the spreading of war phobia.  
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Part 2 Case Studies – Does Contemporary Military 
Technology Bring Ultimate Military Success 
against the Geographically Advantaged and 
Tactically Well-prepared North Koreans? 
 
Chapter 4 Imjin Wars 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter 3 analyzed the significance of tactical preparedness using knowledge of the local 
terrain as a geographic edge in the ancient and modern eras of military strategy in the Korean 
peninsula. This chapter will evaluate why tactical preparedness using geographic edge is such 
a significant element in Korean peninsula security through an examination of the Japanese 
invasion of Korea (Imjin Wars). It will characterise the effectiveness of traditional defensive 
strategy using terrain, and the Korean peninsula as an ideal place to wage a defensive warfare 
using geographic edge. It will be seen that the Korean peninsula is a place where the 
geographic dimension is important and Koreans have plenty of experience in defensive 
warfare using the geographic knowledge to their advantage.   
 
 Since the fate of war is not decided by a single dimension, Joseon and Japan’s tactical and 
strategic decisions and outcomes will also be researched in depth. The transformation of the 
Joseon strategy – using their knowledge of the local landscape and thus serving as a 
geographic edge – can explain why the geographic dimension, if prepared adequately, was so 
important in the Imjin Wars and the eventual outcome of warfare in the Korean peninsula. In 
addition, it would also reveal how Korea was an ideal place to wage a defensive war using 
geographical knowledge and how the Koreans excelled in this instance of warfare.  
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Outbreak and the end of the Imjin Wars248 
 
Japan invaded Joseon in 1592 with their justification that Joseon rejected the request to pass 
the Korean peninsula for the invasion of China (Ming Dynasty at that time). Joseon already 
noticed the Japanese intention through exchanging envoys and other sources. However, their 
preparation was not suitable or good enough to drive away the Japanese expedition forces. 
Therefore, the Japanese took the initiative and drove Joseon to the far north of their territory 
nearby Joseon and the Ming border. Joseon asked for Chinese aid and after the Chinese 
engagement, the tide of war gradually became more and more favourable to Joseon. The 
Japanese force stationed in Pyongyang led by Konish Yukinaga was defeated and withdrew 
back to Seoul. However, the Ming forces recklessly advanced to Seoul and were humiliated 
when the Japanese ambushed their forces in Pyokje (Battle of Pyokje).  
 
Furthermore, the Japanese also had to cope with much adversity. Since Japan initially 
planned an intensive surprise offensive whose objective was to occupy Joseon as soon as 
possible, they were not well-prepared for the protracted warfare that ensued and suffered a 
host of logistical problems. Supply and communication difficulties only continued to worsen 
because of the lengthy supply and communication route from the Japanese mainland and 
hindrance from the Joseon Navy and local militias. Their strategy also had another problem: 
since their invading route was the quickest route to Seoul, they did not invade and conquer 
Cholla province, which had a vast plain and could have become a national supply depot for 
Joseon. Therefore, Joseon was able to quickly recover from the surprise attack and retaliate.  
 
In this circumstance, Ming and Japan started a ceasefire and began peace talks. Japan 
withdrew from Seoul to the coastal towns in Gyeongsang province where they built their 
traditional style castle (Wajo), geographically adjacent to the Japanese mainland, 
guaranteeing better communication and supply. However, there was one more twist: the truce 
talk was not successful and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Japan’s leader at this time) ordered a second 
invasion. The Japanese force tried to capture Seoul again, but this time passing through 
Cholla province with the support of the navy instead of cutting through Gyeongsang province, 
since they now recognized the strategic significance of the Cholla province. However the 
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Joseon and Ming joint forces had strengthened during the interwar period in terms of actual 
military power as well as strategic and tactical preparation.
249
  
 
Therefore, the second invasion was not as easy as the first. The Japanese Army was defeated 
in the Chiksan, while their navy also failed to cross the Myungnyang strait, the junction 
between the South Sea and Yellow Sea of Korea. With the logistics problem imminent again, 
they withdrew their force to the coastal line towns. War again went into stalemate until 
Toyotomi suddenly died and, in his will, ordered the force to withdraw back to the homeland. 
The Imjin Wars finally ended after the Japanese force withdrew from the Joseon territory.  
 
4-1 The Japanese Invasion Plan  
 
After the reunification of Japan had finally been achieved,
250
 the new government of Japan 
began to discuss and plan for the advance into the Chinese mainland. This was because of 
both the personal ambitions of Toyotomi and his intention of weakening warlords after the 
reunification.
251
 They discussed two possible routes to invade the mainland. The first 
possibility was to use the sea route passing through Okinawa, and then land on the south 
eastern coast of China. Another route was the overland course passing through Joseon, 
Manchuria, Shanhai-kwan, and then reaching the mainland. After an ardent discussion, 
Toyotomi decided to use the overland route and planned the strategy with two options.
252
 The 
first option was to put Joseon under their control with diplomatic pressure and then invade 
China with Joseon as their guide. The second option was to occupy Joseon as soon as 
possible, and thereafter reorganize and strengthen, again disguising their intentions through 
diplomatic talks with the Ming dynasty. Ultimately, after the careful consideration of the 
situation around them, they would decide whether or not to invade the Chinese mainland. 
Toyotomi believed the first option was more viable and attractive. However, Joseon denied 
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the Japanese diplomatic threat saying they could not guide Japan to invade the Chinese 
mainland.
253
 
 
 
Map 4-1 Japan, China and Korea in 1592 
254
  
 
After the diplomatic threat failed, Toyotomi had no choice but to follow the second option 
(the military expedition to the Korean peninsula). He therefore, assembled around 330,000 
soldiers and organized 158,700 strong expedition forces.
255
 Their strategic objective in this 
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war was to capture Seoul as soon as possible and annihilate Joseon’s main forces in the South 
of the Han River to urge Joseon to surrender; if they did not, the next objective would be to 
occupy the whole of Joseon as soon as possible.
 256
 This intensive surprise offensive strategy 
aginst Joseon could reduce logistical problems while earning them time to advance toward 
the Chinese mainland. 
 
Furthermore in order to achieve the strategic objective, they chose the shortest route to Seoul 
by landing on the southern coast of Gyeongsang province and marching through the 
highlands between the border of Gyeongsang and Chungchong province. They divided the 
expedition forces in three divisions. The First division, led by Konish Yukinaga (18,700 
soldiers), landed on Pusan and advanced through Taegu, Choryong (a mountainous border 
pass between Gyeongsang and Chungchong province), Chungju, and Yongin to reach Seoul 
(Central Route). The Second division, led by Kato Kiyomasa (22,800 soldiers), also landed 
on Pusan and planned to advance through Ulsan, Kyongju, Jukryong (a mountainous border 
pass between Gyeonsang and Chungchong province), Wonju, and Yeoju to reach Seoul 
(Eastern Route). Kato, however, who was very keen on military success in war, changed their 
planned eastern route to a central route passing through Gunwi, Jeomchon, Mungyong, 
Choryong and reached Seoul quicker than Konish did. 
257
 The Third division, led by Kuroda 
Nagamasa (11,000 soldiers), landed on Dadaepo and advanced through Kimhae, Songju, 
Kimcheon, Chupungryong (a mountainous border pass between Gyeonsang and Chungchong 
province), and Chongju to reach Seoul (Western Route).
258
 They were to be joined within a 
few days by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh divisions totalling 84,700 men, while the 
Eighth and Ninth divisions of 21,500 men were to be held in immediate reserve on the islands 
of Tsushima and Iki respectively. 
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Map 4-2 The first invasion (1592), and the retreat to Seoul (1593)
259
 
                                                          
259  
Excerpted from- S. Turnbull, op.cit., p.25 
113 
 
4-2 Japan’s Initial Successes and Joseon’s Defence 
Systems    
 
The initial Japanese success was not brought about by one or two simple reasons but was 
caused by a mixture of strategic and tactical strengths and weaknesses of both sides. This 
section will examine why Japan had huge success in the initial phase of war and why the lack 
of Joseon’s tactical and strategic preparation using the geographical edge was the most 
significant factor in Japan’s initial success.  
  
Tactically speaking, Joseon prepared the battle formation warfare carrying long-range 
weaponry while attaching importance to the cavalry’s striking capability. Joseon’s main 
adversaries were the Jurchens on the Northern Border who adopted cavalry mobile warfare
260
 
and the Japanese pirates in the southern coastal lines who were predominantly infantry. 
Joseon did not experience massive infantry invasion before the Imjin Wars because of the 
warring state period in Japan and peaceful diplomatic relationship with the Ming dynasty. In 
this circumstance, Joseon focused on developing the anti-cavalry tactics which aimed at 
Jurchen’s cavalry mobile warfare.  
 
To protect them from the enemy’s mobile cavalry striking power and for the following 
counter-attack, in terms of armoury, the Joseon army was armed with long-range weaponry 
such as the long bow and the Chongtong, which used gunpowder’s explosive power to fire 
arrows, bullets or even cannon balls. However, because the gunpowder weaponry was not 
widely used, the battle formation became the most important element to deal with the 
Jurchens. In the Joseon battle formation tactic, the cavalry and infantry, armed with long-
range weaponry, were trained to create a battle formation quickly according to the field 
commander’s orders.261 Joseon’s tactical approach had the advantages that they could attack 
Jurchen cavalry from a long distance and weaken the enemy strike with a quick and fluent 
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transformation of battle formation. Therefore, Joseon’s fluid and well-trained battle 
formation tactics and long-range weaponry made Joseon capable of dealing with the Jurchen 
cavalry mobile warfare. However, because of the long peace and corruption, Joseon did not 
possess many well-trained forces which are a crucial element to wage battle formation 
warfare.
262
 Even though the Joseon force managed to form a battle position, their formation 
was easily crumbled by the terror and massive concentrated power of Japanese forces’ 
harquebus.  
 
In the actual combat situation, Joseon commanders also applied combat skills written in 
Gyechukjinseol, Eungjeonpyeon (how to engage combat). It focused on cavalry use from the 
vast combat experiences with Jurchens. It also detailed how to create a cavalry battle 
formation; however the key was to take the initiative by beating the enemy’s spearhead with 
the deposition of cavalry in front and charging into the enemy battle position.
263
 In general 
Joseon’s military tactics before war were the quick transformation of battle position, carrying 
long distance weaponry, and cavalry use in actual combat situations.  
 
The Japanese developed the close-order infantry tactics from their civil war experience. In the 
middle of the 15th century, the Muromachi feudal government lost their control of Japan after 
the Onin War caused by the shogun succession dispute. After that, Japan entered into the 
warring state period. In terms of military command structure at the time, the ‘master and 
servant’ military model became very popular. More importantly, the harquebus was 
introduced from the west and castle fortification technology was further developed. Therefore, 
the cavalry became an easy prey for foot soldiers and castles became impregnable for the 
cavalry and small numbers of troops. In this circumstance, the subject of combat was 
transferred from the small number of valiant knights to massive fronts of infantry soldiers and 
tactically speaking, war transformed to close-order infantry battle. 
264
 
 
Since the combat style was transformed from the individual brilliance test to preponderance, 
a light infantry called Ashigaru was introduced into the battle. Initially their job was to agitate 
the enemy rear line by setting it on fire or by inflicting other means of devastation. They 
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became part of the regular army following the introduction of the harquebus and gunpowder 
and grew further to become the main subject of war armed with harquebus, bow, and long 
spear under the guidance of Ashigaru commander.
265
 However, their ultimate contribution to 
war came from the harquebus division.
266
 Oda Nobunga adopted these Ashigaru tactics and 
took the initiative in the reunification race. Oda, in his famous battle of Nagashino in 1575, 
defeated the Takeda’s old cavalry charge tactics by using the wooden stockades 267  and 
rotating volleys of fire. The defeat of the famous Takeda cavalry also signified a change in 
the general style of warfare, away from the more ‘chivalric’ cavalry combats and a melee-
weapon infantry to a less personal, more industrialised warfare depending on advanced 
equipment and new tactics as much as on personal valour. The centre of this battle was 
obviously Ashigaru armed with harquebus.
268
 
 
After Oda was suddenly assassinated, Toyotomi took charge of Oda’s force and succeeded in 
reunification. He developed the Ashigaru tactics further. The basic Japanese military tactics 
developed by Toyotomi were to divide the military into four sections and if the first section 
led by cavalry was ready to surround the enemy by charging in from two different directions, 
then the second section (Harquebus Ashigaru section) would advance to the enemy front 
firing harquebuses to unsettle the enemy line. Then the third section, the longbow Ashigaru 
section, would quickly follow, and finally spearmen and sword men would charge to the 
enemy for hand-to-hand combat. The efficiency of this tactic was magnified because they 
were well-equipped and had reasonable war experience as well as the power of unity between 
the commander and soldier, also a central cause of their high morale.
269
  
 
During the engagement in the initial phase of the Imjin Wars, once the Japanese spotted the 
break-up of the battle line because of the accurate harquebus firepower, the Japanese infantry 
                                                          
265 
H.S. Lee, ImJinJeonRanSaSang, p.29-33 
266 
S. Turnbull, op.cit., p.19 
267 
The stockades served to blunt the force of charging cavalry, provide protection from sword blows 
and spear thrusts, and provide limited protection from arrows. Ports or gates in the staggered and 
overlapping stockades were positioned to channel the cavalry charges into lanes where they would be 
at a disadvantage to further gunfire, arrows, and sword and spear thrusts from the stockade's defenders.
  
268
 J. Keegan, A history of Warfare, London, Pimlico, 1994, p.42- 43 
269
Ibid., p.27-28 
116 
 
spearmen and swordsmen charged to the battle line for hand-to-hand combat.
270
Meanwhile, 
the Joseon forces’ cavalry charged the enemy front line. This tactic had been an effective 
against the Jurchens but it was not against the Japanese, since they received a hail of enemy 
bullets through rotating volleys of harquebus fire. On a tactical level, the Joseon forces, who 
did not have a solution for Japanese battle tactics, exposed a serious weakness in a set piece 
battle with the Japanese.  
 
On a strategic level, since the army dominated defensive strategies, the Japanese could avoid 
a naval battle in an open sea, which enabled them to land on the Joseon soil without any 
casualty or cost.
271
 In addition, because the invasion route was a traditional trade route 
between Joseon and Japan, they possessed a sound geographic knowledge which also boosted 
their confidence and morale in the initial phase of war.
272
 
 
Joseon’s national defence system273 (Jeseungbangryak system) also brought negative side 
effects. Upon inauguration, Joseon had a local administrative and defence system inherited 
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from the preceding Korean kingdom Goryeo. However, since Goryeo only set up military 
fortresses in strategically important places, there was a lack of fortresses and the collapse of a 
fortress could be catastrophic to the whole course of war. Thus, Joseon reshuffled the 
national defensive system (Jinguan defence system: 1457A.D). The core of the Jinguan 
system was to secure as many defensive fortresses as possible to enhance the defensive depth. 
Accordingly, every local administrative unit (Eup; Town) became a military defensive unit 
(Jin: Fortress) at the same time.
274 
 
 
In proportion to the size of the administration unit, the provincial capital became Jujin (Main 
Fortress). Byeongsa (Military commander of Province) was stationed in Jujin and put 
division or corps sized forces under his command. The medium-size local administrative 
units between the provincial capital and small local towns became Geojin. Byeongmajeoljesa 
or Cheomjeoljesa (Geojin Military Commander) put regiment-sized forces under his control. 
Finally there was a Jejin, which was set up in remaining small towns. In principle, Jejin also 
had to have a military commander; however, in fact, the local chief magistrate commanded 
the local force, usually the size of a battalion. A chain of command was unified and Byeongsa 
gave orders to lower unit commanders. It was also a provincial defence system where 
Byeongsa took charge of provincial defence and neighbouring provinces were not allowed to 
support in case of conflicts. 
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Index 4-1 The Chain of Command (The Jinguan National defence system)  
 
Even though they managed to set military defence fortresses even in the small towns, the 
Jinguan was created for the efficiency of defence. The Jinguan is an independent defence 
unit which was composed of a central Geojin and several neighbouring Jejins. A Jinguan was 
supposed to fight and defend itself by using this strategic composition. Therefore, every 
province had several independent Jinguans. Under this system, the roles of local commanders 
were to be stationed at their post, know the local topography inside and out, draft the 
operation plan, train local soldiers, and defend their own defensive quarter through 
mobilising their own local soldiers in the case of conflict.
276
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Index 4-2 Jinguan National Defence System Structure 
 
The Jinguan defence system required many solders since it was not a concentrated use of a 
force but a dispersed-force defence system, which required local forces to defend their own 
defence perimeters, called Jinguan. However, there were not enough soldiers to maintain the 
Jinguan system when Joseon adopted the Jeseungbangryak defence system.
277
 Joseon’s 
military conscription and supporting system, called Bobub, was introduced in the Sejo of 
Joseon (1464) The Bobub was a system to support an active soldier (called Jungbyung). The 
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peasant class alone took the burden of national defence and the soldiers were selected from 
them. The inactive adult male peasants (Called Boin) had to support the active soldier by 
paying a canvas instead of military service.
278
 According to the Bobub, one active soldier was 
supported by the allocation of another inactive adult male peasant (one canvas per year).
279
 
However, once the allocated Boin fled to avoid the military duty, in most cases, the financial 
burden was directly inherited by the active solder.  
 
A peasant class in Joseon actually did not hold a sound economic base, therefore many 
peasants fled to avoid paying canvases. As a consequence of these flights, the allocation of 
Boin became titular and the burden of the active solder was increased. Also because of the 
lengthy service period (three months every year), in many cases the service period and the 
farming season collided with each other. Consequently, many active soldiers were not able to 
finish their farming which caused them great economic difficulties.
280
 Because of these 
increased burdens of military service, most of the peasants wanted to avoid the military 
service by paying a canvas, and the corrupt local military commander received canvases from 
active soldiers and freed them; these were called Banggunsupo. Since the Bangunsupo 
became a national phenomenon, the Joseon government tried to introduce the Gunjeoksupo 
system in 1541 which collected a canvas from each peasant class adult man aged between 16 
and 60, and hired soldiers from among them. However, in reality, collected canvases were 
used as the running expenses of government or for the private purposes of government 
officials. Therefore, even though there were plenty of soldiers in their army and navy roster, 
at any given time there were only a few active soldiers.
281
 
 
Because of the lack of active soldiers, Joseon could not afford the dispersed local defence 
system (Jinguan system) and were forced to adopt a concentrated troop application defence 
system. Along with the lack of active soldiers, the Jinguan system also bore other problems. 
Firstly, it was basically a provincial defence system. Active rule called Bupiljeoktajinjijobeob 
prohibited neighbouring province support. Therefore, if there was a massive invasion or 
conflict and the Jinguan and upper military unit in the province (Jujin: top of local 
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(provincial) defence system) failed to defeat the enemy, there were not many military options 
available because the neighbouring province could not offer support.
282
 If a massive invasion 
occurred and the provincial military commander was not able to defend the province, a 
military commander would be dispatched by the central government. The government was 
thus supposed to be in charge with the cooperation of invaded provincial commanders and 
their neighbouring commanders. However, there was a fatal problem here. Because the 
central government military commander was not knowledgeable of the local topography and 
details of that situation, he was not able to excel. Secondly, the Jinguan system was devised 
for the local force to defend their defensive perimeters. However, if a massive number of 
enemies attacked only a certain area, this area could be vulnerable through the lack of 
defence forces. Also, if the enemy succeeded in establishing a bridgehead, the shockwave 
could easily spread out.
283
 The shortcomings of the Jinguan defence system were “(1) the 
lack of active soldiers because of the Gunjeoksupo, (2) the difficulties of maintaining a 
dispersed local defence system as a consequence, (3) the vulnerability of provincial defence 
(Cooperation problem with neighbouring province) (4) the need for a concentrated 
application of forces if there was a massive enemy invasion in a narrow area.” These brought 
the strategic review on the Joseon government.
284
 After the review, Joseon devised the 
Jeseungbangryak defence system.   
 
Under the Jeseungbangryak system, the local magistrates would be the first to mobilise local 
troops, bring them to the pre-arranged troops assembly point called Shinji and wait for the 
arrival of military commanders from the central government. Then, if the central government 
military commander arrives, he would lead the local troops with the cooperation of local 
military commanders. The key of Jeseungbangryak is that the central government military 
commander would have full control of assembled troops, which could solve the cooperation 
problem. It also could make the concentrated use of force possible, which would be very 
effective against a sizable enemy. In addition, as the concentrated use of troops became 
possible, the commander in charge was able to repel the enemy in an initial phase of conflict 
since he could concentrate his force in a possible enemy invasion route or war zone to defeat 
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the enemy.
285
 To summarise, the Gunjeoksupo led to the deficiency of troops to fill in forts, 
therefore a static defensive system (Jinguan) was no longer a viable option to Joseon. Instead, 
they introduced the mobile defensive system (Jeseungbangryak) to maximize the efficiency 
of existing small numbers troops available. A few strategically important forts such as Pusan, 
where the Japanese initially landed during Imjin Wars, and some northern border garrison 
towns used to defend against the Jurchens were still manned, but most of the forts became 
empty before the Imjin Wars.   
 
However, the Jeseungbangryak defence system also had several serious problems. Since the 
military commander dispatched from the central government used all the available resources 
to repel the enemy in a decisive place, there was a reserve forces problem. Therefore, if 
defeated, there would be a certain wide defensive blank. In addition, it took much time for the 
central government military commander to dispatch to a hot spot, and without proper 
knowledge of the area’s topography and local situation, he was unable to prepare for the 
battle properly.
286
  
 
According to the Jeseunbangryak defence system, Dongrae, Ulsan (Second division invasion 
route), Taegu (First division invasion route), Sangju (First division invasion route) were the 
prearranged local force assembly points in Gyeongsang province. However, only in Dongrae, 
the local military commander (Dongrae magistrate) was able to muster local forces to defend 
the city. This was because it took so much time to dispatch the central government military 
officers to Gyeongsang province towns. The ones that were especially close to coastal lines 
were too far away from Seoul, and the dispatches were delayed and assembled forces were 
scattered without proper control.  
 
In the case of Ulsan, where the Gyeongsang Left Army garrison was located, it was too far 
away from Seoul to send the central government commander, and assembled forces who were 
gathered from thirteen local towns around Ulsan simply scattered after the Gyeongsang Left 
Army commander (Lee Gak) fled.
287
 The commander dispatch was also delayed in Taegu, 
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and the assembled forces around Taegu again were scattered.
288
 It was the same in Sangju. 
Consequently, the central government military commander in charge of Sangju (Lee Il) had 
no forces available upon his arrival. He then ordered conscription of the local military 
commander who used a bait of food rations to conscript local farmers and refugees. However, 
he did not know details of the local situation (he did not even know how far advanced the 
enemy was upon his arrival) or its topography for a proper defensive battle to delay the 
enemy advance. Because conscripted forces had no discipline, he started a battle formation 
training procedure – the basic skill for the Joseon army at that time – in Sangju Bukcheon 
(Northern stream) bank, which was open and wide enough to train for battle formation 
properly, but also an ideal place for the Japanese to wage a set piece battle on their own terms. 
From these two cases, one can see that the critical flaws of the Jeseungbangryak defence 
system, the delay of central government military commander dispatch and their lack of local 
knowledge,  actually contributed to the initial success of the Japanese invasion.
289
 
 
Although this military fiasco cannot be attributed to one simple reason, there is a catalyst 
among these contributing factors. The decisive factor was Joseon’s failure to frustrate the 
main Japanese strategy (an intensive surprise offensive strategy) through stalling tactics with 
their strategic edge of topography. The Japanese were the invaders from overseas, and 
therefore faced an inevitable logistics problem since their supply route was long and hard. If 
Joseon had adopted stalling tactics using their tricky topography, the Japanese would have 
been in a serious trouble. In fact, because of the local militia, the Euibyeong, the Joseon navy, 
and the long supply route, Japan suffered from serious logistic problems during the Imjin 
Wars.
290
  
 
Also, they could have had Chinese aid without any suspicion or delay which would have 
allowed Joseon to halt the Japanese from advancing sooner than their original phase. Though 
the refusal to pass through the Joseon territory to invade China was one of the main reasons 
for the Japanese invasion, the Ming dynasty was still suspicious of Joseon’s intention. Their 
suspicion was that the Joseon commitment to war was not serious enough, and would simply 
give way to the Japanese; and they even thought that Joseon acted as Japanese guides 
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because of the quick demolition of the Joseon forces.
291
 Therefore, if Joseon were able to 
delay the Japanese any longer than what they actually managed to do (a reasonable advancing 
speed), Joseon could have had reinforcements earlier, which would have been crucial in 
deciding the fate of war.  
 
Furthermore, Joseon was not an easy country to occupy even though there were strategic and 
tactical mistakes on their side. In fact, they showed resilience. Even though their army was 
ultimately sacrificed by faulty strategies and tactics, their ground forces were quickly 
complemented by the local militia and their navy was in superb shape to prevent any 
Japanese naval movement. The northern three provinces and southern three provinces sent 
their troops to Seoul to save the king. Even though the northern and southern province forces 
were defeated by the Japanese in the Imjin River and in Yongin, just south of Seoul, because 
of the flawed battle strategy, Joseon showed that they could wage a protracted war with the 
Japanese. 
 
The Korean local militia’s strategy and tactics were very similar to those used in modern 
guerrilla warfare. Namely, they were good at local topography and enjoyed a close 
relationship with the local population, which meant they could get sufficient supplies and use 
their geographic knowledge for ambush or retreating routes following combat. Their main 
strategy was to ambush the enemy using their superior knowledge of local geography and 
information, then retreat using the familiar topography when the main enemy element was 
approaching to rescue troubled troops or starting to get over the initial shock and prepare the 
counterattack. By their guerrilla warfare, they put the enemy supply line in jeopardy, and at a 
later stage of the first invasion, the Japanese could only use a central route to Seoul to supply 
their troops in the Northern provinces. In addition, when there was a castle on the hill battle, 
such as the siege of Chinju castle and the battle of Haengju castle (12
th 
of February, 1593), as 
a part of traditional defensive strategy, they cut off enemy supplies or replied to the 
reinforcement requests and rallied around the castle on the hill. 
  
Since they could not match the Japanese regular army in firepower, training, and 
preponderance, they tried to evade open space battle. As will be analysed below in the section 
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about the Japanese second offensive to Cholla province, open space battle was only 
committed with the support of Joseon regular forces (in the case of Go Gyeongmyeog’s 
militia’s joint operation with the Kwak Young’s regular army at the Japanese second 
offensive to the Cholla province) or they were raided in surprise by the Japanese regular 
forces (in the case of Cho Heon’s militia’s battle in Keumsan). Even though they failed to 
give a decisive blow to the Japanese main forces, the Joseon militia were still able to 
destabilize the Japanese by cutting off their supply line, and contributed to frustrating their 
so-called pacifying operation, which inevitably led to the later military debacle in Pyongyang 
and withdrawal to the southern coast.
292
 Therefore, the Japanese were not able to occupy the 
vast majority of the Joseon territory except for towns in their main invasion route. In other 
words, even though Gyeongsang province was occupied, if they had delayed the Japanese 
advance, with the resilience they had (actually Gyeongsang province was one of eight 
provinces in Joseon); it would not have been that easy for the Japanese to maintain that phase 
of the advance.  
 
In conclusion, Japan’s initial success can attributed to a wide array of decisive factors. It was 
possible for Joseon to change the whole course of the war or at least draw them to quagmire 
by adopting a traditional defensive warfare strategy which used the geographic edge to retard 
the Japanese advances. The following section will examine the battle of Chungju, which 
failed to retard the Japanese advances with the geographic defensive edge, wreaking 
catastrophic results for the Joseon side.  
 
The battle of Chungju 293 
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Following the Japanese landing on Pusan, Joseon had not properly applied the stalling tactics 
using their geographic defensive edge until the Japanese reached Chungju. They had 
advanced all the way through the natural barriers of the South Eastern part of the Korean 
peninsula, the Naktong River, the mountainous inland of the Gyeongsang province, and the 
mountainous border passes between Gyeongsang and Chungchong province. Their advance 
was very fast without much resistance. Because of these failures, Joseon did not earn the time 
to recover from the surprise Japanese invasion which inevitably led to the military fiasco on 
the Joseon side in the initial phase of war.
294
   
 
At the battle of Chungju where Joseon assembled sizable forces for the first time to tackle the 
Japanese, Joseon did not adopt stalling tactics using their mountainous border pass Choryong. 
Instead, they chose a set piece battle in Chungju and their force was brutally crushed. This 
did not delay the Japanese advance. Through examining the Japanese advance to Chungju 
and the battle of Chungju, this section will show that Joseon failed to apply stalling tactics 
using their geographic defensive edge. This failure and mistake had a crucial impact on the 
Joseon’s defence campaign.  
 
Previous engagements before the battle of Chungju  
 
The next target of the Japanese First division following the fall of Dongrae was Miryang.
295
 
On their advance to Miryang, there was a village called Jakwon which was about twelve km 
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away from the Miryang castle and this had to be passed through to advance to Miryang, 
Cheongdo, Taegu, and eventually to Seoul. Therefore this village acted as a checkpoint and 
transport station to check the goods of Japanese traders and envoys.
296
 To pass this village, 
there was a narrow central pass (an artificially-made route), and, on the left and right side, a 
steep cliff. However, with only small numbers of troops available, the Joseon commander in 
charge committed tactical mistakes, and decided to divide the forces between the 
Jakwonguan and Miryang castles. The defending forces in Jakwonguan had no option but to 
concentrate the force on the central pass and could not guard the left and right sides of the 
cliff. The Japanese climbed the left cliff and surrounded the defending force. The remaining 
small force in the Miryang castle also became easy prey for the Japanese invaders.
297
 For the 
Japanese First division, Miryang was the first gate to advance to the inland of Gyeongsang 
province, which meant they had to take Miryang at all costs. However, Joseon did not fully 
use the natural barrier (Jakwonguan) and lost the chance to earn crucial time. Following the 
collapse of Miryang, the Japanese reached the outskirts of Sangju smoothly and quickly, 
without any resistance in Cheongdo and Taegu.
298
 
 
Notable among towns on the Japanese invasion route, Taegu has natural barriers (The 
Nakdong River and various mountains) from the West to the East which means with the 
utmost use of natural barriers, the city could become impregnable or at least apply stalling 
tactics against an invasion from the North or the South. The importance of Taegu in terms of 
defensive warfare was proven in the Korean War’s Nakdong River line defence campaign, 
where both sides were desperate to keep Taegu on their side. However, the assembled forces 
in Taegu were scattered because of the delayed dispatch of a central government military 
commander.
299
 If the local force in Miryang succeeded in earning crucial time using 
Jakwonguan, the first central government military commander Lee Il would have had a better 
chance to delay the Japanese from advancing in Taegu relying on the natural barrier around it. 
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He only managed to reach Sangju
300
 which did not hold any severe natural barriers and 
strategic importance except for the fact that it was the provincial capital, and was eventually 
crushed by the Japanese without the much-needed delay of the advance. Therefore, the 
tactical failure of Miryang affected the whole Japanese Gyeongsang province inland 
campaign. Their First division did not experience severe resistance during their offensive 
inland of Gyeongsang province where the immense natural barriers like the Nakdong River 
and Sobaek Mountains were able to keep them away.       
 
During the initial phase of war, after they took Kyongju, the Second Division also chose the 
central route (The First Division Route) instead of the originally planned Eastern route to 
Seoul. This was a longer route than the central route, but the choice was made because of the 
personal ambition of the Second division commander, Kato. Thus the strategic importance of 
this central route was intensified. To check the Japanese who were advancing through the 
central route to reach Seoul, the central government dispatched a military commander (Lee Il) 
to collect the available forces in Sangju. However there were no significant natural barriers in 
Sangju to help stall the Japanese advance. In addition to the natural barriers, and because of 
the tactical mistake of Lee Il (scouting), he was not able to defend his forces at the Sangju 
castle and had to fight in open space.
301
 Following the collapse of Sangju, because the 
Japanese main force was concentrated on the central route, the strategic importance of 
Choryong, with its steep mountainous topography, to stop or delay the Japanese advance was 
significantly increased. However, the Second Central Government Military Commander 
(Shin Lib) chose an open field in Chungju rather than in Choryong to stall the Japanese from 
advancing onward.   
 
Why choose Chungju? 
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Sangju was the provincial capital therefore their castle was in a reasonable status to defend against 
the Japanese. 
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Following the collapse of Sangju, and the Japanese advance to the Choryong border pass, 
Joseon appointed Shin Lib as the Samdosunbyeonsa (the supreme military commander in 
charge of Southern three provinces) who received national hero fame after he defeated the 
Jurchens along the Northern border, and Kim Yeomool as the Jongsaguan (the military 
advisor) to check the Japanese advance with 8,000 dominantly conscripted forces.
302
 After 
taking Sangju, the Japanese met the steep mountainous area of the Sobaek Mountains, at the 
border of Gyeongsang and Chungchong provinces. Only the border pass could afford the 
quick passage of massive troops and supply. The Sobaek Mountains became a natural barrier 
for the Japanese, so this border pass had an immense strategic significance. Since Konish (the 
First Division Commander) had an ambition to occupy Seoul as soon as possible, he had no 
option but to pass through the border pass called Choryong (642m) which is located between 
Juheul mountain (1075m) and Baekhwa mountain (1063m).
303
 Therefore, Choryong was a 
strategically important place for the Joseon to check the Japanese advance. Upon being 
dispatched, Kim Yeomool also insisted that the only way for the outnumbered troops 
(Joseon’s central government force) to stall the opposite forces (the Japanese expedition 
forces) would be to hold on to the Choryong border pass.
304
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However, there were a few military commanders who set a low defensive value on the border pass. 
Outstanding figures were Shin Lib and Lee Il who earned their fame through beating the Jurchens. 
They had an expertise in the offensive cavalry warfare and were not the defensive warfare specialists, 
using mountainous defensive edge. They insisted that the Joseon force could check the Japanese 
advance in the mountainous border pass but could not give them a decisive blow. Their lack of 
expertise in defensive warfare became one of the main reasons for them to abandon the defensive plan 
in Choryeong. On the other hand, Kim Yeomool’s proposition was to check the Japanese advance in 
Choryeong. He said the best way to beat the Japanese was to lay ambush in the left and right side of 
gorge in Choryeog, allow them to advance to the gorge and shoot them. Excerpted from– Y.S. Lee, 
op.cit., p.29-31 
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However, Shin Lib insisted on setting up a battle in the open field mainly because the Joseon 
force was cavalry and that of the Japanese was infantry.
305
 Shin also insisted that since the 
Japanese already came close to Choryeong (actually this was not the case), the Joseon force 
would not have enough time to prepare the defensive warfare and consequently, their position 
would be vulnerable. Shin then mentioned that, once they put their forces in mountainous 
area, because of the poor training of the forces, there would be a great number of runaway 
soldiers. Finally, Shin made a decision to abandon Choryong and form a defensive line in 
Danweolyeok which is located 4km away from the Chungju castle. This meant that Shin 
believed that hand-to-hand combat with the Japanese using the cavalry’s mobile and striking 
power would give an edge to Joseon.
306
  
 
Adopting a cavalry tactic was not a total misjudgement of data. Shin tried to adopt the tactic 
he was good at while using the main force’s (cavalry) strength against the Japanese. However, 
Shin made a crucial mistake in executing this tactic and experienced bad luck. Shin led the 
force from Danwolyeok to Tangeumdae and then set up a defensive line in the low and humid 
ground where the Namhan River and Dal Stream met, and waited for the Japanese arrival. 
His decision to wage a cavalry offensive warfare instead of stalling defensive warfare in 
Choryong was a mistake that could only be seen in hindsight.
307
 His decision to choose low 
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and humid ground surrounded by a paddy field and swamp was a truly tremendous blunder. 
Also, it had begun to rain which meant the ground became much soggier. The strength of the 
cavalry was mainly derived from the horses’ speed. Because of the soggy ground their horses’ 
speed and striking power was reduced, and ultimately they became an easy prey for the long-
range weaponry.
308
 This is a typical example of Clausewitzan friction, where inevitable 
mishaps build upon each other, with each minor setback producing another series of 
additional problems. On the Japanese side, they had the advantage of having accurate long-
range weaponry (Harquebus). They set up wooden stockades as a barricade to blunt the 
forces of the charging cavalry and applied volley fire tactics to maximize their firepower. As 
a consequence, the Joseon force was crushed by the Japanese.
309
  
 
Strategic effects of The Battle of Chungju during the Initial Phases of 
War 
 
Strategically speaking, this battle took on a significant meaning during the course of war. 
After the collapse of Chungju, Joseon were no longer able to delay the Japanese advance – let 
alone defeat them before the Japanese reached the outskirts of Seoul – since there were no 
more formidable natural barriers for Joseon to hang on to after they abandoned the Choryong 
border pass. Consequently, even though Joseon had resilience, they did not have enough time 
to recover because of their earlier failure of delaying the Japanese advance. This meant they 
had to make the decision to abandon Seoul and then flee to the North.   
 
Even though the Joseon government made a decision to abandon Seoul, they set up the 
defensive line in the Han River. The Han River was the last resort for Joseon to defend Seoul 
since Seoul was located in the northern bank of the Han River. They only managed to 
conscript a small number of soldiers around Seoul to defend the Han River, but their effort of 
defending the Han River was in vain. Seoul was then occupied on the 3
rd
 of May, 1592, only 
nineteen days after the Japanese landed in Pusan.
310
Joseon could amass a force which was 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Gyeongsang and Chungchong province border, they could diminish the effect of direct firing of 
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capable of defending the Han River defence line if there was adequate time. The Northern 
three provinces (Hamgyong, Hwanghae and Pyongan) had already dispatched their troops, 
but because of the early collapse of Seoul, they managed only to reach the Imjin River, 
located towards the north of Seoul and the next northern natural barrier. The Southern three 
provinces, most notably the Cholla province, also sent troops to Seoul, but they retreated after 
the collapse of the city.  
 
In conclusion, the military catastrophe of Joseon was not the result of a single deciding factor. 
However, the failure of defensive warfare using geographical edge was the most significant 
blunder, which had a domino effect. Failing to check the Japanese advance in Miryang using 
Jakwongwan affected the outcome of the Japanese Gyeongsang province’s inland campaign 
such as Taegu and Sangju. Their failure to use the Choryong border pass in delaying the 
Japanese advance also later affected the Han River defensive line and Seoul. Therefore, 
Joseon’s failure to adopt stalling tactics using their geographic edge acted as the catalyst for 
many mistakes they made in the initial phase of war and led them to complete military 
catastrophe. In hindsight, if the Joseon forces had adopted a stalling tactic, with the resilience 
they had, they could have earned enough time to regroup and rearm themselves. In addition, 
because of the reasonable advance speed, a quicker Chinese engagement could have been 
made. More than anything else, the Japanese expedition force would suffer logistic problems 
because of the long supply line. Therefore, the Imjin Wars could have concluded earlier. The 
next part of this research will review the strategic transformation of Joseon and its effect 
through the Cholla province’s defence campaign.     
 
4-3 Shock and the Gradual Strategic, and Tactical 
Transformation of Joseon - Cholla Province Defence 
(occupation) Campaign311 
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The Japanese Operation Plan    
 
The Japanese expedition force launched its full-scale operation in Cholla province at the end 
of June, 1592. Since their initial strategic objective was to occupy Seoul as soon as possible, 
they only managed to secure towns along their short plotted invasion route from Pusan to 
Seoul. Therefore, they planned to occupy Cholla province, which had been excluded in the 
initial operation.  
 
The expedition forces in charge were the 7
th 
Division (15,700 soldiers) led by Kobayakawa 
Takakage. His division landed in Gyeongsang province in the middle of April as a six 
division. It was stationed in Gimcheon or Changwon to secure the western route to Seoul 
with Mori’s 7th Division. However, according to the division and rule plans of Joseon drafted 
in the middle of May in Seoul, his division became the 7
th
 division and was ordered to take 
charge of Cholla province.
312
  
 
Kobayakawa then ordered his troops in Changwon led by Ango Kugi to advance to Cholla 
province. He planned to advance to Chonju (The provincial capital of Cholla province) 
passing through Haman, Ulryong, Hamyang, and Namwon. Ango’s initial advance was 
checked and repelled in Ulryong by a local militia led by Kwak Chae-U.
313
  
 
Then they altered their invasion route. They would enter Cholla province from the north-
western part of Gyeongsang province and the southern part of Chungchong province into the 
North Eastern part of Cholla province. Ango’s troops invaded Cholla province from the 
north western part of the Gyeongsang province. (Initially planned route: Gimcheon, Jirye, 
Buhangryeong (north eastern border pass between Cholla and Gyeongsang province), Muju, 
Chinan, Ungchi, and Chonju). Kobayakawa led his troops from the southern part of 
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Chungchong province to the Cholla province. (Initially the planned route encompassed 
Chungju, Choryong pass, Kumsan, Ichi and Chonju).
 314
 
 
They made a final effort during the first invasion to occupy Cholla province after their 
second effort had failed again. Their planned invasion route this time was Jinhae and 
Goseong, which are the southern coastal towns of Gyeongsang province, and then cross the 
Nam River, and finally reach Cholla province. This plan was also not successful since they 
suffered another miserable defeat during the first siege of Chinju (5
th
 of October, 1592-10
th
 of 
October, 1592) 
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Map 4-3 The Japanese offensive route and Joseon’s defensive line during the Cholla 
province occupation (defence) campaign.
315
  
 
Joseon’s Reaction to the Japanese Offensive 
 
The Battle of Ulryong (25
th
 of May, 1592) 
 
According to the initial occupation plan of Cholla province, Ango’s troops would advance to 
Cholla province from their post in Changwon. He successfully reached the eastern bank of 
the Nam River marching through Haman. He then tried to cross the Nam River to reach 
Ulryong.  On the Joseon side, the respected local leader Kwak Chae-U rallied the local militia 
and laid an ambush along the Jeongamjin ferry, located in the North Western bank of the 
Nam River, assuming that the Japanese would invade Ulryong by crossing the Nam River. At 
first, Ango sent the scout around Jeongamjin ferry to check the local topography. The 
Japanese scout spotted the swamp and stuck twigs into the ground to point out the available 
route. However, at night, the Joseon local militia pulled out the twigs and stuck them into the 
ground again, leading them to the swamp. The following day (25
th
 of May), Ango’s troops 
headed to the ferry, but because of the false information they then fell into turmoil in the 
swamp. At that point, the ambushing Joseon militia launched a surprise attack to Ango’s 
troops. Ango was then defeated and moved to Gimcheon to regroup and wait for the next 
order.
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The Battle of Ichi, Ungchi, and Kumsan – The Second Offensive to 
Cholla Province 
 
The Japanese initial attempt to occupy Cholla province was frustrated at the Battle of 
Ulryong. Afterwards, they made another plan to cross the North Eastern border of Cholla 
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province and reach Chonju. During the course of this offensive, there were a series of battles 
called the Battles of Ichi, Ungchi, and Kumsan. The Joseon camp in Cholla province was also 
assigned to the defence sector to prevent the Japanese invasion from Gyeongsang and 
Chungchong province.  
    
Rank Name Defence Sector 
Bangeosa Kwak Young Kumsan 
Jobangjang Jang Euihyun 
 
Buhangryeong (690m)– Border pass between Muju of 
Cholla province (Muju Gun (County),  
    Mupung Myeon (Township- Sub division of Si and  
Gun in contemporary Korea) and Jirye of Gyeongsang 
province (Gimcheon Si (City), Buhang Myeon ) 
 
Jobangjang Lee Gyejeong 
 
Yuksipryeong (734m)- Border pass between Chinan of 
Cholla province (Jangsu Gun, Janggye Myeon)  and Aneui 
of Gyeongsang province (Hayang Gun, Seosang Myeon) 
 
Jobangjang Lee Yooeui 
 
Pallyangchi (513m)- Border pass between Namwon of 
Cholla province (Nawon Gun, Inwol Myeon) and 
Hamyang of Gyeongsang province (Hamyang Gun, 
Hamyang Eup) 
 
Index 4-3 Initial Cholla province defence sector allocation in 1592 
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However, the Japanese offensive came too quickly for Joseon’s Cholla province defence 
forces to fortify their northern and north-eastern border. Ango’s troops managed to cross 
Buhangryeong and reached Muju on the 19
th
 of June and Kobayakawa’s troop also 
successfully reached Kumsan on the 23
rd
 of June. As a supportive attack, Ango’s troop passed 
Chinan and reached Ungchi, the last natural barrier to reach Chonju from the North-East 
border of Cholla province. From the northern border, Kobayakawa troops as a main attack 
tried to reach Chonju through Ichi. Therefore, both the Ungchi and Ichi were the last natural 
defensive barriers to reach Chonju from the North and North-Eastern border.
318
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On the Joseon side, following the withdrawal from Kumsan, Kwak Young’s force regrouped 
and reinforced in Gosan, then advanced again to Jisan, near Kumsan, to threaten the enemy 
advance. The defensive void was quickly filled with the relocation of troops. Once the Joseon 
government realized Ango’s intention after the capture of Muju was to reach Chonju instead 
of Namwon, Lee Gwang (Cholla provincial governor) ordered the Gimje magistrate Jeong 
Dam and Naju Panguan
319
 Lee Boknam to advance from their position to Ungchi to check the 
Japanese advance. On their departure, the local militia leader Hwang Bak also joined the 
battle with his 200 militias. On the 7
th
 of July, when Ango tried to overrun the Joseon’s first 
defensive line in Ungchi, the battle of Ungchi began. On the 8
th
 of July, the Joseon force 
began to crumble when they ran out of arrows and could not hold back the Japanese forces. 
They withdrew to Chonju and Ango advanced to Chonju on the 9
th 
of July.
320
 
 
Along with the Dongbuk Magistrate Hwang Jin, Kwon Yul’s force was reallocated in 
Namwon, only to be then moved again to Ichi to check Kobayakawa’s Japanese main force, 
when they noticed that Ango’s troops were heading to Chonju rather than Namwon.321 The 
Japanese main forces launched their offensive to Chonju through Ichi. In Ichi, they set up a 
wooden fence on their defensive line on top of the hill and artificial obstacles on the probable 
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321 Namwon took a strategically very important position in the defence of Cholla province and 
the entire defence of Joseon at that time. On Namwon’s east, there is pallyangchi which is a 
valuable check point for Joseon in case of Japanese invasion from the western border of 
Gyeongsang province. Once Namwon is occupied, the Japanese could quickly advance to the 
southern part of Cholla province without a severe natural barrier for Joseon to check their 
advance and the Joseon Army in the south east of Cholla province and Chinju to prohibit the 
Japanese south western coastal offensive as well as the naval garrison in the southern coast of 
Cholla province would also be in danger of siege. Namwon is also located in the important 
transport junction where you can go to provincial capital Chonju, or Seoul through Muju, 
Chungchong province, or Gyeongsang province through Pallyangchi and Hamyang, or to 
southern part of Cholla province. Therefore, because the strategic significance, the Japanese 
were keen on taking Namwon to advance to Seoul and dominate Cholla province in the 
second invasion. 
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Japanese offensive route to the Joseon defensive line. They also prepared enough stones and 
arrows to defend their position, and made thick smoke to render their position invisible to the 
Japanese scout.
322
   
 
On the 7
th
 of July, Kobayakawa left Kumsan castle with few forces to defend, and contacted 
the Joseon force in Ichi on the 8
th
 of July in the early morning. They tried to overrun the 
Joseon’s defensive line initially breaking through artificial obstacles on the way to the top of 
hill and then demolishing the wooden fences through the continuous attack of two separate 
divisions. However, their attempt failed because of the timely reinforcement. However, 
Kobayakawa was not prepared to admit defeat and withdrew to Kumsan.  
 
In fact, he was about to launch the second offensive to Ichi but, he received news that 
unknown Joseon forces were spotted in Yonsan, which is not far away from their main 
offensive base in Kumsan. They were obviously heading to Kumsan. In fear of encirclement 
by Kwon Yul and unknown troops they decided to withdraw from their current position to 
Kumasn. Ango’s troops were in the same dilemma since they could be surrounded by the 
defensive force in Chonju and Ichi. So, they also withdrew initially to Muju and then to 
Kumsan.
323
   
 
The reason that the Japanese offensive to Chonju was unsuccessful was not just that the 
regular army had checked the Japanese in Ichi and Ungchi. There was a coordinated local 
militia effort also in place. In fact, the local militia activities were the crucial reason for the 
Japanese withdrawal since Cholla and Chungchong province militia attacked the enemy’s 
main base in Kumsan consecutively twice. The reported unknown troops which made the 
Japanese main attack force to withdraw to Kumsan were Go Gyeongmyeong’s local militia 
from Damyang.
324
   
 
Under the cause of saving the king, they tried to advance to Seoul and reached Eunjin in 
Chungchong province. However, a rumour that the Kobayakawa force would attack Kumsan 
and Chonju was spread. A severe discussion followed as to whether they had to advance to 
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the north or help the local force in Cholla province save the province. Their decision was to 
save the province so they made a plan to help Kumsan. However, before they reached 
Kumsan, it was occupied by the Japanese. Consequently, they decided to station themselves 
in Jinsan next to Kumsan to regroup and organize the coordinated attack on Kumsan.  
 
Go Gyeongmyeong already agreed to join the attack on Kumsan with Kwak Young’s army and 
contacted the Chungchong province local militia Jo Heon for that purpose as well.
325
 His 
force started to advance to Kumsan on the 8
th
 of June and obviously their movement was not 
unnoticed by Kobayakawa. Upon arrival on the outskirts of Kumsan castle, his force was 
united with Bangeosa Kwak Young’s army. They started to attack the Kumsan castle, but 
failed to occupy the castle and withdrew on the 10
th
 of July, because of poor coordination 
with the regular army and untimely reinforcement of Kobayakawa.
326
  
 
Afterwards, Jo Heon’s Chungchong province militia that promised the joint attack also 
approached the outskirts of Kumsan castle on the 17
th
 of August and waited for the Cholla 
province regular army reinforcement to arrive. However, the Japanese forces came out of the 
castle and fought in the open space. The entire Joseon militia was killed in action, and the 
Japanese also suffered severe casualties.
327
 Both militias could not manage to capture 
Kumsan but strategically the battle of Kumsan has a significant meaning. Because of the fear 
of encirclement, the Japanese main operation forces had to withdraw and defend Kumsan. In 
addition, owing to casualties suffered in both attacks, the Japanese supporting attack force in 
Muju withdrew to Kumsan on the 7
th
 of September and all the Japanese forces engaged in this 
operation eventually withdrew from Kumsan to Okchon on the 16
th
 of September.
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The First Battle of Chinju Castle (the First Siege of Chinju)329   
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Located in the western bank of Nam River and surrounded by steep mountains, the Chinju castle 
was the fortress blessed with natural barriers for defence. Strategically, once the Japanese managed to 
occupy it, they would have an access to Pallyangchi which is the crucial border pass to reach 
Namwon and Seomjin River which makes a provincial border between Gyeongsang and Cholla 
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Following the failure of the Second occupation campaign, the Japanese planned another 
coordinated naval and ground attack on the Southern coast of Cholla province. However, 
their navy was humiliated by the Joseon navy at the end of July in Hansando and they were 
ordered to station their base in Pusan. Therefore, the army had to take the whole 
responsibility and advanced westwards to Chinju in early August from their army base in 
Kimhae.  Their initial advance was frustrated and they returned to the original base. 
330
  
 
After the initial joint operation collapsed, the Japanese expedition forces headquartered in 
Seoul set up the strategic objective to reacquire the southern coast naval base following the 
consecutive defeat of their navy, and to gain entrance to Cholla province by occupying 
Chinju. They would also be able to attack Kwak Chae-U’s guerrilla forces hiding in the area. 
Under this strategic direction, from the middle of August, some elements of the Japanese 
Army in Seoul headquarters started to relocate to Kimhae.
331
  On the 24
th
 of September, they 
launched the offensive campaign again to Chinju castle. They had more than 20,000 soldiers 
led by General Hosokawa Tadadoki. On their way to Chinju, they recaptured Changwon, and 
Haman. From the 6
th
 of October, they started to cross the Nam River and surrounded the 
Chinju castle. On the Joseon side, Kim Simin also prepared for battle in the Chinju castle with 
his 3,800 soldiers. He had already asked for reinforcements in Cholla province and local 
militia, which arrived in time, was dispersed around the mountainous terrain encircling 
Chinju castle.
332
 
 
Even though they arrived on the 6
th
 of October, the Japanese hesitated to attack the castle 
until the early morning of the 8
th 
of October because surrounding mountains and other natural 
barriers were taken by the Joseon local militia and army, and consequently could threaten 
their rear supply line or even the main battle camp once they advanced to attack the castle. 
However, they already had an order from headquarters to occupy the castle as soon as 
possible and therefore attacked it on the 8
th 
of October. Following the failure to occupy the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
province, and was not far away from the Joseon Left Navy main naval base. In addition, the Japanese 
could control the southern coast of Gyeongsang province and build the naval base against the Joseon 
Navy in Cholla province once the Chinju castle collapsed.      
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castle on that day, there was a discussion in the Japanese camp as to why they failed to 
occupy it. They thought it was because they could not give 100% of their efforts to occupy 
the castle since the Joseon militia and army, which took the geographically advantageous 
position around Chinju castle, threatened their main camp and supply line.  
 
From the 9
th
 of October, they separated their forces into several small groups to find and 
destroy the Joseon militia and army around them. However, this effort worsened the situation.  
The Joseon militia and army already took the advantageous position and knew the local 
topography. Therefore, the Japanese effort to eliminate the surrounding fear was foiled with 
much cost. After the failure of this attempt, the Japanese saw other attempts to capture the 
castle also failed because of the significant natural barriers around the Chinju castle and 
stellar leadership shown by Kim Simin. In the end, they decided to withdraw from the Chinju 
castle on the 10
th
 of October. . 
333
  
 
Outcome along with Long Term Effects of the Campaign, and Why 
this was the Signal of the Joseon’s Gradual Strategic Transformation 
 
Because of the failure of this campaign, the Japanese attempt to occupy Cholla province 
proved in vain during the first invasion. Cholla province contained the largest prairie in 
Joseon which could support the Joseon and the Ming force’s joint offensive to the Japanese, 
therefore their success in this campaign also became a turning point of the war. Strategically 
speaking, this campaign also held significant meaning since Joseon started to apply efforts to 
weaken the Japanese tactical strengths (accurate firepower of Harquebus, battle experience, 
and preponderance) by adopting defensive strategies using their geographic advantages.  
 
In the battle of Ulryeong, the Joseon local militia took a chance on the enemy’s weakness of 
local topography knowledge and won the battle. During the second offensive, Bangeosa 
Kwak Young initially allocated the defence sector to defend Cholla province whose objective 
was to use their defensive edge by stationing the troops in a steep mountainous border pass. 
Following the collapse of the Buhangryeong defensive line and Kumsan before they 
solidified their defensive line, they also relocated their troops from their original positions to 
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Ichi and Ungchi which was the last significant natural barrier for the defence of of Chonju 
and managed to repel them in Ichi. Meanwhile, at the battle of Chinju castle, Joseon also 
defended the castle using natural barriers such as the Nam River and mountainous terrain 
around the castle. This campaign showed that unlike the initial phase of war when the Joseon 
Army recklessly waged an open field set piece battle in Chungju or a cavalry offensive in the 
battle of Imjin river, Joseon began to recognize the weakness and strength of herself and 
Japan, thus gradually transforming their strategy to the traditional defensive warfare using the 
advantages of topography.  
 
The traditional defensive warfare strategy was not constrained to defence tactics employing 
natural barriers. The coordination of forces in the enemy offensive sector is also crucial using 
either mobile manoeuvre to wage guerrilla warfare against the enemy main offensive base or 
cutting off enemy supply lines based on their knowledge of local topography. In this 
campaign, during the second offensive Cholla and Chungchong province local militias 
actually attacked the enemy main offensive base in Kumsan by the mobile manoeuvre which 
crossed the Kum River and mountains. They were defeated, but the threat of encirclement and 
the casualties they suffered eventually led to the Japanese decision to withdraw from Kumsan. 
Meanwhile, during the battle of Chinju castle, the local militia and army which stationed 
itself amongst steep mountains around the castle also threatened the enemy supply or even 
the Japanese main base, proving to be a tremendous distraction.  
 
The consecutive victories during the campaign gave Joseon a lesson about which appropriate 
strategic approach using the geographic edge would help give the defensive edge against the 
well-trained and outnumbered Japanese. It also brought great confidence back to the Joseon 
army and militia. The lesson learned in this campaign helped to regain the control of Japanese 
western and eastern invasion route towns, which meant the Japanese could only communicate 
with and supply the troops in Seoul and the northern part of Joseon through the central route, 
which caused a significant logistics problem.
334
 In addition, the combat experiences and 
                                                          
334 
To review the Joseon’s guerrilla warfare using topography in the western and eastern invasion 
route towns,   
See)  H.S. Lee, ImJinJeonRanSaSang, p.422-445 
I.H. Seo, op.cit., p.99-105, p.111-117 
J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3, p.184-188 
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lessons learned in this campaign also helped contribute to Joseon’s developing a new 
defensive strategy – in actuality, return to traditional Korean defensive strategy during the 
interwar period.  
 
4-4 The Second Invasion and the Transformed Joseon 
Strategies and Tactics  
 
During the initial phases of the war, the Japanese easily defeated the ill-prepared Joseon 
forces and advanced on to the North. Konishi pressed on towards Pyonggyang, while his rival 
Kato set off on a long campaign to pacify the North East of Joseon and captured two Joseon 
princes in Kyongsong.
335
 They could not advance further because of the logistics problem and 
the threat of possible Chinese engagement. However, the logistics problem worsened because 
of the long supply line and local militia’s guerrilla warfare which threatened the supply. Their 
supply to the forces in the North of Joseon suffered further setbacks since their naval supply 
route was also blocked by the Joseon Navy.  
 
In addition to this supply problem, Joseon’s winter was not very generous to the Japanese 
who had never before experienced such cold weather. Konishi’s forces in Pyongyang were 
not even equipped with winter clothes because of supply problems; consequently their morale 
was quite low.
336
 Therefore, when there was the second battle of Pyongyang (8
th 
of January, 
1593), they were defeated by the Ming and Joseon joint force, and withdrew to Seoul. Even 
though the Japanese managed to beat the Chinese who tried to recapture Seoul, at the battle of 
Pyokje (27
th
 of January, 1593) they desperately needed a time to regroup and think about how 
to fight back.
337
 The Japanese asked for peace talks with the Chinese in order to gain more 
precious time. As a consequence of the initial peace talk, they evacuated Seoul on the 18
th
 of 
                                                          
335 Turnbull, op.cit., p.27 
336 H.K. Jang, JoSeonSiDaeGoonSaJeonRyak, p.169-175 
337
 At this point, the best estimate of the army’s strength was 53,000 men. Death and wounds from 
numerous battles, sieges, frostbite, guerrilla raids and typhoid fever had taken a huge toll, and the 
chronicler noted how the common soldiers suffered from frostbite and snow-blindness. Excerpted 
from- Turnbull, op.cit., p.63 
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April and withdrew to the southern coastal towns in the Gyeongsang Province. The Japanese 
used the time to regroup themselves and decided to invade again in February, 1597.
338
  
 
The Japanese Strategic Objective and Invasion Plan  
 
Following the decision to reinvade, the Japanese formed a reinvasion force totalling 142,000 
men including a newly mobilised army of 115,000 and a navy numbering 7,000 as well as the 
remaining forces in Joseon equalling around 20,000. Toyotomi gave six operation guidelines 
to his forces. The first and second guidelines were related to Cholla province
339
 since he did 
not want to repeat the mistakes of the first invasion result where because of their haste to 
advance to Seoul, the remaining Cholla province local militia and navy attacked their rear 
supply route and eventually forced them to retreat. Cholla province also possessed a vast 
paddy field which could supply the whole Japanese expedition force as this province already 
proved its capability in the first invasion. In addition, Joseon and Ming already bolstered their 
defence in the Japanese first invasion route towns located mostly in Gyeongsang province.
340
   
 
Before the second invasion, following ardent discussion, the Japanese military authorities 
decided upon their combat guidelines. 
“The reason that Joseon did not collapse even after we occupied most of the                       
territory was because the remaining parts of Cholla and Chungchong provinces supported the 
whole Joseon through the naval route. Therefore the operation guideline should be fulfilled 
through the joint operation in ground and sea, not only through ground occupation but also by 
securing the sea line supply to Seoul”.341   
                                                          
338 Ibid., p.63 
339 In his guideline 
(1) They will occupy Cholla province thoroughly and then advance to Choungchong province 
and the other Joseon territory.  
(2) Once the occupation of Cholla province was finalised, they appointed a castle defence 
commander in charge in the whole Cholla province as planned.   
340 H.K. Jang, JoSeonSiDaeGoonSaJeonRyak, p.176 
341 K.N. Cho, NanJungJabRok3, Jungyu, 20th of August.   
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In other words, the Japanese thought that the occupation of Cholla province along with 
securing the naval supply line to Seoul through the South Sea of Cholla province were 
prerequisites to advance to Seoul.   
 
Prior to the army’s advance, the Japanese navy tried to break down the Joseon navy to secure 
the command of Joseon South Sea which would secure the naval supply line for the 
advancing army. In Joseon’s position, losing naval command in the South Sea would be 
disastrous since it cut off their naval supply line to Seoul. Therefore, Japan set up a plan to 
get rid of Joseon’s naval commander in chief, Yi Sunsin, who had made them suffer the 
consecutive humiliating naval defeats of Okpo, Sachon, Tangpo, and Hansando, using false 
information. Yi was sacked on the 26
th
 of February.
342
  
 
Gyeongsang Right Navy commander Won Gyun took over command. However, he also 
suffered from the same dilemma as Yi. After the central government was informed that more 
than 600 ships were at anchor in Pusan around early July, they ordered him to attack the 
enemy main base in Pusan. He was initially reluctant realizing he may face the same trouble 
as Yi. He had no option but to lead his navy to Pusan on the 14
th
 of July. He could not break 
down the Japanese navy in Pusan because the Japanese could wage a navy and army joint 
operation since it was the Japanese main military base in Joseon. He then tried to withdraw to 
the main base in Hansando, but the Joseon navy almost suffered complete annihilation in 
Chilchollyang on the 15
th
 of July by the Japanese joint naval and ground operations.
343
 
Following the defeat of Chilchollyang, Joseon lost their naval command and the Japanese 
became ready and, able to apply the army and navy joint operation to reach Seoul.    
 
                                                          
342
 The misleading information given to the Joseon central government by the Konishi spy was that 
Kato would arrive in Pusan on the 21
st
 of January from Japan so, if the Joseon navy ambushed him on 
his way back to Joseon, Joseon could capture him in the open sea. The Joseon government believed 
the information because Kato and Konishi had experienced antagonism during the first invasion and 
ordered Yi to capture Kato. However, Yi said he could not trust the information given by the enemy 
and refused the central government order. He was then dismissed with the accusation of missing a 
chance to capture Kato. Excerpted from- J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3, p.245   
343 
Ibid., p.246 
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The army invasion plan was to move inland in two main thrusts meeting in Chonju, one 
veering toward the right, the other to the left. Two great armies were organized for the 
purpose; 65,300 men in the Right Army under the overall command of Mori Hidemoto
344
 and 
49,600 men in the Left Army under Ukida Hideie
345
 - a combined army invasion force of 
114,900 men.
346
 In addition to army advances, the navy (7,200 men) also had a plan to land 
in Hadong and advance through the Seomjin River to Gurye where they planned to meet the 
Left Army.
347
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
344
The planned invasion route initially crossed the Nakdong River, and then advanced to Kochang, 
Chinan, and finally reached Chonju. 
345 The planned invasion route was advancing through the southern coast line of Gyeonsang province 
(Goseong, Sachon, Hadong on its way) and turning north westwards to occupy Namwon and reaching 
Chonju.  
346 S. Hawley, The Imjin War –Japan’s Sixteenth Century invasion of  Korea and Attempt to Conquer 
China, Royal Asiatic Society-Korea Branch, 2005, p.466  
347 J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3, p.233  
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 Map 4-4 The Second invasion in 1597 and the Liberation of Korea, 1598
348
 
 
                                                          
348
 S. Turnbull, op.cit., p.76 
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Joseon’s Preparation during the Interwar Period and Reaction 
to the Invasion 
 
Tactical Preparation  
 
Before the Imjin Wars, the Chinese were already equipped with tactics and specialized forces 
to deal with the cavalry-centred northern nomad enemy like the Jurchens, Mongols, and the 
infantry-centred Japanese pirates (倭寇),349 unlike Joseon who only managed to possess the 
antidote against the cavalry-centred northern nomads. During the Imjin wars, the tactical 
approach of troops (南兵) that specialized in combat against the Japanese pirates became a 
major sucess in this war. Their tactics were based on Qi Jiguang’s military drill book called 
Jixiaoxinshu (紀效新書 - New Book of Effective Discipline (1561)), and called Zhejiang 
tactics. (浙江兵法) The core of these tactics was the close cooperation of the infantry’s long-
range firepower and hand-to-hand combat. Without using the cavalry, they were equipped 
with a shield in one hand and various types of hand-to-hand weapons in the other, usually 
quite long to cope with the Japanese long sword. The Ming force in the battle of Pyongyang 
successfully applied these tactics and Joseon were hugely impressed. In Pyongyang, the Ming 
force took the initiative against the Japanese, thoroughly devastating the Japanese defensive 
line with their accurate long-range cannons which were above the Japanese harquebus’s 
shooting-range. They finally defeated the unsettled Japanese with a massive infantry 
charge.
350
 
   
                                                          
349 Wokou means small-build bandit. Traditionally Japanese called as 倭(Wo) by both Korea and 
China since they were relatively smaller than the Korean and Chinese. 寇(Kou) means a bandit or 
thief in Chinese. Therefore literally, it means a Japanese bandit. Because of the debilitation of central 
government influence, political instability, and the devastation of land during the Warring State period, 
a group of petty farmers and fishermen in the coastal areas of Japan who were usually around 20-400 
ships and commanded by small or medium sized feudal lords, started to raid the Korean and Chinese 
coastal towns for their survival. So it is wrong to say that they were a regular army with any military 
objective. They were only pirates, surviving in the horrible civil war time through the pillage.   
350 H.E. Jung, HanKukJeonTongByeongSeoEuiIHae, p.23-24 
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Unlike the Joseon tactics, which stressed long-range weaponry and formation, the Chinese 
were more efficient with close coordination of long-range firepower and hand-to-hand 
fighting. Joseon were most impressed with the Chinese cannons and their application. In 
addition to cannons, since Joseon suffered from the accurate firepower of Harquebuses and 
the Japanese close order infantry tactics, they were also interested in the Harquebus and 
various infantry hand-to-hand fight weapons and techniques (the Harquebus was also applied 
in the Ming forces). Therefore, from July, 1593, Joseon started to train their troops according 
to Zhejiang tactics and officially established Hunryeondogam in August, 1594 to train the 
troop with this tactics. In Hunryeondogam, they started to train Samsubyeong (three different 
types of infantry) including Posu (Artillery and Rifle (Harquebus) man), Sasu (Archer), and 
Salsu (a Spear and Sword man) according to Zhejiang tactics. Joseon especially stressed great 
importance upon producing Posu because they greatly affected the Chinese artillery and 
Japanese Harquebus.
351
  
 
In terms of weaponry, the harquebus had been approved for adoption by the army and was 
now in limited use among many units, although still far below the numbers employed by the 
Japanese. New cannons, which had proved their worth in the first invasion, were cast to 
replace those destroyed in battle and captured by the Japanese. Hwacha (fire wagons), which 
shot up to one hundred gunpowder-propelled arrows in a single volley, were turned out as 
well. Efforts were also made to refine new weapons, such as the rock-throwing sucha sokpo 
(water wheel rock cannon).
352
 In addition, they also produced massive numbers of various 
weapons in Cholla, Chungchong and Hwanghae provinces. Therefore, at least in terms of 
firepower, they had reached the Japanese level of sophistication, unlike in the initial phase of 
war.
353
 The introduction of the Harquebus and the massive production of cannon, hwacha, 
and sucha sokpo, brought not only a similar technological level to the Japanese Army, but 
also the significant efficiency enhancement of castle on the hill defence because of the 
increased firepower against the Japanese who had to climb the slope to reach and attack the 
castle.    
 
Strategic preparations  
                                                          
351 I.H. Seo, op.cit., p.213-214 
352
 S. Hawley, op.cit., p.446-447 
353
 J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3, p.233 
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Strengthening the Quality and Quantity of Local Troops 
 
Prior to the Imjin Wars, Joseon’s local force was on the verge of breaking down because of 
the Gunjeoksupo. Since the Joseon government recognized it was one of the main reasons for 
its initial military fiasco, they tried to fill their local forces’ lack of quality and quantity, and 
organized a new local force system called Sokogun based on the suggestion of Qi Jiguang’s 
Jixiaoxinshu. Unlike the previous system (only peasant classes were mobilised and the 
subdivision of towns were excluded in organizing local force), it included all classes and 
local administrative units.
354
 Therefore, Joseon were able to increase the number of their 
local forces through applying the military duty to every class, as well as training and 
mobilising the local forces properly thorough expanding their military organization to the 
very last administrative unit.   
 
Review of the National Defence System 
 
In addition to renovating organization of local troops, Joseon also returned to the Jinguan 
national defence system. Yoo Seongryong (Joseon’s prime minister during the interwar period) 
indicated the necessity of returning to the Jinguan system with the comment below:  
“If we keep a hold of the Jinguan system with a qualified person who can properly train the 
local soldier in peacetime and defend the garrison with the trained soldier and prepare 
weapons in case of conflict, our national defence would be fine. So if we return to the 
Jinguan system how can we have another disaster resulting in a meltdown of our defence line 
and losing our capital in ten days’ time?” 355 In other words, the Joseon government 
recognized it was impossible for Joseon to refurbish the national defence and eventually win 
the Imjin Wars without taking the merit of the Jinguan system.
356
  
 
There was a major development of the national defence system (modified and strengthened 
Jinguan system) during the Interwar period. It could be categorized into three significant 
developments. First, as in the original Jingguan system, the commander in charge would stay 
                                                          
354 I.H. Seo, op.cit., p.213-214 
355 W.S. Lee, op.cit., p.86 
356
 Local forces would be ready to mobilise in good conditions. It would be easy for Joseon to cope 
with enemy surprise attack. Local force could take advantage of their merit in local topography. 
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in the defence sector. Secondly, the role of commander had been significantly strengthened. 
Under the Jeseungbangryk system, the commander only commanded assembled local troops; 
however, under the new system, they were ordered to understand local topography in and out, 
draft operation plans, train local soldiers, keep discipline and a chain of command with 
enhanced authority, and defend their own defence sector in case of conflict. Compared to the 
old Jinguan system, the commander would have a strengthened authority which could not be 
overruled by the local magistrate.
357
 Finally, the chain of command was much more clarified 
and densified. Under the Jeseungbangryak system, the military commander took charge of 
the whole military action. Under the new system, the military organization spread into the 
smallest local administration unit which meant the command was delegated to the appropriate 
level and the size of reserve forces was increased dramatically. As in the old Jinguan system, 
there was a Jujin (Provincial capital), Geojin (Jinguan) and Jejin (Town) and, the military 
organization was expanded to the smallest local administration unit.
358
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
357
 A strict chain of command was set up to bolster the weakness of the Jinguan system. In the 
Jinguan system, usually there were many local magistrates in a Jinguan so it was very difficult to 
coordinate each other and sometimes even difficult to set up a chain of command. Even though there 
was a Cheomjeoljesa as a military commander in a Jinguan, his authority was often infringed by the 
local magistrate since Joseon was a civilian society and military officers were held in contempt. 
Therefore, the military commander’s authority was strengthened to avoid chain of command problems.    
358
 W.S. Lee, op.cit., p.86-89 
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  Original Jinguan system Jeseungbangak system 
Modified and strengthened 
Jinguan system 
Location of 
commander 
in charge 
Defence sector 
Dispatched from  
Central government 
Defence sector 
Role of 
Commander 
1) Know a local topography 
inside  out 
2) Draft an operation  plan 
3) Train a local soldier 
4) Defend own defence 
sector in case of conflict. 
Command  assembled 
local  troops without 
an information on local 
topography and operation 
plan 
1) Know local topography 
inside  out 
2) Draft an operation  plan  
3) Train a local soldier  
4) Defend own defence 
sector in case of conflict. 
5) Keep discipline and chain 
of command with  
a strengthened authority  
Chain of 
Command 
Jujin- Byongsa,  
Provincial capital, 
Division size 
Central government 
military commander take 
charge of whole military 
action 
The same as original 
Jinguan system  
Geojin- Cheomjeoljesa,   
Jinguan (one big centre 
Geojin and  Several 
Jejins), Regiment size 
Jejin-Local magistrate,   
Town (Si, Gun),  
Battalion size 
Myeon, Dong- 
(Subdivision of Town) : 
Military unit was not 
existent 
Choguan-  a company size 
unit commander 
(Reserve Force) 
Tong, Ri- (Subdivision of 
Myeon and Dong): 
Military unit was not 
existent 
Gichong- A platoon size 
unit leader (Reserve 
Force) 
 
Daechong - A squad size 
unit leader (Reserve 
Force) 
  
Index 4-4 The Joseon national defence system
359
  
 
                                                          
359
 Recreated from W.S. Lee, op.cit., p.86, 87, and 89 indexes  
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Return to Traditional Korean Defensive Warfare360 
 
Jinguan System Reform  
 
Jinguans were set up to consider the entire defence of Joseon. Jinguans in Southern 
provinces were created for defence against the southern foe (the Japanese), maximizing 
advantage of local topography. Jinguans in Northern provinces were organized for the 
effective defence against the Northern enemy (Jurchens) at the time.  
 
After the first invasion, the Joseon government did a detailed research on local topography, 
their defence capability, the enemy capability and possible invasion routes. After a systematic 
review had been finalized, the Joseon government decided to bolster and reform the Jinguan 
defence system, maximizing their geographic advantage. They further strengthened the 
Jinguan system with the connection of natural barriers such as local castles and mountainous 
topography (usually border passes) as well as various streams and rivers. For example, 
Guangju Jingaun, the final defensive sector to check the Japanese advance to Seoul, was 
further bolstered with the headquarter in Namhan castle (Guangju), Jukju castle in the south 
(Front line), Dok castle and Muhan castle in the East, Pasa and Yongjin in the North (rear 
line). The Western front was the Yellow Sea and naval supremacy was in the hands of the 
Joseon navy. They were well connected, and were able to prevent enemy manoeuvre from the 
East and the West.
361
 Under this system, like the traditional Korean defence strategy, once 
any defence line in Jingaun was in danger, the reserve troops in the headquarters or the 
troops in other defence lines were called upon and sent as reinforcements or to harass the 
enemy supply line.   
 
The old Jingauan system was the provincial defence system.  In most cases, steep mountains 
or deep and wider rivers became a natural border between provinces. These mountains and 
                                                          
360 The significant characteristics of traditional Korean defensive warfare strategy were 
1) Using the utmost geographical advantage of steep Korean mountains and deep and wide 
rivers 
2) Keep the coordination among troops in defence.  
3) Cut off enemy supply line through Scorched Earth tactics and guerrilla warfare.  
361 Ibid., p.85 
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rivers have been strategically important in the defence of the Korean peninsula. For example, 
the Sobaek Mountains, which are a natural border between Chungcheong and Gyeongsang 
provinces as well as Cholla and Gyeongsang provinces, became a huge natural barrier for 
enemy entry to Seoul and Cholla province. According to the old Jingguan system, once these 
border mountains and rivers were invaded, even though these places were strategically 
important, they would first have to decide which province would be in charge of defence. 
Once this problem was solved, they have to cope with the reinforcement problem. Since the 
old Jinguan system was the provincial defence system, the neighbouring province’s Jingguan 
could not provide support. Therefore, timely and decisive reinforcements became very 
difficult. They realized that to maximize their defensive advantage in geography, they 
required the close coordination of strategically important and adjacent Jinguans. Therefore, 
they abolished active rule called Bupiljeoktajinjijobeob which did not allow the neighbouring 
province Jinguan’s support to the Jinguan in trouble. The military operation plan was drafted 
accordingly. Therefore, close coordination of troops was further boosted beyond Jinguan 
level. 
  
High Ground Defence and Close Coordination of Troops 
 
During the interwar period, the Joseon government analysed the topography of each province 
and built or repaired both the Castles on the Hill in strategically important places and the 
gateways
362
 in the mountainous border pass. Strategically speaking, bolstering high ground 
defence strategy was not simply a matter of building or refurbishing castles. First, it could 
only be possible with significant financial support. In addition, as mentioned, the major 
mountainous topography was located in the border between provinces. To maximize the 
defensive worth of castles on the hill, the Joseon government had to review their defence 
system as well. They relinquished the Bupiljeoktajinjijobeob principle in the old Jinguan 
system for the fluent cooperation among troops which would enhance the defence potential of 
castles on the hill. Thus, the Castle on the Hill (high ground) defence strategy had reflected 
                                                          
362
Generally speaking, the border pass is a narrow road surrounded by steep mountains on their left 
and right. Therefore if a check point (usually a castle) is constructed, it could be an impregnable 
fortress since manoeuvres and encirclement would be almost impossible. That check point is called 
the gateway. 
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the painful experience during the first invasion and was a very systematic approach to their 
advantage in geography.  
 
Tactically speaking, they recognized that the incentive of enemy harquebus would be reduced 
during the Castle on the Hill warfare. In an open field combat situation, the Joseon forces 
became an easy prey of the Japanese harquebus volley fire. In a combat situation of Castle on 
a Plain, the Japanese first, built the earthworks within their harquebus shooting-range while 
firing the harquebus to deny the approach of the Joseon force and if finished, hiding in the 
back of their earth works, they kept firing toward the castle. It was not easy for the Joseon 
forces to deal with the arrows and stones.
363
   
 
Yoo Seongryong also indicated that traditionally Koreans were good at the Castle on the Hill 
defence warfare and the wrong selection of battlefield (either an open field or a Castle on a 
Plain) rather than Castle on the Hill was the main reason for Joseon’s consecutive military 
fiascos during the initial phase of war. Bibyeonsa
364
 also sent in a written report concerning 
the advantage of Castle on the Hill defence in December, 1593. It indicated that the reason 
Korea still stood even though there had been many massive-scale invasions was mainly 
because of the Castle on the Hill defence advantage. But because of the long peace, Joseon 
had not built or repaired any of their Castles on Hills which had caused Joseon a disastrous 
succession of defeats in the initial period of war. This suggested that Joseon must build or 
repair their Castles on Hills and bring the local people with their belongings (most 
importantly grain and cookery) into the castle. The report also predicted that the Japanese 
would have a hard time trying to occupy the castle and that lack of supplies would lead them 
                                                          
363 Joseon had two styles of castle. One was called Eupseong which was Castle on the Plain and 
another was Sanseong which was Castle on the Hill. Excerpted from, Turnbull, op.cit., p.8-9 
364 
Before the Imjin Wars, since Joseon reached the peak of civilian society, there was no government 
organization to discuss military matters. What they did was to decide who to send in a troubled place 
and there was no deep discussion on following measures such as logistics or coordination with the 
neighbouring towns. Therefore, once the commander in charge was sent to the place, there were lots 
of problem even before he met the enemy. In addition, since there was no government organization on 
military affairs, it was impossible for Joseon to react quickly once military trouble occurred. To solve 
these problems, Joseon organized a permanent government organization to discuss military matters 
that organization was called Bibyeonsa. 
157 
 
to retreat. Once they retreated, Joseon could deal the Japanese another blow by chasing out 
the withdrawing Japanese forces.
365
   
 
After the plan of repairing or building these Castles on Hills was agreed upon, they discussed 
crucial Japanese check points and started repairing and building a new and better Castle on 
the Hill plan from there. Most of all, they thought the mountainous border passes between 
Gyeongsang and Chungchenog province, which were located in the Japanese initial invasion 
route, and Chinju, which was the vital place to reach Cholla province from the southern coast 
of Gyeongsang province, would serve as the most important check points. 
 
Ming military commanders also mentioned the importance of those border passes. Among 
those three border passes the Choryong pass was deemed the most significant. Sung 
Yingch'ang, the vice minister of military affairs, indicated the importance of the Choryong 
pass by mentioning, “it is vital and urgent to install a gateway at the Choryong border pass 
which is the steepest mountainous border pass of all, to defend Joseon against the probable 
Japanese invasion in the future.” Seonjo the King of Joseon also agreed with his view and 
installed a gateway in the Choryong pass that was finished in October, 1594.
366
   
 
The installation of a gateway and the rebuilt castles in Gyeongsang province became a real 
stumbling block for the Japanese and one of the main reasons for them to alter their invasion 
route to Cholla province, since the repairing and building process was faster in Gyeongsang 
province and the gateway was not installed in other crucial border passes such as 
Yuksipryeong and Pallyangchi to reach Cholla province from Gyeongsang province. 
 
In addition to the Castle on the Hill repair and building plan, the Joseon government also set 
up the cooperative defence system among several Castles on Hills in a Jinguan and between 
adjacent Jinguans. They overcame the problem of the original Jinguan system which did not 
allow for the coordination of neighbouring provinces by allowing the close cooperation with 
the neighbouring province’s Jinguan. For example, for the defence of Cholla province 
(Chonju),  Joseon set up the close troop coordination plan among the Namwon Jinguan in the 
                                                          
365 Ibid., p.292-294 
366
 W.S. Lee, op.cit., p.114-118  
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central eastern part of Cholla province, Chonju Jinguan (Provincial capital of Cholla 
province) Kongju  Jinguan
367
 (South Eastern part of Chungchong province).  
 
Enemy Supply Harassment 
 
With the strengthened high grounds defence, Joseon planned to harass the enemy’s supply 
while checking their advance. Yoo Seongryong drafted the Scorched Earth tactics upon the 
imminent reinvasion. Its core concept was for the local people to bring their cookery and 
grains to the nearby Castle on the Hill, in order to stop the local supply flow and defend 
against the Japanese with their geographic edge.
368
   
 
In fact, the Scorched Earth tactics was one of the main traditional Korean defensive tactics 
using lengthy enemy supply lines and the defensive edge of the Korean mountainous 
topography. However, Joseon was lacking many Castles on Hills at this point, which is the 
single most important element of the Scorched Earth tactics. Hong Bokyang (Gyeongsang 
province governor at that time) reported to the government that “right now we only had a 
Samga castle nearby to store the grain we produced this year so to apply the Scorched Earth 
tactics, we had to repair or build the castle on the hill.” However, the intensive high-ground 
defence bolstering process that took place during the interwar period allowed them to apply 
the Scorched Earth tactics. According to the central government order, the local people were 
allocated to be near the Castle on the Hill and defended it against the imminent Japanese 
reinvasion.
369
      
 
Along with the Scorched Earth tactics, Joseon also tried to boost the guerrilla warfare 
capability of local militias who harassed the enemy supply with their geographic knowledge 
and manoeuvre. They were exempt from military duty, organized into suitable units, and 
given proper military training. So the Joseon government appointed the Chongseob in every 
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province to take charge of the entire local militia, which helped to build the chain of 
command and train the local militia. They were trained in Zhejiang tactics to raise the level of 
their effectiveness.
370
 Thus, the Joseon government tried everything they could to develop 
operational, strategic, and tactical solutions to the Japanese during the interwar period. 
Bolstering the guerrilla warfare capability and the adoption of Castle on the Hill defence 
strategy proves that during the interwar period, the geographic factor became the major 
consideration when it came to drafting the defence strategy and plan.    
 
The Second Invasion and Outcome  
 
The strategic objective of the Japanese reinvasion was to occupy Cholla province using a 
western route and eventually capture Seoul. However, Joseon’s defence was concentrated in 
Gyeongsang province where the shortest route to Seoul from the Japanese main base Pusan 
was located. The only force that was located in the Japanese reinvasion route was the 
Gyeongsang Right Army Commander Kim Eungseo’s force in Eulryong.  All the other forces 
and local militia were evacuated to a Castle on the Hill according to the Scorched Earth 
tactics.
371
 In addition, Ming decided to send their expedition forces again to Joseon with 
around 60,000 soldiers in March, 1597. These forces were stationed in strategically important 
places in Cholla, Gyeongsang, and Chungchong provinces, so the Japanese expedition forces 
could avoid contact until they reached Namwon 
372
 
 
As a consequence, the Japanese could easily advance to Cholla province. But, they also 
understood that the remaining Castle on the Hill on their way to Cholla province could be a 
real threat to their rear line, therefore they tried to occupy it. Kato Kiyomasa of the Right 
Advance Troop tried to capture Hwangak Sangseong but had to abandon the plan, because of 
the steep mountainous terrain and defensive preparation of the castle. Both Right and Left 
Forces advanced and were able to evade contacting Kim Eungseo’s forces to save time and 
capability. The Joseon force in Gyeongsang province also did not come out of their defensive 
garrison for fear of a Japanese counter-attack. Therefore, the Right Forces reached 
Yuksipryeong, entering Cholla province without much resistance.  
                                                          
370
 J.H .Lee, op.cit., p.176-182 
371 I.H. Seo, op.cit., p.222 
372
 J.S. Yoo, HanMinJokJeonJangTongSa3, p.233 
160 
 
Even though the Japanese recognized that these Castles on Hills could disturb their rear line, 
they had to advance to save time and reduce casualties. Therefore, many of these castles were 
left behind them. Upon arriving at Yuksipryeong, they started to suffer supply problems. The 
Japanese chose the harvest time to acquire the local supply but Joseon adopted the Scorched 
Earth tactics which did not leave anything behind for the enemy. Therefore, the Japanese 
became desperate for provisions and attacked the Hwangseok Sanseong.
373
 In fact, to avoid 
more casualties and losing time in this mountainous and well-prepared castle, they suggested 
that if the Joseon force in the castle gave them the supplies they needed, they would not 
attack the castle. The Joseon defence force refused, and the Japanese were left with no other 
option but to attack the castle. Unlike the Japanese prediction, this castle easily collapsed 
because of chaos within the castle and the opening of the gate following a Japanese night 
attack on the 16
th
 of August.
374
 Afterwards, the Right Forces collected enough supplies from 
the castle to reach Cholla province on the 17
th
 of August.
375
  
 
From the battle of Hwangseok Sanseong, it can be inferred that the Japanese felt a serious 
burden by Joseon’s Castle on the Hill defence strategy and Scorched Earth tactics, although 
the efficiency of this strategy and tactic was severely dependent on the commander’s quality. 
At this battle, the castle was easily collapsed because the quality of command and soldiers 
was lacking. This instruction is also reflected in the modern warfare in the Korean peninsula 
(Korean War – Battle of Chunchon in the initial stage of War) and North Korean defence 
doctrine (Four Military Guide Line) where both North and South realized the significance of 
command and training to maximize the efficiency of fortifications using the topography.  
 
Unfortunately for Joseon, even though they could make a defence and operation plan using 
their geographic edge in a fairly short time, because of the long peace and civil society, the 
quality of command and troops was not as high as expected. Therefore, they failed to 
maximize their defence and operation plan using the defensive worth of Korean peninsula 
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topography. However, the introduction of Castle on the Hill defence and Scorched Earth 
tactics made the Japanese hesitate to attack the Castle on the Hill and cause the supply and 
safety problem in their rear. In addition, even though they succeeded in Hwangseok Sanseong, 
the Japanese force was not able to conquer any more Castles on Hills with the military power 
during the second invasion. Therefore, even though Joseon failed to maximize the effect of 
the reintroduction of Castle on the Hill defence with the Scorched Earth tactics, it contributed 
to the military success of the Joseon and Ming Joint forces during the Japanese second 
invasion. During the Japanese second invasion, in addition to the Right Advance Force, there 
was the Left Advance Force. They started to advance through the coast of Gyeongsang 
province and turned north upon their arrival at the Seomjin River to reach Namwon. Since the 
Joseon navy crashed in Chilchollyang, they had not experienced severe resistance from the 
Joseon force. Upon the arrival of the navy, they were prepared to attack Namwon.  
  
After Ming decided to send their troops again to Joseon, Xing Jie was appointed as the 
general oversight of Military Affairs in the Eastern regions under, which Joseon was included. 
He insisted that “to defend Seoul, we need to defend Choryong and Chungju from our Eastern 
front, and Namwon and Chonju in our Western front”. He further commented that “Once we 
lose Namwon, we would lose our Western and Eastern front, and had to withdraw to the Han 
River”376 They considered Namwon as the most important strategic place and sent Yang Yuan 
who served as the Left Division Commander under Li Rusong in 1593. At that point, the main 
garrison was on the verge of moving to Kyoryong Sanseong, where the Japanese would have 
to attack uphill through wooded terrain as initially planned by the Joseon government, but 
Yang Yuan overruled them and decided to make a stand in the Namwon Eupsong.
377
 He chose 
the Castle on the Plain, to help take advantage of their cannon firepower instead of 
Sanseong’s geographic edge. He then began an extensive programme to strengthen 
Namwon’s wall and install the cannon firing facilities which enabled them to fire three 
cannons from various positions. In addition to the castle refurbishment, he asked for 
reinforcements to the Joseon and Ming forces around Namwon and another 3,000 Joseon 
reinforcements arrived at the castle.  
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The Japanese launched their offensive to Namwon on the 13
th
 of August. However, the Ming 
Commander Yang Yuan’s tactical approach was totally wrong. First, although the Ming had 
long-range cannons, Japan possessed harquebuses, which are also great firing assets in the 
plain. Secondly, the Japanese adopted small group tactics which meant the Ming cannon 
could not deliver decisive blows on the Japanese. The main body of the force, in any case, 
stayed back and well out of range.
378
 Thirdly, they also had poor cooperation amongst their 
troops. Ma Gui who was the actual commander in chief of the Ming expedition force, gave 
this order to his forces, “Once Namwon is in danger, the commander assigned to the town had 
to report to Chonju and the force in Chonju should cooperate with the force in Namwon”. 379  
The General assigned to Chonju (Chen Yuzhong) did not reply to the reinforcement request 
from Namwon. The way that General Yang and the Ming expedition force in Cholla province 
fought against the Japanese was not identical to the Joseon’s defensive warfare concept. This 
involved using the geographic edge of the Castle on the Hill and close cooperation with the 
neighbouring forces. In the end, the Namwon castle collapsed on the 17
th
 of August and Chen 
Yuzhong also fled from Chonju following the collapse of Namwon. Thus, Chonju was easily 
captured by the Japanese.
380
  
 
Joseon suffered heavy costs at most of the battles at the Castles on the Plains (the first 
landing point, Pusan castle, and next target Dongrae castle were Castles on the Plains) and in 
the open field (Sangju and Chungju) because of the well-organized Japanese close order 
infantry tactics using Harquebuses. Therefore, they decided to return to the traditional 
defensive strategy to reduce the effectiveness of enemy tactics. But, the Ming commander 
was fully committed to the Castle on the Plain battle, instead of the recommended Castle on 
the Hill combat plan, due in part to his excessive pride in firepower, and was defeated in the 
end. The instructions were the same as that of Lee Il in Sangju and Shin Lib in Chungju. Once 
the commander underestimated the enemy and did not fully understand all the benefits of the 
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local topography,
381
 the efficiency of traditional Korean defensive strategy using geographic 
edge would be seriously damaged. 
 
Once the Japanese expedition force met in Chonju, they decided to advance in two ways. One 
division (formerly a Right Army) kept their advance to the North and another division 
(formerly a Left Army) turned their troops to the South of Cholla province for the pacifying 
operation of Cholla province. This cut off the Cholla province sea route to suffocate Joseon 
and stopped supply the Northern-bound expedition force. The Northern-bound force was 
roaming around Chungchong province capturing several towns without any resistance. They 
quickly started to suffer supply problems when Joseon evacuated the local people in 
Chungchong province to a steep Castle on the Hill according to the Scorched Earth tactics.
382
  
 
They kept advancing forward to Seoul and eventually the Japanese expedition force along 
with the Joseon and Ming joint forces met in Chiksan (7
th
 of September) and the Japanese 
were defeated. They withdrew to Chongju but they were scared of being strangled by the 
Joseon (who were stationed in a castle on the hill in their rear line and launched the offensive 
against the Japanese with a grudge which meant they had a high morale) and Ming Joint force. 
Also, their supply was endangered because of the Scorched Earth tactics. They eventually 
decided to withdraw to the original position in the southern coast of Gyeongsang province.
383
 
The Southern-bound force was also not able to pacify Cholla province and was in danger of 
cutting off supply. Since most of the local people were evacuated to a castle on the hill, they 
suffered severe resistance from the Joseon regular or irregular forces during the operation and 
their navy was also defeated in the battle of Myungnyang. Securing the coastal line to cut off 
the Joseon supply line and supply the northern-bound force also became useless since their 
army and navy were defeated in Chiksan and Myungnyang. Therefore, they held a meeting 
and decided to withdraw to the southern coast. After their second effort was rebuffed, there 
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were successive battles to recapture the Japanese castle (three great sieges at Ulsan, Sunchon, 
and Sachon). The sudden death of the Japanese autocrat Hideyoshi and the other in his will to 
withdraw the expedition force caused the Japanese headquarter to make a decision to end the 
futile war. Finally they withdrew from Joseon and the Imjin Wars came to an end.   
 
Joseon’s cooperative castle on the hill defence strategy, with the Scorched Earth tactics, 
using mountainous topography was based on the experience of military debacle in the initial 
phase of war. The Cholla province defence campaign became a heavy burden to the Japanese. 
However, Joseon’s strategy did not bring success everywhere. Like Namwon, the commander 
in charge scraped the plan and as in the case of Hwangseok Sanseong, the quality of 
commander and troops were not good enough to carry out the strategy. However, throughout 
the second invasion and the later stage of first invasion, the Japanese effort to capture the 
Castle on the Hill was either unsuccessful (the First siege of Chinju Castle, the Battle of 
Haengju Sanseong, and the battle of Dok Sanseong; July, 1593) or too costly (the second 
siege of Chinju Castle; 22
nd
 of June, 1593 - 29
th
 of June). Therefore, the Joseon navy’s 
victory in Myongnyang inevitably led to the cutting off of supplies from the sea route. Also, 
Scorched Earth tactics and the Japanese hesitation to attack the Castle on the Hill during the 
second invasion made it hard to get local and inland supplies, brining a logistics problem.
384
 
 
In addition, the Japanese could not have had more preponderance, and better training and 
firepower (Harquebus) after the Chinese engagement. Following the defeat of Chiksan, they 
were still able to keep hold of Cholla and Chungchong province. Instead, they withdrew to 
their original position along the coastal towns of Gyeongsang province mainly because of the 
supply problem. It was a totally different approach from the Joseon side which did not adopt 
stalling tactics using natural barriers in the initial phase of war to earn crucial time.   
 
From the analysis of the initial military debacle, the Cholla province defence campaign, and 
the Japanese reinvasion, it is not right to say that the geographic dimension alone changed the 
whole course of war. However, Joseon’s gradual transformation of an approach to the 
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defensive warfare using their geographic edge became a turning point of the war by 
worsening the Japanese supply and keeping the supply depot of Cholla province. This 
contributed to the eventual Japanese withdrawal.  
 
Conclusion  
 
War is not a simple game decided by a single factor; rather it has many dimensions that 
interact closely together until there is an ultimate outcome. The Imjin Wars were likewise not 
decided by a single factor. Joseon was not able to compete with the Japanese, who had an 
expanded military organization because of the warring state period, in the number of troops 
available because of the Gunjeoksupo. However their preponderance gap became smaller due 
to the mobilised local militia. In addition, with the Chinese engagement preponderance was 
no longer a problem. The number of troops available also increased after the introduction of 
Sokogun during the interwar period.   
 
In terms of training and morale factors, there was a huge gap between the two before the 
Imjin Wars. The Japanese had vast real combat experience, and enjoyed high morale and a 
good chain of command. However, Joseon had enjoyed long peace which in turn led to the 
lack of actual combat experience and training, and the military culture was held in contempt. 
This obviously contributed to the low morale in the initial period of war. During the Imjin 
Wars, the Joseon forces first experienced real combat. The Joseon government also raised 
professional soldiers from Hunryeondogam, whose training methods were based on Ming’s 
Zhejiang tactics and improved the standard of the local forces through Sokogun. Their morale 
was also significantly boosted by the grudge against the Japanese.  
 
In terms of unit tactics, Joseon only possessed the tactics they had used against the Jurchens, 
battle formation warfare with long-range weaponry. This was not suitable to Japanese close 
infantry tactics. It was also supplemented by Ming’s Zhejiang tactics during the interwar 
period.  
 
The geographic dimension was the most significant factor to decide the fate of this war. The 
strengthening of traditional defensive strategy using geographical edge contributed 
significantly to the outcome. Before the Imijn Wars, in terms of strategy, Joseon adopted the 
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Jeseungbanryak defence system whose key was the concentrated use of force, and army 
dominating defence strategy. Ultimately, their strategic approach turned out to be a great 
catastrophe. The main reason behind it was that the Joseon Army failed to use their 
mountainous topography or their deep and wide rivers for checking or delaying the Japanese 
advance to earn crucial time in the initial phase of war. Instead, their force was either 
dismantled because of the delayed dispatch of central government military commander, such 
as the Taegu case (which was also because the Joseon force failed to earn time in 
Jakwonguan) or they chose the plain as a battlefield such as Sangju and Chungju. Their 
defensive strategy using geographic edge gradually became a prominent component of their 
strategy, and made a great success against the Japanese invasion force during the Cholla 
province defence campaign. The successful defence of Cholla province eventually became a 
turning point of war since Cholla province became an immense supply depot for Joseon.  The 
Japanese started to suffer the supply problem because of the Joseon navy and the local militia 
who were based in and operated in the Cholla province.  
 
With the Japanese first invasion experience, and with time, during the interwar period the 
Joseon government completed the defensive strategy using its geographic edge. At the centre 
of this strategy was the aim to repair or build the Castle on the Hill and the installation of a 
gateway in the border pass. The Castle on the Hill asked for a heavy cost once the Japanese 
tried to occupy it because of the natural steep slopes and bolstered walls during the interwar 
period. It also reduced the firepower of the Japanese harquebus and became an evacuation 
camp according to the Scorched Earth tactics. The Castle on the Hill strengthened their 
effectiveness as a defensive bulwark through the close coordination with the neighbouring 
castle and became an important subsystem of the Jingauan defence system. The existence of 
the Castles on Hills gave the strategic dilemma to the Japanese that, if they attacked the castle, 
it would cost them much time and casualties; and if they did not, it would threaten their rear 
and supply line. In fact, the Japanese could advance quickly and without many casualties to 
Chiksan by avoiding the Castle on the Hill combat in their advance route. But, local supply 
became almost impossible by the cooperative Castle on the Hill defence with the Scorched 
Earth tactics and inland supply was also threatened by the Castle on the Hill combatants and 
the local militia’s guerrilla warfare. Therefore, Joseon’s Castle on the Hill defence 
contributed to the withdrawal of the Japanese force to their original position in the southern 
coastal towns.  
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In conclusion, Joseon’s defence strategy, using their geographical edge, also worked 
effectively during the Imjin Wars. From the transformation of Joseon’s defensive strategy to 
use their geographic edge and its eventual outcome on the fate of the war, it is quite right to 
say, first, that the Koreans have been good at defensive warfare using their topography and 
that they have learned a lot from the past. Secondly, the Korean peninsula is a great place to 
wage a defensive war using natural barriers such as the deep and wide rivers and steep 
mountains. Thirdly, the outcome of the whole course of war was quite often decided by how 
the defender (the Koreans) used their geographic edge. Finally, from the Imjin Wars’ 
experience, the efficiency of the operation plan or a military strategy using geographic edge 
will depend upon the quality of the commander and the training of the troops. Like the early 
phase of war and the battle of Hwangseok Sanseong, the quality of troops and commander 
was decisive in the outcome of the war even though the defender possessed the geographic 
edge. However, as one can see from the battle of Imjin River, in the initial phase of war, a 
less competent commander and troops could still enjoy the geographic edge against a potent 
foe, while the competent one could use its fullest potential.  
 
The Imjin Wars also provided invaluable information that is applicable to modern Korean 
warfare strategy. The steep mountains and deep and wide rivers of the Korean peninsula are 
suitable for defensive warfare: the Korean forces defeated the Chinese and Japanese invaders 
who were sometimes at a tremendous technological advantage: these facts made both of the 
Koreas recognize the importance of defensive warfare using topography and to prepare their 
defensive warfare strategy accordingly. It also brought to attention the significance of the 
commander and the troop’s quality. As will be analysed below in the Korean War section, the 
geography itself was a significant component of the Korean War. Both Koreas also realized 
through the analysis of past wars and the Korean War that, with better command and training 
the worth of this strategy could be enhanced. Therefore, both Koreas have strongly invested 
in training and improving commanders’ quality, both during the Korean War and also the 
post-Korean War era.   
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Chapter 5 Technological and Geographic 
Dimensions of the Korean War  
 
Introduction  
 
The Korean War was the international war of its era, including both Koreas, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), the United States of America and sixteen other UN nations. 
Consequently, an extensive amount of research has been documented. However, this chapter 
will concentrate on the issue of efficiency of military technology in the Korean peninsula. 
 
This chapter will focus initially on analysing the Korean War battles order of events, but at 
the end of each significant campaign analysis, it will classify and analyse each according to 
the defender and aggressor’s technological and geographic advantages in the war. This 
process of analysis aims to examine the core objective of this research, which is that military 
technology superiority alone would not guarantee an ultimate military success against the 
North Korean forces, because they were able to use the geographic edge on their own terms. 
Ultimately, this chapter also aims to add to Biddle’s research on the relevance between the 
modern technology and geography which is the core theoretical background of this research.  
 
5-1 Outbreak of War and North Korea’s Initial Success 
 
The NKPA385 
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The NKPA’s Foundation and Capability Before the Korean War  
 
The NKPA’s roots can be traced to anti-Japanese guerrilla groups that operated in Korea and 
Manchuria in the years prior to and during the Second World War.
386
 Some of these anti-
Japanese guerrillas switched to communists and built the North Korean armed forces with the 
help of the former Soviet Union and the PRC. 
  
Therefore, from the inception they were heavily influenced by a communist style of warfare, 
especially since their forces were founded with help from the former Soviet Union. Kim 
Ilsung, the president of North Korea from 1945 to 1994, also admitted that the NKPA was 
formed under heavy influence from the former Soviet Union in a speech given at the high 
ranking officer committee under the title of “Strengthening the NKPA” on the 24th of 
December, 1952. Here, he mentioned that “The NKPA was founded in February, 1948, 
organized under the principles of the Soviet Army with the consideration of their abundant 
experience. It was also based upon the advanced Soviet military technology and strategy 
which were successfully employed during the Second World War”. 387  They followed 
thoroughly the Soviet army model. Arms and equipment were provided according to ordinary 
Soviet force establishment. The Soviet military advisor also used a Soviet drill book to train 
the NKPA.
388
  
 
The NKPA’s capability dramatically strengthened after the Soviet forces decided to withdraw 
from North Korea in December, 1948. Terenti Shtykov, the Soviet ambassador to North 
Korea, reported to Stalin on the 9
th
 of December, 1948 that the NKPA, which had 29,000 
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soldiers at the time, was inferior to the South Korean counterpart, which possessed 55,000 
soldiers and would therefore require further reinforcement.
389
 Upon receipt of the report, 
Stalin called the North Korean military delegate to Moscow on 25
th
 of December and agreed 
to help strengthen the NKPA’s capability until June, 1950.390 
 
North Korea and China also agreed to send Korean soldiers in the PLA back to North Korea 
until the end of 1949. There were 28,000 soldiers sent back to North Korea by January, 1949. 
According to these two agreements, North Korea was able to build six heavy infantry 
divisions and a capable Air Force. Around 5,000 Korean soldiers in the Soviet army who 
served during the Second World War also returned to North Korea in early 1949. Finally, 
about 10,000 Korean soldiers who still remained in the PLA also returned to North Korea and 
formed the 7
th 
Infantry Division in May, 1950. Therefore, around 30% of NKPA was 
comprised of battle hardened veterans from the Second World War and the Chinese Civil 
War.
391
   
 
Due to the massive amount of received Soviet military aid, North Korea succeeded in 
strengthening their mobile warfare capability and firepower. More than anything else, they 
acquired the T-34 tanks which the ROK did not have and were able to apply the Soviet style 
mobile warfare. In addition, North Korea also had access to 122mm howitzers which had a 
longer range and were adaptable to a greater range of numbers than the ROK 105m howitzer. 
On top of that, they had also gradually strengthened their Air Force and were able to retain 
about 200 air craft before the Korean War.
392
 Therefore, the NKPA became one of the most 
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heavily armed, disciplined, and effective forces in the world.  They were ready to invade the 
South.
393
   
 
NKPA’s strategy and initial operation plan  
 
Even though Stalin agreed to strengthen North Korea, he was initially reluctant to approve 
North Korea’s invasion of the South. After a meeting of Shtycov and Kim was held on the 
12
th 
and 13
th
 of August; Shtycov reported to Stalin regarding Kim’s intention to invade the 
South. However, Kim’s proposal was quickly refused by Stalin. Stalin stated the following as 
the reasons of his decision.
394
 
1) The ROK was already recognized as a nation state by the US and there was a high 
possibility that the US would engage in the conflict. 
2) North Korea’s invasion of the South could be used as propaganda for activating the  
anti-Soviet movement  
3) Even though they might have political support from the South Koreans, North Korea 
still did not possess any overwhelming military superiority against the South  
 
However, Stalin changed his mind in January, 1950 and the preparation of war was 
accelerated. At a luncheon on the 17
th
 of January, 1950, Kim asked Shtykov again to approve 
the invasion to the South saying, “It is our turn after the communization of China”. Then 
Shtykov reported to Vyshinsky on the 19
th
 of January. However, unlike the previous pleas, 
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 M. Varhola, op.cit., p.151 
394 Analysed from “Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky” (3rd of September, 1949) and “Telegram 
from Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, in reply to 11 September telegram” (14th of September, 1949) 
Acquired from the  Woodrow Wilson International centre for Scholars, Cold War International 
History Project Virtual archive,  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034C
6D8-96B6-175C-9FFA83512DC39318&sort=Collection&item=The%20Korean%20War, (Accessed 
on the 20
th
 of July, 2009) 
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this time Stalin approved and wanted to discuss it with Kim saying, “This kind of matter 
should be prepared cautiously and perfectly”.395  
 
As a first step, Stalin sent a military advisory group in February that consisted of experienced 
officers of the Second World War and appointed the Second World War hero Alexandre 
Vasiliev as the Chief. Kim also visited Moscow from the 30
th
 of March to the 25
th
 of April as 
requested. In that visit, he and Stalin discussed the basic idea of war. Stalin gave a strategic 
suggestion that 1) Troops must be assembled in the 38
th
 Parallel beforehand, 2) North Korea 
has to suggest the new proposal on the peaceful reunification, 3) Once the South has rejected 
it, launch the surprise attack. He further said that “War has to be quick and hold a surprising 
nature and there will be a chance to break through the enemy defence line and if so, the 
NKPA should not give any chance for the US to breathe, resist, and further mobilise 
international aid”.396 Stalin demanded a quick victory. He suggested political deception as a 
first step, followed by military measures including a surprise attack, the concentrated use of 
force, and a pursuing operation to annihilate the enemy capability. This is obviously reflected 
in the North Korean invasion plan, “Counter-attack plan”. 397 
   
The already dispatched Soviet military advisory group, along with a few NKPA headquarter 
members drafted the invasion plan based on the Stalin’s suggestion and Soviet military 
strategy. Therefore, with Soviet style military training based on their military drill book, and 
                                                          
395 Analysed from “Telegram from  Shtykov to Vyshinsky (19th of January, 1950) and “ Telegram 
from Stalin to Shtykov (30
th 
Of January, 1950)” Source; Woodrow Wilson International centre for 
Scholars, Cold War International History Project Virtual archive,  
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034C
6D8-96B6-175C-9FFA83512DC39318&sort=Collection&item=The%20Korean%20War, (Accessed 
on the 20
th
 of July, 2009) 
396 K.R. Kim, SoRyeonEuiJaRyoRoBonHanGukJeonJaengEuiJeonMal, Seoul, Yeolim, 1998, p.53-54 
It was the Korean Translation of Russian source: E. Bazhanov, N Bazhanova, Analysis of the 
Korean War from the Soviet document. 
397 The counter-attack plan was founded on Razuvayev’s Report. To avoid criticism from international 
society as a result of full scale invasion, the former Soviet Union and North Korea tried to explain the 
Korean War was the counter-attack on the ROK invasion to the North. Therefore, they named the 
invasion plan ‘the counter-attack plan’. 
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operation plans drafted by the Soviet military advisor group, the NKPA followed exactly the 
Soviet army strategy during the initial phase of the Korean War. Its characteristics were the 
concentration of force, surprise attack, breakthrough, and outflanking movements to 
annihilate the enemy capability.   
 
Initial Contact with the NKPA and the Relevance of 
Technology and Geography 
 
The NKPA’s First Phase Operation Plan 
 
The NKPA drafted the counter-attack plan for the all-out offensive to the South. According to 
this plan, the NKPA’s first phase target was to reach the Suwon and Samchok line in three 
days, at a depth of 90km.
398
 Accordingly, the NKPA 1
st
 Corps in the Western front became 
the main attack to capture Seoul and the 2
nd 
Corps (Central and Eastern Front) became the 
supportive attack to advance to Seoul and Suwon through Chunchon and support the 1
st
 Corps 
movement. In the western front, the NKPA 6
th
 Infantry Division advanced to capture the 
Ongjin peninsula and then landed on Kimpo to advance to Seoul (Kimpo Axis). The 1
st 
Infantry Division marched from the North West of Seoul (called Munsan Axis) to Seoul. The 
4
th
 Infantry Division along with the 105
th
 Tank Brigade attacked the right above Seoul and 
the 3
rd
 Infantry Division along with elements of the 105
th
 Tank Brigade also marched to Seoul 
from the North East. Both 3
rd
 and 4
th
 Infantry Invasion route was called the Uijongbu Axis 
because, even though both of these forces started to advance from different positions, they 
planned to meet in Uijongbu and advance again to Seoul. Therefore, among the NKPA 1
st
 
Corps, the forces comprising the main attack were the 4
th
 Division, 105
th
 Tank Brigade, and 
the 3
rd
 Infantry Division, which had a role in making a breakthrough. The 6
th
 and 1
st
 
Divisions marching from the Northwest, became a supportive attack to surround and 
annihilate the ROK forces in Seoul and the North of Seoul.  
                                                          
398
 There are a few analyses about the North Korean counter-attack plan in the first phase; however, all 
the analysis is based on the Razuvayev Report. The objective of this small chapter is to explain North 
Korea’s initial operation plan showing that they were hugely influenced by the Soviet way of warfare, 
thus only the original source will be cited here. All the analysis of the counter-attack plan here is 
based on IMHC, SoRyeonGunSaDanJangRaJuBaYeFEui6.25JeonJaengBoGoSeo1, p.135-139.  
174 
 
Among the NKPA 2
nd
 Corps, the 2
nd
 Infantry Division as a supportive attack to Seoul aimed 
at surrounding Seoul from the North-east, marching through Chunchon, Hwachon, Kapyong 
(Chunchon Axis). The 12
th
 Division aimed at advancing through Inje and Hongchon 
(Hongchon Axis) and, after the breakthrough in Hongchon Axis, some elements (the 12
th
 
Infantry Division and the 603th Motorcycle Regiment) were destined to advance westward to 
Suwon to form a second envelopment line. The remaining element (the Reserve Force of the 
2
nd
 Corps; the 5
th
 Infantry Division (except for 10
th
 Regiment)) advanced straight forward to 
Wonju to cut off the reinforcements. Another supportive attack (Eastern coast Axis) was 
launched to cut off the reinforcement to Chunchon and Hongchon Axis and reach the 
Samchok line. Under this objective, the 1
st
 Border constabulary brigade and an attached 
Infantry Regiment (10
th
 Regiment) of the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the Eastern coast 
while the 766
th
 Independent Unit and Navy 945
th
 Independent Marine Unit landed at the rear 
to cut off the ROK’s 8th Division retreat route. 399 
 
This operational concept followed the Soviet military strategy thoroughly. They used mobile 
power and firepower as sources for the main attack (3
rd
, 4
th
 Infantry Division, and 105
th
 Tank 
brigade). Then, they made a breakthrough in the most important defence sector, captured the 
strategically most important target, and chased the remaining enemy forces (ROK’s main 
defensive line: Uijongbu defence sector and Seoul). The supportive attack (1
st
, 2
nd
, 6
th
 and 
12
th
 Infantry Division) was required to surround the enemy’s main force at Seoul and 
annihilate them north of the Han River.   
 
                                                          
399 Its analysis of North Korean invasion plan during the initial period of war based on the research of   
Y.J. Yang, op.cit., p.7-48 and  Department of military history, op.cit., p.15-17 
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Map 5-1 The North Korean Invasion Plan
400
  
                                                          
400
 Excerpted and modified from- Department of military history, op.cit., p.17 
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 Preparations of the ROK 
 
The ROK forces were officially founded on the day of official independence: 15
th
 of August, 
1948, with a size of about 50,000 army and 3,000 navy.
401
 At the time of the foundation, the 
ROK Department of National Defence thought that they needed around 230,000 forces 
considering the threat of North Korea and Manchuria, however, their available forces were 
just ¼  of what they thought to defend their territory.
402
 Moreover, the US residential forces 
were withdrawn by the 30
th
 of June, 1949 and only 500 hundred military advisors (The 
Korean Military Advisory Group) were kept there.
403
 Even though there was a Wedmeyer 
report (September, 1947) which warned about the possibility of North Korean invasion, the 
US decision was made according to the Foreign Residential Force Readjustment Plan after 
they cut down their size of force (12 million in 1945 to 1.74 million in 1947) and reduced the 
military budget.
404
  
 
In addition, because of the hasty foundation, they also had to deal with the communists inside 
their forces.
405
 Therefore, from the foundation, the ROK armed force had to cope with many 
internal and external problems. However, they kept trying to increase their infantry and saw 
them reach six brigades and twenty regiments by January, 1949 and take over the 38
th
 parallel 
defence duty – which meant that the ROK practically took the national defence duties from 
the US. 
                                                          
401
IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.49 
402
 Ibid., p.50 
403
 Ibid., p.52-53 
404
 The US JCS raised several reasons for the withdrawal 
1) Korean Peninsula is not an absolutely important  place for the US national defence 
2) The existence of the USFK would give an excuse of automatic engagement of other parties in 
case of conflict. 
3)  The conflict in Korea could be sorted out with the Naval and airpower.  
Excerpted from Department of Military History, op.cit., p.12 
405 There had been a few incidents organized by the communist inside of the ROK forces before the 
Korean War which were Yosu and Sunchon revolt (19
th 
of October, 1948, 14
th
 regiment), Taegu revolt 
(2nd of November, 1948, 6
th
 regiment) and The first and second battalion of 8
th
 regiment was crossing 
over to North Korea (5
th
 of May, 1949) Excerpted from- B.C. NO, IGeosIHanGukJeonJaengIDa, 
Seoul, 21segigunsayeonguso, 2000, p.261-262 
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However, the fundamental North and South military capability imbalance could not be solved.  
Among the weaponry handed over to the ROK forces, 105mm howitzer had a shorter 
shooting-range than the North Korean 122mm and lacked numbers; 57mm and 37mm anti-
tank guns were out-dated and not powerful enough to penetrate the armour of the NKPA T-
34 tanks. It was due to the US Foreign Military Aid policy towards Korea that the “The ROK 
armed forces had to develop only up to a standard of strength that can maintain domestic 
security and deter the North Korean invasion”. 406  But the ROK already recognized the 
enhanced threat posed by North Korea and demanded further military aid. Even though the 
US military advisory group also insisted on further military aid in the year of 1950 to meet 
the minimum level for self-defence requirements, the US government was not keen on 
military aid to the ROK. Therefore, the ROK military capability could not be matched with 
the NKPA before the Korean War began.
407
 
 
Terrain, Technology, and the Initial Phases of the Korean War 
 
Before the US engagement, North Korea enjoyed technological superiority against the ROK. 
Due to the massive Soviet military aid, they were equipped with a reasonable capability to 
wage Soviet style mobile and firepower warfare, and drafted an operation plan aimed at 
maximizing their mobile and firepower capability. On the contrary, in terms of capability, the 
South was well behind that of North Korea due to the passive US military aid. According to 
Biddle’s explanation, the technological superiority was decided before the Korean War and 
the efficiency would depend upon how the ROK utilized their defensive edge.  
 
In this sub-chapter, it will be shown how it happened that, even though North Korea enjoyed 
the technological superiority and overwhelming victory in the initial phase of war, they failed 
to annihilate the ROK Forces and gave the US crucial time to engage in the Korean War. 
                                                          
406
IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.53 
407
 Ibid., p.58-59 Razubayev also mentioned in his reports that “due to the mountainous Korean 
peninsula topography, the tank was not provided and long-range artillery was also not offered in 
enough numbers.” He also mentioned that “even though the ROK tried hard, Navy and Air Force 
were not strong enough, the ROK mainly used the US weapons but the number of weapons were still 
inadequate, and they also used vast numbers of old Japanese weaponry so it became very difficult for 
the ROK to strengthen their forces and raise the reserve.” Cited from-IMHC, 
SoRyeonGunSaDanJangRaJuBaYeFEui6.25JeonJaengBoGoSeo1, p.113-121 
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Ultimately, this sub-chapter will explain that the efficiency of military technology (North 
Korea’s) will depend on how the defender (the ROK) used their defensive edge. 
 
An Overwhelming, but not Perfect Victory and The Battle of   
Chunchon  
 
 Leadership, Fortification, and Training 
 
As analysed, the ROK forces were ill-equipped and did not have the capability to hold out 
against the North Korean invasion. However, its weakness became much worse due to poor 
human resource management (Commander’s quality) and an ill-prepared defensive position. 
Therefore, the ROK was not ready to use their defensive strategies and was on the verge of 
completely being overwhelmed by North Korean’s technological dominance.    
 
The ROK President Rhee Syngman’s human resource management style was to control and 
balance through division and rule, therefore he did not like to appoint powerful figures as 
minsters in his cabinet.
408
 He appointed Shin Sungmo as the Minister of National Defence. 
Shin was not politically ambitious and did not have any expertise since his previous career 
was serving as the captain of a British shipping company. The appointment of young Chae 
Byungdeok, in April, 1950 as the Chief of the General Staff was also a logical conclusion, 
since Rhee was reluctant to appoint anyone with a brilliant military career and strong 
opinion.
409
 Through insufficient time and inexperience, Chae made crucial mistakes during 
the first stage of war and was eventually sacked on the 30
th
 of June, just five days after the 
Korean War broke out.
410
The war headquarters was compromised by the President’s personal 
                                                          
408
 Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.36 
409
 Ibid., p.28-30 and p.36  
Chae did not have any actual field commanding experience since he was an Ordnance Officer in the 
Imperial Japanese Army. 
410
 Ibid., p.77 
1) Drastic personnel changes went into effect just before war to put his men into the significant 
position and as a consequence, the ROK forces were inadequately prepared for war  
2) Incomplete Anti-tank measures  
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political tastes leaving the ROK to pay the price for these decisions during the initial phase of 
war. In addition, due to the defeat of the ruling party in the second election of members for 
the National Assembly on the 30
th
 of May, there was a massive overhaul in personnel 
changes in the armed forces with the newly appointed Chae assigning his own men to 
significant positions. Therefore, the newly appointed armed force commanders who were not 
even able to grasp their defence sector had to cope with the North Korean invasion.
411
 
 
The ROK military authorities also gave a defence guide (Yukbonjakjeongyehoek38ho- Army 
Headquarter Operation Plan 38
th
: 25
th
 of March, 1950). According to this plan, they assumed 
that the NKPA main attack would be heading to the Uijongbu axis and planned to secure the 
38
th
 Parallel with a defensive concentration in the Uijongbu defence sector. To secure the 
Uijongbu defence sector, they planned to set up three defensive lines in front of Uijongbu, 
place the local force in the first line and reserve forces in the second and third line. They 
would defeat the NKPA in these three consecutive defensive lines.
412
 This defence concept 
was given to the ROK troops, the Guard, usually in line with the border trench, the Main 
defence position trench, and the Final protective line. But, the defence line fortification using 
the mountainous topography of Korean peninsula showed only slow progress.  
 
Following the USFK withdrawal, the ROK took over the 38
th
 Parallel defence duty. There 
was only a guard post to check the personnel and traffic passage and the defensive trench was 
totally nonexistent.
413
 In this circumstance, the defensive line fortification started, and 
because the North Koreans had already taken the geographically advantageous position, the 
fortification became a much more difficult task than initially thought.
414
 To help this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3) Too many resources were focused on holding on to Seoul and as a consequence, wasted the 
crucial reserve since he ordered the counter-attack in Uijongbu.  
4) Prematurely blowing up the Han River bridge consequently, the ROK forces lost almost 
entire  main force since most of  them was still located at the North of Han River 
5) Incomplete demolition of the Han River bridge subsequently, the ROK unwittingly allowed 
the early river crossing of the NKPA’s tank   
411
 Ibid., p.39 
412
 Y.J. Yang, op.cit., p.157 
413
 The ROK Army Headquarter, YukGunBalJeonSaSang, The Army headquarter, 1970, p.278-279 
414
 Y. J. Yang, op.cit., p.169  
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fortification, the Ministry of National Defence included the fortification cost in their 1950 
budget, but, the National Assembly made major cuts. In addition, due to the guerrilla 
movement in the rear, they also experienced a tremendous lack of personnel to handle this 
new situation.
415
 Under these circumstances (The North Korean hindrance, lack of pre-
constructed trenches, personnel, and cost), an adequate fortification could not be realized. 
 
Still, with diligence, they managed to make slight progress by June, 1950. At that point, most 
of the 38
th
 Parallel guard defensive trench was a cover trench made of concrete or logs, and 
possessed two barbed wire lines at the front and anti-personnel land mines. In the main 
resistance line and reserve trenches, they only managed to set up access and individual 
trenches without a cover. Artificial obstacles such as landmines and barbed wires were not 
implanted. They did not have any anti-tank mines, so their anti-tank measures were 
incomplete. Under these circumstances, the ROK defensive trenches were not fully equipped 
with the facilities necessary to protect their forces and instruments from the enemy’s 
howitzers and trench mortars. In addition, they did not have sufficient defence in depth and 
anti-tank measures since their second and third defence line was not fully prepared and did 
not possess anti-tank mines.
416
 
 
In his report, Razuvayev also gave his opinion on the ROK defensive line.
417
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
At that point, the North and South border was the straight line divided by the 38
th
 parallel without any 
consideration of geographic characteristics. Therefore, there were no defensive facilities immediately 
after the division. North Korea, who inherited the 38
th
 parallel defence duty earlier than the ROK, 
could take the geographically advantageous position and disturb the fortification of the ROK 
defensive position.     
415  As mentioned in the Imjin Wars case study, the steep mountainous area existed between 
Gyeongsang and Cholla province which also became the provincial border. This mountainous area 
became the main operation ground for the communist guerrillas before and during the Korean War. It 
was suitable for doing hit and runs, and the peasant class, mostly tenant farmers in this area, were 
sympathetic to the communists because many landlords had helped the Japanese colonial regimes, and 
the ROK government did not put them on the trial and delayed the proposed land reform  
416  Jeonsapyeonchaneuiwonhwae, HanGukJeonJaengSaJe–HaeBangGwaGeonGun (1945-1950.6), 
Seoul, ROKMND, Jeonsapyeonchaneuiwonhwae,1968, p.396-398 
417
 IMHC, SoRyeonGunSaDanJangRaJuBaYeFEui6.25JeonJaengBoGoSeo1, p.129 
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(1) The ROK military authorities were not interested in laying out the consecutive 
defensive lines along the 38
th
 Parallel since they had a conviction that their force had 
a capability to beat the NKPA and advance to the North Korean territory.   
(2) Most of the ROK trenches were built without much consideration of local strategic 
characteristics and cooperation with the neighbouring facilities. 
(3) The 38th Parallel defence was not built systemically and did not correspond to the 
principle of the mountainous topography defence trenches. Only Uijongbu defensive 
sector trenches were relatively sound   
(4) Most of the defence trench was built along the 38th Parallel and they did not have a 
defensive trench line after the first defence line. Only Ujongbu axis had a defence in 
depth.   
 
In conclusion, even though the ROK had tried to fortify their defensive trenches, until the 
Korean War began their level of preparation did not reach a level that could rival the North 
Korean offensive preparation.  
 
The ROK forces were also facing a lack of systematic training.
418
 They did not have a time to 
complete systematic training since they had a duty to guard the 38
th
 parallel and many of 
them were mobilised for anti-guerrilla operations.
419
 Their first attempts (Goyukgakseo1ho: 
the First training note) to complete a systematic training were delayed until January, 1950, 
and because of the increased burden of anti-guerrilla operations it was not achieved as 
planned. The Army headquarters gave the second training note on the 14
th
 of March but this 
order was only achieved by 25% of the ROK battalion (15 among 65 battalions) before the 
Korean War began.  
 
On the contrary, along with the military capability build up, the NKPA also planned the 
systematic training for the offensive operations. They completed the division self-training by 
                                                          
418 Due to the increased and heavy duties, the ROK forces were not able to exercise the battalion level 
tactical defence or manoeuvre training as well as the regiment and division level comprehensive 
operational training.   
419
 Before the Korean War began, among  8 ROK Infantry Divisions, the 1,7,6 and 8
th
 Division was 
deployed on the front line while the 2, 3 and 5
th
 Division was mobilised for anti-guerrilla operation 
Excerpted from- IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.122 
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the early 1949, and started a division level comprehensive military tactic training from the 
end of 1949. This also gave them a chance to evaluate the offensive operation plan and 
revised the plan based on the evaluation.
420
 At the end of February, 1950, they carried out the 
massive size joint training called “Jeokeuijinjidolpateuksoohunryeonmichdohajakjeonhunryeon 
(Special Training for the Penetration of the Enemy Trench and River Crossing Operation)” 
which was attended by two infantry divisions and tank troops. They evaluated this training as 
satisfactory.
421
 They finished the manoeuvre warfare exercise at the end of March. From 
April, their high ranking officers also secretly started to research the ROK and its forces for 
an improved military command. Therefore, with the inclusion of the Korean veterans who 
previously served for the PLA and Soviet army, and continuous hard training, the level of 
NKPA’s training and readiness was far better than those of the ROK counterpart.  
 
The First Phase of North Korean Invasion and the Central Eastern Front  
 
Biddle’s argument about military technology efficiency was that, since the NKPA enjoyed 
the technological advantage and the South was not prepared for combat using their defensive 
edge without proper training, adequate trenches, and suitable command, the fate of war was 
inevitably in the favour of the NKPA. In fact, the NKPA enjoyed an overwhelming victory 
and captured Seoul in three days. They gave the ROK crucial time to regroup in the South of 
the Han River, and the US time to engage, and they failed to deliver a finishing blow to the 
ROK forces. This meant their initial success was not a decisive and perfect one. Even though 
they managed to find a breakthrough, the outflanking troops failed to envelope and 
completely annihilate the ROK forces.  
 
                                                          
420
 Y.J. Yang, op.cit., p.167  
Also, in February, there was an engineer corps’ trench breakthrough special training and river 
crossing training. Especially, trench breakthrough special training was designed to train the special 
assignment troops in the engineer corps who had a duty to remove the artificial obstacles in front of 
enemy trenches such as the barbed wire and land mines and blow up the enemy fortified trenches to 
make a breakthrough in them. Therefore, before the Korean War began, the NKPA already finished 
the trench offence training. Excerpted from- Ibid., p.170 
421  Jeongbochammobu, the ROK Army, BukGwawNamChimBunSeok, Seoul, Army Headquarter, 
1970, p.50  
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Especially the NKPA 2
nd
 Corps which was supposed to envelop the ROK forces by an 
outflanking movement did not fully achieve their objective. This small section will reveal 
why the NKPA 2
nd
 Division (Chunchon Axis) and the 12
th
 Division (Inje-Hongchon Axis) 
failed to outflank the ROK main force around Seoul.  Ultimately, it will explore why 
technological superiority was not fully utilized when the defender has a well-trained force 
and a leader who can utilize the well-fortified defensive position.  
 
The objective of the NKPA 2
nd
 Corps in the first phase of the operation, which was designed 
to finish in two days, was to reach the ROK 6
th
 Division reserve’s stationed post in a day, 
although it was 23-35 km south of 38
th
 Parallel. In the second day, they aimed at 
guaranteeing the mobile troops (the 603
th 
Motor cycle regiment) reaching the South of Suwon 
and to begin the following troops’ (Corps Reserve: 5th Infantry Division) advance to Wonju to 
cut the ROK reinforcement and defensive line in two.
422
  
 
The 12
th
 Division, which invaded the Hongchon Axis as a main attack had two roles to 
achieve. First, they were assigned the duty to occupy Hongchon and cut off the road between 
Wonju and Yoju to prohibit the reinforcement to Seoul. Secondly, they had a plan to support 
the 603
th
 Motor Cycle Regiment’s High-Speed penetration movement whose objective was to 
reach Suwon as quickly as possible, and then advance to Suwon marching through Hongchon 
and Yoju to cut off the ROK forces’ withdrawal route and envelop them.423     
 
The 2
nd 
Division which invaded Chunchon Axis (Chunchon, Kapyong, and Seoul) planned to 
occupy Chunchon, Kapyong, and cross the Han River to attack Seoul. They aimed to cut off 
the ROK reinforcement, protect the left flank of their main force (3
rd
, 4
th
 Infantry division, 
105
th
 Tank Brigade of the 1
st
 Corps), and envelope the ROK forces in Seoul from the East. 
The 5
th
 Division as a reserve planned to follow the 12
th
 Infantry Division and advance to 
Wonju to cut off the ROK reinforcement and defensive line in two.
424
 Therefore, the ROK 6
th
 
                                                          
422 Wonju is located in the middle of the Suwon and Samchok line and one of the points to reach 
during the first phase of operation. Excerpted from- Y.J. Yang, et. al., op.cit., p.34 
423
 Ibid., p.34-36 
424
 Ibid., p.36-39 
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Infantry Division who took charge of the Central Eastern front had to cope with the NKPA’s 
three infantry divisions and one Motor cycle Regiment.
425
   
 
The role of the ROK 6
th
 Infantry Division was to wage both defensive and guerrilla warfare 
using steep mountainous topography, check the enemy’s advance to Seoul from the Central 
Eastern front (2
nd
 and 12
th
 Infantry Division), and give firepower support to the North Eastern 
front of the 7
th
 Infantry Division defence sector to turn the tide of war on the main battlefield 
in the ROK’s favour.426 For the defence of the Central Eastern front, the concentration of 
defence was in Chunchon, since they believed the enemy main force would advance from 
Hwachon to Chunchon.
427
 They aimed at keeping the 38
th
 parallel by repelling the enemy in 
front of Chunchon. Therefore, they placed the 16
th
 Artillery Battalion in Chunchon for the 
concentrated use of firepower.
428
 They also placed the 7
th
 Regiment on the North Western 
perimeter (Chunchon Axis), the 2
nd
 Regiment on the North Eastern perimeter (Hongchon 
Axis), and used the 19
th
 Regiment stationed at Wonju as a reserve.  
                                                          
425
 Ibid., p.419 
426
 IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.96 Since the ROK defence capability and strategy was centred 
on the defence of Seoul, the 6
th
 Division, which was in charge of Central Eastern front, took excessive 
amount of duties. For the defence of Seoul, the 6
th 
Division had a duty to support the 7
th
 Division 
which was in charge of Uijongbu defence sector, an area which both Koreas regarded as the most 
significant defence sector to defend Seoul.  
427 For the NKPA 2nd Corps, the shortest and quickest way to reach Seoul was using Chunchon Axis 
(Hwachon, Chunchon, Kapyong, and Seoul). That was the reason why the 6
th
 Division thought that the 
NKPA main force would be heading to Chunchon. In addition, if the NKPA mechanized or mobile 
troops which were stationed in Hwachon or Yanggu wanted to advance to Seoul they had to pass 
Chucnchon so strategically Chunchon was very important place for the NKPA. (Route 5
th 
(Hwachon-
Chunchon-Hongchon), Route 46
th
 (Yanggu-Chunchon-Seoul)) However, even though the NKPA 12
th
 
division was heading to Chunchon, it was as the supportive attack and the NKPA’s 2nd Corps had a 
bigger picture than this. They aimed at annihilating the ROK main force in Suwon by outflanking 
movement and envelopment. Excerpted from- Jeonsapyeonchaneuiwonhwae, 
HanGukJeonJaengJeonTuSa–38DoSeonChoGiJeonTu(JungDongBuJeonSeonPyeon), Seoul, 
Samwhainswae, 1982, p.30-31 
428 The 6th infantry division Jakjeonmyeongryeongje42ho (Operation order the 42nd, 18th of May, 1950) 
Excerpted from- Jeonjaengginyeonsaeophwae, HanGukJeonJaengSa3, Seoul, Haenglimchulpansa, 
1992, p.84 
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In terms of the 6
th
 Division defence sector topography, there were plenty of natural barriers to 
wage defensive warfare. The 6
th
 Division’s defence sector had a very irregular topography 
where the steep mountains linked vertically and horizontally to each other. Around the 38
th
 
parallel, there was a mountainous topography where the Maebong (615m), Obong (779m), 
and Buyong (882m) Mountain linked into each other. Bongui Mountain (301m) which is 
located in the southern bank of Soyang River, could dominate the surrounding area. The Mal 
Gogae (the Horse pass) located in front of Hongchon was a steep mountainous pass where 
the defender could easily check the enemy’s advance. Therefore the topography in general 
was in favour of the defender.   
 
In addition, the steep mountainous topography and thick forest was perfect in preventing 
observation by the enemy, the rapid movement of mechanized troops, and increasing the 
efficiency of high-angle guns rather than direct-angle ones.
429
 The river served as another 
natural barrier. The Soyang River flowed from the forward area of the defensive sector 
westward, and the Bukhan River flowed from Hwachon southward to meet in the north of 
Chunchon. This became a severe natural barrier in the summer since the increased 
introduction of water during the rainy season, usually starting from the middle of June and 
averaging 100-250mm rainfall, made any attempts at crossing the river a great ordeal.
430
  
 
At the Central Eastern Front, the 7
th
 Regiment which had been stationed in the Chunchon 
defence sector from May, 1949 knew the local topography very well and enjoyed a sound 
civil military relationship. They laid the main defence line in front of Chunchon with the 
concrete or log-covered trench, barbed wire and anti-personnel mine in front of the trench. 
They also built the anti-tank trenches composed of ferro-concrete along the road to 
Chuchon.
431
  
                                                          
429 One could easily think that the NKPA advantage of numbers and shooting-range of howitzers 
would be prominent; however, the ROK 6
th
 Brigade Artillery Battalion already knew their defensive 
sector in and out, had proper training, and was under capable command; so at least the application of 
high-angle gun was in balance. Moreover, the thick forest and steep topography as well as the river 
made the NKPA mobile power such as the self-propelled howitzer, tank, and motor cycle less 
prominent.  
430 M.S. Son, ChoGiJeonTuChunchon,HongCheonJeonTuYeongGu, Jeonsa 2 of ROK: Dec, 1999, p. 
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In terms of training and command, the regimental commander, Im Butaek (lieutenant colonel) 
was particularly concerned with education and training. Therefore, all of his regiment 
finished battalion combat training which was achieved at an average of 25% of the ROK 
battalion. He tried to improve the quality of officers by sending them to the Army infantry or 
artillery school when most of the other commanders were not keen on a re-education spell.
432
 
In addition, the 16
th
 Artillery Battalion commander (Major Kim Sung) who was in charge of 
firepower support in the Chunchon Axis was also in favour of the training and education. 
After he finished his courses at the artillery school, he sent three of his battery commanders 
to the course, and trained his battalion intensively. Therefore, the level of training and 
command of the 16
th
 Artillery Battalion was also high.
433
   
 
Moreover, at least at the Chunchon Axis where the NKPA enjoyed the technological and 
numerical advantage, the ROK forces possessed relatively well-constructed trenches in a 
mountainous topography. These could be used due to the adequate training and command. 
According to Biddle’s argument, the North Korean technological superiority would not be 
fully exerted in this area since the ROK force in that sector had the capability to use their 
geographic edge. So, even though the NKPA fully enjoyed their technological superiority at 
almost the entire front, it was highly expected that the NKPA would struggle in the Chunchon 
Axis. Through analysing the Battle of Chunchon, the section below will examine the 
adequacy of Biddle’s argument and the significance of the defensive warfare using the 
defensive topography in the Korean Peninsula. 
 
The Battle of Chunchon and the Efficiency of Military Technology in the 
Korean Peninsula 434 
 
The 7
th 
Regiment finished the fortification of the trenches based on the “Three Consecutive 
Defensive Line Defence” concept. At the guard (border) trench line, they did not set up 
                                                          
432 Y.J. Yang, et. al., op.cit., p.446 
433 I.H. Shin, 16PoByongDaeDaeJangKimSung (16th Artillery Battalion Commander Kim Sung), Seoul, 
Kookbanilbo (The Korea Defence daily), 27
th
  of August, 2002) 
434 To Review the Battle of Chunchon, 
The ROK Army Headquarter,  HanGukJeonJaengJeonSaRyo: Je6SaDanJeonTuSangBO (53), 1987  
M.S. Son, op.cit., p.183-215 
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trenches at great depth since given the limited resources available, they believed that the 
enemy’s main forces would not attack at this axis435, and they had to consider the phase of the 
main battlefield and flexibility of defence.
436
 Therefore, their fortification of trenches was 
concentrated on Hill 164 (the main resistance line) which could dominate the Chunchon basin 
and the riverside of the Soyang River
437
 (the final protective line). This battle lasted four 
phases which were: the battle in the guard trenches, the main resistance line, the final 
protective line, and the stalling combat aiming to earn time for the withdrawal. Especially 
analysing the last three phases of this battle, it would seem that the technological advantage 
in mountainous topography like the Korean Peninsula would be diminished once its 
counterpart possessed the properly fortified trenches, used the mountainous topography and 
maximized its worth through proper training and command.   
 
The NKPA 2
nd 
Division tried to swiftly occupy Chunchon using Route 5. But, the ROK 
forces already planned to repel the NKPA along the main resistance line. So, in the first line 
defence (Guard Border trenches) they only placed a few troops. As a consequence, the NKPA 
swiftly passed the ROK first line of defence.
438
 Therefore, the first full scale contact occurred 
around the ROK main resistance line. Following this easy victory, with the SU-76 self-
propelled gun in front, the NKPA 2
nd
 Division 6
th
 Regiment advanced to Chunchon along 
Route 5. When they reached near to Hill 164, the ROK 1
st
 battalion of 7
th
 Regiment placed in 
Hill 164 lured them into open fire and crushed them with the joint firepower of the infantry 
and artillery.
439
  
 
Their first attempt was foiled and they attempted to occupy the hill again by employing 
massive amounts of 122mm howitzer fire support. However, their firepower advantage did 
                                                          
435
 They believed that the NKPA main attack would invade in the Uijongbu axis which was correct 
but they failed to recognize the sheer size of invasion. 
436
 They believed that they would beat the NKPA and at least keep the 38
th
 Parallel line. The guard 
trench only had a role to retard the enemy advance and they had a plan to wage a decisive battle on a 
main resistance line and recuperate the 38
th
 parallel once they were able to repel the NKPA in a main 
resistance line or at most along in the final protective line. It was revealed in the 6
th
 Infantry Division 
commander’s decision not to blow up the bridge in the Soyang River for further counter-attack   
437
 Ibid., p.447 
438 Ibid., p.449-456 
439 Ibid., p.458 
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not make much of a dent in this attempt since their self-propelled howitzer did not actually 
make any impact thanks to the topography.
440
 Moreover, the 122mm howitzer’s firepower 
was also offset by fortification completed before the war. Thus, their second attempt was also 
foiled. Following the failure of the second attempt, the NKPA tried to outflank Hill 164 and 
cross the Soyang River (Western Point) to occupy Chunchon. However, on the Western flank 
of Hill 164 was an open field, and their outflanking movement was quickly noticed and 
rendered them into easy prey for the well-trained ROK Infantry and artillery joint 
operation.
441
 But, for the ROK, the main resistance line defence also bore problems. Even 
though the NKPA only attacked Hill 164 and the Western flank at that time, if they changed 
their attacking route to the Eastern flank of the main defence line and crossed the Soyankg 
River,
442
 the ROK forces would unwittingly allow the enemy an easy passing of the river and 
occupation of Chunchon. In addition, their forces stationed at the North of the Soyang River 
(1
st
 Battalion in Hill 164 and 19
th
 Regiment element on Udu Mountain) would be outflanked 
and encircled.  
 
In fact, the ROK 6
th
 Division already seized the enemy movement at the Eastern riverside of 
the Soyang River and heard a North Korean prisoner’s statement that there would be 
reinforcements in that flank. Therefore, the outflanking threat became a reality, forcing 
withdrawal to the southern riverside of Soyang River (The Final protective line) to shrink 
their front and concentrate their forces.
443
 The ROK forces managed to repel the NKPA in the 
main resistance line and forced enemy reinforcement on that front. The success was due in 
part because they fortified the main resistance line trenches properly using the steep hill 
dominating the basin. They succeeded in the joint operation of the infantry and artillery 
because of proper training and command.     
 
                                                          
440
Due to the mountainous topography in this sector, the mobility of the self-propelled howitzer was 
severely restricted; therefore, it could not support the frontal assault unit properly. 
441 Ibid., p.456-465 
442 The Soyang River is averagely 200-300m wide and quite deep. However, at this point, they could 
cross the river by wading.  
443
 After the 2
nd
 Division attempts to occupy Chunchon foiled until the 26
th
 of June, the 2
nd
 Corps 
orders 2 regiments of 12
th
 Division which was attacking Hongchon axis to reinforce the 2
nd
 Division. 
Excerpted from- IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.137 
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Following the withdrawal from the main resistance line, the 6
th
 Division placed the 7
th
 
Regiment along the left flank of the Soyang River and the 19
th
 on the right.
444
 However, the 
division headquarter made crucial mistakes during the final protective line phase. First, they 
did not blow up the bridge which linked the Northern and Southern bank of the Soyang River. 
The decision was made since the 6
th
 Division commander thought that, without much 
information of the other fronts, if they blew up the bridge, they would lose the chance of 
counter-attack and recovering the 38
th
 Parallel. In hindsight, this was the wrong course of 
action to follow since it allowed the enemy’s mechanized troop a passage to the defence 
line.
445
 That bridge was only blocked by broken instruments but those were quickly removed 
and used by the NKPA armoured troops which became an additional pressure to the defender. 
The newly arrived reinforcement from the 12
th
 Division was another blow to the defender.  
 
However, the 6
th
 Division’s headquarter made another mistake by retreating to the 19th 
Regiment stationed on the eastern bank of the Soyang River for fear of encirclement and 
securing Hongchon.
 446
 The threat of the Hongchon Axis was dramatically reduced due to the 
reinforcing movement of the NKPA 12
th
 Division, and the NKPA threat toward Chunchon 
became much greater. Therefore, the 7
th 
Regiment, which was in the defence around the 
Soyang River South Western bank and Bongui Mountain, received massive pressure from the 
Eastern and Northern fronts due to these two decisions. Thus, it was struggling to hold onto 
the final protective line and had to withdraw from Chunchon.
447
 They also withdrew to 
Hongchon doing a consecutive stalling combat, using the mountainous topography like 
                                                          
444 M.S. Son, op.cit., p.195 
445
 The Commander of the Engineer’s Battalion recommended the blasting the bridge according to the 
Division Operation Plan but that suggestion was refused. The first communication with the Army 
headquarters was completed after the 7
th
 Regiment was fought with the NKPA in the final protective 
line on the 27
th
 of June which was the breakdown of western front and order of retreat. Excerpted 
from- Y.J. Yang, et. al., op.cit., p.468 
446
 If the NKPA 12
th 
Division (Hongchon Axis) managed to beat the 2
nd
 Regiment and captured 
Hongchon, ROK 6
th
 Division would lose the retreating route and be surrounded. Excerpted from- M.S. 
Son, op.cit., p.196 
447 The ROK Army Headquarter,  HanGukJeonJaengJeonSaRyo:Je6SaDanJeonTuSangBO, p.113  
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Wonchang Gogae for instance.
448
 The NKPA 2
nd
 Corps finally managed to occupy Chunchon 
after three days of heavy battle (this was only a 14km advance from the 38
th
 Parallel). 
 
This final protective line defence also gave a critical message to the defenders: that, once a 
technologically-advanced force could use their advantage, it would be tough for the defender 
to hold on to their defensive line, even though the defender enjoyed the sound advantage of 
geographical knowledge. In this phase of battle, the ROK 6
th 
Division allowed the NKPA 2
nd
 
Corps to fully utilize their strength of technology and preponderance to allow an outflanking 
movement from the North Eastern bank of the Soyang River to Chunchon, because of the 
misjudgement and tactical mistake in the failure to blow up the bridge. In the battle of 
Chunchon, the NKPA lost a lot more than the ROK did. The NKPA 2
nd
 Division lost the 
chance to envelop the ROK main force in the North of Seoul since they failed to occupy 
Chunchon as planned (in a day).  Their feet tied for three days due to the 7
th
 Regiment’s 
stalling warfare using their advantage of topography. The 12
th
 Division (Hongchon Axis) also 
delayed their advance to Hongchon and lost the chance to cut off the ROK retreat route in 
Suwon through the outflanking movement, since they had to support the 2
nd
 Division
449
  
 
In conclusion, an examination of the battle of Chunchon reveals that, in the Korean peninsula 
topography, which boasts of steep mountains and deep and wide rivers, the technological 
advantage (the North Korean advantage of fire and mobile power) can be offset by the 
defender’s proper defensive line fortification. In addition, training and command could force 
the defender to make the most of the fortified defensive line using the advantage of 
geography.
450
 It also demonstrates through the final protective line combat that, even though 
the defender possessed the geographic advantage (Soyang River and Bongeui Mountain), if 
                                                          
448 It was located in the middle of road between Hongchon and Chunchon. It was 600m high and 
boasted of steep northern slope. Therefore, it was a good place for the defender to wage a stalling 
warfare. Excerpted from- M.S. Son, op.cit., p.198 
449
 The NKPA discussed the strategic and tactical mistakes of the Korean War during the Third 
Plenum of the Second KWP Central Committee. One of them was the failure of annihilating the 
enemy capability (the failure of outflanking and annihilation operation). It meant the failure of 
annihilating the ROK forces around Seoul due to several logistical and tactical mistakes. It is certain 
that the battle of Chunchon was one of the main reasons for the NKPA to fail to annihilate the ROK 
main force around Seoul. Excerpted from- M.S, Jang, op.cit., p.152 
450 It was the case in the main resistance line combat.  
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they cannot utilize it
451
 the aggressor will use their technological advantage to punish the 
defender. This revelation coincides with Biddle’s argument on the efficiency of military 
technology, skill and geography, as well as this project’s core argument that the NKPA, who 
possessed a geographic defensive edge while keeping the decent level of training and 
command edge, would not be deterred by the technology only.   
 
5-2 The US Engagement and the Naktong River Line 
Campaign 
 
Topography of the Naktong River line 452  
 
The NKPA plan was to annihilate the ROK main force in the Suwon–Samchok line in the first 
phase of invasion and mop up the remnants of the defeated army. This plan was not realized 
since the ROK main force was not completely annihilated and managed to form the Han 
River defence line, earning crucial time for the US to engage. However, the US engagement 
did not make much of an impact during the initial phase of war. The NKPA was heavily-
armed and well-trained, and the under-armed and ill-trained first US contingent (The 24
th
 
Division) could not turn the tide of war. After the 24
th
 Division was demolished in Kum 
(River)-Sobaek (Mountains) defence line, the idea of organizing defence along the Naktong 
River was discussed. Considering various factors such as the UN reinforcement, topography, 
condition of Pusan harbour, Navy and Air Force support, supply and so on, General Walker 
(The commander of the US 8
th
 Army which controlled the US ground forces initially, then 
                                                          
451
1) The allowance of outflanking movement from the North Eastern bank of Soyang River to         
Chunchon due to the misjudgement.  
    2) The failure of blowing up the bridge which enabled the NKPA to use their mobile power 
452 R.E. Appleman, op.cit., p.248-262 and 289-487  
IMHC,  HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.295-391 
Department of Military History, op.cit., p.66-86 
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War–The Classic Korean War History (50th Anniversary Edition), 
Dulles Virginia, Potoman Books, 2000, p.108-159 
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controlled all the UN and ROK ground forces afterwards) and his staff chose the Naktong 
River defence line as their final resistance line.
453
   
 
This defence line was organized along the Naktong River, and was shaped like an inverted L 
stretching for 80Km from east-west and 160Km north-south, connecting Masan-Namji-
Nakjongri-Yongdok from the south-west to the northeast. The Naktong Line was composed of 
three sections. The first sector utilized the Naktong River as a natural defence line and linked 
Nakjongri-Waegan-Namji. At that time, the Naktong River was at a width of 400-800 meters 
and a depth of 1-1.5m. The second sector was from Namji to Chindongri to the west of 
Masan. This sector was from the confluence of the Naktong and Nam River all the way to the 
Southern coast. It also has a rough topography featuring Chontu Mountain (661m) Pil-bong 
(743m), and Sobuk Mountain (738m). The final sector was from Nakjongril to Yongdok, and 
included the rugged hills of the Taebaek Mountains in the upper Naktong region.
454
  
 
Overall, the defence line ran along the rivers and mountains in the Naktong region, and these 
natural obstacles bolstered the frontal defence. Moreover, the well-developed road network 
from Pusan to major towns on the defence line aided interior operations.
455
 In addition, the 
Naktong River line was the first defensive line which linked the entire front. The close 
coordination among defence troops became possible and prevented the NKPA’s outflanking 
movement. Finally, the UN and ROK joint force also established an alternative defence line 
called “Davidson line” to secure a landing spot (Pusan) even in a contingency situation.456 In 
conclusion, for the defender, the Naktong River line was the defence line which utilized the 
utmost of topography (steep mountains and river); and for the offender, and it was a 
defensive line which would require enormous sacrifice to occupy. 
                                                          
453
 R.K. Flint, T.F. Smith and the 24
th
 Division: Delay and Withdrawal, 5-19
th 
July, 1950 in  Charles 
E.H. Heller and W.A. Stofft, America’s First Battle (1776-1965), University press of  Kansas, 1988, 
p.296 This defence line was also called as the Pusan Perimeter or Walker line.  
454
 IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.296 
455
 In other words, due to the well-managed road and rail network from Pusan (Main supply base) to 
frontal towns such as Masan, Taegu, Yongchon, and Pohang, the UN and ROK troops had an 
advantage of an effective supply, troop relocation, and  improved counter-attack capability by 
dispatching reserves wherever required.  Excerpted from- The Department of Military History, op.cit., 
p.66 
456 Ibid., p.66 
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The Enfeebled NKPA and UN force 
 
The NKPA started to lose their dominance in the areas of technology, training, and 
preponderance following the UN’s engagement. At First, the US Air Force took command in 
the air. The US initially intended to repel the NKPA with their air and naval power, so they 
started to use the US FEAF strength. This destroyed the North Korean airpower in a few 
days.
457
 Meanwhile, in late July, the US Navy carrier, Boxer, arrived in Japan with 145 F-51 
Mustangs. In early August, the US FEAF had 626 F-80 fighter planes and 264 F-51s which 
carried out a mission of CAS, strategic bombing strikes, reconnaissance and cargo sorties.
458
 
Thus, due to the US air dominance, many of the NKPA supply depots were destroyed. They 
were forced to transport during the night to escape the UN air raid in the day time. 
 
 In these circumstances, they could not support their front unit properly. Their armoured units 
were no exception. They had been so severely damaged in consecutive fights that they no 
longer had the capability similar to what they had shown in the initial phase of war.
459
 The 
first large tank replacement for the NKPA’s August offensive (21 new tanks and 200 tank 
crews) was almost destroyed by the UN air strikes before they could reach the battle zone.
460
 
In addition, on the 31
st
 of July 1950, the US FEAF and Strategic Air Command began a 
strategic bombing campaign by B-29s. Due to this strategic bombing, their five major 
industrial centres Wonsan (Oil factory), Pyongyang (A railway switchyard and Arsenal, 
Aluminium mill nearby Chinnampo), Heungnam (Synthesizing Chemical Factory), Chongjin 
(Iron Works), and Najin (Pier facilities)) had been completely demolished. Above all, the 
                                                          
457
 Truman initially authorized MacArthur to use the Far East naval and airpower in support of the 
ROK against the entirety of enemy targets south of the 38th Parallel. On the 27
th
 of June, General 
MacArthur had authorization to intervene in Korea with air and naval forces. R.E. Appleman, op.cit., 
p.28 (Telecon TT3426, 27
th
 of  Jun, 1950) 
458 Ibid., p.256-257 
459 Ibid., p.264, 376 
 On 5
th
 of August, many of the NKPA division were at half strength; the total of combat strength of its 
eleven divisions could not have been more than 70,000 and they had no more than 40 tanks. 
Excerpted from- T.R. Fehrenbach, op.cit., p.113 
460 R.E. Appleman, op.cit., p.264 
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communication route between North Korea and Siberia was cut off. Therefore, the North 
Korean combat support capability was virtually exhausted.
461
  
 
Moreover, the ROK division were given effective anti-tank weapons
462
 and long-range 
artillery along with UN forces against the NKPA armoured troops and long-range artillery. 
The US tank battalion also started to deploy in the Naktong River line.
 463
 This made a big 
difference in the Naktong River line defence campaign. Therefore, for the ROK, their 
technological vulnerability quickly was overcome and the ROK–UN joint force started to 
gain the technological advantage. Under these circumstances, the NKPA division deployed in 
the Naktong River line was generally reduced to 50 to 60 percent of fighting strength 
compared to the initial phase of the war. Ultimately, along with their loss of technological 
advantage to the UN force, they lost the edge of their training because of the heavy loss of the 
battle-hardened force, and their morale also dropped due to the poor supply of troops and 
instrument.   
 
Success of the Defender and the Relevance of Technology 
and Geography 
 
The NKPA launched two big offensives (the August offensive and September offensive) in 
the Naktong defence line to occupy Pusan and finish the war. According to the NKPA 
                                                          
461 R.A. Pape, Bombing to Win, Cornell University Press,1996, p.144-145 
462 The ROK forces was initially equipped with 37mm and M18 57mm recoilless rifle, and M9/M9A1 
2.36 Inch Rocket launcher which could not penetrate the NKPA T-34 tank armour. However, during 
the Naktong River line campaign, they were supplied with effective anti-tank weapons such as the 
M20 3.6 inch rocket launcher and the M20 75mm recoilless launcher. The artillery unit, the weakest 
link of the ROK Army, was supplied with the new 30 105mm Howitzers on the 12
th
 of August and 
expanded from 6 105mm Howitzer artillery battalions before war to 10 battalions by the 10
th
 of 
September. Excerpted From- Jeonsapyeonchaneuiwonhwae, GukBangSa2, Seoul, ROKMND, 1987, p. 
328, 363 
463
 On the 3
rd
 of August, 1950, the 89
th
 Medium Tank Battalion, for the first time, arrived in Korea 
with 50 M4A3 tanks to be attached to the US 25
th 
division. By the 19
th
 of August, there would be 500 
tanks, outnumbering the enemy armour by more than five to one. Excerpted from- IMHC, 
HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.305 and T.R. Fehrenbach, op.cit., p.113 
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supreme commander’s order 81 (13th of August, 1950),464  they pushed to occupy Pusan 
before the 15
th
 of August. The NKPA troops were ordered to cross the river and attack and 
chase the ROK and UN forces to Pusan before a formidable defence line was formed. In 
detail, their main attack was heading to Taegu while they attacked the entire approachable 
route, and then they planned to exploit the breakthrough in any route. 
465
 However, the 
NKPA’s August offensive reached the critical point without even occupying Taegu, let alone 
Pusan. Therefore, they prepared the last offensive from the 21
st
 of August to the 30
th
 and 
launched the September offensive. Their operation directive was to attack hard at the Naktong 
defence line through two echelons advancing from the West and North, and then envelop and 
destroy the ROK and UN main forces around Taegu and Yongchon, ultimately wiping out the 
enemy operation base in Pusan.
466
 However, those two attempts were foiled.  
 
In this campaign, the defender possessed the geographic edge due to the nearby wide and 
deep river and steep mountains along the defensive line, and also had a logistical advantage 
due to the relatively well-developed road and rail network from the defender’s main base to 
the frontal towns. The NKPA was slow to cross the river because of the loss of personnel and 
instruments through consecutive battles before they reached the Naktong defence line. This 
gave crucial time for the ROK and UN troops to regroup and fortify their defence line. In 
addition, because of the improved military command, training, and morale of the UN and 
ROK forces
467
, they were crucially able to use the defensive topography, and thus could 
                                                          
464
 The 15
th
 of August is the liberation day from the Japanese occupation: it has, therefore, a 
significant meaning. Their intention to occupy the entire Korean peninsula till that date was also 
shown in the NKPA’s propaganda leaflet on the 6th of August and Kim Ilsung’s visit to Suanbo (The 
NKPA Frontal Headquarter) on the 20
th
 of July where he urged the NKPA to occupy Pusan till the 
15
th
 of August. Excerpted From- IMHC,  HanGukJeonJaengSang, p.341 
465 Ibid., p.302 
466
Sahoiguahakryeoksayeonguso, JoSeonJeonSa25-HyunDaePyeonJoGukHaeBangJeonJaengSa1, 
Pyongyang, Gwahakbaekgwasajeonjonghabchulpansa, 1981, p.272 
467
 In July, the ROK President placed the ROK forces under General MacArthur, the United Nations 
commander. Excerpted from- R.E. Appleman, op.cit., p.111-112  
From then on, due to the handover of military command to the UN, the ROK forces which suffered 
from the incompetent command of the Headquarter due to inexperience and political consideration, 
received the better command from the Headquarters. The ROK forces also had experienced the 
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maximize their geographic edge. According to Biddle, under these conditions the offender 
would struggle even with a technological advantage. However, the NKPA had already lost 
their advantage of technology, training and preponderance.
468
 The NKPA was no match with 
the ROK and UN forces in any respect. Therefore, the NKPA August and September 
offensive was doomed to fail.  
 
In conclusion, this campaign gives us a few lessons. Firstly, from the NKPA’s August and 
September offensives, one can learn that having the technological advantage would have a 
much more devastating effect on an ill-prepared opponent in the open field. In these two 
offensives, the UN forces possessed the technological advantage while the NKPA became 
weakened in terms of training and equipment compared to the initial phase of war due to the 
relentless US air bombardment and frictional consecutive ground battles. However, the 
NKPA was ordered to attack the UN and ROK defence line which, in most cases, had to go 
through the open field in the Naktong River bank or the open slope of the mountains. In the 
end, they failed to achieve their objective with much cost which clearly shows that the 
technology would become much more effective against the ill-prepared enemy in the open 
field. Secondly, once the technologically advanced defender can hold the defence line with 
the proper fortification using their geographic edge, command, and training, they can 
guarantee the maximization of their geographic edge, thus rendering the offender’s frontal 
attack as suicidal. Thirdly, the Korean Peninsula is an adequate place to wage a defensive 
warfare. The steep mountainous topography and deep and wide rivers, on the one hand would 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
several months of hard fight and their morale was also raised due to the better military supply 
following the US engagement.   
468
 The fact of how much the NKPA had struggled after the UN engagement due to the UN’s military 
technology dominance (especially their Airpower) was shown in their discussion regarding strategic 
and tactical problems during the Third Plenum of the Second KWP Central Committee where they 
indicated the immaturity of their night and highland combat skills under the enemy’s predominant 
firepower (especially the UN air supremacy) along with the lack of supply from the rear to front 
among several military defects. In this discussion, they also presented several suggestions to fix their 
military defects while many were regarding how to overcome various technological vulnerabilities 
such as the improvement of highland and night combat skills under their air supremacy, mastery of 
land mine warfare to weaken the enemy mobility, enhancing the logistical capability. Excerpted from- 
M.S. Jang, op.cit., p.152-153 
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prevent the offender from using their fire, air, and mobile power
469
, on the other hand give a 
natural cover for the defender from the enemy fire, mobile, and airpower.   
 
5-3 Chinese Engagement and the New Phase of War 
 
The Initial Objective, Strategy and Capability of PVA 
 
The NKPA was exhausted following the failure of two offensives and fled to the North 
following the UN success on the Inchon landing operation and the successful counterattack 
on the Naktong River line. The Korean peninsula reunification under the US guidance would 
not be welcomed for the Chinese. They were reluctant to see a capitalist regime in their 
backyard and wanted a buffer zone to prevent direct US influence to the continent.  
 
The PRC warned against entry into the Korean War in various ways. On the 25th of 
September, a proxy of the Chief of Staff, PLA, directly warned K.M. Panikkar, India’s 
ambassador to China said: “Chinese people will not tolerate the US Forces’ crossing of the 
38
th Parallel”.470 On the 3rd of October, the PRC Foreign Secretary, Zhou Enlai, warned again 
the Indian Ambassador that “China will not stand idly by if the UN forces cross the 38th 
Parallel”.471 However, the US ignored these warnings due to the optimistic mood of war and 
their belief that they could beat the Chinese since they had petty equipment.  
 
In 1950, the Communists had won the Chinese civil war only one year before and had not 
gotten over the devastation of the longstanding war. In terms of military capability, even 
though the PRC possessed a battle-hardened 5 million veterans in the Army, the Navy and the 
                                                          
469 For example, the NKPA could not use their mechanized power properly due to the natural barrier 
in the Naktong River and Sobaek Mountains.  
470
Jeonsapyeonchaneuiwonhwae, HanGukJeonJaengSaJe4–ChongBanGyeokJeonGi(15.09.1950-30.11), 
Seoul, ROKMND, Jeonsapyeonchaneuiwonhwae, 1971, p.488 
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 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa (Korean Translation 
of  The Research institute of Military History, Chinese Academy of Military Science,  Chinese 
People’s Volunteer Army’s War history of  Resist America and Aid Korea, Beijing, Military Science 
Publishing Co, 1988), Seoul, Segyungsa, 1991, p.8 
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Air Force were still in the early stage of development and Army equipment was really 
outdated.
472
 Mao hesitated to send his troops and his hesitation as was shown in his telegram 
to Stalin on the 2
nd
 of October. However, after careful discussion of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China under the supervision of Mao Zedong from 1
st
 of October to 
15
th
 of October, the PRC finally decided to send their troops. Mao explained his decision thus:  
“If we do not dispatch our troops to Korea, the enemy will approach the Yalu River, internal 
and international reactionary element will increase. Therefore, we will be in a 
disadvantageous position. More than anything else, the North Eastern Border Defence Army 
will be contained and the South Manchuria would be in danger”.473 
 
Mao assumed two possible scenarios of military action in Korea. One was the problem-
solving, which was to eliminate the US troops within Korea or drive them out of Korea. 
Another was war expansion: waging a general war with the US. The scenarios aimed at 
eliminating the US troops within Korea or driving them out of Korea. They assumed that, 
even though there was a possibility of general war with the US because of the entry of the 
Korean War, if they eliminated the US troops, the situation would turn to favour the 
revolutionary force and China. The possible general war would be of limited scale and would 
not last long, and they could drag the US into the negotiation table on their terms.
474
 
Therefore, their military objective was to eliminate the US force or at least give them a 
crucial blow to drag the US to the negotiation table.  
 
The PVA initially avoided an offensive against the UN forces, which possessed a dominant 
mobile and firepower, and intended to conduct a strategic defence in North Korea. They 
initially dispatched twelve divisions and planned to move to the mountainous area (Tokchon) 
about 120miles northeast of Pyongyang. Here, the UN troops would hesitate or cease 
advancing onward, check the enemy advance from Wonsan and Pyongyang, and earn time for 
their troops to train and equip. On the 5
th
 of October, Mao informed Zhou Enlai of his 
specific plan for fighting a defensive war in Korea. They planned to build two or three 
defensive perimeters around the Tokchon areas north of the Pyongyang and Wonsan Railway 
                                                          
472 Ibid., p.9 
473
 Ibid., p.10 
474
 Ibid., p.11 
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and South of the Tokchon-Yongwon Road.
475
 In this first phase of war (strategic defence), 
they planned to destroy the UN troops in front of the well-constructed trenches once the UN 
troops advanced. Meanwhile, the PVA would wait for Soviet weapons to become better 
equipped. Then they would coordinate with the NKPA to launch the offensive against the UN 
troops.
476
 
 
Their strategy applied in the Korean War can be inferred from Peng Dehai (The PVA 
Supreme Commander)’s speech in the first PVA officer meeting in Shenyang. 477  In his 
speech at the PVA High Ranking Officer meeting, he spoke regarding the issue of strategy, 
saying “Our current task is to preserve and protect a revolutionary base whereby to annihilate 
the enemy force at an appropriate time while we will actively assist the Korean people 
fighting against the invaders”. Given the technical and ordnance superiority of the UN forces 
and the narrowness of the Korean peninsula, he concluded that, “The mobile war strategy that 
we employed in our civil wars does not fit in with the Korean battleground” In his view, the 
best plan was to fight a “combined positional and mobile warfare”. He explained that “We 
will firmly resist the enemy advance to keep it from forwarding even one more step; 
meanwhile, we will make a quick decision to strike out by penetrating into enemy’s rear 
wherever, there is a weak point”. Finally, Peng reiterated that “our present task is to preserve 
a base but, more importantly, is to annihilate the enemy strength. Therefore our defence is not 
completely defensive. It should enable us not only to defend our position but also to eliminate 
the enemy.”478The PVA adopted the strategy that under the enemy’s technological superiority, 
they lure the enemy in deeply while checking the enemy advance using the well-constructed 
trench in the Korean peninsula’s steep mountain479  (Strategic defence). Once the enemy 
                                                          
475
 S.H. Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism–China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, University 
press of Kansas, 1995, p.87 
476
 Ibid., p.79 
477
KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.13 
478 S.H. Zhang, op.cit., p.89-90  
479 To review the Mao’s military principles  of strategic defence, strategic offensive, how to spot and 
utilize the enemy weakness, mobile warfare, and war of attrition and annihilation,    
See) the Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume 2, pecking, foreign language press, 1965, p.102-
106, 157-179 
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showed their weakness,
480
 they planned to turn to the offensive as quickly as possible, and 
envelop and annihilate them.     
 
In terms of tactics, to escape from the UN firepower and reach the UN defence line without 
much casualty, the PVA used the bad weather and invisibility of night time, and hard to pass 
routes which would avoid enemy observation. During the assault, they attacked the enemy on 
either flanks or one flank with their main force while the support attack drew the enemy 
attention and firepower.
481
 Once this attack was successful, they went into the enveloping 
stage. They cut off the enemy’s main operation route and enveloped the enemy. Ultimately, if 
the enemy retreated from the front, they would destroy them in the pre-occupied enemy main 
operation route. The frontal unit was encouraged to carry as many grenades as possible since 
they were lacking firepower to support the assault, and heavy instrumentation could hamper 
mobility in the mountainous topography.
482
  
 
Progress of War Following the PVA Engagement and the 
Relevance of Geography and Technology 
 
The PVA 1-3
rd
 Offensives 
 
The NKPA already lost the will to fight due to the shock of the Inchon landing operation and 
the immense casualties and costs suffered in the August and September offensives. 
Consequently, the UN forces’ advance speed was incredibly fast. They occupied the 
                                                          
480 On the 24th of October, Macarthur removed the advance restriction line which was set by the UN 
forces General Headquarter operation order 2 (2
nd
 of October) and 4 (17
th
 of October). Therefore, the 
US force in the Western front (the 8
th
 US army) and the Eastern front (the US 10
th 
Corps) were 
entitled to advance with all speed, utilizing all the available forces. However, they were exposed to 
great danger, as they dashed in disarray as if they had been in competing in a race to the border. The 
PVA noticed the UN troops’ weakness and turned to the offensive to envelope and annihilate them. 
Excerpted from- IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, Seoul, IMHC,1996, p.98 
481
 During the Korean War, they would usually attack the ROK Army on the flank which was under-
armed, lack of training, and suffering ill-command.  
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 Department of Military History, op.cit., p.114 and Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.248 
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strategically important cities on the Eastern Front (Wonsan) and Western Front (Pyongyang) 
on the 10
th
 of October and the 20
th
 of October, and kept advancing toward the MacArthur 
line.
483
  
 
However, upon crossing the Chongchon River, MacArthur overturned his operation order (no 
more limits were placed upon the advance) and ordered his troops to advance to the border 
line of North Korea and China. This ‘MacArthur line’ was the narrowest straight defence line 
in the Korean Peninsula. As they advanced toward the North, the topography became rougher 
and their defence front broadened. In addition, the UN unit’s competitive race to the border 
had serious problems. Most of all, the UN Forces suffered ill communication and cooperation 
between adjacent units. Because of the hasty, poorly coordinated and communicated advance, 
the Marching North Operation experienced several problems such as an overstretched 
defence front and the scattering of the advancing troops. Eventually there was a wide 50 mile 
wide gap between the Western and Eastern Front. Therefore, they were in danger of being 
defeated one by one once a breakthrough was made in this wide gap and the enemy were 
allowed to infiltrate to their rear.
484
  
 
The PVA initially planned a strategic defence.  They could not miss this chance and launched 
the first offensive (25
th
 of October–5th of November). Mao ordered a surprise attack to 
annihilate the ill-equipped ROK 6
th
, 7
th
 and 8
th 
Division in the Western front and make a 
breakthrough and infiltrate the enemy rear. After they were able to cut the US and British 
forces operation route, they would destroy the US and British troops while ambushing the 
advancing troops and deploying minimum defensive forces in the Eastern Front.  
 
Accordingly they made a surprise attack on the ROK 1
st
 Division in Unsan and the 6
th
 
Division in Onjong-ri. Their initial operation was successful but was not fully exploited since 
the ROK 1
st
 Division and 6
th
 Division kept a hold of Yongbyon and Piho Mountain. This did 
not allow the PVA to infiltrate to the UN troops’ rear line. However, the PVA struck a fatal 
                                                          
483 It was drafted according to the Macarthur Operation Order 4 and the narrowest straight defence 
line in the Korean Peninsula running from Sonchon in the Yellow Sea to Songjin in the East Sea. It 
kept the principle of the September 27 directive (Do not stimulate the Chinese and Russian). 
Excerpted from- B.C. NO, op.cit., p.92-99 
484
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blow at the ROK 1
st
 and 6
th
 Division and advance to the North of Chongchon River.
485
 After 
the first offensive, the PVA analysed the battle of Unsan, published the education material 
called “The Conclusion of the Battle of Unsan Experience” and distributed it to their unit. In 
that material, they regarded highly the US forces’ cooperative operation capability amongst 
their infantry, tanks, and artillery. They also thought the US airpower would be a great threat 
to them. They concluded that the US infantry was relatively weak, feared death and did not 
possess the required courage during the battle. They also thought that the US forces in 
general had a weakness in night and close combat, because of a heavy reliance on the 
airpower, artillery, and tank forces, which would be thrown into chaos once they made a 
breakthrough. They would have no answer once they cut off the supply route.
486
 All things 
considered, the PVA drafted the combat principles as below: 
1) Outflank  the enemy as quickly as possible  
2) Cut off the enemy rear with the main force  
3) Give a first consideration to night and mountains combat  
4) Keep communication close between small units 
  
These strategic and tactical approaches were almost identical to the ideas outlined in Peng’s 
speech regarding strategy and tactics before their engagement (spotting the enemy weakness, 
dispersing the enemy main forces’ attention, outflanking, and cutting off the operation route, 
enveloping and destroying the retreating enemy unit) and were usually observed by the PVA. 
In addition, they evaluated that the ROK forces displayed immaturity in almost every area 
except for showcasing a reasonable level of fighting spirit. The PVA also thought that the 
firepower and combat capability of the ROK forces was less than 1/3 of those of the US 
forces. Therefore, the PVA usually attacked the ROK units to outflank or make a 
breakthrough.
487
In conclusion, the PVA kept their style of mobile warfare strategy 
(dispersing attention and outflanking, enveloping and destroying the enemy) during their 
offensive. After the first offensive, the PVA units were exhausted and short of food and 
ammunition. In the meantime the NKPA also needed time to regroup. Therefore, on the 4
th
 of 
November, Peng decided to take the “Induce and counter-offensive strategy as the next 
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operation policy”.488 This was the strategy the PVA had utilized in their first offensive. They 
planned to lure the UN troops deep into their territory, strike the flank units first and then 
infiltrate and exploit the breakthrough.  
 
On the UN side, after the PVA offensive ended, they planned a final offensive to win the 
Korean War. However, the UN forces failed to evaluate the enemy situation accurately. On 
the 9
th
 of November, The UNC notified the US 8
th
 Army that the Chinese might have sent 
around 76,800 regular troops into North Korea.
489
 Since the 8
th
 Army also estimated that the 
numbers of PVA soldiers would be around 60,000, they believed the UNC notice and planned 
the Christmas offensive based on the estimate. The number of PVA and NKPA totalled 
around 420,000, which was far more than the 8
th
 Army estimates. The misjudgement of 
numbers was due to the lack of reliable strategic intelligence but it was also caused both by 
their heavy reliance on the aerial reconnaissance and PVA’s covert and night time 
manoeuvre.
490
   
 
The UN forces also underestimated the PVA combat capability. They thought the PVA 
combat capability was better than the NKPA’s but their morale was quite low due to poor 
supply. They also thought that, even though the PVA was experienced at night combat and 
mountainous manoeuvres using machineguns and trench mortars, they assessed that their fire 
and mobile power was quite weak. This was because their weaponry was usually American 
or Japanese ones taken during the Chinese civil war or Second World War, their artillery was 
borrowed from the NKPA, and they possessed a small numbers of tanks.
491
  
 
Based on this false analysis, the UN forces launched the ‘Christmas offensive’ on the 24th of 
November to repel the NKPA and PVA, and liberate the Korean peninsula. Their offensive 
was concentrated on the Kangye-Huichon line where the communist Army main supply line 
was located. In the initial phase of this offensive, the PVA allowed the UN forces to advance 
deep into their territory and, once they spotted the UN forces’ weakness of long operation 
line, launched a counter-offensive on the 25
th
 of November as planned. They outflanked the 
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ROK 2
nd
 Corps on the right flank and planned to envelop the UN forces in two circles. The 
PVA 38
th 
Army (3 Infantry divisions) as inner circle envelopment troops were targeting 
Yongwon-ri, and the 42
nd
Army (3 Infantry divisions) were the outer circle envelopment 
troops. They had planned to advance to the Pyongyang–Wonsan line in this counter-offensive. 
Their counter-offensive was a massive success. Their outer circle envelopment was not 
successful because of the US 1
st
 Cavalry Divisions’ hard fight and their eventual success in 
checking the PVA 42
nd
 Army element’s enveloping movement in the North of Sunchon. But 
their inner circle envelopment was successful and the US 2
nd
 Division suffered a heavy loss 
due to the retreat route cut off by the PVA 38
th
 Army element, later named the “Indian 
Gauntlet” or “Tragedy of Kunwu-ri.” 492 
 
The PVA adopted the same strategy in the 2
nd
 offensive as in the first offensive but its better 
result was attributable to the success of outflanking the ROK 2
nd 
Corps and cutting off the US 
2
nd
 Division retreat route from the original position in Kunwuri to Sunchon in Kalgoge 
(Mountainous pass). This was unlike the first offensive, whose enveloping movement was 
foiled at Piho Mountain and Yongbyon. Ultimately the UN forces lost their stronghold at the 
strategically important Cheongchon River and decided to withdraw the defence line around 
the 38
th
 Parallel because of the fear that they would be surrounded by the outnumbering PVA. 
They had adopted the outflanking and enveloping strategy using the mountainous gap 
between the Western front US 8
th
 Army and Eastern front 10
th
 Corps during the night time.
493
   
 
The UN forces decided to lay the defensive line running from the southern bank of the Imjin 
River, Hwachon to Yangyang in the East Sea. The PVA countered and launched the 3
rd
 
offensive (30
th
 of December, 1950–7th of January, 1951). Peng was pessimistic about 
launching another offensive and wanted two or three months’ time to regroup and rearm 
themselves, Mao, however, ordered the offensive be launched again, mentioning “If we stop 
our offensive, the 38
th
 Parallel would be fixed; therefore, we need to chase the UN troops”.494 
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Because of this chasing offensive, the UN forces again lost Seoul and retreated to the 
Pyongtaek-Ansong Line.  
 
However, the miraculous PVA victory did not last until the end of the Korean War. After 
analysing the PVA’s 1st–3rd offensive, one can easily conclude that the offenders could 
overcome the defender’s technological prowess through shrewd strategies and tactics, using 
their experience, training, command, manoeuvre and so on as the PVA did. However, in 
modern warfare, there is a certain limit to an offender’s prowess with human elements against 
the defender’s technological dominance. Even though there were brilliant PVA strategies, 
tactics, training, and command, the UN forces’ military debacle was also because of their 
ignorance and slighting attitude toward the PVA, and their tactics and strategies. They did not 
know the number of PVA troops sent to Korea and looked down on the PVA capability. 
These mistakes led to the decision to launch the catastrophic Christmas offensive. Their 
ignorance and unfamiliarity with the PVA’s strategies and tactics (allurement, outflanking, 
enveloping and destroying the retreating forces) also helped contribute to the early PVA 
success.  
 
In terms of geography, the UN forces did not study enough of the Korean topography. Firstly, 
the advance beyond the MacArthur line was risky due to the fact that the defence front would 
be widened and they would meet the steepest topography in the Korean peninsula. Secondly, 
without the coordinated and paralleled advance, they would be easily penetrated and 
encircled due to the widened defence sector and mountainous topography. On the other hand, 
the PVA took a chance on the exposed UN forces’ weakness. They penetrated the ill-
coordinated UN forces’ defence line utilizing the manoeuvre of mountainous topography and 
eventually encircled the UN forces. Obviously, the geographic factor contributed 
significantly to the outcome of offensives. Ultimately, the lack of UN preparation and 
understanding of the PVA’s well-prepared tactics was the catalyst for the UN forces’ military 
debacle at the time.  
 
PVA 4
th
 Offensive 
 
The argument that there is a certain limit of an offender’s prowess with human elements 
when compared to a defender’s technological dominance can be examined in the PVA 4th - 6th 
206 
 
Offensives and the UN Forces’ counter-offensive strike. Once the PVA 3rd Offensive had run 
out of momentum, the UN forces, which recovered from the panic of the early stage of PVA 
engagement, started to plan the counter-offensive.
495
Before they launched the counter-
offensive; they planned a limited size reconnaissance in force operation called “Wolfhound” 
to probe the PVA deployment, size, and future offensive plan as well as to contain the 
communist forces’ pressure on the Central Eastern front.496 Through the reconnaissance in 
force, the UN forces recognized that the PVA defence line was running from Suwon to Ichon, 
and their firepower support and supply was quite poor as well as the fact that the PVA could 
not launch the offensive in the near future.
497
  
 
In addition, the UN defence line became stabilized with better morale. The UN forces’ 
headquarters also believed that since the communist forces were still attempting to expel the 
UN troops, if the UN forces stood still in the fixed defence line, the UN force would inflict 
much more damage. Therefore, rather than securing the area, the UN forces planned to attack 
the enemy while they were in the process of moving, since it would cause a maximum 
amount of damage or delay to their offensive actions. Eventually, the UN forces decided to 
transform their defensive operations into offensive ones.
498
 Before the UN troops launched 
the counter-offensive, General Ridgway drafted the operation guide line and distributed it to 
the relevant units. This draft was later known as “The Crusher Tactics”.499  
(1) To contain the PVA’s human wave tactic which is based on their preponderance, our 
friendly troops will exploit our fire and mobile power advantage to the maximum 
degree. To achieve these blood shedding tactics (Inflict as many casualties and costs  
upon the enemy as possible) with the advantage of our fire and mobile power, the 
close coordination of all branches of services such as artillery, infantry, cavalry 
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On the UN side,  Matthew B, Ridgway was appointed as the US 8
th 
Corps commander following the 
sudden death of General Walker  due to the car accident on the 23
rd
 of December.  
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 During the 3
rd 
communist offensive, while the PVA stopped chasing the UN troops, the NKPA in 
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op.cit., p.285-286 
497
 Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.301 
498
IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.364 
499
 Department of Military History, op.cit., p.366 and  IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.138 
207 
 
(Armoured troops) has to be achieved. Air force and Navy will also be required to 
give fire support for the ground operation. 
(2)  My objective is killing the enemy rather than securing a territory. Likewise, the main 
operation objective lies in minimizing the friendly losses and maximizing the damage 
to the enemy troops and material.  
(3) In any assault, performing a reconnaissance in force with a smaller unit is advisable. 
Only after the enemy situation is identified, we should increase the level of contact 
with the enemy such as more intense combat patrols or all-out attack to achieve the 
limited goal.
500
 
(4) During the assault, the lateral coordination and maintenance of the links with the 
adjacent units is more crucial than the advance speed. To achieve this, control lines 
will be gradually established. To prohibit attacking echelons from protruding outside 
the friendly front line or to prevent them from advancing by-passing the enemy, all 
the attacking echelons must obtain prior permission from the Corps-level 
Commanders before crossing a control line.
501
 
(5)  If the large scale enemy offensive is launched, the friendly forces will withdraw in 
order to a planned defensive line, while maintaining communication and coordination 
with adjacent units. In this circumstance, we should not cause the imbalance of the 
front line which could be created by the hasty withdrawal of a unit since this 
imbalance would allow the enemy to break through our front line or penetrate into our 
rear area.
502
  
(6) All the units in the process of withdrawal should maintain the contact with the enemy, 
carry out a delaying action, and if there is any chance, we have to inflict as much 
bloodshed as possible on the enemy. We need to try to trap the enemy main force into 
                                                          
500 This operation guideline is to avoid the adventurous operation and prudently attack limited enemy 
targets in an effort to avoid the unnecessary loss of friendly forces. 
501 This is a Meat grinder type of tactic which places emphasize on the annihilation of enemy troops 
rather than speed or occupying territory.  
502 By keeping the connection of the defensive line, it could prevent the PVA from outflanking or 
breaking through the UN troops.   
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the killing zone, and once successful, we should strike them with concentrated ground 
and air firepower.
503
 
(7)  When the enemy’s offensive reaches its limit, the friendly force should immediately 
turn into counter-attack. On the phase of counter-attack, through continuous 
manoeuvring, we have to compel the enemy to consume and bloodshed. 
504
  
 
Even though the UN troops retreated to the 37
th
 Parallel, they started to better understand the 
PVA’s strength, capability, strategy, and tactics, and prepared their countermeasures. They 
also developed tactics and strategies which could maximize their strength (technology and 
supply) as shown in the Ridgway operation guide lines.  
 
In addition, the US 10
th
 Corps which was under the direct control of Far East Command 
(FECOM) until the 26th of December, 1950, and took charge of the Eastern Front, was 
assigned to the 8
th
 Army for the command unification. This came from the instructions of the 
PVA 1-2 offensives, where the PVA utilized the 50 mile gap between the ill-coordinated 8
th
 
Army in the West and 10
th
 Corps in the East to infiltrate to the 8
th
 Army rear.
505
  
 
At this point, Ridgway also recognized the fatal PVA weakness was logistics issues and 
tenacity of offensive as a consequence. He discovered that the PVA offensive up to that point 
had only lasted 8 days
506
and there was one month gap from one offensive to another. He 
thought the main reason for stopping the offensive at the critical stage (8 days after launching 
offensive; the exploitation stage) was a fundamental logistics problem.
507
 
 
                                                          
503 They tried to establish the concept that withdrawal is not a mere retreat but wanted to use it as a 
bait to lure the enemy and destroy them with their technological advantage.  
504
 Using the mobile power advantage, the UN troops targeted at annihilating the enemy capability. 
505
 Far East Command (Controlled the all the US forces in Japan, ROK, the Philippines);  
-Commanding general of FECOM also became the Commander-in-Chief, UNC (CINCUNC)  
- 8th Army, FEAF, Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) was also under control of FECOM    
Excerpted from– G.L. Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle–United States, United Nations, and 
Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953, Praeger Publishing, 2002, p.1-2 
506
 1
st
 Offensive (25
th
 of October–1st of November), 2nd Offensive (25th of November–2nd of 
December), 3
rd
 Offensive ( 31
st
 of December, 1950–7th of January, 1951)  
507
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Accordingly, the UN forces expanded their air interdiction efforts to worsen enemy logistics 
and planned to attack the enemy once the enemy supply reached a critical point. However, in 
the eagerness to catch and destroy the withdrawing UN Forces, the advancing PVA troops 
abandoned their usual methods of moving only at night under strict marching and camouflage 
discipline. Therefore, the UN Air Forces inflicted terrible damage on the PVA until they 
returned to the original moving principle in the middle of December. Also, the supply to the 
PVA divisions was mainly by porters or animals. Therefore, at this point, the PVA logistics 
were too meagre to maintain good shape.
508
 At the turn of year, the better organized and 
prepared UN troops became ready to launch the counter-offensive against the ill-supplied 
PVA and on  the 25
th
 of January, 1951, they launched a counter-offensive at the Western 
front (25
th
of January, Thunderbolt operation) which was followed by the Central and Eastern 
Front Counter-Offensive. (5
th
 of February, Round-Up operation) The UN Forces managed to 
advance an average of 30-60km on all fronts from their original position around the 37
th
 
Parallel. The progress of battle in 1951 was not favourable to the PVA, unlike their 1
st
 to 3
rd
 
offensives, since the UN troops did not underrate the PVA’s capability anymore. They had 
started to establish a good understanding the PVA’s strategy and tactics as well as being 
ready to use their strength in technology.  
 
According to the plan in Peng’s mind509, while the remaining PVA in the Western front 
halted the UN troops from advance using the natural barrier of the Han River, the PVA’s 
main attack was initially assembled in Kapyong and Hongchon. They launched the 4
th
 
Offensive (11
th
 of February–16th of February) in the salience (Yangpyong and Hoensong) in 
the UN Central front. The military objective of this offensive was initially attacking the ROK 
8
th
 and 3
rd
 Division, whose units were insufficient in mobile and firepower and stationed in 
Hoengsong. Also to be attacked were the UN troops in Chipyong-ri which belonged to 
Yangpyong County afterwards. Ultimately, they extended their front line to the Wonju–
Chungju line. The ROK 3
rd
 and 8
th
 Division was crushed by the outnumbered communist 
forces (11 PVA and NKPA divisions attacked Hoengsong) and withdrew to Wonju. At that 
moment, Ridgway tried to secure Wonju and Chipyongri. Wonju was located in the heart of 
the Central front and was a major transportation point.  Once the UN forces lost Chipyong-ri, 
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 C.R. Shrader, Communist Logistics in the Korean War, Greenwood Press, 1995, p.173-174 
509
 “Seize and destroy the UN  main forces on the Central front” 
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there would be a crevice between the US 9
th
 corps in the West and 10
th
 Corps in the East, so 
the right flank of the UN’s main force would be exposed.510  
 
The battle of Chipyong-ri (13
th 
of February–16th of February), however, was a strategically 
important case since it could demonstrate the difference of UN approaches to the PVA 
offensive.  Following the success on the Hoengsong front, the PVA units were flocking to the 
Chipyong-ri area.
511
 They first cut off the retreat route to the South, enveloped the forces in 
Chipyong-ri, and laid a strong defence line around Chipyong-ri to repel any reinforcing 
movement. However, the UN troops in Chipyong-ri did not retreat in a disorderly fashion as 
they had done in Kunwu-ri during the 2
nd
 PVA offensive. They secured firepower dominance 
through close coordination between the ground and air, managed to unshackle the 
surrounding forces through the much-strengthened salvation operation, and ultimately 
repelled the PVA, who bore many logistical costs and casualties during the battle.
512
  
 
The PVA 4
th
 Offensive, especially the battle of Chipyong-ri is quite the thought provoking 
case. From the PVA’s point of view, they started to realize the reality that their strategies and 
tactics were not a panacea to the UN troops, who were adequately equipped and soundly 
commanded. The PVA’s strategy and tactics were still working well against the ROK forces 
that were ill-equipped and badly commanded. In addition, they also learned that even though 
there was a breakthrough or success from an outflanking movement, it came at a high cost to 
achieve it, resulting in many casualties, unlike the 1-3
rd
 offensives. During the offensive, the 
PVA tried to capture Wonju following their success in Hoengsong.  On their way to Wonju, 
they lost around 30,000 personnel due to the UN troops’ blood-shedding tactic. Because of 
the supply crisis coupled with the defeat in Chipyong-ri, they ceased their offensive and 
started to withdraw.
513
  
 
                                                          
510
 Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.312-315, Department of Military History, op.cit., p.140, IMHC, 
HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.397-406, and KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-
HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.104-107 
511
 Chipyong-ri was held by the US 23
rd
 Regiment of 2
nd
 Division. 
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 T.R. Fehrenbach, op.cit., p.251-266, Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.315-323, IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, 
p.406-413, and KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.108-
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After the failure of the PVA 4
th 
offensive, the UN forces organized the 2
nd
 counter-offensive 
and launched it on the 11
th
 of February from the Western Front to ease the pressure of Central 
Front, and expanded it to the entire front. The offensive last until the PVA launched the 5
th
 
offensive on 22
nd
 of April. During the counter-offensive, the UN forces recovered Seoul and 
the Kansas line
514
, and advanced further to take the Wyoming line.
515
 They managed to 
advance only to the Utah line
516
 during the last offensive operation (Dauntless operation: 11th 
of April–22th of April). In April, there was a significant personnel change in the UN troops. 
The Commander-in-Chief of UNC, General MacArthur was dismissed on the 11
th
 and 
replaced by Ridgway. General Van Fleet was appointed as the US 8
th
 Army commander. 
Dauntless Operation – to secure the Wyoming line as a part of the 2nd counter-offensive – 
was beginning to halt from the 22
nd
 of April due to the heavy resistance from the communist 
forces (the initiation of the PVA 5
th 
offensive). Accordingly, Van Fleet ordered his troops to 
                                                          
514
 It runs generally parallel and to the north of 38
th
 Parallel except on the left, where it would follow 
the twists and turns of the Imjin River to the Sea (It runs along the Imjin River, the Hwachon 
Reservoir, and to Yangyang in the East Sea). It was designed as the UN main resistance line which 
linked the topography that was advantageous to the defender.  
Excerpted from, M.B. Ridgway, the Korean War, New York, Doubleday&Co, 1967, p.116, 
Department of Military History, op.cit., p.142, and Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.387 
515
 The Wyoming line was the defence line located above the 10-20 km of Kansas line which is very 
close to the current cease-fire line. However, at that time, it was set as the outpost of Kansas line. 
Excerpted from- Y.H. Choi, op.cit, p.387, and M.B. Ridgway, op.cit., p.123 
516
 It is located between the Kansas line and Wyoming line. The Utah line lies along the northward 
bulge on the Kansas line to put the UN troops in a position to strike at the Iron Triangle. Excerpted 
from- M.B. Ridgway, op.cit., p.121  
The Iron triangle which linked Chorwon, Kimhwa and Pyonggang, is the most valuable area to 
command the central front. This area is generally a mountainous topography and there were several 
mountains which could dominate the Central front. This area was also located at the Central part of 
Korean peninsula and used as an important transportation junction. One of the main reasons of the UN 
Forces’ retreat to the 38th Parallel during the PVA 2nd Offensive was the withdrawn NKPA troops 
from the Naktong River line which recognized the importance of the Iron Triangle and laid the second 
front in this area to harass the UN supply and communication utilizing the mountainous topography. 
The size of forces in the second front was so immense that the UNC was worried that their retreat 
route could be cut off and eventually enveloped by the PVA to the North and NKPA in the South. 
Excerpted from- B. Ridgway, op.cit., p.178, and Department of Military History, op.cit., p.124 
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turn into a defensive position to cope with the expected PVA offensive. Therefore, the 2
nd
 
counter-offensive finished and the defensive warfare against the PVA 5
th
 Offensive began.
517
  
 
The PVA 4
th
 offensive can be divided into three phases: The battle of Hoengsong, the battle 
of Chipyong-ri, and the UN forces’ counteroffensive. In terms of geography, technology and 
the tactical dimension of war, the Hoengsong battle front was geographically advantageous to 
the defender. But, because of the lack of training, command, and firepower, the advantage 
could not be utilized and the defence line was easily penetrated. Even though the US and 
French forces were deployed in geographically less advantageous positions
518
, they managed 
to halt the PVA advance. As analysed, this was due to the combined effort of technology (fire 
and airpower), and human elements of war such as training, morale, and command. Finally in 
the UN counter-offensive period, even though the UN forces also had to pass through the 
central highlands of the Korean Peninsula, they could easily advance to their strategic targets. 
At that point, the PVA had an obvious geographic edge. Since they were intoxicated by the 
early success, they were overly aggressive and made some mistakes during the offensive.
519
  
In terms of geographic and tactical dimension of war, even though the Korean Peninsula is 
geographically advantageous to the defender in general, once the defender was not prepared 
to use the advantage (fortification, trained troops, command, and proper firepower support), 
the advantage could not be utilized, as was the case in the battle of Hoengsong and the UN 
counter-offensive. As was shown in the battle of Chipyong-ri, the combination of skill, 
technology, and geographic edge in the modern warfare can give a tremendous advantage to 
the defender.   
 
The PVA 5
th
 Offensive 
 
                                                          
517
 Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.331 
518
A French infantry battalion which was composed of volunteered professional soldiers was attached 
to the US 2
nd
 infantry division and deployed in the Chipyong-ri front. Chipyong-ri was the major 
transport junction; however, the topography itself was rather flat compared to the Hoengsong front. 
519
They put too much reserve into the offensive, did not prepare the defence position in the central 
highlands, and were also extremely exhausted and suffered logistic problems due to the prolonged 
offensive. 
213 
 
The PVA prepared the 5
th
 Offensive over a long time. On the 1
st
 of March, Mao sent a 
telegram to Peng ordering his troops to destroy the US and ROK forces around the 38
th
 
Parallel and advance to the Southern Bank of the Namhan River. He also said that the 
Offensive preparation had to be long enough to perfect manoeuvres, but the operation’s 
duration must be short. Accordingly, they planned to launch the Offensive around the 20
th
 of 
April if the UN advance was quick or at the beginning of May if the UN advance was 
slow.
520
 Under guidance given by Mao, Peng aimed at destroying the UN troops through 
enveloping them in Seoul using the massive 305,000 communist forces including 37,500 
NKPA forces and going on to recapture Seoul on 1
st
 of May (Labour Day).  
 
In order to envelop Seoul, the PVA main attack on the Western front approached three 
Axes
521
 while the remaining element of the 9
th
 Group Army (6 divisions) waited in the 
Central Front as another main attack advanced to Seoul through the Hwachon–Chunchon 
Axis. The NKPA also joined the offensive as a supporting attack assaulting Inje and Sinnam. 
The PVA as usual planned to make a breakthrough or to outflank the under-armed ROK 
forces, then advance to the rear line, cut off the operation route, and envelop the UN 
forces.
522
  
 
During the PVA 5
th
 Offensive, there was an especially bloody battle in the Kaesong-Munsan 
Axis. In this Axis, the ROK 1
st
 Division in the Papyong Mountain and the Gloster battalion 
of British 29
th
 Brigade in Solma-ri succeeded in stalling and beginning blood-shedding 
warfare. Their success contributed to foiling the PVA 5
th
 Offensive. In those two battles, even 
though the ROK 1
st
 Division and Gloster Battalion met massive numbers of the PVA in their 
position, and they were enveloped, they succeeded in stalling the PVA through the massive 
air and firepower aid while holding onto their main base. However, in the Hwachon-
Chunchon Axis, the ROK 6
th
 Division was heavily defeated by the PVA and withdrew to the 
Kansas line nearby Chunchon. The PVA avoided contacting the US 1
st
 Marine Division in 
                                                          
520
KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.132-133 
521
 Kaeseong-Munsan Axis (The PVA 19
th 
Group Army; 9 divisions), Yonchon-Tongduchon Axis (The 
PVA 3
rd
 Group Army; 9 divisions), and Kimwha-Pochon Axis (The PVA 9
th
 Group Army; 9 divisions) 
522
Department of Military History, op.cit., p.144-146,  Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.341, IMHC, 
HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.496-503, and KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa- 
HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.139-144 
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this front and contacted the under-armed ROK 6
th
 Division. This decision led the PVA to 
achieve the great initial success on this front. They failed to exploit this success because of 
the hard fight of British 27
th
 Brigade which checked the PVA 9
th
 Group Army’s penetration 
to Seoul from the North East.
523
 The PVA 5
th
 Offensive was also finished without much gain 
on the 29
th
 of April because, along with the huge casualties suffered by the UN forces’ blood-
shedding tactics, their main force’s advance toward the Western front was severely delayed in 
the Papyong Mountain and Seolmari. Their breakthrough in the Hwachon–Chunchon Axis 
was not exploited because of the British 27
th
 Brigade’s tenacious fight. The 5th Offensive 
ended without much gain to the Communist forces but they did suffer tremendous casualties. 
Peng reported to Mao regarding the next offensive on the 26
th
 of April. In this report, he 
pointed out the main reasons of their poor offensive results were the fear of the UN landing 
operation behind the line once they advanced too deep. The UN troops’ disposition was too 
dense to outflank or penetrate, and the UN troops’ resistance was quite adamant compared to 
previous attempts.
524
 
 
In conclusion, as one can see from Peng’s report to Mao, the UN force started to overcome 
their weaknesses of being easily penetrated, outflanked, and forced to retreat once their 
operation route was cut off. In contrast, the PVA strategy and tactics were still positively 
working against the ROK forces who were ill-equipped and poorly commanded unless there 
was immense firepower assistance (The battle of the Papyong Mountain). Like the 4
th
 
Offensive, due to the UN Forces’ stalling and blood-shedding tactics, using their 
technological dominance even during the withdrawing phase, the PVA lost around 80,000 
men in the North of Seoul.
525 
 
The PVA 5
th 
Offensive experienced a similar course of action and fate as had the 4
th
:  (1) 
Making a breakthrough in the ROK defence sector (geographically advantageous but the lack 
of firepower support and skill); (2) They failed to exploit the breakthrough because of the 
stubborn resistance of skilful and fully firepower-supported UN forces’ defence position; (3) 
The UN Forces’ counter-offensive returned to their original position. However, during the 5th 
Offensive, the PVA suffered more casualties and cost than in the 4
th
 Offensive. This was 
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 Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.346 
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 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.142-143 
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because the UN forces had a better understanding of PVA tactics, Korean peninsula 
geography, and how to combine and maximize their advantage in geography and 
technology.
526
 Through an analysis of the PVA’s 4th and 5th Offensives, one can learn that 
once the technologically superior forces recognized their ignorance and started to become 
familiar with the opponent’s strategy and tactics, their opponents, who had a prowess in the 
human elements of war such as well-trained forces, well-established command structure, 
strategy, and tactics, could not enjoy the success they had before. Based on the experience of 
the PVA 1-3
rd
 offensives, the UN forces did not deeply penetrate enemy territory to prevent 
the encirclement. They maximized their firepower prowess through fortifying the three 
consecutive defence lines Kansas, Utah, and Wyoming, using the Korean peninsula’s central 
highland.  
 
The PVA 6
th 
Offensive 
 
The 5
th
 Offensive suffered huge casualties to achieve the political and geographic objective of 
capturing Seoul, because of the heavily disposed UN fire, air, and mobile power along the 
Western and Central fronts.
527
 Based on this experience, Peng decided to attack the under-
armed ROK units in the Central Eastern and Eastern Front. These were deployed mostly in 
the mountainous topography prohibiting the fire and mobile power’s utmost application.528 
Their military object was to annihilate six of the ten ROK divisions in the Central Eastern 
front. Peng believed that if they destroyed the ROK units in the Central Eastern and Eastern 
                                                          
526
 During the battle of Chipyong-ri, they learned that even though an operation route was cut off and 
encircled due to the PVA outflanking movement (the Key element of PVA tactics), if they did not 
withdraw but instead fought in the defence position keeping high morale and discipline with the 
support of fire and airpower, they could foil the PVA offensive due to their major advantage in 
technology and geography.  
527 During the 5th Offensive, even though they mainly targeted the ROK units such as the 1st Division 
in the Kaesong–Munsan Axis and the 6th Division in the Hwachon-Chunchon Axis, because the 
Western and Central Western front were mainly composed of plains which were a better topography 
to deal with rather than the mountains to apply fire and mobile power, this front was mainly defended 
by the UN troops. Therefore, even though they were able to achieve a breakthrough, they could not 
exploit it due to heavily concentrated UN firepower.    
528
 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa,p.149-150 
216 
 
front, they could isolate and threaten the UN forces on the Western Front thus attaining an 
advantageous position in the ceasefire talk.
529
 
 
Among the available thirty eight divisions, twelve at the Western front aimed to contain and 
deceive the UN’s main forces, and eight along the Central front aimed to make a deep 
breakthrough to separate the UN forces’ Western and Eastern front. This would prohibit 
reinforcements from the Western Front getting to the Central Eastern Front where the 
Communist Forces’ main attack was being directed.530  
 
The Communist Forces main attack consisting of 20 divisions launched the Offensive on the 
15
th
 of May against 4 ROK divisions (5
th
, 7
th
, 9
th
 and 3
rd 
Division) on the Central Eastern 
Front. Their main strategies were to envelop and destroy the ROK divisions through 
outflanking movements on both flanks. They tried three tier envelopment lines to ensure the 
complete destruction of ROK divisions on this front. They also drafted an operation plan to 
destroy two other ROK divisions on the Eastern Front (The Capital and 11
th
 Division) once 
the initial offensive proved to be successful. The PVA strategy of the 6
th
 Offensive
531
 also 
observed their basic strategy in the Korean War in which the main attack was to outflank or 
make a breakthrough in the ROK forces’ front and cut off their operation route, envelop, and 
destroy the withdrawing forces while the supportive attack tied the enemy’s main force 
through deception.  
 
At this point, the UN Forces believed that the communist forces would again invade Seoul 
and thus concentrated their firepower and reserves to the Western front. Therefore, the 
adequate reinforcement and firepower support became a much more difficult task than 
                                                          
529  Their operation objectives were transformed from a geographic and politically-centred one toward 
focusing on completely annihilating enemy troops, and their main forces attacking points were 
switched from the Western and Central Western front to the Central Eastern and Eastern front. 
Excerpted from- Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.353-354 
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 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.146-148 
531
 The Chinese Military History described the 5
th
 Offensive as the first phase of 5
th
 Offensive and 6
th
 
Offensive as the second phase. From the analysis of KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-
HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.129-168 However, those two offensives had a different military 
objective and their main attack was heading toward different fronts. Therefore, the US and ROK 
military history generally described the former offensive as the 5
th
 and the later as the 6
th 
offensive.  
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originally planned on the Central Eastern front.
532
 During the 6
th
 offensive, the communist 
forces tried to envelop 4 ROK divisions in three tiers from the west and east. However, the 
third tier enveloping them from the west was not successful, since the PVA 12
th 
Army was 
stuck in Bunker Hill (800m).
533
 The ROK 3
rd
 Corps (3
rd
 and 9
th
 Division) defending the 
Hyon-ri defence sector was surrounded by the PVA in two tiers from the west.
534
 However, 
unlike the US forces in Chipyong-ri and British forces in Solma-ri which tried to hold on to 
their defence sector, because of the fear of encirclement, the ROK 3
rd
 Corps was dissolved 
into pieces and withdrawn without orders. This was exactly the same scenario used by 
Kunwu-ri in the PVA 2
nd
 Offensive. Fortunately for the ROK 3
rd
 Corps, their withdrawal 
route to the South East (Pangdae Mountain) was not cut off by the NKPA 5
th
 Corps, unlike 
their initial plan
535
 and managed to withdraw to Hajinburi, 70 km away from their original 
line of contact.
536
 
 
However, when they reached the vicinity of Soksa-ri, there was a visible change in the front. 
First, because of the logistics problems and casualties suffered from the UN Forces’ fire and 
airpower, the PVA’s advance stagnated and their last penetrating movement in this offensive, 
from the Hyonri breakthrough to Kangnung to envelop and destroy the ROK 11
th
 Division 
and the Capital Division, were checked at Taegwalryong.
537
 Secondly, the UN troops became 
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IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.548-549 
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 The PVA thought that this defence sector (Chaunri) was defended by the ROK 5
th
 division but it 
was actually defended by the US 2
nd
 division and they had a heavy fight with the US forces in Bunker 
Hill.   
534
 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.145-152, Y.H .Choi, 
op.cit., p.355-359, Department of Military History, op.cit., p.146-147, and IMHC, 
HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.496-503 
535 The NKPA 5th Corps which was the first tier enveloping force from the Eastern flank could not 
reach the Pangdae Mountain because of the mountainous topography in that region. The second and 
third tier enveloping force from the Eastern flank (NKPA 2
nd 
Corps) also could not reach their target 
because of the heavy snow and steep mountains.     
536
 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.149-150, and Y.H. 
Choi, op.cit., p.359-360 
537
 The topography of Taegwalryong is very steep, the PVA attacking unit was relatively exhausted 
and the ROK Capital division could obtain enough firepower support especially from the US 7
th
 fleet 
in the East Sea. Excerpted from IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.577-579 
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very adept at moving their reserves from the Western front.
538
 During the first five days of 
the offensive, through the well-organized delaying actions of the UN troops, their artillery 
fire and air strikes were able to inflict heavy losses on the PVA. The PVA’s 12th and 15th 
Armies already suffered huge casualties after contacting the US 2
nd 
Division on their way to 
Soksa-ri. After their supportive attack’s advance on the West and Central front was stalled 
and their initial attack on Taegwalryong was foiled, the PVA’s 20th and 27th Armies and the 
NKPA 2
nd
 Corps were in danger of being cut off by the ROK and UN Forces. The PVA could 
commit further reinforcements along the front but, they were hesitant to since they had 
already suffered a great deal of casualties, not only from frontal assault to the UN position, 
but also from the incessant artillery fire and air strikes on their approach to the UN front.
539
  
 
After reviewing the situation at hand, Peng decided to end the offensive and issued an order 
for a rapid withdrawal on the 21
st
 of May. During the 6
th
 Offensive, the PVA learned the 
military technology’s dreadful effect on modern warfare and turned to positional warfare. 
Even though they made a massive breakthrough on the Hyon-ri Front, their exploitation of 
this breakthrough was hindered when their advance was checked at Bunker Hill, Yongmun 
Mountain, and Taegwalryong by the US or ROK troops hanging on to the hill with much fire 
and airpower support. The PVA also suffered heavy losses because of the UN forces’ blood-
shedding tactics (the PVA called these tactics the Sea of Fire tactics) based upon the Ridgway 
guidelines in applying their fire and airpower dominance. Furthermore, in this offensive, the 
UN forces who had become accustomed to the PVA strategy and tactics, acquired the 
strategy and tactics necessary to maximize their strength. They applied the counter-
envelopment strategy which used their dominant mobile power to cut off the PVA’s retreat 
route, thus enveloping and destroying them.
540
 The outcome of this counter-envelopment was 
                                                          
538 The UNC recognized that the Communist movement in the Western front was only a deception and 
the PVA attempt to penetrate deep into the Central front and separate the Western and Eastern front 
was foiled when the PVA’s 63rd Army were checked and destroyed in the Yongmun Mountain held by 
the ROK’s 6th division which were heavily supported by neighbouring UN fire and airpower. Taken 
from The Department of Military History, HanGukJeonJaengSaBuDo, p.146, and  Y.H. Choi, 
6.25JeonJaengEuiSilPaeSaRyeWaGyoHun, p.362 
539  B.C. Mossman, op.cit., p.466-467, IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.596-598, and KRIS, 
JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa- HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.151-152 
540 General Van Fleet believed that even though the PVA made a huge breakthrough on the Hyon-ri 
front, it also rendered their forces salient. Therefore, once the offensive was stalled as it had been due 
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disaster for the PVA. During the 6
th
 Offensive, they suffered their heaviest casualties during 
the entire Korean War thereby allowing for a massive counter-attack from the UN forces. The 
size of the PVA 5
th
 and 6
th
 Offensive was bigger than any other offensives completed during 
the Korean War. Still, they could not achieve their objective (5
th
; recapture Seoul and destroy 
the UN’s main force, 6th ; destroy the ROK divisions along the Central Eastern and Eastern 
front ultimately threatening the UN forces on the Western front) and consequently lost 85,000 
men during these two offensives
541
 because of the UN forces’ immense fire, air and mobile 
power.
542
   
 
Peng mentioned in his retreat order that, “the front became too widened, the supply of food 
and ammunition is quite a difficult task due to the lack of transport means, the troops are too 
tired, and consequently we cannot advance anymore”. In this spring offensive (5th and 6th 
offensive), the PVA recognized that the reason for their defeat was mainly technological 
inferiority. They vowed to prepare the new offensive through improving their military 
instruments and modern warfare operation’s capability.543  
 
The PVA 6
th
 Offensive followed a similar course of action as HAD the 4
th
 and 5
th
 Offensives. 
However, in this offensive, the PVA realized that their approaches to war were no longer 
effective against the UN forces and could be countermined by the UN forces. In this 
offensive, the UN Forces adopted the counter-envelopment strategy which reflected the 
weakness of the PVA strategy and tactics, as well as theIR understanding of the Korean 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the logistic problems, the PVA would retreat and the UN troops could give them a decisive blow by 
cutting off the line of communications along the enemy’s rear line thus trapping the enemy in a long 
bag, allowing them to launch the counter-offensive. Excerpted from, B.C. Mossman, op.cit., p.465 
According to his judgement, the US 3
rd
 division cut off Unduryong which was located along the 
transport junction between Hyon-ri and Soksa-ri, The US 2
nd
 division was also cut off at the Soyang 
River crossing point which was the crucial retreat route to the North for the Communist forces at the 
Hyon-ri breakthrough. Therefore, the Communist forces along the Central Eastern front were counter-
enveloped in two tiers.  
541
 The casualty figure is varied. This figure is from the Chinese source which is obviously cites the 
most generous one.  
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KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa- HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.160 
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 IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.594-595, Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.389-391, and KRIS, 
JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa- HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.160-167 
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peninsula topography. Due to the steep mountainous topography, the mobility and operation 
route was severely limited in the central highlands of the Korean Peninsula.
544
 Moreover, 
there are a few deep and wide rivers and streams in this region such as the Soyang, Namhan, 
and Bukhan rivers which also restricted the manoeuvre.
545
 The communist forces used the 
geographic characteristics (mountain paths), easily cut off the withdrawal route of the Hyon-
ri defence sector ROK forces easily, and gave a decisive blow to the retreating force. 
However, unlike the previous offensive, the UN forces adopted a counter-enveloping strategy, 
combining the weakness of PVA offensive strategy
546
, the geographic characteristics of the 
central highlands and their advantage in technology. The communists made a breakthrough in 
the Hyon-ri defence sector but failed to exploit that breakthrough because of logistics 
problems and stubborn resistance. Eventually they were forced to withdraw. They enveloped 
the retreating communist forces, though. Unlike the PVA who were equipped with the light 
weaponry, the UN forces utilized their strength in technology and poured everything they 
could muster in this sector. In the end, the communist forces’ casualty toll was the greatest in 
this offensive. It showed that the UN forces were beyond the understanding of weaknesses 
and strengths of the PVA as well as their own, and had reached a level which understood the 
geographic characteristics and how to combine and maximize the geographic characteristics 
with their technological advantage. It was a great shock to the communists and they decided 
to delay the further massive offensive until they reached a similar technology level 
(especially logistics, air and firepower) as the UN forces.  
 
After they had experienced several PVA major offensives, the UN forces started to recognize 
the significance of geographic factors in the Korean peninsula, and prepared the antidote to 
the PVA ways of warfare by contemplating how to combine and maximize their strengths in 
technology, geography, and skill (manoeuvre, training, and command) that raised their 
                                                          
544
 During the Korean War, the situation was much worse than now. There were few roads to use for 
the operation and if there were roads, they were usually narrow and winding mountainous roads.  
545
 During the initial phase of the Imjin Wars, the geographic characteristics of the central highlands 
were one of the main reasons for the Japanese decision not to pacify the Gangwon province where the 
central highlands are located. 
546
 1) The tenacity of offensive due to the logistics problems 
 2) The limited mobile and firepower.  
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technological and geographic edge. The efficiency of this new approach proved to be decisive 
in the UN forces’ counter-offensive.  
 
It can easily be judged that the technologically inferior offender can overcome the defender’s 
superiority in technology through the advantages of the human elements of war: the PVA’s 
absolute success during the 1
st–3rd offensives and the partial success during the 4th to 6th 
offensives against the poorly equipped and commanded ROK divisions in Hoengsong and 
Hyon-ri. After the UN force fully appreciated the PVA’s capability and became accustomed 
to the PVA way of warfare, they were not easily defeated by the PVA, except for the ROK 
troops that were not well-equipped compared to the normal standard held by US and British 
forces. Therefore, one can infer that, in modern warfare, even if the offender is well-prepared 
in the human element of war, it is not easy to overcome the defender who is technologically 
superior and who can fight with the geographic edge. 
 
Also, from the analysis of PVA’s 4-6th offensive, it can be inferred that it is highly probable 
that a potential North Korean invasion will culminate in result similar (more or less likely to 
be even worse) to the PVA’s 4th-6th offensives. On the one hand, like the PVA in these 
offensives, the North was presumably strong with the human element of war such as 
preponderance, and possibly the individual training level due to the long service period. On 
the other hand, like the UN Forces in these offensives, the ROK military authorities have a 
better understanding of the NKPA tactical and strategic approaches to the possible war, and 
are technologically superior except for certain areas such as ballistic missiles. 
 
5-3 Stalemate (Position Warfare) and Ceasefire 
 
The PVA Strategy and Tactics Transformation 
 
The PVA headquarters analysed that, “Even though they were victorious in the 5th Offensive 
(5
th
 and 6
th 
offensive for their view), they faced difficulties caused by a disparity in 
equipment.”547 After having suffered heavy casualties due to enemy fire and airpower, they 
                                                          
547
Mao cabled Peng on the 26
th
 of May, saying “Our enveloping, outflanking, and penetration 
operation at both campaigns have encountered such great difficulties that we were prevented from 
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realized the importance of technology in modern warfare. They also understood that with 
their modern warfare capability, they could not win the war through an offensive-based 
strategy. Accordingly, they accepted the US Armistices Proposal to earn time for their 
rearmament. In an area of military operation, they called for a war of attrition, piecemeal 
warfare, and active defence to leave the enemy exhausted and demoralized.
548
 The piecemeal 
warfare and active defence strategy included not only the defensive position warfare in the 
trenches but also involved various tactical offensives (if the enemy were to expose the 
weakness, they would then launch a counter-attack to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy) 
during the seesaw battles around the 38
th
 parallel. 
 
While they lay the solid defence line by using favourable terrain in an aim to destroy the UN 
troop’s combat capabilities, they would also strengthen their operation capability by 
improving equipment and training, then aim to reduce the gap of combat power between 
friend and foe. This ultimately allowed them to achieve the final victory or at least force the 
enemy to face insurmountable difficulties and withdraw.
549
 In this circumstance, the Korean 
War was transformed into positional warfare in order to capture the dominant hill. 
 
From the PVA’s military point of view, in order to wage an active defence and piecemeal 
warfare strategy, they first needed to lay a defensive line in their favourable position and 
enhance their logistics capabilities since the strong defensive line would inflict heavy losses 
on the offender and become a base for the counter-attack. The defender could not hold the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
achieving the goal of completely annihilating several US divisions or the whole US division or 
regiment.” He also said that, “due to the strong will of the US and British forces, they suffered huge 
losses.” However, only through willingness could not give a significant blow to the PVA. The UN 
troops’ will to hold on to their defensive line unlike the 1-3rd offensives was one of the major factors 
of the PVA defeat but the understanding of the PVA’s way of warfare and maximization of their 
strength (technical dominance) were more prominent factors contributing to the PVA’s disaster during 
the Spring offensive. Then Peng directed that instead of targeting the UN forces at the division or 
regimental level, each PVA army unit should only “aim at completely destroying one of two 
battalions of the US, British and Turkish troops.” He ordered a transformation to the piecemeal 
warfare. Excerpted from- S.H. Zhang, op.cit., p.154 
548
KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.160-167, and IMHC,  
HanGukJeonJaengJung, p.594-595 
549
 KRIS, JungGongGunEuiHanGukJeonJaengSa-HangMiWonJoJeonJaengSa, p.163-167 
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line without a proper supply. The PVA had previously relied on small individual bunkers 
against UN artillery and air raids, and set up the defence in depth along the hilly area. This 
defence line had too much exposure to the UN fire and airpower and would allow the UN 
troops easy access to penetrate their main defence line trenches, which consequently caused 
severe casualties.
550
  
 
They also discovered the usefulness of U-shaped tunnels and started to use them. The tunnel 
in position warfare had many strong points for the defender, who was suffering from 
technological disparity. This would first guarantee the fluid coordination of defence troops 
wherever there was going to be an enemy assault since most of the important holding points, 
including the anti-tank defence position in the valley
551
 and the possible enemy airborne unit 
landing point in the rear were all linked together through the tunnel. Secondly, the tunnel 
gave proper protection against enemy air and firepower and became a safe depot for supplies 
and troops. Thirdly, from the tactical point of view, if the trench became overrun or was 
demolished by enemy firepower, the defender could still hold the line and give a blow to the 
offender either by holding out the entrance of the tunnel or by counterattacking the offender 
using a different exit of the tunnel. Fourthly, since the tunnel guaranteed the safety of the 
defending troops, the PVA could direct the fire on their position. Finally, since the defender 
could keep their forces intact in the tunnel, they could use them as a reserve to repel the 
offender’s final assault to the main trench or counter-attack the retreating offender.552 After 
they found out the effectiveness of the tunnel, the PVA’s headquarters urged the troops to dig 
tunnels on the main defensive position. Therefore, the tunnel became the base of the PVA’s 
active defence and piecemeal warfare strategy.  
 
Defensive Warfare Using the Geographical Edge and   
Technology 
                                                          
550
 Ibid., p.200 
551 The UN tanks could not be fully used in the Korean peninsula trench warfare due to the mobility 
problem in the steep slope. Instead, in many cases, the UN tanks were used to cut off the enemy 
retreating route and envelope them using the valley and the narrow road between mountains  
552 IMHC, JungGongGunEuiJeonRyakJeonSulByeonCheonsa, Seoul, Guningongjehwae, 1996, p.456-
464                                                             
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After the PVA’s 6th Offensive, the UN forces overwhelmed the Communist forces and took 
the initiative in the war. From the US point of view, an expanding war to achieve the 
reunification of Korea would have more losses than gains. Most of all, it would increase the 
possibility of direct Soviet engagement which could inevitably lead to a 3
rd
 World War. 
Strategically, the war in Korea was not important enough for them to risk such great 
casualties and cost.
553
 Therefore, what the US wanted at this point was to achieve an 
honourable armistice. Accordingly, they pressed the communists hard to accept the armistice 
agreement on their terms. Meanwhile they tried to secure the dominant hills
554
 for the better 
defence position, and then worked to set up a stronger defence line to repel any communist 
offensives before the ceasefire agreement.
555
  
 
So, after the 6
th
 offensive, the war spiralled into a stalemate which resulted in a scramble to 
secure the dominant hill, because of the US political position and the PVA’s active defence 
strategy. This stalemate was sustained until the PVA launched the 7
th
 offensive just before the 
ceasefire agreement. During this stalemate, even though there was no massive offensive from 
either side, there were many scrambles for the dominant hill. Among these, it would 
beneficial to analyse the battle of Bloody Ridge Line and Heartbreak, which were typical of 
the type of struggles held between the technologically dominant UN troops and the 
Communist forces who had a eagerness and capability to held on to the geographically 
advantageous defending position. 
   
The Battle of Bloody Ridge Line and Heartbreak Ridge Line  
                                                          
553 Y.H. Choi, op.ict., p.385 
554 The Korean peninsula is full of mountains, most of all in the central highland of the Korean 
peninsula where lots of trench combats were committed during the stalemate. Among those mountains 
and hills, several hills were strategically important since it was possible to monitor the enemy’s 
movement from these high hills. These hills also were also able to give a severe defensive edge. For 
example, the battle of Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak line were committed to secure dominant hills in 
order to defend Yanggu. Those dominant hills would also give them a strategic edge since they could 
watch out for the PVA movement in Oseong Mountain (1,050m) and its vicinity where the most 
significant PVA Central Eastern front defence position was existed.  
555 Ibid.,p.389 
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Even though the armistice talks were initiated in July, no real progress was achieved during 
the talks. Therefore, the UN forces tried pressuring the communists to engage in the talk 
positively by way of limited objective attacks, strategic bombing and the air interdiction of 
the enemy supply depot and route.
556
 Accordingly, General Van Fleet ordered to launch 
operation “Creeper” on the 14th of August. It was a pre-operation initiative that was supposed 
to be launched before they were to attack Punchbowl.
557
 Its objective was to capture the cross 
compartment J Ridge consisting of Hills of 884, 924, and 1030, East of Punchbowl and the 
Sohwa Valley, then advance forward up to the Nam River, and exercise pressure upon the 
enemy on Punchbowl from the East.
558
 Van Fleet also ordered the attack of Hill 983 (The 
Principal crest of Bloody Ridge) in the west of Punchbowl and to assist this attack, the UN 
attacked Hills 554 and 883 located to the west of Hill 983. The UN troops also attacked the 
Hill 1211 between Punchbowl and Hill 983 to envelope Punchbowl. Operation Creeper, 
which was to occupy the Northern ridge of Punchbowl through the Eastern ridge line, was 
extended both to the left and right hill mass of 983.
559
    
                                                          
556 During the stalemate, the position warfare was concentrated along the mountainous topography 
running along the Central and Central Eastern Front. From the US perspective, once they launched the 
offensive on the Western front, it would include Kaesong where the armistice talks were being held 
and would thereby inevitably expand war which would ultimately collapse the armistice talks. From 
the Communist perspective, since the Western Front was mainly defended by the UN forces and the 
topography was relatively plain which allowed the UN forces to use their technological dominance; 
they were also eager to avoid the Western Front. Excerpted from, Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.406-407, and 
IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengHa, Seoul, IMHC, 1997, p.226-237 
557
 Punchbowl is the basin that averages circa 450m height above sea level and around 44.7km² which 
is located in Yanggu (Central Eastern front). Punchbowl is surrounded by a high hill mass on the West 
and East. The Yanggu defence sector which was located in the South of Punchbowl was far behind the 
ordinary UN forward line on the Central Eastern Front and any movement of supplies or troops would 
easily be spotted by the dominant hill around Punchbowl. Therefore, Punchbowl was a very important 
strategic position for the communists and the vulnerable area of UN forces’ defence line. Therefore, 
Van Fleet ordered to attack this area preferentially. Excerpted from- Y.H. Choi, op.cit., p.406-407 
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IMHC, HanGukJeonJaengHa, p.102-103 
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Map 5-2 Operation Creeper
560
  
 
The battle of Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge Line were the most intensive battles in this 
operation. These can best demonstrate the model of combat between the defender, who fully 
utilized the geographic advantage, and the offender who fully utilized his technological 
advantage, more than any other battles in this operation. Therefore, in this small section, 
among the several significant position combats during the stalemate, we will focus on the 
battle of Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge line. 
 
As the part of Operation Creeper, the US 2
nd
 Division was ordered to capture Hill 983. Hill 
983, which was the principal crest of an eight kilometre long cross compartment ridge 
consisting of Hills 731-980-940-773. This ran like a crossbar across the Valleys of Mundung-
ri and Sat’ae-ri. Since the terrain consisted of a steep slope southward, it was advantageous 
for the defenders. It was also a strategically important dominant hill which enabled the 
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communists to watch over and bombard the UN forces’ troop and supply movements. The 
purpose of the attack was to remove the weak point of the UN forces’ defence line, capture a 
foothold for future attacks, and eliminate the communist threats to the West flank when the 
UN forces attacked Punchbowl. The communists had not only built up hundreds of shelters, 
which could cover them from artillery and airpower, but also constructed covered trenches on 
the reverse slope which were connected to the front trenches through the connecting trenches. 
They also planted four to five thousand mines in front of their defensive positions and 
boasted that this defensive position was impregnable.
561
 
 
The US 2
nd 
Division gave the duty of capturing Hill 983 to the ROK troops, to improve their 
combat skill and confidence. However, the command and fire support, which was the weakest 
point of the ROK troops were supervised and supported by the US 2
nd
 Division. Therefore, 
their combat capability standard was almost equal to that of the ordinary US troops in that 
front. Under the offensive plan, which included breaking down the enemy position by using 
the firepower advantage, the US 2
nd
 Division poured a massive firepower upon these hills 
from the 15
th
 of August. On the 18
th
 of August (D-Day), 126 artillery pieces of seven artillery 
battalions laid down concentrated preparation fire on the NKPA positions. However, contrary 
to their expectations, the ROK attacking troops faced many troubles, beginning at their first 
daytime assault. On their approach toward the hill, they were met with a mine field, fierce 
enemy supporting artillery fire, and direct fire from the enemy’s position. The level of enemy 
resistance was far greater than they had anticipated, so the attack was stalled. Therefore, the 
ROK troops asked for fire support to suppress enemy fire, hit the enemy position hard, and to 
clear the mines. Before dark, they used more than 200 artillery pieces in this 4km front for 
these purposes. However, even though the firepower support was intense to such a degree 
that the enemy shelters on the front lines were stripped of their camouflage, the night assault 
also failed, since the NKPA’s defending troops had been waiting amongst covered trenches 
along the reverse slope during the preparation fire, and upon the ROK troops’ advance, they 
quickly moved into forward positions, and stubbornly resisted.  
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J.S. Na, HanGukJeonJaengJeonTuSa,YangGuJeongTu(PiEuiNeungSeon,DanJangEuiNeungSeon), 
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Eventually they managed to capture Hill 983 on the 22
nd
 of August after they succeeded in 
infiltrating into the enemy’s rear line. When the NKPA saw the enemy from the back slope of 
Hill 983, they were shocked, since they did not think the ROK troops were capable of turning 
up on their very steep back slope. Thus the NKPA withdrew from the hill.
562
 This first stage 
of the battle of Bloody Ridge Line showed that using only firepower and frontal attack would 
not guarantee success against the defender who could fully utilize the steep mountainous 
topography of the Korean Peninsula to their advantage.  
 
Since the US 2
nd
 Division failed to rotate the exhausted ROK troops, they lost the hill. 
Afterwards, the US 2
nd
 Division tried to recapture the hill through massive fire support and 
frontal attack but they suffered heavy losses and could not recapture the hill. Ultimately the 
NKPA withdrew, but that could not be attributed to the success of the US attack on Hill 983. 
The ROK 7
th
 Division on the West and the US 38
th 
Regiment on the East of Bloody Ridge 
Line made good progress and cut off the NKPA main operation route from the north to Hill 
                                                          
562
 J.S. Na, op.cit., p.59-64  
As mentioned, the steep mountainous topography of the Korean peninsula gives the great advantage 
to the defender while the offender has a chance to cut off the defender’s operation route using the 
outflanking movement. In small or medium size combat actions, due to the limited space of 
manoeuvre and access to the defender’s position in the Korean highlands, the defender could 
concentrate their power on the limited front and the direct approach of the offender could take a heavy 
toll. However, due to the defender’s overconfidence in their defending topography and position, and 
the highly trained offender’s novel approach, there have been a few cases in the Korean peninsula 
military history that the defender was caught in a surprise attack. For example, in the Battle of 
Miryang during the Imjin Wars, the Japanese expedition forces avoided direct contact with the Joseon 
defender and attacked the defender by outflanking them and launching a surprise attack using the left 
and right side of the cliffs. That was also the case in the battle of Dabudong during the Naktong River 
line defence campaign (the offence was carried out by the ROK 1
st
 Division). However, this kind of 
combat was committed in unique conditions and does not represent the typical type of battle in the 
Korean peninsula. First of all, only a few cases were reported and it is only possible when the 
defender is negligent of the inaccessible topography due to overconfidence or lack of available forces 
and the offender’s troops are highly trained and under great command. Secondly, the inaccessible 
topography may provide an opportunity but that approach is too risky to take. In this battle, the NKPA 
was caught in a surprise attack achieved by brave ROK troops who used the inaccessible topography. 
However, this surprise attack using the inaccessible topography did not happen again in the operation 
“Creeper”. 
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983. Under the severe pressure of supply and encirclement fear, the NKPA withdrew from 
Hill 983 and the US 2
nd
 Division took the hill on the 5
th
 of September.
563
 During the battle of 
Bloody Ridge Line, the UN forces consumed a massive amount of artillery shells but they did 
not manage to beat the NKPA forces on Hill 983, who used the steep mountainous 
topography well enough to cover the considerable UN forces’ firepower from their artillery 
pieces, warship guns, and air bombardment.    
 
After the battle of Bloody Ridge Line, Van Fleet realized the harmful effects of trench 
warfare and planned the massive landing and airborne operations to attack the enemy rear 
together with the frontal attack on the Central Eastern Front. This would remove the sag in 
the front line, lay down the straight defence line, and pressure the Communists to attend the 
armistice talk more positively. However, because of the fear that the Communist forces 
would retaliate and consequently the armistice would be broken off, Ridgway (Commander 
of the UN Forces) rejected his idea and only gave permission to wage the limited trench 
warfare.
564
 Therefore, Van Fleet had to continue waging trench warfare, and was ordered to 
attack the ridge (later called Heartbreak Ridge) composed of Hills 894-931-851 north of 
Bloody Ridge on the 8
th
 of September. He used  the US 2
nd 
Division to remove the sag in the 
front line, thus incapacitating the enemy operation base Mundung-ri, and eliminating the 
weakness of the Kansas because it could be observed by the communist forces from the ridge.  
 
Heartbreak Ridge consisted of three crests which were located one after another from the 
South to North. If the UN forces advanced from the South, they needed to attack the three 
crests consecutively. These hills were not only steep but also densely forested, which made 
air reconnaissance and observation of the hills difficult. The NKPA 6
th 
Division started to 
construct a new defensive position during the battle of Bloody Ridge Line and the standard of 
this defence position was exactly the same as the Bloody Ridge Line.
565
 The US 2
nd
 
Division’s first round of the campaign for 13 days (13th of September–26th of September) was 
not very successful and suffered heavy casualties due to the NKPA’s strong defence line 
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using steep topography.
566
 Accordingly, the US 2
nd
 Division commander asked permission to 
halt the attack which was guaranteed and prepared the new attack with different 
approaches.
567
  
 
The newly appointed US 2
nd
 Division Commander, Robert. N. Young described their initial 
attack as a fiasco and pointed out all the causes of this failure.
568
 Reasons included were that 
the troops were committed successively to an area of limited manoeuvring space, that the fire 
support was not properly applied, and that the enemy mortars were not neutralized.
569
 He then 
drafted a new plan for the second round of operation. First, in order to disperse the defender’s 
attention and capability, the offending echelon would attack them from all directions.
570
 If the 
defender’s attention could be dispersed, the main attack could strike the main hill (Hill 931). 
To perfectly deceive the defender, the main attack would wage a surprise night raid without 
any light or fire support. In the final stages, once the defenders were sent into turmoil due to 
the loss of the main hill, the offender’s tank battalion would outflank the defender’s defence 
line and cut off their operation route, leading them into a position of ever greater turmoil 
while exploiting their pandemonium to capture the remaining hills. This plan proved to be a 
great success. After the few days of hard training, the US 2
nd
 Division’s main attacking 
echelon (the 2
nd
 battalion of 23
rd
 regiment) carried out the night surprise assault on Hill 931, 
resulting in its capture. The defender turned into turmoil just as they had anticipated, leaving 
the Communist’s defence line on the brink of collapse. At that moment, the 72nd tank 
battalion, surprisingly, turned up on the defence line’s rear. This was a great shock to them as 
it meant their main operation route was cut off. Thus the defender had no other options, 
forcing them to withdraw from the Heartbreak Ridge.
571
 
 
                                                          
566 During the preparation fire, they were hidden in the reverse slope covered trenches. They came out 
to the forward position and resist stubbornly when the preparation fire stopped. 
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During the 6
th
 Offensive and the UN forces’ counter-offensive, the PVA succeeded in using 
the geographic characteristics of the Korean peninsula in an offensive but failed to use the 
geographic edge offered by the central highlands in defence. Therefore, to maximize their 
defence potential with the Korean peninsula’s mountainous topography and protect 
themselves from the UN forces’ firepower, the communist forces adopted well-connected 
tunnels and covered trenches widely in the defence position. With this upgraded approach to 
the defence, the communist forces could maximize the geographic edge and match the UN 
forces’ massive firepower during the stalemate. The communist forces also raised the skill 
level by the re-education of officer class and strict new recruit training in Manchuria during 
the winter and spring of 1950 and 1951. The communist forces’ morale was immensely 
improved because of brainwashing and increased the chances of promotion opportunities 
based on military merit. War is the art of action and reaction. During the Korean War, both 
parties’ approaches to war affected each other’s approaches to war. The communist forces’ 
defence strategy also made a reasonable success in the early stage of stalemate, since the UN 
forces’ direct approach to the communist positions with their massive firepower did not bring 
the expected success.  
 
In both battles, one can see the dynamic action and reaction of both parties and the fact that 
the right combination of skill, technology and geography is the key to the military success in 
the Korean peninsula. The battle of Bloody Ridge and first phase of Heartbreak Ridge 
showed that the UN forces’ monotonous direct approach using the technological advantage 
against the communist forces’ defence position could not bring the desirable success to the 
UN forces. The defenders were heavily fortified, used their geographic advantage, and had   
skilful and high-morale troops. Accordingly, there was a reaction to the communist forces’ 
action. They adopted night surprise assaults and tank troop outflanking manoeuvres to catch 
the defender by surprise. This approach was a combination of geography, skill, and 
technology, culminating in a sum capable of great success.
572
  
                                                          
572 Technology– Tank troops’ mobile and firepower  
Skill- Commander’s quality (Creative plan of US 2nd Division commander), determination and morale 
of troops (Engineering troops endeavour to refurbish the road for the tank use), and training of troops 
(2
nd
 battalion’s hard night combat training) 
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Conclusion  
 
The Korean War finally ended on the 27
th
 of July, 1953 after a prolonged armistice talk. In 
this chapter, analysis has been concentrated on the issue of the military technology and 
geography. If the Korean War is analysed regarding the issues of military technology and 
geography, then there are four different types of warfare that can be extracted from this 
analysis.  
 
First, there is the type in which the offender has an edge in military technology and the 
defender has a geographic edge but they do not have the necessary capability or willingness 
(morale) to use this to their advantage (technologically superior offender vs geographically 
advantaged but less skilled defender). In that case, the offender’s advantage of military 
technology would be intensified. This was the situation in the case of the NKPA’s invasion to 
the Western front and the UN forces’ Marching North Operation.  
 
The second of these types of warfare is where the defender holds an advantage in technology 
and geography. This type of warfare can be further divided into two sub-types. The first is the 
case where the defender underestimates the offender’s capability and does not take the time 
to fully understand their strategy and tactics, like the PVA 1-3 offensives (skilled offender vs 
technologically and geographically advantageous but less skilled defender). Here, the UN 
forces were heavily defeated and forced to withdraw to the 37
th
 parallel line. The second sub-
type is where the defender completely examines the offender’s capability, has a good grasp in 
the understanding of the offender’s strategy and tactics, and prepares the solution for the 
offender (skilled offender vs technologically and geographically advantaged and skilled 
defender). This was the case in the NKPA Naktong River Line campaign and the PVA 4
th
-6
th
 
Offensives. The communist became overconfident following these early successes and began 
to attack recklessly against the enemy’s geographically advantaged defence line, which was 
fully supported by advanced fire, air, and mobile power. The NKPA suffered heavy losses at 
this time and its exhausted forces were abruptly broken down following the Inchon landing 
operation. The PVA also suffered heavy losses and had to transform their strategy to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Geography– Outflanking movement using the narrow mountainous path which was believed as 
inappropriate for the massive tank manoeuvre and eventually became a great shock and burden to the 
NKPA     
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positive defence with a war of attrition, using the steep mountainous topography and 
simultaneously accepting the armistice talk suggestion.  
 
Moreover, the PVA 1
st
-6
th
 Offensives also gave crucial instructions to the possible conflict 
between the North and South. Like the PVA who achieved great success during the 1
st
-3
rd
 
Offensives, North Korea believed that they could successfully conquer the ROK who at this 
time were better equipped, possessed a superior economy to support the forces, built a strong 
defence line, had a good understanding of the NKPA strategy, and enjoyed the military 
alliance with the US. However, during the 4
th
-6
th
 PVA Offensives, after the UN forces 
recognized the PVA way of warfare, the PVA assault on the geographically advantageous 
UN defensive positions, heavily supported by their advanced firepower, ended in a great 
disaster.
573
 Thus it is highly unlikely that the NKPA invasion will be successful against the 
technologically and economically advanced ROK who also understand the NKPA strategies 
and tactics quite well. They will not be caught by surprise due to sixty year’s confrontation.  
 
Third is the case where the defender has a weakness in technology but has a geographic 
advantage and the capability and willingness to use that advantage (technologically advanced 
offender vs geographically advanced and skilled defender). From the battle of Chunchon and 
the communist trench warfare during the stalemate, it is proved that the technological 
superiority of the offender alone cannot guarantee any military success against the defender, 
who can use their knowledge of local geography to their advantage. During the battle of 
Chunchon, even though the NKPA possessed a technological advantage, they suffered heavy 
losses. Their operation was delayed to such an extent that the operation of their other fronts 
were also affected by the ROK 6
th
 Division’s well-trained defence strategy using their 
geographic edge. During the stalemate, even though the UN forces possessed dominant fire, 
air, and mobile power, they suffered heavy casualties and wasted many resources.
574
 This 
                                                          
573
 As analysed above, the UN forces did not underestimate the enemy capability any more, and 
prepared the strategic and tactical solution (see the Ridgway Operation Guideline) to the PVA 
offensive. The prominent cases were the Battle of Chipyong-ri during the 4
th
 Offensive, the battle of 
Papyong Mountain and Solma-ri during the 5
th
 Offensive, and the counter-envelopment operation 
during the 6
th
 Offensive.   
574
 Over the course of many battles during the stalemate, they were able to achieve their goals by the 
end but if the cost of achieving these goals was at a high price, including heavy casualties, like the 
Battle of the Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Line, it was only a partial success at best.  
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type of battle could prove Biddle’s argument that even though the offender possessed the 
dominance of military technology, there is no guarantee of military success against the 
defender who held the capability and willingness to use their geographic edge. This also 
serves to prove that if the US–ROK alliance relies too heavily on the technological 
advantages of the possible offensive, they will struggle against the NKPA who has fortified 
their territory and raised the capability to use this edge to the highest standards possible. In 
short, once the US-ROK alliance heavily relies upon their technological advantage, they can 
defend themselves and maximize their advantages as a result of their sixty years of defence 
preparation. This has included the fortification of territory, along with an understanding of 
the NKPA strategies and tactics. However, it is very unlikely that the technological 
dominance alone would guarantee their ultimate success (an offensive campaign) against 
North Korea. Furthermore, since it was proved during the Korean War that geography 
possessed a huge potential in defence and offence, the geographic consideration is still the 
major dimension of modern Korean peninsula warfare.
575
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
575 Defence– Battle of Chunchon (Soyang River and Central Highlands)  
Naktong River line defence campaign (Naktong River and Sobaek Mountains)  
The UN Christmas offensive (Kaema Plateau)  
 Position warfare during the stalemate (Central Highlands)  
Offence– the PVA 1st-2nd Offensive (Mountainous manoeuvre (outflanking movement) using 50 miles 
crevice between the UN forces’ western and eastern front)  
The PVA 6
th
 offensive (Mountainous manoeuvre in the Hyon-ri defence sector)  
The UN counter-offensive following the PVA 6
th
 offensive (Counter-envelop strategy)   
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Chapter 6 The Future Prospect of Technology and 
Geography in the Korean Peninsula Conflict 
 
Introduction  
 
After the Korean War, the US-ROK alliance has been developing military strategies 
regarding a possible NKPA invasion and the defence of territory. For them, the concentration 
of their warfare capabilities and strategic plans at the territorial defence matter was only 
natural. The NKPA has been desperately chasing a communized reunification of the Korean 
Peninsula, developing the offensive military build-up and strategy after the Korean War, and 
until recently, it was widely believed that the ROK conventional warfare capabilities would 
not be any match against those of NKPA’s. However, after the Cold War ended, a new 
scenario of conflict emerged. Based on the confidence in their technology and their 
conventional power as well as the pressing need of neutralizing the suspicious WMDs targets 
for their homeland and allies’ defence,576 the US did not rule out the possibility of carrying 
out a pre-emptive strike against the dubious North Korean WMD targets. In addition, because 
the US-ROK alliance needs to adopt a positive (offensive) deterrence strategy against North 
Korea, the need for an offensive strategy has increased in recent years.
577
   
 
From a military perspective, it is quite obvious that two different conflict scenarios would 
bear seriously different outcomes. In the first case (the US-ROK alliance in defence), the 
technologically-superior and skilled US-ROK alliance would encounter the NKPA on the 
highly fortified defensive line. This will be similar to the situation encountered at the 
Naktong River line defence campaign and the PVA 4
th
-6
th
 offensive on the UN front during 
                                                          
576
 (1) The arguable US military success of the First and Second Gulf War boosted their confidence in 
employing their technology 
(2) The vast improvement of ROK armed forces’ conventional warfare capability  
(3) The North Korean economic crisis   
577
 Because of the specific North Korean value evaluation system, the only threat North Korea would 
succumb to is the regime collapse therefore, for deterrence purposes, the need of offensive strategy 
and capability has augmented in recent years. The detailed research on the North Korean deterrence 
issue will be discussed below.   
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the Korean War. The possible North Korean invasion would be met with severe resistance 
from the US-ROK joint forces, which, after the Korean War, have vastly improved in terms 
of military technology, training, command, strategic and tactical preparation, economic 
tenacity, and defence line fortification. Therefore, even though the NKPA has strengthened 
the irregular and asymmetric warfare capability recently using WMDs
578
, as analysed above 
in the Korean War case study of Naktong River line defence campaign and the PVA 4
th
-6
th
 
offensive on the UN front, it is highly probable that a North Korean invasion would result in 
tremendous disaster without bearing any fruit. 
 
On the other hand, if the US-ROK alliance were to launch an offensive measure, as was the 
case with the Battle of Chunchon and the trench warfare during the stalemate in the Korean 
War, the technologically-advanced US-ROK joint forces would meet an NKPA that is 
capable of using their fortified position. After the Korean War, the US-ROK alliance has 
developed highly competitive military technologies and deployed those. The NKPA has also 
successfully fortified their territory while simultaneously attempting to offset their 
technological disadvantages via enhancing their asymmetric power and military readiness. 
What might happen if conflict in the Korean peninsula were to break out a second time, under 
this new scenario of the technologically superior offender and the skilled defender who 
possesses the geographic edge and the capability to use it?   
 
The US-ROK alliance would expect their technological advantage to give them a crucial edge 
against a stubborn North Korea. However, as was the case in the battle of Chunchon and 
position warfare during the stalemate and the limit of current military technology, which will 
be analysed in this chapter, even though the military technology serves as a vital element of 
military success, relying solely upon technology cannot guarantee a complete military 
                                                          
578
 It is widely believed that the NKPA would use the long-range artillery and ballistic missile in the 
initial stage of war to spread the war phobia and support the offensive unit in the front. However, 
Even though it became much more difficult to neutralize the NKPA artillery or Ballistic missiles 
because of the fortification, eventually those have to come out of the trench to support the advancing 
units. Therefore, even if the NKPA application of WMD  would have a significant impact in the initial 
stage of war -those can give a significant blow to the ROK front and Seoul metropolitan area- those 
would be easily detected and neutralized once those come out and support the advancing units 
because of the superior US-ROK intelligence and stand-off power. Therefore it is highly unlikely that 
those will change the whole course of war. 
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success against an opponent who holds a geographical advantage and understands how to use 
that advantage to exploit their opponent’s weaknesses. The right balance between the military 
technology and the human elements of war such as the training, command, preponderance, 
and strategic and tactical preparation must be found, in order to ensure what would be the key 
to military success, as was the case in the battle of Heartbreak ridge. 
 
The purpose of this case study is to reveal that possessing advanced military technology alone 
cannot guarantee the ultimate success of war against a stubborn defender who maintains a 
formidable defensive edge and knows how to employ it. Chapters 2 and 3 already examined 
how the US-ROK alliance has transformed their armed forces to one centred on technology, 
and the complex development of NKPA military strategy revealed how they had developed 
the defensive strategy using their geographic edge. This chapter will first examine why the 
US adopted the pre-emptive strike strategy, which meant another scenario of war (the US-
ROK in the offensive) would emerge. The second section of research will focus on the 
deterrence of North Korea which can reveal that the US-ROK alliance has gradually 
transformed their military strategy towards the offensive for the effective deterrence against 
North Korea. This section will also reveal that it is crucial for the US-ROK alliance to have a 
capability to nullify the North Korean HDBTs in the front and rear for deterrence. The final 
section of research will examine whether current US military technology, which is vital to the 
US pre-emptive strike strategy, and a US-ROK alliance all-out offensive would be efficient 
enough to help take out the strategically important but well-protected North Korean targets 
during a conflict. Thus, this chapter will examine the claim that the contemporary US 
military’s technology alone would not guarantee ultimate military success and deterrence 
against North Korea, who have fortified their territory using their geographic edge.   
 
6-1 The US Pre-emptive Strike Strategy and OPLAN 
5027 
 
WMD and US-ROK Alliance  
 
Since the NKPA pursued an asymmetric warfare strategy with their main means being 
WMDs, the US-ROK alliance would meet a fresh and difficult security challenge. The North 
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Korean SSM could reach the US military base in the Korean peninsula and Japan. The 
missile could load either nuclear or bio-chemical warheads. However, the missile defence 
system is not easy to establish; not to mention it has no guarantee of neutralizing the missile 
once launched. Therefore, it poses an obvious security threat for the US-ROK alliance. Once 
the NKPA are able to develop their current missile technology further to the ICBM level,
579
 
the US homeland would be within easy reach of their missile range and thus they instantly 
became a direct threat to various nations’ homeland security. Meanwhile, if the North Korean 
missiles and their technology were to be exported or transferred to a rogue state or terrorist 
organization, it would also threaten the US and her allies’ security.580 In “The President of the 
United States, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America-September 
2002” the US government admitted that “in the past decade North Korea has become the 
world’s principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles 
while developing its own WMD arsenal”. 
 
After 9/11, the alerts about WMD have been raised in efforts to cultivate an effective strategy 
for countering WMD.
581
 This became an integral component of the US national security. The 
US would try a non-proliferation effort such as active non-proliferation diplomacy, 
multilateral regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA)), control on nuclear materials, export controls and non-proliferation 
                                                          
579 The key of ICBM technology is to have a sufficient rocket propelling power to get out of the 
atmosphere. North Korea incurs suspicion that they have used two satellite launchings (1
st
 of March, 
1998 and 5
th
 of April, 2009) for the ICBM technology test.  
580  J.Y. Yun, BukHanEuiDaeRyangSalSangMuGiGaeBalHyunHwangMichEuiDoWaJeonMang in 
BukHakYeonGuHakHwae, BukHanEuiGunSa, p.373-374 North Korea already exported around 500 
SCUD B (SRBM (Short-Range Ballistic Missile), Range; 300Km and Warhead; 985Kg)/C Variants 
(SRBM, Range; 500Km and Warhead; 700Kg) to Middle East including Iran, Syria, and UAE by 
1998. They also started to export the advanced Ro-dong 1 missile (MRBM (Medium-Range Ballistic 
Missile), Range 1,300 Km and Warhead; 1200Kg) to Iran and Pakistan. In addition, it is known that 
they have been cooperating with Pakistan for the development of the Gauri Missile and contributed 
the development of Iran’s Shahab-3 missile (MRBM, Range; 1300-2500Km, and Warhead; 1200Kg) 
Excerpted From- Y.S, Han, op.cit., p.347, and Missilethreat.com- 
http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld, (Accessed on 12
th
 of January, 2010) 
581
 It is not restricted to the use of WMDs and contains the case of proliferation of technology and 
arsenal. 
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sanctions.
582
 Once entire diplomatic options have been exhausted or if they want to show 
their determination on the matter, military activity (counter-proliferation effort) such as pre-
emptive surgical operation or interdiction efforts would follow. The U.S government has 
already decreed that “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right 
to respond with overwhelming force -including through resort to all of our options- to the use 
of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies”.583  
 
Therefore, the US government officially decreed their right of pre-emptive attack against the 
WMDs of rogue states and terrorist organization as self-defence after 9/11. The US 
government stance which reserves the right of self-defence against the WMDs of rogue states 
and terrorist organization can be traced back to the Clinton administration.
584
 Although PDD-
62 and PDD-16 documents did not mention the right of pre-emptive attack as self-defence, 
OPLAN 5026 and OPLAN 5027-94, which were drafted or modified during the Clinton 
Administration and will be analysed below, clearly show that the US already considered and 
adopted the pre-emptive strike as a military option. 
 
The ROK was unwilling to comment on the pre-emptive strike option since they did not want 
to provoke North Korea to succeed the “Sunshine policy”. 585  However, considering the 
devastating effect of long-range artillery and missiles once launched, the ROK military 
authorities also cannot shun the pre-emptive attack option any more. The ROK minister of 
                                                          
582  The US Department of State, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction-
December, 2002, p.3-5 
583 The President of the United States,  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
–September , 2002 
The US Department of State,  National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction- December, 
2002, p.3 
584
 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 (Protection Against Unconventional Threat to the 
Homeland and American Overseas): 22
nd
 of May, 1998, FAS website:  
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm  (Accessed on   1
st
 of January, 2010) 
PDD-18 (Counter-proliferation Initiative): December, 1993, FAS website: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm (Accessed:  1
st
 of January, 2010) 
585  The “Sunshine Policy” was the ROK reunification doctrine towards North Korea until the 
incumbent ROK president Lee Myungbak restructured the reunification doctrine. The doctrine stresses 
the peaceful cooperation, and short-term reconciliation as a prelude to ultimate unification.  
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National Defence, Kim Taeyong, mentioned on the 20
th
 of January, 2010 at an open forum 
(Subject: National Defence Reform and the Prospect of South and North Korea Relations) 
that, “even though there has been a debate on the lawfulness of pre-emptive strike, due to the 
severe damage caused once the North Korean nuclear weapons are launched, if there is an 
obvious sign of North Korean Nuclear attack, we will pre-empt suspicious targets”. 586 
 
The NKPA asymmetric strategy using WMD forced the US-ROK alliance to think over their 
existent defensive strategy, prepare the pre-emptive surgical operation plan (OPLAN 5026), 
and reshuffle their concepts concerning the all-out war scenario (OPLAN 5027). This is 
because of the devastating effect of these weapons once exploded, and the fact that it is hard 
to neutralize any missiles once launched, and the threat of its export or technology transfer 
(proliferation) to the rogue state or terrorist organizations.    
 
OPLAN 5026, OPLAN 5027, and OPLAN 5029 
 
In June, 1993, when the nuclear crisis was heated, the US drafted the operation plan (OPLAN 
5026) for the surgical air-strikes on suspicious North Korean nuclear targets.
587
 The Clinton 
administration ordered the Pacific Command (PC) to draft it. OPLAN 5026 is the USPC 
operation plan; therefore it is also the USFK OPLAN, which is under the USPC command. 
However, since the ROK-US CFC wartime command belongs to the US, the USPC OPLAN 
is automatically the ROK-US CFC OPLAN. After the OPLAN 5026, there was the all-out 
war scenario reform (5027-94), which was desired at that stage since the fear of all-out war 
between the North and South was raised by the US threat and operation plan to neutralize the 
suspicious nuclear targets.
588
 The all-out war operation plan (OPLAN 5027) which 
                                                          
586
 Jungang Ilbo (Seoul), 10
th
 of January, 2010 
587 Those plans consisted of deploying additional squadrons of aircraft to the ROK, including F-117s, 
the deployment of several battalions of ground troops to reinforce elements of the 2
nd
 Infantry 
Division, and the deployment of an additional aircraft carrier battle group with its strike aircraft and 
Tomahawk cruise missiles. Excerpted from– Global Security; OPLAN 5026 
588
 OPLAN 5027 was first drafted in 1974 (5027-74) as an all-out war scenario, which aimed at 
repelling the NKPA to the north of the ceasefire line. The scenario of the OPLAN5027-94 is the ROK 
armed forces hold the NKPA in the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area, 20–30km south of the 
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experienced significant transformation in 1994 has been updated every two years. Unlike the 
previous ones which concentrated on how to defend the territory, the OPLAN 5027-98 
included a much more offensive-minded plan, such as the possibility of a pre-emptive attack 
if the North Korean showed unmistakable signs of preparing to strike. The operation plan was 
developed in detail to achieve the eventual objective of abolishing North Korea as a 
functioning state, ending the rule of its leader (Kim Jongil), and the reunification of the 
country. This modification also included a strategy of manoeuvring warfare that would take 
place north of the DMZ, along with the countering strategy in the case of sudden chemical 
and biological attack against Seoul. Based on the Iraq Freedom Operation success and further 
development of Missile Defence (MD) especially sensor technology, OPLAN 5027-04 added 
new plans. These used the latest development of airpower and sensor technology to respond 
to any possible North Korean missile launching or invasion without waiting for more ground 
forces to arrive.
589
 Therefore, based on the development of OPLAN 5027, it is quite obvious 
that the ROK-US CFC’s all-out war plan was developed in a way which was elaborate, 
aggressive, and showcased their technological sophistication. 
 
There is also the scenario where the ROK-US alliance has to launch an offensive because of 
sudden changes in North Korea. Contemporarily, the ROK-US alliance has reportedly been 
engaged in discussions to flesh out the OPLAN 5029, to prepare a sudden change in North 
Korea (contingency plan). Based on the various statements Walter Sharp (The USFK Chief) 
has made, the operation plan currently under discussion by the US and ROK which includes 
plans for a possible military operation in response to five or six scenarios of upheaval in 
North Korea. These include the possibility of an outflow of nuclear weapons or other WMDs, 
a civil war resulting from a regime change or coup d’état, a South Korean hostage incident 
within North Korea, a large scale defection of North Korean residents, or a large scale natural 
disaster.
590
 Therefore, this operation plan also does not rule out the potential offensive against 
the NKPA.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ceasefire line) for approximately one month → the US sends reinforcements → US army repel the 
NKPA along with the landing operation → breakdown of the North regime.  
589
 Excerpted and analysed from- Global Security; OPLAN 5027 
590
The Hankyore (Seoul),2
nd
 of November, 2009  
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Briefly, the NKPA persistent military strategy of Two-Front and High-Speed warfare strategy 
resulted in a defensive-minded stalling strategy for the US-ROK alliance since they hold a 
geographic defensive edge but would still need to wait for the arrival of US reinforcement to 
fully repel a North Korean invasion. However, the NKPA’s addition of WMDs as an 
asymmetric warfare has led the US-ROK alliance to review the defensive-minded stalling 
strategy. This is because of the WMDs effect on potential Korean peninsula conflicts as well 
as the possibility of WMD technology and arsenal proliferation. As a consequence, they 
started to seriously consider the pre-emptive strike option and a following offensive operation 
against North Korea. Therefore, the level of conflict in the Korean peninsula for the US-ROK 
alliance is not restricted to the territorial defence until the US is fully engaged, and has 
expanded to the idea of carrying out a pre-emptive strike against strategic North Korean 
targets. Meanwhile, the all-out offensive warfare to get rid of the North Korean regime that is 
at the heart of WMD proliferation and continues to jeopardize the regional security has also 
been developed.    
 
6-2 North Korea and Deterrence 
 
In its most general form, deterrence is “simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that costs 
and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”591 To review the 
North Korean deterrence issue, it is essential to research the specific nature of Korean 
peninsula security. In the Korean peninsula, most of all, the efficiency of nuclear weapons as 
a means of deterrence against North Korea is severely limited. There are humanitarian and 
diplomatic concerns about the side-effects of nuclear weapons and doubts about the real 
efficiency of nuclear weapons because of the heavy fortifications.
592
 Therefore, instead of 
nuclear weapons, conventional ones would act as the key element of deterrence.  
 
                                                          
591 L. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy ; theory and practice, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1974, p.11 
592
 The detailed research on the humanitarian, diplomatic concern and North Korean fortification will 
be achieved below.  
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Second is the distinctive nature of North Korean regime. First, under Juche doctrine
593
, North 
Korea has no choice but to withstand the US pressure and Juche provides the rationale for 
Pyongyang to exert defensive power over the US. Even though they are far behind the ROK 
in terms of economy, military, and foreign diplomacy, they believe that they have an edge 
over the ROK in one area that has attracted many ROK students and intellectuals over the 
years:  national sovereignty based on Juche ideology.
594
 Therefore, if they succumbed to the 
mere American nuclear threat, this would mean giving up the only comparative edge they 
possibly have over the South, and consequently would signify a complete defeat in the 
regime competition.  
 
In addition, there are a few necessary conditions for deterrence to function predictably and 
reliably. Most of all, the enforcer would be required to have a credible capability. Then, the 
opponent should have rationality in decision making, be well-informed, and possess a value 
that could be threatened by the enforcer. In addition, it is also desirable for both sides to have 
reliable and reasonable communications, mutual familiarity and understanding.
595
 However, 
North Korea is an autocratic country so the decision-making rationality is inevitably lower 
than in democratic countries. The mutual familiarity and understanding between the US and 
North Korea is also lower compared to the US and the former Soviet Union. Also, North 
Korea hints that they will wage a suicidal all-out war when their regime is in danger, which 
means that they put the regime’s survival as the prime value. In conclusion, North Korea does 
not have a rational, reliable regime or the same value evaluation system as the US and the 
                                                          
593 For the understanding of Juche ideology,  
See) B.C. Koh, Chapter 5 and 11 in  The foreign policy systems of North and South Korea, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1984   
Juche (self-reliance) ideology in North Korea is the central guideline for both domestic and foreign 
policy. The core concepts of Juche, independence and sovereignty, have been the manifested goal of 
North Korea’s foreign policy and are linked to politics, economics, social life, and even to the very 
existence of Kim JongIl’s leadership and his legitimacy. What is important in North Korea’s foreign 
policy with respect to the promotion of Juche is the principle of anti-foreign intervention, which is 
clearly prescribed in their constitution. Excerpted from  K.A. Park, North Korea’s Defensive power 
and U.S- North Korea Relations, Pacific Affairs, 73(4),  Special issue in Flux, Winter 2000-2001, p. 
544-545 
594
 Ibid., p.547 
595 K.B. Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review; Setting the Record Straight, p.138-139 
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former Soviet Union therefore they are incalculable and irrational. Under these circumstances, 
North Korea is not easily deterred by the threat of nuclear weapons. Instead, since the North 
Korean prime value lies in the survival of its regime, the US-ROK alliance has to envisage 
that any suspicious movement could lead to military action and, ultimately, regime collapse. 
In other words, to put deterrence into effect in the Korean peninsula, the US-ROK alliance 
needs to implant the fear in the North Koreans that any challenge, even territorial defence, 
would result in failure.  
 
Because the US deterrence strategy against North Korea during the Cold War era was 
focused on the denial of North Korea’s communized reunification ambitions by nuclear 
weapons and massive engagement threat (defence oriented), it was closed to deterrence by 
denial.
596
 However, in the post-Cold War era, to deter North Korea, who have become more 
incalculable and irrational, the US-ROK alliance needs to have a strong will and capability to 
threaten the North Korean prime value (regime survival) with conventional means 
(deterrence by punishment), which are beyond the level of deterrence by denial.
597
 The US-
ROK alliance has not ostensibly implemented a positive deterrence strategy because of the 
expected heavy North Korean defiance. But, they have slowly but resolutely pursued the 
offensive strategy and capability aimed at bringing down the North Korean regime.
598
 
 
                                                          
596
 Deterrence by denial is achieved by precluding opponent from actually accomplishing their desire.  
Excerpted from- R. Crawley eds., The Reader’s Companion to Military History, Houghton Mifflim, 
1995, p.131 
597
 The deterrence by punishment is operated by threat.  
To see the detailed difference of deterrence by denial and punishment,  
Read) G. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1961, p.14-16 
598 Dwindling defensive minded deterrence by denial strategy  
1) The US nuclear weapon withdrawal from the Korean peninsula  
2) The waiver of trip-wire notion   
Emerging positive measures  
1) Positive measures against the North Korean WMDs: The adoption of pre-emptive strategy 
(OPLAN 5026) and reinforcing the stand-off precision power   
2) Upgraded OPLANs  
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How far has the US-ROK offensive strategy been developed? As one can see from OPLAN 
5026 and 5029, the US-ROK alliance declared that they would choose an offensive against 
North Korea in limited cases. As one can also see from OPLAN 5027, the US-ROK alliance 
all-out war plan is to repel the North Korean offensive in the prepared defensive position first, 
and then launch a counter-offensive later. This shows that there is still a deterrence by denial 
approach in the US-ROK alliance deterrence strategy, since they plan to deny the North 
Korean intention of communized reunification. However, the final objective of OPLAN is to 
remove the North Korean regime, which would signal that once the North is committed to a 
full scale offensive, the only result they will obtain is the regime’s collapse. It is a deterrence 
approach based on threat (deterrence by punishment). Therefore, one could say that the 
Korean peninsula deterrence approaches have been gradually transformed from a Cold War 
type deterrence by denial approach to the deterrence by punishment approach. Meanwhile, 
the significance of offensive warfare capability of the US-ROK alliance has been augmented. 
Once the US-ROK alliance decides to launch an offensive against the North, which strategy 
will be applied and how will the geography and technology factors influence this offensive?  
 
The basic US-ROK military strategy against the North is a forward-based offensive strategy.  
An analysis of this strategy was done in the Introduction (OPLAN 5027-94). The strategy is 
composed of three operation stages. During Phase 1 (NKPA Attack), the US-ROK forces 
would perform a vigorous forward defence aimed at defending Seoul. Their campaign would 
be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armour. 
The US-ROK air and naval forces would conduct CAS, interdiction, and deep strike missions. 
US-ROK operations in Phase 2 (ROK Defence) would probably focus on seizing key terrain, 
inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing further attacks.
599
 Their 
military strategy in these two phases would follow the US Airland Battle strategy against the 
NKPA armoured troops which would adopt the Soviet OMG. However, considering the 
specialty of the Korean peninsula security circumstances, they have also implemented the 
forward defence line concept. In the Korean peninsula, central highlands and a few deep and 
wide rivers would prevent the manoeuvre of massive mechanized troops, while the strategic 
importance of the capital is immense. Therefore, the massive mechanized troop battle in the 
south of Seoul’s prairie has not been considered. Instead, the US-ROK alliance chooses to 
                                                          
599 Global Security; OPLAN 5027 
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defend against the NKPA armoured troops using the central highlands which are north of 
Seoul.  
 
Phase 3 is a counter-offensive aimed at nullifying the NKPA military power. The counter-
offensive would start when the US ground build-up was complete and ROK forces were 
replenished. The war plan envisions an amphibious operation at the narrow waist of North 
Korea. The US and ROK Marine Corps would land there to establish a beachhead, with 
substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore operations.
600
 The key element 
of the US OPLAN 5027 counter-offensive stage is the amphibious operation. Reflecting the 
success of the Inchon landing operation, its intention is to avoid the immense casualties in the 
central highland and finish the war quickly. However, reflecting upon the Inchon landing 
operation disaster, the NKPA has also strengthened their coastal defences since 1951. Kim 
Ilsong visited coast guard units in March and April of 1951, and insisted that “the capability 
of the coast guard should be raised to make our coastal defence impregnable”.601 In his speech 
at the Naval officers’ school (July, 1954), he also stressed that “we needed to increase the 
coast-battery firepower as a first stage of the North Korean Navy establishment”. The NKPA 
showed their coastal defence capability in the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island by the 
NKPA coast-battery on the 23
rd
 of November, 2010. Therefore, the efficiency of amphibious 
operations is not as great as the Inchon landing operation and the US-ROK alliance would not 
avoid action in the central highlands where the cease-fire line is located. North Korea had 
already fortified their frontal defence line heavily during the Korean War, and after the War 
they have heavily fortified the entire territory.
602
 Moreover, because of the Korean War 
experience, they know how to use the defence position in the mountainous topography and 
the skilful NKPA would guarantee the maximum use of defence potential of the central 
highlands.  
 
The NKPA defence line and strategy contains a fatal weakness: its depth. Because, their force 
structure and strategy is based on offensive strategies, they have not been keen on the defence 
depth. Further, once the central highland positions are conquered, there will be no more 
                                                          
600 Global Security; OPLAN 5027 
601  Sahoiguahakryeoksayeonguso, JoSeonJeonSa26, Pyongyang, Gwahakbaekgwagajeonjonghabchulpansa, 
1982, p.342-345 
602
 The history and extent of North Korean territorial fortification will be examined below.  
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severe natural barriers on the way to Pyongyang on the western front and Wonsan on the 
east.
603
 Therefore, considering the North Korean defence posture and geography, one can 
realize that the US-ROK alliance penetration of the central highlands frontal defence line 
would be strategically important when it comes to the offensive operation against the North. 
So, to topple the North Korean regime without much cost, the US-ROK alliance has to 
possess the capability to neutralize the NKPA main asymmetric warfare asset in long-range 
artillery in the front and heavily-fortified frontal defence positions. In addition, the capability 
to eliminate the North Korean centre of gravity aims at paralyzing the proper command and 
communication. WMDs assets (missile sites and bio-chemical weapons production units and 
reserves) in the rear are also required for effective operation. In conclusion, strategically 
important North Korean targets are usually HDBTs using the mountainous topography and 
overcoming those HDBTs would be the key to the military success in the offensive.  
 
As was the case in the trench warfare during the Korean War stalemate, a direct approach 
using the firepower advantage against heavily fortified central highland trenches would 
demand huge casualties and costs, which is a the desirable scenario for the US-ROK alliance. 
The US-ROK alliance has tried to overcome this dilemma through upgrading military 
technology by target acquisition, stand-off precision, and earth-penetrating technology. As 
analysed above in the Korean War and Imjin Wars cases, the skilful defence strategy using 
the geographic characteristics of the Korean peninsula blunted the sharpness of technology 
and acted as the key element of war.
604
  
 
In the Korean peninsula, the geographic dimension of war has been a significant element of 
war. But, one can question whether these newly developed military technologies, developed 
                                                          
603 During the Korean War, the impressive UN forces’ ‘Marching North’ operation speed was partly 
because the NKPA did not have a reserve to defend the central highlands. 
604 Unlike the first invasion, during the Japanese second invasion the Joseon forces’ castle on the hill 
defence strategy using the steep mountains of the Korean peninsula weakened the firepower of 
Japanese Harquebus. The reason that the Imjin Wars case study did not have detailed research on the 
technology was because both Japan and Joseon did not have a significant level of difference in 
military technology, while the geography acted as the significant element. For example, the Japanese 
possessed an accurate direct-firing Harquebus while Joseon and Ming possessed a long-range high-
angle cannon which was decisive in the Joseon Navy’s successes and Ming army’s success in the 
Battle of Pyongyang.     
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to destabilise the NKPA defence strategy by maximizing their edge in geography, are as 
effective as the US-ROK alliance expects. If these new technologies are working effectively, 
the US-ROK alliance could easily penetrate the heavily fortified central highlands frontal 
defence line and advance to Pyongyang and Wonsan. Meanwhile, these technologies would 
enable the US-ROK alliance to neutralize the heavily fortified North Korean WMDs and 
centre of gravity targets in the rear which prevent unrest in the ROK rear, guaranteeing a 
better supply from the US mainland, and paralyzing the NKPA command.  
 
The NKPA defence strategy using the geographic edge and the US-ROK technology-centred 
offensive strategy have both merits and demerits. The NKPA defence strategy would have 
better survivability against the massive and accurate US-ROK firepower. However, because 
of the lack of sustainability of war and technology, once the US-ROK alliance is capable of 
overcoming the North Korean defence strategy maximizing the geographic edge, North 
Korea would be in danger of complete melt down. The US-ROK alliance has tried to develop 
the technology-centred offensive strategy to demolish the NKPA defensive strategy with less 
casualties and costs. If that was successful, they would have a relatively comfortable war 
against the North as was the case in the First and Second Gulf War. However, that was fought 
in the open desert with poorly organized, commanded, and trained troops. Therefore, there 
could be a doubt about the advanced military technology’s efficiency against the 
geographically advantageous and highly skilled NKPA. If the US-ROK alliance decides to 
wage a technology-centred war but contemporary US military technology does not have the 
expected efficiency against the NKPA defence strategy, the result will be unpredictable. As 
in case in the Battle of Bloody Ridge Line, if the offender’s technology fails to destabilise the 
geographically advantaged and highly skilled defender’s position, the offender’s options will 
be limited and the direct offensive approach would bring massive casualties and costs.  
 
The section above revealed that, since North Korea adopted the asymmetric warfare strategy 
using WMDs, the US-ROK alliance had to develop the offensive strategy. In this situation, to 
enforce the North Korean deterrence, the US-ROK alliance would need an offensive strategy 
using conventional powers with the objective of the North Korean regime’s collapse. The 
section also examined that to succeed in the offensive strategy, the US-ROK alliance will 
have to overcome the fortified NKPA defence trenches and long-range artilleries in the front. 
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Also it will have to overcome the centre of gravity and WMDs targets in the rear which are 
heavily fortified with geographic merit.  
 
The following sub-chapter will examine the effectiveness of the technology-centred 
contemporary US pre-emptive strike strategy and the offensive operation scenario in the 
Korean peninsula through the virtual application of US stand-off precision earth-penetrating 
weapons to the North Korean underground facility. By doing so, it can examine the claim that 
technology alone would not guarantee ultimate military success against North Korea, which 
has fortified their territory using the geographic edge. 
 
6-3 The US-ROK Stand-Off Precision Earth- 
penetrating Weapons and North Korean HDBTs  
 
HDBTs and US national security 
 
The NKPA WMDs and the production units or reserves are mostly hidden in the mountainous 
area’s underground tunnels, which were severely fortified after the Korean War. Those 
HDBTs
605
 maximize the advantage of the Korean Peninsula’s mountainous topography. 
Furthermore, through intensive research on the Vietnam War, NATO’s engagement in 
Kosovo, and the First and Second Gulf War, North Korea has learned the importance of fully 
using deception in their defences which makes it even more complicated for the US-ROK 
alliance to neutralize those targets.  
 
Militarily, if the NKPA’s strategically important targets (WMD, modern air defences, most 
sophisticated C4I system, national leadership in wartime, and a variety of tactical arms) were 
to be increasingly concealed and protected by networks of hard and deeply buried facilities 
and sophisticated deception skill, those targets would become much more difficult to 
neutralize.
606
 However the effect of underground facility construction and deception is not 
                                                          
605
 According to the definition of “Report to Congress on the defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried 
Targets”, July, 2001, HDBTs refer to an adversary’s threatening and well protected assets in 
structures ranging from hardened surface bunker complexes to deep tunnels.  
606
 Report to Congress on the defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, p.3 
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restricted to the efficiency of the military mission. Once those targets become operative 
without much hindrance and the WMD technology and arsenal has proliferated, it would 
affect the national security of the US and ROK, but more importantly it would harm the 
credibility of deterrence against other potential adversaries. To overcome this security 
dilemma, the US military authorities have begun to research a military option for the HDBTs 
of potential adversaries. This is for the absolute deterrence against potential adversaries.
607
 
The military counter-measure contemplated is to develop a technological capability to 
neutralize HDBTs.
608
   
 
The US DOD in conjunction with the Department of Energy (DOE) published the “Report to 
Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets” in July, 2001.609 In there, they 
vowed to develop the military technology to neutralize the HDBTs of possible adversaries. In 
addition, through the NPR that was submitted to Congress on the 31 December 2001,
610
 the 
US declared that “the Cold War’s strategic nuclear triad consisted of manned bombers, land 
based ICBMs, and SLBMs which assured the mutual destruction (balance of terror), all 
designed and acquired with explicit reference to the Soviet threat would be still maintained 
                                                          
607 As analysed above, to enforce the deterrence, the US-ROK alliance must have the capability to 
neutralize the North Korean HDBTs which are strategically so important (for the effective US-ROK 
offensive) and directly related to the regime survival.  
608 For example, during the First North Korean nuclear crisis, the US did not carry out a pre-emptive 
strike. The reasons behind this decision were not only because of the ROK and Japan’s reluctance to 
the all-out war as a result of surgical air-strikes, but also the US apprehension of the North Korean 
counter-attack. More precisely, since the US was not equipped with the technology to neutralize the 
North Korean HDBTs at that point especially the North Korean frontal long-range artillery which 
would be the greatest threat to the US-ROK alliance once war broke out, they were not able to stop 
North Korea from bombarding the Seoul metropolitan area and the US 2
nd
 Infantry division. Their 
inability to cope with the NKPA HDBTs gave the US military authorities a great motive to develop 
more innovative military technology.  
609
 It is from the Nuke Watch website;  
http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/HiRes_Report_to_Congress_on_the_Defeat.pdf (Accessed on 
the 12th of January, 2010) 
610
  Global security website; Nuclear Posture Review excerpt,  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (Accessed on the 12th of January, 
2010) 
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for the continuity of traditional deterrence should relations with Russia, or perhaps China, 
sour”.611 However, it also mentioned that, because of the changed security environment of the 
post-Cold War era, the emphasis on nuclear deterrence had been shifted. Those changes 
include: “the end of the Soviet threat; the rise of new, different challengers using Asymmetric 
means; and the proliferation of WMDs and other lethal military technologies.”612 The NPR 
2001 emphasized that, in the post-Cold War security environment, the balance of nuclear 
terror is not an adequate basis for strategic policy and the uncertainties surrounding 
deterrence undermine its predictable functions. The US recognized that the balance of terror 
would not work against the potential adversaries
613
 (the rogue states) that possessed WMDs, 
having proliferated technology and arsenal in the post-Cold War era became the motive to 
transform to a capability-based nuclear deterrence strategy.
614
 
 
In the NPR 2001, in order to dissuade potential adversaries from threatening US interests, 
deter adversary use of WMDs, and, should deterrence fail, defeat those adversaries decisively, 
the NPR envisioned a ‘New Triad’ with three redefined legs;  
1. Strategic offensive forces, nuclear and conventional; 
2. Defensive forces (Meshed missile defences) 
3. A Responsive Military Infrastructure.
615
 
                                                          
611 National Instituted For Public Policy, Strategic Offensive Forces and the Nuclear Posture Review’s 
“New Triad”, March, 2003, p.2  
612
 Ibid., p.2 
613 Reasons that the US thought that the balance of terror would not work against the potential foes in 
the post-Cold War era are below;      
1) Irrationality of their decision making 
2)The potential foes do not have a rational cost-benefit calculation (usually, at any cost, they want to 
save their regimes)  
3)The US cannot  recognize  values which they can threaten 
4)The potential foes will not become cautious in the face of nuclear threat  
5) The potential foes are not well-informed of real impact of nuclear weapons  
6) Both the US and potential adversaries do not share the mutual familiarity, understanding, reliable    
channels of communication.  
614 K.B. Payne, The Nuclear Posture Review; Setting the Record Straight, The Washington Quarterly, 
Summer, 2005, p.138 
615
 The National Instituted For Public Policy, op.cit., p.11 
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This ‘New Triad’ also shows the US strategic forces planning transformed from the 
traditional threat based approaches to capabilities based approaches. The notable point for the 
Korean Peninsula security was that the US was targeting to possess a strategic offensive 
capability to neutralize the enemy centre of gravity, WMDs launching facility, production 
units, and arsenal for the reliable deterrence against irrational rogue state regimes such as 
North Korea.
616
 For its strategic offensive, the US aimed to develop a precise low-yield 
Nuclear Earth Penetrator (NEP) along with other conventional means. The details of NEP are 
shrouded in secrecy. According to the CRS Report for Congress “Bunker Busters”: Sources 
of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Penetrator Debate, 10
th
 of January, 2005: “(1) The 
Administration sought, successfully, in the FY2004 budget cycle to have Congress lift the 
ban concerning R&D on low-yield (Sub-5kiloton) nuclear weapons. (2) Nuclear earth 
penetrators could be used to destroy some hardened and deeply buried targets. (3) Some in 
the DOD and DOE have suggested using nuclear weapons to destroy chemical and biological 
agents. (4) It is desirable to minimize collateral damage and, for attacking HDBTs, a low-
yield earth penetrator will produce less fallout than a surface-burst weapon of yield high 
enough to have equivalent effectiveness.” In conclusion, because of the changed security 
circumstances in recent years, and for the effective deterrence against the potential adversary 
whose WMDs and centre of gravity became gradually fortified and HDBTs, the US has 
                                                          
616
 The US Strategic Command and the nuclear laboratories maintain the stance that the use of nuclear 
weapons would be considered as a last resort, and only be targeting the national level readership. 
Excerpted from- J. Fleck, Nukes Could Hit Enemy Bunkers, the Albuquerque Journal, 18
th
 of 
December, 2001. However, it is very hard to believe this stance. Most of all, under the current security 
circumstances, because of the dramatically increased strategic significance, the potential adversary’s 
WMDs target became as significant as their national leadership target. For example, during the First 
North Korean Nuclear crisis, the US planned to bombard the suspicious nuclear target in Yongbyon 
rather than Pyongyang where the North Korean national leadership target is located. In addition, 
according to the US  DOD and CIA classified document in 1998 regarding the nuclear bombardment 
simulation in the Korean Peninsula obtained by the Natural Resource Defence Council (NRDC), they 
finished the simulation both national leadership target and WMD targets.  Excerpted from- J.M. Kang 
and I.L. Hwang, MiNRDCEuiHanBanDoHaekPokGyeokSimulation, Shindonga, Seoul, 543, 
December, 2004  
253 
 
conceptualized the pre-emptive strike strategy and developed the capability,  conventional 
and nuclear, using their technological superiority to neutralize those targets.
617
  
 
Furthermore, in the Korean Peninsula security, the US military authorities also drafted the 
operation plan to neutralize the North Korean WMD HDBTs which adopts the pre-emptive 
strike, and conventional and strategic nuclear weapons. In the Korean peninsula, the US 
already prepared the pre-emptive surgical air-strike operation plan (OPLAN 5026) against the 
suspicious North Korean WMD targets during the First North Korean Nuclear crisis. At that 
point, even though the US used the nuclear umbrella for credible deterrence against North 
Korea, it was highly improbable that the US would draft a scenario to use tactical nuclear 
weapons in order to neutralize those targets. However, the necessity of adopting tactical 
nuclear weapons arose since they needed the enormous striking power following the 
intensified fortification of North Korean WMD targets, and to burn out the chemical and 
biological agents.
618
 Therefore, they started to prepare the application of tactical nuclear 
weapons against the North Korean HDBTs. The nuclear bombardment simulation in the 
Korean Peninsula in 1998 was also part of it. Eventually, as an offensive wing of the new 
nuclear triad in the NPR 2001, the application of tactical nuclear weapons along with 
conventional means against the North Korean HDBTs became an official policy.  
 
                                                          
617 If the US-ROK alliance possesses the technological capability to neutralize the North Korean 
HDBTs, they would be able to reduce the strategic impact of North Korean WMDs and contribute to 
deny the North Korean intention of communized reunification. Therefore, one can say it would be the 
deterrence by denial. However, the excessive reliance on the HDBTs using their geographic edge 
could be a fatal weakness. If the US-ROK alliance has the technological ability to neutralize those, it 
can also threaten the North Korean prime value (regime survival). Therefore, it can be viewed as 
deterrence by punishment.  
618 According to the testimony of Ashton Carter (Professor of Harvard University), in June, 1994, as 
the assistant deputy minister of defence, when the tension between the US and North Korea reached 
its peak, he prepared the real surgical air-strike operation against the North Korean nuclear target 
without radiation pollution. Excerpted from- Yonhap News (Seoul), 3
rd
 of March, 2005. According to 
this testimony, the US administration thought reducing a nuclear fall-out once the strike is committed 
was the key element of their surgical air-strike success. One of the main reasons of adopting low-yield 
tactical nuclear weapons is that those weapons possessed the excellent combustion capability which 
could burn out nuclear or bio-chemical agent.   
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The US Strategic Command also drafted Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 8022-02 to deal 
primarily with WMD threats posed by Iran and North Korea.
619
 Given the US Strategic 
Command’s mission to integrate possible conventional and nuclear strike options according 
to Bush’s classified directive for the US Strategic Command to develop the capacity to 
deliver long-range ‘kinetic’ (nuclear and conventional) and ‘non-kinetic’ (information 
operation) strikes, CONPLAN8022 includes an option to employ a NEP to deal with 
HDBTs.
620
  
 
 One critical question which emerges is whether the key elements of contemporary US 
military strategy – utilizing their technological dominance (conventional and nuclear means) 
to neutralize the possible adversaries’ WMDs and centre of gravity (many of them are 
HDBTs at the point) for the utmost deterrence – actually works against possible adversaries 
such as North Korea, who hold a fortified territory and a capability to use their edge in 
defence. 
 
To answer the question, we must first examine the obvious US-ROK alliance target of North 
Korean WMDs and centre of gravity facilities’ exact count and defensive preparation of those 
targets against the US stand-off precision technology. Afterwards, we will also assess how 
US technology would work against North Korean targets.  
 
The US DoD Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 
 
The US DoD published the Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 in April. Like the previous 
report, it also mentioned “In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have 
violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security 
Council, pursued missile deliver capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve 
through diplomatic means.”621  It also stipulated, “It is essential that we better align our 
nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and 
                                                          
619
The CONPLAN 8022 posits swift and decisive precision attacks (conventional and cyber) 
complemented by Special Forces on the ground to locate targets and secure them, if needed.  
620
 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, US Military Options Against Emerging Nuclear 
Threats, Strategic Comments, 12(3): April, 2006, p.1-2 
621
 The US DOD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April, 2010, p.3 
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nuclear proliferation”.622 It clearly published the US government view that North Korea is 
still a direct and indirect security threat and that nuclear capabilities would be developed to 
deter them. 
 
In addition, according to the report, even though the US determined to reduce the role of 
nuclear weaponry, they still did not give up on nuclear deterrence. According to their security 
threat perception in the post-Cold war era, they will not deny any nuclear applications to 
North Korea. Finally, it mentions how the US would invest its efforts on the conventional 
means to not only reduce the role of nuclear weapons but to also deter nuclear weapon or 
WMD proliferating countries or terrorist organizations such as Iran and North Korea. 
Therefore, in terms of Korean Peninsula security, comparing the new NPR to the old NPR 
and the report on WMD and HDBTs, the only the significant difference is that the US has 
decided it would rely more on conventional means than they used to.  
 
The North Korean HDBTs  
 
The US believed that the potential adversaries’ HDBTs would threaten their security but they 
reckoned that the number of HDBTs of potential adversaries did not number highly. 
According to the “Report to the Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets”, 
they suspected that the number of HDBTs was well over 10,000 and their numbers would 
only be increased in the next 10 years. This number included the HDBTs of Cold war foes – 
Russia, China, and the former Warsaw Pact Countries.
623
 According to “Rumsfield’s War: 
The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander”, they suspected the number of 
HDBTs in rogue states including North Korea would not be able to number more than 1000.  
                                                          
622
 Ibid., p.6 
623
 Report to Congress on the defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, p.8 
256 
 
 
Index 6-1 The Number and Thickness of HDBTs in the Rogue States (The US intelligence)
624
  
 
The ROK Intelligence Agency and the Department of National Defence suspected the 
number of North Korean HDBTs to be more than 8,200 (about 1,600 in the frontal area) and 
would continue to increase.
625
 Another significant element when it comes to judge the threat 
of HDBTs is their thickness (depth). As analysed, the US reckoned that few are over 50m 
                                                          
624
DIA Report on a Primer on the Future Threat–The Decades Ahead;1999-2020, p.139 in R. 
Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander, Regnery 
Publishing, 2004 
625
The ROK government has not officialised the number of North Korean HDBTs. Their new Military 
White Paper 2008 mentioned that North Korea has tried to strengthen the survivability in the rear area. 
Therefore, they have built a lot of underground tunnel in the front and rear under the slogan of 
“fortifying the entire territory” and developed the deception skill. Excerpted from– ROK National 
Defence White Paper 2008, p.25. However, the ROK military authorities position on this matter could 
be inferred from the KIDA, affiliated with the Department of National Defence, analysis “K.W. Shim, 
21SeGiChoHanGukHangGongRyeokEuiBalJeonBangHyang, International Airpower strategy 
symposium for the celebration of the 50
th
 Anniversary of ROK Air Force foundation, September, 
1999 and several news articles which cited the ROK intelligence authorities comment (Yonhap News 
(Seoul), 16
th
 of September, 1999 and  5
th
 of January, 2005, and JoSeon Ilbo (Seoul), 16
th
 of 
September).  
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depth. The ROK military authorities believe that the average depth of the North Korean 
HDBTs is around 80m.
626
  
 
According to several testimonies, some strategically significant targets such as the North 
Korean Commanding Centre in Pyongyang and other nuclear facilities are over 300m depth. 
According to the testimony of Hwang Jangyeop (The North Korean defector to ROK and ex-
Chairmen of the North Korean Parliament) to the “Free North Korea”,627 there is a secret 
underground facility believed to be the North Korean military headquarters at the depth of 
300m in Pyongyang which is underneath the Pyongyang metro
628
 and linked to strategically 
significant cities of North Korea such as Nampo (Where the Headquarters of the West Coast 
Fleet is located), Sunchon, and Yongwon.   
 
In addition, according to a secret document titled, “GaengDoJeonRryak,JeonSiSaEopSeChik 
(The Underground Tunnel Strategy Part in the Detailed Rule of Wartime Operation)” 
published on the 7
th
 of April, 2004, they stipulated that the leading department of cabinet,  
InMinMuRyokBu (Ministry of People's Armed Forces), InMinBoAnSong (People’s Safety 
Agency) and the leading headquarter of Do (Province), Si (City) and Gun (County) had to be 
built in the underground tunnel in case of war occurring.
629
 According to a North Korean 
defector’s (formerly an underground tunnel superintendent) testimony on Bukhan, July, 
2005
630
 and another defector’s (formerly an underground tunnel construction worker) 
testimony,
631
 the underground tunnel site for the commanding centre in Si and Gun is mostly 
                                                          
626
 Based on the estimate of K.W. Shim, 21SeGiChoHanGukHangGongRyeokEuiBalJeonBangHyang 
and news article (Yonhap News (Seoul), 5
th
 of January, 2005) which cited the ROK intelligence 
authorities comment.   
627
 Cited on the New Daily (Seoul), 8
th
 of December, 2009 
628
 Averaged 120m, the Pyongyang Metro was designed as part of a broader military system of tunnels 
and underground installations. The stations are situated very deep underground and are fitted with 
multiple heavy blast doors, indirect linking tunnels, and other features that imply military purposes or 
service as emergency shelters. Excerpted from- The Pyonyang Metro; http://www.pyongyang-
metro.com, (Accessed on the 12
th 
of February. 2010) 
629 Yonhap News (Seoul), 5th of January, 2005 
630
 DailyNK(Seoul),7
th
 of July, 2005 
631
 Joseon Ilbo(Seoul), 18
th
 of October, 2001 
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located in the rigid rock bed. They also used the best material they could muster for the 
construction of the underground tunnel.  
 
In addition, to help raise the morale of the construction workers, the North Korean 
government gave various incentives such as priority rations and the opportunity to join the 
communist party. They also attested that the underground tunnel for Si and Gun possessed the 
capability to control the district assigned to them, and of protecting them from possible 
nuclear bombardment. It was also revealed in these testimonies that to escape from the US 
military satellite trace on underground tunnels, North Korea asked Russia to give military 
satellite images of North Korean underground tunnels to them which was later agreed. After 
analysing images of the Russian satellite, they ordered underground tunnels spotted by the 
Russian satellite to paint electromagnetic wave absorbing material.  
 
In conclusion, the US and ROK military authorities have a different opinion on the number, 
depth, defensive and commanding capability of the North Korean HDBTs. North Korea has 
fortified their territory to a standard where they will be protected from any possible US 
nuclear bombardment. From the North Korean strategic point of view, to wage the 
asymmetric war using their WMDs, fortification and deception skill are the prerequisites. In 
addition, the North Korean fortification and deception efforts gathered pace after the First 
Gulf War when they analysed that proper fortification and deception are vital to protecting 
them from the US stand-off precision technology. Therefore, the optimistic US judgement on 
the North Korean HDBTs is highly risky and the careful analysis of the ROK who would 
receive a fatal North Korean WMD attack in the first place would be closer to reality.  
 
The US Conventional Military Technology for HDBTs and its 
Efficiency Against the North Korean HDBTs 
 
In the section above, the numbers and preparation of North Korean HDBTs were analysed. 
How good, then, is the technical readiness of the US-ROK alliance against the North Korean 
HDBTs? According to the “Report to Congress on the Defeat of HDBTs”, the US DoD and 
DoE planned to develop and deploy non-nuclear kinetic (conventional) weapons and nuclear 
weapons for HDBTs defeat. In the non-nuclear kinetic sector, they planned to employ the 
Guided Bomb Unit (GBU-24 and 28), the Conventional Air Launched Missile (CALCM) 
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Block II penetrator, the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), TACMS (Tactical 
Missile System) Penetrator and the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW).
632
 With the reasonable 
penetrating capability and striking power, those weapons were designed to possess a stand-
off precision capability. Obviously, the stand-off capability is required to protect the missile 
launching friendly air-fighter or warship from the hostile anti-air or ship defence.  
 
In addition, precision technology even under the conditions of the tough topography, horrible 
weather condition, and enemy jamming is required for the operation’s efficiency. Even if the 
technologically advanced offender managed to detect HDBTs, launch the missiles or bombs 
at a long distance, and reach the HDBTs under these severe conditions, if the missile or bomb 
did not have enough penetrating capability (depth) and striking power the stand-off precision 
technologies would not become any real threat.  
 
Therefore, with the reasonable striking power to demolish the HDBTs upon reaching enemy 
HDBTs, the efficiency of those US weapons against the North Korean HDBTs is dependent 
upon the penetration depth. As analysed above, setting aside the staggering numbers of North 
Korean HDBTs (around 8,200), the North Korean HDBTs were usually constructed on the 
solid point of the mountain at an average of 80m depth. The underground tunnel depth 
features strategically important facilities such as the significant command centres of the 
                                                          
632
 Reports to Congress on the defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, p.16-18 
For the general information on conventional bunker buster- Committee on the effects of Nuclear 
Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, National Research Council, Effects of Nuclear Earth Penetrator 
and Other Weapons, Washington, D.C,  The National  Academies Press, 2005, p.99-102  
For the general information of  GBU-24, and 28,  
Carlo Kopp, The GBU-28 Bunker Buster, Technical Report APA–TR-2005-0501, accessed from the 
Airpower Australia, http://www.ausairpower.net/GBU-28.html, (Accessed on the 20
th
 of February, 
2010) 
Global Security website; GBU-28, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/gbu-
28.htm and GBU-24, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/gbu-24.htm, 
(Accessed on the 20
th
 of February, 2010) 
Designation-systems website; http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app5/paveway-3.html, 
(Accessed on the 20
th
 of February, 2010) 
The FAS websites; GBU-28, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/gbu-28.htm, (Accessed on 
the 20
th
 of February, 2010) 
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National and local government are believed to number approximately 300m. Furthermore, 
since the North Korean HDBTs are usually located in rock bed, the solidity of HDBTs is 
comparable to that of reinforced concrete.  
 
For the penetration and demolition of these targets, the US currently possesses and deploys a 
variety of penetrating warheads titled the BLU-109 penetrator, BLU-116 Advanced Unitary 
Penetrator (AUP), BLU-118/B Thermobaric Warhead and BLU-113 Super Penetrator. BLU-
109 can be loaded on to the GBU-10, GBU-15, GBU-24, GBU-27, AGM-130, and possesses 
a penetration depth of maximum 1.8m against reinforced concrete.
633
 BLU-116 AUP can be 
attached to the GBU-15, GBU-24, GBU-27, AGM-130, and possesses the capability to 
penetrate at a depth of maximum 3.6m against reinforced concrete.
634
 The BLU-118/B is a 
penetrating warhead filled with an advanced thermobaric explosive that, when detonated, 
generates higher sustained blast pressures in confined spaces such as tunnels and 
underground facilities. The BLU-118/B Thermobaric Warhead used the same penetrator as 
the BLU-116. Therefore, the penetrating depth of BLU-118/B Thermobaric Warhead against 
reinforced concrete is the same as BLU-116 but can only be used for the GBU-15, GBU-24, 
and AGM-130.
635
 Finally the most advanced BLU-113 can be loaded on to the GBU-28 and 
GBU-37 and it has a penetration depth around 7m against reinforced concrete and around 30 
meters against earth.
636
  
 
In short, current conventional technology would only penetrate up to 7m against reinforced 
concrete which is not adequate to penetrate and destroy the North Korean HDBTs. At the 
developing and near deployment stage, there is the GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB) 
and GBU-57A/B (also called the Massive Ordnance Penetrator or MOP). The GBU-39B 
                                                          
633
 Excerpted from the Global security website; BLU109, 
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th
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261 
 
SDB was designed as a stand-off precision small-sized bomb
637
 with a reasonable price, 
penetration depth and striking power, which is required in urban warfare where reducing 
collateral damage is one of the most important concerns.
638
 The US Air Force (USAF) agreed 
to low rate initial production with the Boeing / Lockheed Martin at the end of 2006, first used 
during combat in Iraq, October, 2006.
639
 Reportedly, the Israeli Air Force (ISAF) used this 
against the Hamas underground facilities on the Gaza Strip to reduce collateral damage and 
achieve their military goal of demolishing Hamas underground facilities.
640
 The GBU-39 
SDB carries approximately 38lb (17kg) of AFX-757 of high explosive (warhead), yet 
because of its design it has the same penetration capabilities as the 2000lb BLU-109
 641 
(Maximum penetration capability about 1.8m against reinforced concrete).
  
Therefore, the 
GBU-39 would also not be able to reach the required depth to neutralize most of the North 
Korean HDBTs.   
 
In the near to deployment stage, there is also the GBU-57, also called the Massive Ordnance 
Penetrator (MOP) because it has an improved penetration depth, enormous size (only be 
adapted to B-52 and B-2A stealth bomber), striking power and ability to absorb nuclear and 
bio-chemicals.
642
 The background behind the adoption of the GBU-57 MOP was that the US 
                                                          
637 Since it is a small size bomb, the air fighter can carry more bombs. 
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wanted to be equipped with conventional weapons possessing enough striking power, 
penetration depth, and reasonable burning-out capabilities of nuclear and bio-chemical agents. 
These would replace the tactical nuclear bomb (NEP), which suffered from severe collateral 
damage problem.
643
 Complete information on this bomb has not yet been revealed. Even 
though most military analysts agreed that striking power and size had been immensely 
improved from the GBU-28 (BLU-113 warhead), the debate concerning the actual 
penetration depth is still being discussed.
644
 US military authorities confirmed that they 
would deploy around 20 GBU-57 MOPs until 2012. The penetration depth is widely known 
as 60 metres against the reinforced concrete, 40 metres against moderately hard rock, and 8 
metres against 10,000 psi still-rod reinforced concrete.
645
 Therefore, the GBU-57 could 
demolish a few North Korean HDBTs but, the number of MOP which will be deployed in 
2012 is not enough. The most sought after targets, the North Korean Military Headquarters or 
suspicious nuclear sites, are not going to be neutralized with it.  
 
In conclusion, with the current conventional weapon technology, the US is not able to 
neutralize the North Korean HDBTs effectively and achieve the original military objective of 
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this weaponry. That objective is to deter potential adversaries through the acquisition of a 
technical capability to neutralize their WMDs and command centres hidden in the robust 
underground.  
 
NEP 
 
US official documents such as the “Report to the congress on the defeat of HDBTs” and NPR 
2001 confirmed that the NEP serves as an integral part of the offensive wing for the 
neutralization of potential adversaries’ HDBTs. The US Congress lifted the ban on R&D on 
low-yield (Sub-5kiloton) nuclear weapons. The NEP could offer the decisive explosive power 
and bio-chemical agents burning-out capability compared to the conventional earth 
penetrating weapons. According to the Report of National Academy of Sciences (NAS), with 
the 3 metres penetration, the NEP (10kt, 10 Circular Error Probable (CEP)) can capture most 
of the advantages (100m in a hard rock (granite) bed site) associated with the coupling of 
ground shock.   
 
Figure 6-1 Earth-penetrator weapon (EPW) needs to be of a sufficient yield to be effective 
against specified targets of interest.
646
 Note: CEP = circular error probable (i.e., accuracy). 
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 Excerpted from the Committee on the effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, 
op.cit., p.40 
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The NEP application to the North Korean HDBTs contains many severe problems. First, 
there is the problem of finding (identifying the target) and survival (reaching the target). Even 
though the offender uses low-yield nuclear bombs, the explosion of nuclear weaponry causes 
severe air blasts and fall-out. Therefore, before the application of NEP, the US military must 
have perfect information regarding the target. The NKPA has masterfully developed 
deceptive skills to confuse them, such as painting targets with special paint that may absorb 
parts of the spectrum of electromagnetic waves. Therefore, it is not always possible to obtain 
perfectly clear information. Survival is also a matter of severe concern. Since the NKPA 
analysed that their operation capability under the US air supremacy was their main weakness 
during the Korean War, they have invested immensely in their anti-air defence. There is also 
a huge dilemma in the matter of survival and reducing that fall-out. According to the NAS 
report, the additional depth of penetration increases the ground-shock coupling with fewer 
fall-outs; it also increases the uncertainty of the NEP survival. Therefore, the matter of the 
NEP’s survival is not the easiest concern for US military authorities.  
 
It also follows the severe collateral damage problems not only from the blast but also from 
the radioactive fall-out. Therefore, the US congress only lifted the ban on R&D that applied 
to low-yield (Sub-5kiloton) nuclear weapons. To reduce collateral damage, most of all, it has 
to be capable of reaching a considerable penetration depth. According to the NAS report, 
once the bomb is the same yield and blasted in the same weather condition, the number of 
casualties from nuclear earth penetrating weapons detonated at a few metres depth is equal to 
that from a surface burst. As the bomb penetrates through the soil, the air blast and 
radioactive fall-out reduces.
647
 However, as mentioned earlier, the increase in penetration 
depth decreases the survival of NEP. Furthermore, with the current experience and empirical 
prediction indicate that the NEP cannot penetrate to the depths required for total containment 
of the effects of a nuclear explosion.
648
 Even a 1kt nuclear warhead (less than 1/10 as 
powerful as the Hiroshima bomb) must be buried at least 60-90 meters to contain its 
radioactive fall-out. However, the strongest casing will crush itself by the time it penetrates 3-
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 Since it would be able to reach the target, it also increased the success ratio of neutralizing deeply 
buried underground targets.  
648
 Ibid., p.110 
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9 meters into rock or concrete.
649
Therefore, reducing collateral damage through deep 
penetration is almost impossible.  
 
Another advantage lies in that the NEP could burn out the bio-chemical agent. An attack by a 
nuclear weapon would be effective in destroying the agent only if detonated in the chamber 
where agents are stored.
650
 However, because the US is unlikely to identify the precise 
location, size and geometry of underground facilities, a nuclear attack on a storage bunker 
containing chemical or biological agents would more likely spread those agents into the 
environment, along with the radioactive fallout.
651
 Therefore, at this stage of technology, it is 
almost impossible to burn out a bio-chemical agent with the NEP blast. 
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FIGURE 6-2 Estimated mean number of casualties (deaths and serious injuries) from attacks 
on notional targets A, B, and C using earth-penetrator weapons at 3 meters or greater depth of 
burst and surface bursts, assuming a static population in the open. SOURCE: Estimates 
prepared for the committee by the Defence Threat Reduction Agency.
652
 
 
When it comes to the Korean peninsula, because of the location of North Korea and their 
HDBTs, the NEP collateral damage problem would be much more severe. First, 
geographically, North Korea shares borders with China, Russia, and ROK, and is located  
closely to Japan. Therefore, aside from the North Korean humanitarian concern when a 
nuclear bomb is exploded, there is the risk that collateral damage would not be restricted to 
North Korea.    
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 Excerpted from- the Committee on the effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, 
op.cit., p.80-81 
• Target A: An underground command-and-control facility in a densely populated area 3 kilometres 
from the centre of a city with a population of about 3 million; 
• Target B: An underground chemical warfare facility 60 kilometres from the nearest city and 13 
kilometres from a small town;  
• Target C: A large, underground nuclear weapons storage facility 20 kilometres from a small town. 
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Map 6-1 In case of NEP (5kt) application to the North Korean Bukchang Airbase
653
 and its 
fallout, The estimated death toll within 48hours is 6,000 
Map 6-2 NEP 100kt and its fallout, Estimated death toll (100,000) 
Map 6-3NEP 400kt and its fallout, Estimated death toll (400,000)
654
  
 
The North Korean capital (Pyongyang) is only 261Km away from Seoul, and about 250 Km 
away from the Chinese border. The population of Pyongyang is around 3.25 million and 
about 40% of the North Korean population is densely crowded in Pyongyang or its 
suburbs.
655
 In addition, most of the WMD production units and storage facilities are located 
in the mountainous area near the Russian and Chinese border. The site location provides 
proper protection from the US-ROK alliance artillery and short to mid-range missiles because 
of the distance. This will cause diplomatic friction between the US and China or Russia once 
the US attacks those sites, their choice of location is natural. However, if the US offensive 
means are nuclear, the neighbouring countries’ reaction and protest would not be bearable by 
the US. Thus, under the specific Korean peninsula situation where North Korea is a 
neighbour of China, Russia, and the ROK, and their WMDs are produced and stored near the 
border; the collateral damage problem would be greater than any other potential adversaries.    
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 Bukchang airbase is 80km northwest from Pyongyang, the key defence element of Pyongyang and 
located nearby the nuclear research or production facilities.  
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on CIA secret report “Nuclear Use Scenarios on the Korean Peninsula” 
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Map 6-4 North Korean Chemical Weapon Production Units and Reserves
656
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 Excerpted From– The FAS website  
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/cw.htm, (Accessed on the 22
nd
 of February, 2010) 
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Map 6-5 North Korean nuclear facilities 
657
  
 
As of this writing, the US has about 50 NEPs (B61-11: the B61 (tactical nuclear bomb) 
modification 11) which are designed to be dropped from aircraft. The yield of these warheads 
is reported to be between 0.3 kilotons and 340 kilotons.
658
 According to the USAF comment 
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on frozen soil drop tests conducted in Alaska in March, 1998, only B61-11 proved capable of 
penetrating some 2-3 metres into frozen soil.
659
 
 
Theoretically, this is enough penetration depth to neutralize HDBTs with a concrete structure 
less than 100m because of the ground shock. However, this penetration depth is not sufficient 
to prohibit the subsequent collateral damage (air blast and radioactive fallout) and burn out 
the bio-chemical agent. Since the conversion of low-yield tactical nuclear bomb to the NEP 
exposed so many problems and met with heavy criticism, the Bush administration finally 
withdrew its request for funding of the continued research of NEP in October 2005. The US 
senator Domenici indicated that the Senate agreed to drop the $4.0 million it provided in its 
bill for the DOE national laboratories, including Sandia National Laboratories, to continue 
conducting NEP research. The House bill for FY2006 had no funding for the NEP which 
meant the official end of NEP’s further development.660  
 
There is still a suspicion that, even though the US officially gave up on the further 
development of the NEP, they are still researching it.
661
 The significant point in this matter is 
that the US has a capability (B61-11), operation plan in Concept Format (CONPLAN 8022) 
and most of all, they are not ruling out the nuclear pre-emptive attack on North Korean 
HDBTs. Therefore, the NEP is also included in the US remedies on the North Korean 
HDBTs. Unfortunately for the US, both the conventional and nuclear bunker blaster 
technology is not effective enough to destroy the North Korean HDBTs which is the 
important element of the deterrence against the North Korean.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Medical Consequences, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, posted 25
th
 of 
March, 2003, p.2. Accessed from- International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) website on the 22
nd
 of February, 2010 - http://www.ippnw.org/NukeEPWsFull.html 
659 H.M. Kristen (FAS), the Birth of a Nuclear Bomb: B61-11, nukestrat.com, 27th of April, 2005 
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/B61-11.htm, (Accessed on the 23
rd
 of February, 2010) 
660
 Excerpted from the Global Security website; Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm, (Accessed on the 22
nd
 of February, 2010) 
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Conclusion 
 
The US recognized that the technological capability to neutralize possible adversaries’ hard 
and deeply buried underground commanding headquarters and WMDs production units and 
reserves is the prerequisite of deterrence against them and have since been developing it. 
These investments have begun to bring some success. For example, during the recent Israeli 
offensive in Gaza, the ISAF succeeded in neutralizing a Hamas underground tunnel. However, 
the excessive emphasis on these technologies would be very dangerous because, as the 
offensive technology develops new weapons, the defenders would also start to develop a 
response to the new threat. Usually this response costs less than developing the new 
technology.
662
  
 
As examined, during the time that the US was investing heavily in advanced US military 
technology, the NKPA was also developing masterful deception skills, and used their 
mountainous topography and experience during the Korean War to dig and create the 
underground tunnels. For example, the NKPA prepared the underground tunnel defence 
during the Korean War to protect themselves from the massive US fire and airpower. When 
the US openly deployed nuclear weapons in the ROK at the end of the 1950s, they also 
started to accelerate the construction of the underground defence facility in the rear area from 
the end of 1950s to render themselves immune to any US nuclear threat.
663
 They further 
strengthened their underground facilities and deceptive skills after appreciating the modern 
military technologies’ application during the First Gulf War, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, and 
the Second Gulf War. Obviously the cost that North Korea poured into their defensive 
preparation against the US is not greater than the US cost, and as one can see from their 
relative stability in recent years, compared with other communist countries, this cost has not 
become a great financial burden to them, unlike the former Soviet Union in 1980s.  
 
On the effectiveness side of US technology against the North Korean HDBTs, even though 
the US has a strong intention of neutralizing the North Korean HDBTs with their advanced 
military technology, the US has failed to count the exact number of North Korean HDBTs, 
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 The mountainous geography of Korean peninsula would also further benefit the defender.  
663
 Under this security dilemma, they pursued the fortifying entire territory doctrine. 
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and develop the technological ability to neutralize the spotted targets. Accordingly, some 
Korean peninsula security analysts insist that the Korean peninsula is a mutual deterrence 
state where the US–ROK alliance possesses an advantage in the persistence and conducting 
capabilities of war. The NKPA hold an advantage in the asymmetric warfare capabilities 
using WMDs which means that, at least, both sides hold the capability to make a victory in 
war meaningless because of the severe costs that would be inflicted upon both sides. This 
recognition of deterrence was reflected in the ROK military authorities’ active pursuit of 
independent anti-firepower capability in recent years upon the imminent takeover of wartime 
command in 2015.
664
  
 
Considering the current Korean peninsula security situation, the US-ROK alliance plan of 
securing deterrence against North Korea with their technological superiority is not working 
effectively yet. It is hard to imagine that this prospect will soon turn in their favour when one 
considers the serious efforts by the North Korean government to build low cost but highly 
effective underground tunnel construction while simultaneously using their mountainous 
geography and skills of deception.  
 
In the history of Korean Peninsula conflicts, once the defender has prepared to use their 
geographic edge and then possesses the capability to use it, it becomes difficult for the 
offender to conquer the target with only the technological advantage. During the battle of 
Heartbreak Ridge during the Korean War, the US 2
nd
 Infantry Division Commander’s proper 
command and tactical preparation, as well as the morale and training of the troops 
contributed their success in that battle. That success could be attributed to a combination of 
military technology and human elements of war, these being: training, morale, command, 
tactical preparation, and overall preponderance. Therefore, under the current security 
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ballistic missile. Anti-firepower mission was officially taken over to the ROK in October, 2005. Since 
the anti-firepower mission was in their hands and the ROK military authorities believed that the North 
Korean long-range artillery posed the most dominant threat in the front and Seoul metropolitan area, 
they would have vehemently invested into the mission. The amended draft of 
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circumstances, if the technologically advanced ROK-US alliance plans to neutralize the 
North Korean HDBTs with only their stand-off precision technology for the guaranteed 
deterrence, it would be almost impossible for them to achieve this due in part to the limit of 
current military technology and North Korean preparation based on the past conflict 
experience of Korean Peninsula.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
 
In military history, there have been some revolutionary military technologies, such as the 
long bow and gun powder that have transformed warfare drastically. In contemporary 
military society, there is a dominant opinion that modern military technology, especially 
information technology, has revolutionized warfare. However, in the Korean peninsula, the 
US-ROK alliance has already experienced on numerous occasions during the Korean War 
that technology alone could not bring ultimate military success. Therefore, one can question 
whether these new emerging technologies could solve the strategic dilemma of the US-ROK 
alliance.  
 
The security circumstance of the Korean peninsula is unique. The Korean peninsula has seen 
diverse and escalated levels of conflict. It can experience limited warfare (small war) such as 
the recent Cheonan warship sinking and the bombardment of Yeonpyong Island, the surgical 
operation against the dubious North Korean WMDs targets, as well as the escalated all-out 
war. However, in any conflict scenario, the most important strategic consideration has to be 
given to how one can weaken the enemy’s strength and complement their weakness.   
 
There is an opinion that, because of North Korea’s current economic crisis and the fact that 
their all-out invasion will meet strong and effective resistance from the US-ROK alliance,
665
 
their threat is virtually non-existent. But, since the nature of warfare in the Korean peninsula 
has transformed to an asymmetric one, any conflict will be disastrous to the US-ROK alliance 
and if the cost is too heavy, military success will be tarnished. Therefore, the US-ROK 
alliance has to consider how to reduce their weakness and cost, and debilitate the enemy 
strength. The weakness of US-ROK alliance is that, once the military tension erupts, the 
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 Along with the problem of war sustainability and technological disparity which would be the case 
in any kind of conflicts, if North Korea invaded the South, they will suffer further following problems;  
1) The US-ROK position has been heavily fortified and they have studied the NKPA strategy and 
tactics, and prepared adequate responses.  
2) The NKPA mechanized troops’ advance route is narrow because of the mountainous topography 
and they would become an easy prey in the open and narrow road. 
3) Unlike the Korean War, it is very hard for them to expect massive Chinese and Russian 
engagement.   
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North Korean WMDs would be launched to land on the Seoul metropolitan area and possibly 
also, the US homeland. In addition, the proliferation of WMDs would become a great 
security threat to US homeland security. 
 
However, North Korea will not be deterred by the Cold War type threat-based approach (the 
USFK nuclear weapons and massive engagement threat).
666
They are incredible and 
incalculable because their prime interest is regime survival. They are not afraid of adopting 
any means to achieve their objective, and they lack communication with the US, unlike the 
former Soviet Union. North Korea will not be deterred by a Cold War-type indirect threat but 
only by a direct threat of their prime value (regime survival). Therefore, the US-ROK alliance 
has developed the capability to threaten precious assets for the regime survival as deterrence 
(capability-based deterrence and deterrence by punishment approach).
667
   
 
Can the US-ROK military technology and capability paralyze the North Korean strength and 
bring ultimate military success and deterrence against North Korea? The combat performance 
of modern military technology has not been consistent. On the one hand, as one can see from 
the First Gulf War and the early phases of the Afghan campaign, modern military technology 
and its application was the major reason for western victory. On the other hand, as one can 
see from the later phase of the Afghan campaign, the contribution of military technology is 
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 As it was shown in OPLAN 5027-74 (a reunification of the Korean peninsula by the military 
operation was not considered), Cold War era deterrence was based on the denial of North Korean 
intention of communized reunification by the massive US engagement and nuclear weapons threat 
which was the deterrence by denial.   
667 Contemporarily the biggest asset for North Korea is WMDs which could be used for diplomatic 
and military purposes. There are two ways to neutralize the threat of WMDs. First, they can be 
intercepted once launched; however, the reliability of technology is not great. This would lead to 
tension between the ROK and China since it can be categorized as an MD, and the main WMD threat 
to the ROK is long-range artillery unlike the SSM to the US and Japan. Therefore, it is not a preferred 
option for the ROK and their effort is concentrated on the anti-firepower mission. Secondly, they can 
be pre-empted before launched. However, the North Korean WMDs are usually HDBTs using the 
geographic merit. In addition, the North Korean central highlands defence positions are also heavily 
fortified using the mountainous topography which is strategically significant targets in regards to the 
offensive operation. Therefore, the capability of neutralizing the HDBTs would be important for the 
North Korean deterrence.  
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not as great as might have been expected. Therefore, there is a need to examine whether the 
technology-centred US-ROK alliance would actually demolish the stubborn North Koreans, 
who have a geographic edge and the capability to use this edge through fortification and 
tactical preparation. 
 
The primary claim of this research was that even though advanced military technology 
became an important element of war in the contemporary world, technology alone would not 
bring success against the foe (North Korea) that has geographic edge and capability. The 
claim of this research is well-connected with Biddle’s argument on skill and technology.  
Biddle claims that modern military technology would punish heavily a combatant who is not 
skilled, for example, the First Gulf War and the early phase of the Afghan Campaign. It 
would also not be enough to bring about an absolute and less costly success against a foe who 
has the skill to use their defensive edge. The offender’s skills such as manoeuvres, are 
required to grind out the result that they aspire to as has been seen in the example of the later 
phase of Afghan campaign.  
 
To examine its claim and Biddle’s argument, this research first demonstrated that in the 
contemporary security circumstances of the Korean Peninsula, the potential conflict between 
the US-ROK alliance and North Korea would be the duel of a technologically-advanced force 
against a geographically-advantaged and skilled force. For that purpose, in Chapter 2, it was 
shown that the US-ROK alliance had transformed to technology-centred forces to meet a 
newly emerged threat (North Korean WMDs) and contemporary trends of military 
transformation especially after 9/11.  
 
Chapter 3 first examined the traditional military strategy using the geographic edge. The 
strategic importance of the geographic dimension in the Korean peninsula’s security was 
envisaged. After that, it researched the NKPA military strategy development after the Korean 
War to show that North Korea had not only developed the offensive strategy of the former 
Soviet influenced Two-Front War but also had pursued the asymmetric warfare using WMDs 
and its geographic edge. Since North Korea was no longer able to compete in the arms race 
with the South after the Cold War ended, they adopted asymmetric warfare strategy using 
WMDs which maximize their advantages – strong local war industries and geography – and 
harasses the enemy disadvantage. The Seoul metropolitan area is 40km away from DMZ and 
hidden and fortified WMD targets would be difficult to neutralize with contemporary military 
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technology. In addition, as part of asymmetric warfare strategy, to raise the survivability of 
WMDs and weaken the efficiency of US-ROK military technology, North Korea has fortified 
its territory heavily and raised their capability to use their geographic edge. Therefore, after 
the first part of research, it was demonstrated that the US-ROK alliance has transformed to a 
technology-centred one, and North Korea has a geographic edge and tactical preparedness to 
use the edge. It was also inferred that, like Biddle’s analysis of the later phase of the Afghan 
Campaign, the technological advantage of the US-ROK alliance alone could not guarantee 
ultimate military success against the North Koreans. This was examined through three case 
studies.  
 
This thesis has set four objectives to examine: 1) The geographic dimension and tactical 
preparation of war is an important element of war in the Korean peninsula; 2) Biddle’s claim 
of  modern technology and skill is valid in the Korean peninsula; 3) The North Koreans are 
highly skilled and motivated to take advantage of their defensive geographic edge; 4) Finally, 
military technology is an important element of war, but technology alone cannot guarantee 
military success against a foe (North Korea) that possesses the geographic edge and the skill 
to maximize its worth. This thesis argues that technological advantage will not necessarily 
bring the eventual and effective (reasonable cost and casualties) success against the North 
Koreans and in contemporary warfare, and that, as Biddle argues, technology alone may not 
bring down the skilled and geographically advantageous force. 
 
The first case study of the Imjin Wars showed that the Korean traditional defence strategy of 
maximizing their geographic edge (castle on the hill and defence in depth, cooperative 
defensive network, and Scorched Earth tactics) based on past war experiences is strategically 
important, and that the geographic dimension is important in the Korean peninsula security. 
In this case study, by examining the gradual transformation of the Joseon defence strategy 
(the initial military fiasco, Cholla province defence campaign, and the Japanese second 
invasion), the geographic consideration and tactical preparation accordingly is an important 
dimension of war in the Korean peninsula.   
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Period 
Joseon Force’s strategy, 
tactics and preparation 
Japanese Preparation Outcome 
Before  
Imjin 
Wars 
Army dominating 
Jeseungbangryak Defence 
strategy and system: provincial 
defence and the concentrated 
use of force  
Battle formation warfare 
(Tactics): It was developed to 
deal with the fluid cavalry 
forces of Jurchens in the open 
space. 
Gunjeoksupo: The lack of 
numbers of troops  
Long Peace: the Castle on the 
hill was not repaired and the 
military culture was 
condemned. 
An intensive surprise 
offensive strategy: To occupy 
Seoul as soon as possible to 
prepare the further operation 
in the Chinese main land and 
reduce the burden of logistics 
and Chinese engagement. 
The Close order infantry 
tactics: The tactics has been 
changed from the dual of a 
limited numbers of warrior’s 
cavalry warfare to the massive 
numbers of Ashigaru (Light 
infantry) combat. 
Long and Hard civil wars: a 
full of well-trained, motivated, 
and relatively well 
commanded force. 
Failed to stall the 
Japanese advance 
with the defensive 
geographic edge 
and committed the 
open space set 
piece battle with the 
Japanese. 
Seoul was quickly 
fallen to the 
Japanese and 
Joseon government 
fled to the North. 
Cholla  
Province  
Defence 
Campaign 
Started to defend the Japanese 
using natural barriers between 
Cholla and Gyeongsang 
Province, and use the 
cooperative defensive system 
and guerrilla warfare using the 
Korean peninsula geography. 
The morale and training factor 
of the Joseon forces has been 
raised because of the heavy 
fight with the Japanese 
The preponderance factor 
started to overcome following 
the massive organization of 
local militia. 
Started to suffer the logistic 
problem because of the Joseon 
militia and Navy’s effort. 
Joseon was 
successfully 
managed to defend 
Cholla province 
with the 
coordinated defence 
strategy using the 
geographic edge. 
The 
Japanese 
Second 
Invasion 
Returned to the old traditional 
defence strategy using the 
geographic edge: Castle on the 
hill coordinative defence 
strategy combining Scorched 
Earth tactics 
The introduction of Zhejiang 
tactics to deal with the 
Japanese close order infantry 
tactics 
The level of training and moral 
had risen during the inter war 
crisis. 
They planned to occupy 
Cholla province first and 
break down the Joseon navy 
so as not to suffer the logistic 
problem. 
They almost annihilated the 
Joseon Navy in Chilchollyang 
and occupied the Namwon 
which are strategically 
important place to occupy 
Cholla province. 
The Japanese army 
could not pacify 
Cholla province, 
nor could they 
advance North to 
occupy Seoul 
because of the 
mainly logistics 
problem caused by 
the rejuvenated 
Joseon Navy and 
Joseon’s castle on 
the hill coordinative 
defence strategy. 
Index 7-1 Joseon’s military transformation and its effect during the Imjin Wars  
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By examining the second case study of the Korean War, it was proved that: 1) Even though 
technological dominance became the major dimension of modern warfare, the defence 
strategy using the Korean peninsula geography was still important in the Korean peninsula; 2) 
The efficiency of modern technology in the Korean Peninsula would depend on the  
defender’s capability to use their geographic edge; 3) Once the capable defender holds on to 
the fortified position, military technology alone could not break down the defender’s line or 
would cost them too dearly.     
 
The battle of Chuncheon and the communist trench warfare during the stalemate showed that 
once the defender is skilled and motivated enough to use their geographic edge, technological 
dominance alone would not break down the stubborn enemy resistance. However, as one can 
see from the NKPA Western Front campaign in the initial phase of war, the Naktong River 
line defence campaign, and the UN forces’ ‘Marching North’ campaign, even under the 
geographic restraints, the efficiency and decisiveness of modern technology against the foe 
that is less skilled, motivated, and poorly commanded
668
was very impressive; as indicated in 
Biddle’s analysis of the first Gulf War and the later period of the Afghan Campaign. In 
addition, throughout case studies of the trench warfare, it was also shown that to overcome 
the resolute and skilled defender who holds the defensive line using the geographic edge, the 
offender would need more than a technological dominance. This was the ultimate claim of 
Biddle: that even in future warfare, skill will be as important as technology.
669
  
                                                          
668
During the North Korean campaign in the initial period of war, the ROK armed forces was 
relatively less skilled in the all-out war since they had to serve the anti-guerrilla missions in rear, and 
poorly commanded by headquarters who were relatively less experienced and politically appointed by 
the president.   
During the Naktong River line defence campaign, the NKPA had lost many highly experienced and 
trained troops following the consecutive battles and UN air raid to reach the line and were less 
motivated because of the poor supply and influx of locally conscripted soldiers. Kim Ilsung was also 
too anxious to finish war as early as possible and thus made several mistakes in this front. 
During the Marching North operation, because of the shock of the Inchon Landing Operation and 
combat weariness after several months of hard fighting, the NKPA fled to the North without good 
order and the UN force heavily punished the NKPA with their firepower.   
669
 During the battle of Heartbreak ridge, the better motivated (lure of joining communist party on 
military merit), trained, and commanded (the influx of re-educated officers) managed to prepare the 
stubborn defensive line using steep mountainous topography and foil the UN forces’ attempt to 
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  Type of Warfare Outcome and Strategic analysis  
The Battle of 
Chunchon and 
Communist Trench 
warfare during the 
stalemate  
Technologically advantageous 
offender vs geographically 
advantageous and capable (skilled 
and motivated) defender  
The success of stalling warfare 
(the battle of Chunchon) caused 
massive damage to the offender.  
For the impregnable position that 
has been fortified using the 
geographic edge and defended by 
the capable force, the offender 
requires more than a technology 
to overcome it.  
The NKPA 
western front 
campaign in the 
initial phase of 
war, UN force’s 
Marching North 
campaign.  
Technologically advantageous 
and capable offender vs 
geographically advantageous but 
not highly skilled and badly 
commanded defender 
The technological advantage of 
offender maximized and the 
defender was easily crumbled.  
The PVA 1-3
rd
 
offensive 
Highly skilled and strategically 
and tactically well-prepared 
offender vs  defenders who are 
technologically advantageous but 
are ignorant and looking down on 
the opponents 
The skill, and tactical and 
strategic preparation brought  the 
massive and instant success to the 
offender  
The PVA 4-6
th 
offensive in the 
UN forces front  
Highly skilled and strategically 
and tactically well-prepared 
offender vs technologically 
advantageous and skilful 
defenders who have good 
understanding of the offender’s 
strategy and tactics. 
The skill would not be an answer 
to the well-prepared 
technologically advanced 
defender. It led to the Chinese 
decision to enhance the fire and 
airpower before they launched 
another offensive and prepare the 
cease-fire talk to earn a time.    
Index 7-2 The Korean War and the relevance of geography, skill, and technology 
In the final chapter, by comparing the contemporary US military technology and North 
Korean fortification using geography and their skill to maximize its worth, it was shown that 
contemporary military technology alone would not guarantee ultimate military success 
against the North Koreans who have a geographic edge and tactical preparedness to use the 
edge. This chapter also confirms Biddle’s argument that once the resolute defender is skilled 
enough to use their edge (geography for the Al-Qaeda in the later stage of Afghan Campaign 
and North Korean in the possible conflict with the US-ROK alliance), contemporary military 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
occupy the ridge. However, once the UN forces planned the offensive much consideration of skill and 
command factors (night assault training and tank battalion manoeuvre, credible combat preparation 
and command) the impregnable trenches eventually collapsed with relatively less cost.  
281 
 
technology alone would not secure the ultimate military success which includes the 
acceptable cost and casualties.   
 
  Advantage Disadvantage 
The application to the     
Korean Peninsula  
NEPs  
Enough power to 
penetrate and blast 
HDBTs  
The ability to absorb 
the bio-chemical and 
nuclear agents 
Collateral Damage  
The suspicion on the 
absorbing capability on the 
bio-chemical and nuclear 
agents.  
Collateral damage and 
uncertainty of burning 
out capability would 
deter the US from 
applying these to the 
North Koreans  
The 
Conventional 
Bunker 
Blaster 
Less collateral damage  
Not enough penetrating 
power against the North 
Korean HDBTs 
Doubt on the absorbing 
capability on the bio-
chemical and nuclear 
agents.  
The most up to date 
technology’s 
penetration depth is 
certainly not enough 
to reach and destroy 
the most strategically 
important North 
Korean targets. 
Index 7-3 The contemporary military technology and North Korean HDBTs 
Human beings have developed military technology to save costs and casualties as well as to 
improve combat performance. Once the US started to comfortably lead this technology race 
with their technological and economical superiority, other countries and organizations started 
to look into different areas to enhance their combat potential. In this era, where the US 
dominance in technology and sustainability of war is obvious, the other countries and 
organization have not dared to confront them in a set piece battle or commit all-out war. 
Instead they have developed heterogeneous but effective ways of warfare to cope with the US 
dominance. North Korea has also pondered how to survive and raise their war potential. After 
North Korea realized that they were no longer able to compete with the US-ROK alliance in 
the arms race, they had no option but to develop new ways of warfare such as asymmetric 
warfare using WMDs and fortifications using the geographic edge to raise survivability. In 
other words, the US-ROK alliance has a task to overcome the North Korean defence strategy 
using their geographic edge. 
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In the Korean peninsula military history, the offender has challenged the defender’s defence 
strategy using the Korean peninsula’s geographic merit. During the Imjin Wars, the Japanese 
could obtain an easy sweeping victory against the Joseon force that did not fully use the 
traditional defence strategy in the initial period of war. However, once Joseon was ready to 
commit the traditional defence strategy in the second invasion, the Japanese tried to occupy 
Seoul via Cholla province which was relatively ill-prepared (manoeuvre). In the Korean War, 
the PVA tried to offset the defender’s edge in geography by the concentration of force and 
outflanking movement (manoeuvre) while the US troops tried to overcome the communist 
defence position with massive firepower (technology). Even in the contemporary Korean 
peninsula, the NKPA plans to overcome the ROK defence line by the infiltration of special 
forces and concentrated use of WMDs, while the US-ROK alliance is adopting a technology-
centred military strategy.
670
 This thesis, based on three case studies, suggests that it is a very 
dangerous idea for the US-ROK alliance to try to overcome the North Korean military 
strength and strategy using their geographic edge and the tactical preparedness with a 
technological edge alone. Therefore, this thesis can also support Biddle’s argument 
concerning skill and technology that, even in future wars, skill will be as important as 
military technology. Hence, to overcome stubborn and skilled opponents, the US and its 
western allies will require more than a technological advantage.  
 
Even though the US-ROK alliance strategy has been transformed to a technology-centred 
strategy, they have learned the importance of manoeuvre during the Korean War and past 
wars in the Korean peninsula. They have tried to improve manoeuvre warfare capability 
especially by improving the landing operation capability.
671
 But, there are risks of adopting 
                                                          
670 During the Korean War, the US-ROK alliance already learnt that the monotonous direct approach 
(technology centred) to the heavily fortified enemy defence position using the mountainous 
topography would bring either military disaster or costly success which is not desirable for them as 
well. Therefore, the US-ROK alliance has pursued advanced technology as the key element in 
breaking down the defence line.   
671
 The UN Inchon landing operation and the PVA 1
st
-2
nd
 offensives which adopted the mountainous 
manoeuvre using the crevice between the UN western Easter fronts completely turned the tide of war. 
Because the US-ROK alliance has a capability to land massive troops and ordinance and support the 
landed troops with their advantage in firepower, the landing operation is the preferred manoeuvre 
option for them.  
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manoeuvre warfare in the Korean peninsula. First, to implement manoeuvre warfare properly 
in a tough mountainous topography like the Korean peninsula, technological capability is 
very important. The troops need mobility and firepower to break through, and adequate 
supplies to keep their momentum. This was proven in the PVA offensives during the Korean 
War where the PVA failed to maximize their early breakthrough because of the supply 
problem. It will not be a great concern as the US-ROK alliance possesses the edge in 
technology. Secondly, even though the troops are well-equipped, the proper command, 
training, and high morale are also required to achieve the military objective through the 
manoeuvre warfare. The early success of NKPA manoeuvre warfare in the western front 
during the Korean War was achieved not only by their merit in technology but also by their 
high morale and combat skill. However, their early success was not fully exploited because of 
the poor command from headquarter (the decision to take the symbolic targets in Seoul rather 
than pursuing and annihilating the ROK main forces).  Finally, North Korea already noticed 
the US-ROK alliance’s intention of manoeuvre warfare to reduce cost and finish the war 
quickly, and has prepared tactics and strategies against the possible US-ROK alliance 
manoeuvre operation. The NKPA has raised the coastal defence warfare capability, as they 
also experienced the military debacle after the UN Inchon landing operation and the 
fortification of the frontal defence line. In a situation where the US-ROK alliance does not 
have a technological capability to neutralize strategically-important North Korean targets and 
cannot easily break down the NKPA with manoeuvre warfare, what would be the best 
approach to overcome the tough North Korean geography-centred defence? The answer can 
be found in previous wars. As one can see from the battle of Heartbreak, the US-ROK 
alliance must approach this matter comprehensively, as technology alone cannot break down 
the enemy without great cost.
672
 
 
                                                          
672  Technological dominance would bring the advantage in mobile and firepower and eventually 
enable the offender to wage manoeuvre warfare (tank troops’ manoeuvre in the Battle of Heart-break). 
Adequate command would solve the offender’s dilemma in the position warfare in the Korean 
peninsula which is that the offender’s manoeuvring space is quite limited; therefore the defender 
could concentrate their firepower (night assault and tank troops’ manoeuvre plan in the Battle of 
Heartbreak). 
Sound training and morale would maximize the advantage in technology and command (night assault 
and tank troops’ manoeuvre was possible because of the engineering troops endeavour to refurbish the 
road for the tank use and 2
nd
 battalion of 23
rd
 regiment’s hard night combat training. 
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